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This thesis is positioned in light of the increasing importance of intangible assets to 
firms in today’s economies.  The emergence of the knowledge-based economy has led 
to a shift towards the creation and management of knowledge assets; assets which are 
now widely acknowledged as a key driver of firm innovation and growth. 
Accordingly, there is an increasing need for firms to become concerned with strategies 
relating to intangible assets. 
Based upon firm-level data taken from the UK Community Innovation Surveys and 
the Business Structure Database, this thesis is comprised of three empirical chapters.  
Each of these chapters uses quantitative analysis which is econometric in nature to 
examine firms’ intangibles strategies from different perspectives. 
Using a series of probit and ordered-probit models, the first study examines a firm’s 
intangibles investment and protection behaviour, exploring how the industry 
appropriability regime and other elements of industry structure influence firm 
decisions.  The study contributes to knowledge by seeking to identify whether the 
industry appropriability regime or some other element of industry structure drives a 
firm’s intangibles strategy.  In addition, the analysis explores whether the effects are 
consistent across the different components of a firm’s intangibles strategy.  Results 
suggest that both the industry appropriability regime and industry structure influence 
a firm’s intangibles investment behaviour and the importance a firm attaches to 
different knowledge-protection mechanisms.  In contrast, industry structure is less 
important for a firm’s actual protection decisions, and a stronger appropriability 
regime is found to have a positive effect on a firm’s use of easier-to-implement 
protection mechanisms. 
The second study uses Tobit-model regressions to examine how the strength of the 
industry appropriability regime influences the complexity and variability of firms’ 
knowledge-protection strategies within an industry.  The analysis adds to existing 
knowledge by taking a holistic view of knowledge protection and examining how the 
strength of the industry appropriability regime impacts upon firms’ knowledge-
protection choices within an industry.  Results suggest that both the complexity and 
variability of firms’ knowledge-protection strategies increase when the knowledge-
protection dimension of the industry appropriability regime strengthens.  Moreover, 
results further suggest that the magnitude of the effect on complexity and variability 
varies across different industries. 
In the third study, an innovation production function is estimated using a fractional-
response model to investigate the relationship between a firm’s innovation 
performance and its orientation towards the use of formal and informal knowledge-
protection mechanisms.  The analysis builds upon the existing knowledge-protection 
literature by using data on firms’ actual use of formal and informal knowledge-
protection mechanisms.  In addition, the study contributes towards existing knowledge 
by exploring the effects of both formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies 
on the returns to innovation in firms of different sizes, firms with different 
technologies, firms in different sectors and firms innovating with different degrees of 
novelty.  Results suggest that in general, both formal and informal knowledge-
protection strategies are important for firms’ innovation returns.  Furthermore, 
industrial context, firm size and the degree of novelty of an innovation are all found 
to affect the magnitude of the impact upon a firm’s innovation returns.  
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1.1 Research background 
In recent years, the emergence of the knowledge-based economy has resulted in a 
significant shift in the origins of most companies’ value and sources of revenue; for 
most firms, intangible assets have overtaken tangible assets as the dominant driver of 
value creation.  It is now widely acknowledged that intangible assets are a key driver 
of innovation and organisational value in research and development (R&D) 
organisations (Del Canto and Gonzalez, 1999; Bounfour, 2003), generating more 
value for firms than physical assets (Thurow, 1997).  The recognition that intangible 
assets are a key driver of growth (Montresor et al., 2014) and that innovation stems 
from knowledge (Roper et al., 2016a) has led to a shift within firms towards the 
creation and management of knowledge assets.  As a result, many advanced national 
economies driven by tangible assets have been transformed towards more 
knowledge-based economies based on investment in intangible assets. 
Intangible assets are assets that do not have a physical or financial embodiment.  
They have a difficult to codify ‘tacit dimension’ (Teece, 1981) – knowledge or 
competences are embedded in processes, procedures, routines and structures.  
Intangible assets include intellectual property, such as trademarks and patents, as 
well as brand and company reputation, company networks and databases 
(Hall, 1992).  Also referred to as knowledge assets or intellectual assets, these assets 
are generally classified into three groups (OECD, 2011): computerised information 
(for example, software and databases); innovative property (for example, R&D, 
copyrights, designs, trademarks); and economic competencies (for example, brand 
equity, firm-specific human capital, networks joining people and institutions, 
organisational know-how that increases enterprise efficiency and aspects of 
advertising and marketing).  Together, these groups form part of a firm’s intellectual 
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capital1.  Interpreted broadly, ‘intangibles’ can be related to brands, process or 
product innovations, advertising, managerial skill, human capital in the workforce, 
and other aspects of the firm.  Although balance-sheet data do, at times, contain a 
book (accounting) value for intangible assets, there is widespread agreement that this 
vastly underestimates the true stock of intangible assets of most firms. 
The value of intangible assets lies in their ability to generate revenue for a firm.  For 
example, goodwill (the value of a business in excess of its owner’s equity – for 
example, favourable location and community awareness) and brand recognition are 
intangible assets which allow people to remember a company and want to buy its 
products.  Superior profits stem from intangible assets such as know-how, customer 
relationships, brands and superior business processes (Teece, 1998), and by 
combining intangible assets with complementary intangible and tangible assets, a 
firm can gain further value.  Thus, the ownership and/or control of complementary 
assets helps promote competitive success (Teece, 1986). 
The competitive advantage of a firm lies in its ability to create, transfer, assemble, 
integrate, exploit and protect difficult-to-imitate non-tradable assets, of which 
knowledge assets are the most important (Teece, 1998, 2000a).  Knowledge is 
fundamental to competitive advantage (Thurow, 1997; Blumentritt and Johnston, 
1999) and intangible assets are fundamental to sustained competitiveness and 
performance (Seeman et. al., 2000).  Aaker (1989) identifies the route to sustainable 
competitive advantage as being a process of managing assets and skills.  A firm’s 
strategies, including those of intangibles, are developed with the long-term aim of 
achieving a competitive advantage.  The fundamental shift which has taken place in 
the basis for competitive advantage has immense implications for firm strategy, 
organisation, and management education (Teece, 2011). 
                                                          
1 Intellectual capital is comprised of human, structural and social capital (Edvinsson, 1997; Edvinsson 
and Malone, 1997).  Human capital is the knowledge, skills and experiences that individual 
employees possess. Structural capital is everything that remains in a firm once its employees are 
removed.  It includes the explicit, rule-based knowledge embedded in the firm’s work processes and 
systems, or encoded in written policies, training documentation, or shared data bases of “best 
practices.”  It also includes intellectual property, protected by patents and copyrights. Social capital is 
reflected in the ability of groups to collaborate and work together and is a function of trust.  Effective 
networks of relationships characterised by high levels of trust are a valuable resource in the creation 
and use of knowledge. 
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Given the recognised link which exists between intangible assets and firm growth, 
the strategic management of intangible assets – and in particular the management of 
knowledge (Blumentritt and Johnston, 1999) – is of vital importance.  A firm’s 
intangible assets are shaped when they undertake investment and protect knowledge 
embedded within their innovations.  Investment into intangible assets is increasingly 
becoming the largest form of firm investment due to its contribution to growth 
(OECD, 2013).  During recent times, the growth of investment into intangibles has 
exceeded that of tangibles.  In the United Kingdom (UK) for example, the growth of 
investment into intangibles more than doubled as a share of market-sector gross 
value added during the 1970 to 2004 period (OECD, 2011).  Today, many 
knowledge-based companies possess little tangible capital; their asset base consists 
almost entirely of intangible assets, assets which are increasingly being regarded as 
‘a new source of growth’ (OECD, 2011). 
In light of the increasing importance of intangible assets, there is a need for firms to 
fully recognise the importance of such assets and to be increasingly concerned with 
the strategy relating to them, “What must matter most to businesses is the fact that, 
globally speaking, over 65 per cent of most companies’ value, sources of revenue 
and building blocks for future growth, sustainability and profitability evolves 
directly from intangible assets.” (Maguire and Moberly, 2013, p. 86). 
1.2 Existing literature 
The existing literature surrounding intangible assets largely focuses upon their effect 
on economic performance.  Some authors examine how intangible-asset investment 
affects organisational performance (for example, Ballot et al., 2001; De and 
Dutta, 2007; Marrocu et al., 2011), while others examine the performance effects of 
protecting intangible assets (for example, Falvey et al., 2006; Andries and Faems, 
2013; Hu and Png, 2013).  Contributions concerning those factors which influence a 
firm’s intangibles strategy and the links between intangibles, innovation and 
performance are less common.  Of the studies which do provide evidence of the link 
between intangible assets, innovation and growth, some show skills and talents 
(leadership and people management, for example), attributes that constitute 
intangible assets, to be enablers of innovation and exporting (Leiponen, 2005 and 
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Freel, 2005, for example), while others provide evidence on the link between design 
investment and innovative activity (Cereda et al., 2005, for example), and the 
increasing design intensity of a wide range of products has strengthened this link 
(Verganti, 2009).  In addition, leadership and leadership style have been identified as 
important factors which shape innovation (Vaccaro et al., 2012).  In another study, 
Andrews and de Serres (2012) find that intangible assets such as employee skills, 
databases, design, organisational know-how, brands and various forms of intellectual 
property form the basis for innovation-based growth.   
Innovation – the application of knowledge to change or create more effective 
processes, products and ideas – is translated into economic growth through a greater 
variety of better-quality products and more effective processes.  In the long term, the 
majority of economic growth is due to innovation (Innovation Report, 2014).  
Innovation involves risk; it is expensive and time consuming to develop new ideas 
and translate these ideas into a product or process.  In addition, the probability of 
failure is high.  Innovating firms are faced with a risk of imitation by both existing 
competitors and new competitors attracted into the market by the existence of high 
returns (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009).  In the face of imitation, an innovating 
firm’s competitive advantage may be eroded, and without an expectation of profiting 
from an innovation and a monopolistic power over an innovation, firms will be 
discouraged from investing in innovative activities – there will be no incentive to 
innovate (Schumpeter, 1942).  This appropriability problem (Arrow, 1962) has 
implications for both firm performance and survival (Ceccagnoli and Rothaermel, 
2008), so that firms face the key strategic challenge of protecting returns to 
innovation.  Through the use of protection mechanisms, firms increase their chances 
of securing a return on their investment.  Protecting the returns to innovation helps 
firms sustain any competitive advantage which exists and, in turn, may stimulate 
further innovation.  Knowledge protection adds value to business and gives firms a 
greater chance of surviving and flourishing.  In support of this viewpoint, evidence 
shows that industries with an above-average use of intellectual property protection 
generated over a quarter of UK employment and almost 40 per cent of UK Gross 




1.2.1 Intangibles strategy 
A firm’s management of its knowledge assets – its intangibles strategy – is an 
important determinant of whether or not the firm is able to successfully appropriate 
the returns to its innovation.  An intangibles strategy includes the formulation and 
execution of strategies relating to the investment into and the creation of intangible 
assets, and the protection of intangible assets in order to protect any income streams 
which flow from them.  A firm makes decisions on the investment into and the 
protection of its intangible assets, and the combination of these decisions represents 
its intangibles strategy. 
The most common way for a firm to develop intangible assets is to invest in R&D 
(Teece, 2011).  The majority of the literature identifying the determinants of R&D, 
one significant form of intangibles investment, focuses on two types of factors 
(Barge-Gil and Lopez, 2014).  The first adopts a Schumpeterian view, focusing on 
the effects of firm size and market power.  The second includes more fundamental, 
industry-specific determinants of inter-industry R&D investment such as demand 
pull, technological opportunities and appropriability.  In addition to investing in 
R&D, a firm may develop intangible assets by investing in other areas of the 
business, such as training and computer software, for example. 
Many authors identify factors which affect a firm’s strategy relating to the protection 
of intangibles.  Protection strategy differs across product and process innovations 
(Levin et al., 1987; Granstrand, 1999), industrial sectors (Levin et al., 1987; Harabi, 
1995), the stage of innovation i.e. where in the innovation value chain the firm is 
located (Thomas, 2003), firm size (Kitching and Blackburn, 2003), the level of R&D 
intensity (Leiponen and Byma, 2009), the availability, strength and efficiency of 
appropriability mechanisms (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 2007a) and 
the degree of innovativeness (Thoma and Bizer, 2013).  In one study, Olander et al. 
(2014) identify the availability of protection, the safety or manageability of 
collaboration and the inconvenience of protection as factors affecting a firm’s 
knowledge-protection decisions, and  Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) find that 
industry-level patterns determine a firm’s legal appropriability rather than firm 
managers who have limited opportunity to do so. 
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1.3 Research aims and objectives 
Following this brief introductory chapter, this thesis is divided into three empirical 
chapters to provide an investigation into firms’ intangibles strategies and the 
implications for innovation performance.  The thesis asks:   
 How a firm’s intangibles strategy (the investment into and the protection of 
intangible assets) is influenced by the industry appropriability regime and 
industry structure 
 How the complexity and variability of firms’ knowledge-protection strategies 
within an industry are influenced by the industry appropriability regime 
 How a firm’s returns to innovation are influenced by its knowledge-
protection strategy 
The thesis aims to contribute towards the understanding of the relationship between 
particular aspects of the industry environment and a firm’s intangibles strategy at 
both the firm level and the industry level, and in addition, it aims to contribute 
towards the understanding of the relationship between a firm’s intangibles-protection 
strategy and the returns to innovation. 
1.3.1 Methodology 
The three empirical chapters address the research questions using quantitative 
analysis which is econometric in nature.  The Econometrics Society defines 
econometrics as ‘economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics’ and its 
object as the ‘unification of the theoretical-quantitative and the empirical-
quantitative approach to economic problems’ (cited by Frisch, 1933).  The statistical 
analysis undertaken in the three empirical chapters of this thesis attempts to link 
variables and test theories or hypotheses.  A central question in the philosophy of 
science concerns the relationship between empirical evidence and theoretical 
understanding; econometrics belongs to the evidence side of this relationship.  
Econometricians are positivists attempting to find the source of knowledge in either 
logical deductions or in empirical observation (Hoover, 2005).   
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The quantitative analysis undertaken in the three empirical chapters is based upon 
five waves of the UK Community Innovation Survey (CIS) covering the period 2002 
to 2012 (CIS 4 to CIS 8) and data from the Business Structure Database (BSD) 
covering the period 1997 to 2012. 
The first data source, the CIS, is the main source of innovation data in the UK and 
Europe.  Background information and motivation for the survey can be found in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Oslo Manual 
(OECD, 2005).  CIS-type data are widely used in academic papers concerned with 
explaining firms’ innovation activities and performances (for example, Frenza and 
Ietto-Gillies, 2009; Battisti and Stoneman, 2010; Becker et al., 2016).  The UK CIS, 
the UK counterpart of the European Union (EU) Community Innovation Survey, is 
conducted every two years by means of a postal questionnaire and follow-up 
telephone interviews.  The surveys are non-compulsory and, for the waves analysed 
here, achieved a response rate ranging between 51 per cent in 2012 (CIS 8) and 58 
per cent in 2004 (CIS 4)2.  The UK surveys provide detailed information on firms' 
innovation activity, an indication of the objectives of firms' innovation activity and 
their external innovation connections.  Questions relating to firm size and structure, 
customer base, firm product and process innovation activity, the sources of 
innovation, perceived barriers to innovation, the levels of public support and basic 
economic information about the firm are included.  The surveys contain up to 16,000 
firms (approximately), each having 10 or more employees.  The firms included are 
statistically representative of the 12 regions of the UK, most industrial sectors and all 
sizes of firms (with 10 or more employees).  The sampling frame is taken from the 
Inter-departmental Business Register (IDBR), a UK-Government compiled register 
of all UK businesses based on tax and payroll records. 
The second data source used in the quantitative analysis is the BSD.  This is derived 
primarily from the IDBR, which is a live register of data collected by Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs via Value Added Tax (VAT) and Pay As You Earn (PAYE) 
records.  In 2004, it was estimated that businesses listed on the IDBR accounted for 
almost 99 per cent of economic activity in the UK.  Only very small businesses, such 
as the self-employed, are not listed.  The BSD represents the IDBR at one particular 
                                                          
2 See: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/community-innovation-survey   
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moment in time and provides a version of the IDBR for research use.  The reporting 
period is the financial year, and there are up to approximately 5.5 million firms 
included.  The dataset contains a small number of variables for almost all UK firms, 
and these include employment, turnover, foreign ownership, Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes, start-up dates and termination dates. 
An advantage of using survey research as the strategy of enquiry (Creswell, 2009) is 
that it is efficient at providing large amounts of data.  The research generalises from 
a sample to a population (Babbie, 1990), and allows inferences to be made about the 
characteristics and behaviour of firms. 
The empirical approaches adopted in each study reflect the nature of the dependent 
variables being investigated.  Regression methods are used to test the hypotheses in 
all three empirical chapters.   In Chapter 2, two different types of model are 
estimated.  The first – a probit model – is used to analyse firms’ intangibles 
investment and protection, and the second – an ordered-probit model – is used to 
analyse managerial attitudes towards intangibles protection.  The ordered-probit 
estimation method is a generalisation of the probit analysis to the case where more 
than two outcomes of an ordinal dependent variable exist.  In Chapter 3, a series of 
Tobit models (censored-regression models) are estimated to examine the complexity 
and variability of firms’ knowledge-protection strategies within an industry, and in 
Chapter 4, generalised linear models are used to estimate an innovation-production 
function with the proportion of innovative sales as the dependent variable. 
1.3.2 Empirical chapters 
i. The industry appropriability regime, industry structure and a firm’s 
intangibles strategy 
Chapter 2 links a firm’s intangibles-investment and intangibles-protection decisions 
to the industry environment within which the firm operates.  The motivation for this 
firm-level study originates from the increasing importance of intangible assets in 
today’s economies and the industrial organisation (IO) viewpoint that a firm’s 
appropriate strategy decisions depend strongly on the environment of the industry in 
which the firm operates (Scott, 1982). 
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The emergence of the knowledge-based economy has led to an increase in intangible 
investment, such that, in recent years, intangible investment has risen above that of 
tangibles (Haskel et al., 2011).  Intangible assets reflect value in a firm, and the 
strategy relating to them has important implications for competitive advantage.  
Creating a competitive advantage based upon knowledge is a challenging prospect 
for firms as the benefits of producing new knowledge spill over to competitors and 
create an appropriability problem (Arrow, 1962).  As a solution to this problem, a 
firm’s intangibles strategy not only includes investment into intangible assets but 
also includes the protection of knowledge and creative outputs through the use of 
knowledge-protection mechanisms.   
In Chapter 2, the source of a firm’s competitive advantage is assumed to lie within 
the industry environment (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Thompson, 1967), so that a firm’s appropriate strategy decisions depend strongly on 
the market environment in which the firm operates (Scott, 1982).  In light of this, the 
empirical analysis undertaken in this study investigates how the industry 
environment influences a firm’s strategy in relation to its intangible assets.  In 
particular, this study seeks to explore whether a firm's intangibles strategy is 
contingent upon the appropriability regime of the industry within which the firm 
operates or some other element of industry structure. 
Chapter 2 advances existing research by examining how the industry appropriability 
regime and other elements of industry structure influence the investment and 
protection components of a firm’s intangibles strategy.  The study contributes to 
knowledge by seeking to identify whether the industry appropriability regime or 
some other element of industry structure drives a firm’s intangibles strategy.  In 
addition, the study contributes to knowledge by identifying whether the industry-
appropriability-regime effects and the industry-structure effects are consistent across 
a firm’s intangibles investment and protection strategies. 
ii. Appropriability regimes and the complexity and variability of knowledge-
protection strategies within industries 
In Chapter 2 it is proposed that elements of the industry environment – common to 
all firms within a particular industry – affect firms’ intangibles investment and 
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protection strategies.  Indeed, existing literature identifies that firms’ knowledge-
protection strategies differ markedly across industrial sectors.  For example, Arundel 
and Kabla (1998) find that the effectiveness of patents in preventing imitation varies 
across industries, Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999) find that firms in high-
technology industries are more likely to use patents and Miles and Boden (2000) 
make a distinction between the service and manufacturing industries.  Leading on 
from this, Chapter 3 provides an in-depth analysis of firms’ knowledge-protection 
strategies within industries.  All firms within a given industry operate subject to the 
same industry environment, yet firms within an industry make different knowledge-
protection choices.  Firms are characterised by their resources and capabilities, and it 
is the heterogeneous nature of firm-specific resources and capabilities which gives 
rise to the variation in firms’ knowledge-protection choices within industries. 
Given the heterogeneous nature of resources and capabilities across firms within an 
industry, the analysis in Chapter 3 examines how the distribution of knowledge-
protection strategies within industries is influenced by the industry appropriability 
regime.  Chapter 3 advances the existing field by examining firms’ knowledge-
protection strategies within industries.  It investigates how firms’ knowledge-
protection strategies within industries respond to changing appropriability 
conditions.  In order to examine intra-industry knowledge-protection strategies, the 
study adopts a novel (to my knowledge) approach.  It examines how the strength of 
the industry appropriability regime affects the distribution characteristics of firms’ 
knowledge-protection strategies within industries: it examines how a change in the 
strength of the industry appropriability regime affects the complexity (or average 
intensity) of firms’ knowledge-protection strategies and the variability of firms’ 
knowledge-protection strategies within industries.  In addition, the analysis is further 
extended to compare the effects across different industries, in particular high-
technology/knowledge-intensive industries and low-technology/less knowledge-
intensive industries. 
iii. Formal versus informal knowledge protection: which matters most for 
innovation returns? 
Following on from Chapter 3 which examines firms’ knowledge-protection 
strategies within industries, Chapter 4 examines firms’ knowledge-protection 
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strategies in more detail and explores how firms’ formal and informal  strategies help 
capture the returns to firm innovation.  Formal knowledge-protection mechanisms, 
for example patents, are those implemented through regulation.  They become 
effective by legally excluding imitators (Hall, 1992).  Informal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms, for example secrecy, are not based upon structures and statutory-
enforcement possibilities (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2014). 
Chapter 4 contributes to existing knowledge by examining how formal knowledge- 
protection strategies and informal knowledge-protection strategies affect firms’ 
innovation returns.  In this firm-level study, an innovation production function is 
estimated to investigate the relationship between a firm’s orientation towards formal 
knowledge-protection, and its orientation towards informal knowledge-protection, 
and innovation performance.  A comprehensive analysis is carried out: first, all 
innovating firms are examined, second, different industries, technologies and 
sizebands are compared, and third, firms undertaking new-to-the-market, new-to-the-
firm and both new-to-the-market-and-firm innovations are compared with one 
another.  As an extension to the analysis, firms undertaking new-to-the-market 
innovation are further explored.  The effects of formal and informal knowledge-
protection strategies on the returns to innovation of firms of different sizes, firms 
with different technologies and firms in different sectors within this sub-group of 
innovators are examined.  Initially, an exploratory factor analysis of knowledge-
protection data identifies two factors – one loaded more heavily with formal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms and another loaded more heavily with informal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms.  The two identified factors are used in the 
analysis to represent formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies. 
The final chapter of the thesis – Chapter 5 – provides some discussion and 
conclusions.  It summarises the key research findings from the three individual 
empirical chapters, highlights important contributions to knowledge and discusses 







The industry appropriability regime, industry structure and a 
firm’s intangibles strategy 
2.1 Introduction 
Until recently, measured investments were all tangible; assets were thought to be 
things that could be touched (Haskel and Westlake, 2018).  However, present-day 
economies rely more and more upon other non-physical, intangible assets containing 
knowledge and ideas – they are unable to survive on tangible investment alone. 
Since the early 2000s, investment into intangible assets in the United Kingdom (UK) 
has been greater than that for tangible assets (Haskel et al., 2011).  In 2008, 
intangible investment was £137 billion compared with £104 billion for tangible 
investment.  Of this intangible investment, training accounted for £27 billion, 
organisational capital £31 billion, design £23 billion, software £22 billion and 
research and development (R&D) £16 billion (Haskel et al., 2011).   
The reasons for the transition towards intangible investment provide policymakers 
with an improved understanding of firm innovation and growth (Haskel and 
Westlake, 2018).  Intangible assets such as design, software and R&D are more 
labour dependent than tangible assets – designers and software developers have to be 
paid, as do scientists.  The new technologies that have emerged during recent years – 
for example, information technology (IT) technologies – have increased firms’ 
opportunities to invest in intangible assets so that intangible investment has risen 
above that of tangibles.  Changes in industrial structure have also contributed 
towards the growth in firms’ intangible investment.  Both the services and 
manufacturing sectors have become more intangible intensive, for example, leading 
to an increase in intangible investment (Haskel and Westlake, 2018).  
Firms continually create and use intangible assets – for example, the creation of a 
firm name or the design of the physical attributes of a product.  As intangible assets 
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can be used to reflect value in a firm, the strategy relating to such assets requires a 
firm’s careful thought and attention.   
Creating and maintaining a competitive advantage based upon knowledge is a 
challenging prospect for firms as the benefits of producing new knowledge spill over 
to competitors and create an appropriability problem (Arrow, 1962).  As a solution to 
this problem, a firm’s intangibles strategy not only includes investment into 
intangible assets but also includes the protection of knowledge and creative outputs 
through the use of knowledge-protection mechanisms.  Intangibles strategy – the 
formulation and execution of strategies relating to the investment into and the 
creation of intangible assets (for example, through R&D activities), and the 
protection of intangible assets (for example, through the use of patents), is the focus 
of this study. 
In the pursuit of a competitive-advantage attaining intangibles strategy, a firm is 
required to know the source of the competitive advantage.  Within the literature, two 
prominent views have emerged relating to this source – industrial organisation (IO) 
theory and the resource-based view (RBV) theory.  The first – IO theory – identifies 
the industry environment (structural forces and the competitive environment, for 
example) as a potential source (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967; Thompson, 1967), and the second – the RBV theory of strategic management 
– identifies a firm’s internal resources and capabilities as a potential source of 
competitive advantage (Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984).   
The focus of the present study lies with the IO viewpoint assuming that a firm’s 
appropriate strategy decisions depend strongly on the market environment in which 
the firm operates (Scott, 1982).  The empirical analysis undertaken here investigates 
how the industry environment influences a firm’s strategy in relation to its intangible 
assets.  In particular, this study seeks to explore whether a firm's intangibles strategy 
is contingent upon the appropriability regime of the industry within which the firm 
operates or some other element of industry structure. 
The industry appropriability regime is the environmental factors a firm faces 
(excluding firm and industry structure) which govern its ability to capture profits 
from an innovation (Teece, 1986).  The most important dimensions of the 
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appropriability regime are the nature of the industry’s technology and the effective 
and available means of intellectual property (IP) protection within the industry to 
protect both the innovations themselves and any increased rents that flow from them 
(Teece, 1986, 1998, 2000a; Levin et al., 1987; Teece and Pisano, 1998).  As the 
expected returns to innovation are high when appropriability is strong, the empirical 
analysis explores whether innovative activity (investment into R&D, for example) 
within firms is more likely in the presence of a strong industry appropriability 
regime.  In addition, the analysis investigates how a firm’s intangibles-protection 
strategy responds when the industry appropriability regime changes in strength. 
Industry structure also plays a central part in determining strategy and the strategies 
available to firms (Teece et al., 1997).  The empirical analysis here draws upon the 
IO viewpoint (Porter, 1980) identifying the state of competition within a firm’s 
environment as being an important determinant of a firm’s value-creating intangibles 
strategy.  The empirical analysis investigates how a change in industry competition 
affects a firm’s intangibles investment and protection decisions. 
The existing literature surrounding intangible assets largely focuses upon the impact 
they have on economic performance.  Some authors examine the link between a 
firm’s investment into intangible assets and firm performance (for example, Ballot et 
al., 2001; De and Dutta, 2007; Marrocu et al., 2011), while others examine the 
performance effects of protecting intangible assets (for example, Falvey et al., 2006; 
Andries and Faems, 2013; Hu and Png, 2013).  Contributions concerning the 
industry environment and its impact on the different elements of a firm’s intangibles 
strategy are less prominent. 
The present study advances existing research by examining how the industry 
appropriability regime and other elements of industry structure influence the 
investment and protection elements of a firm’s intangibles strategy.  This study adds 
to previous work by seeking to identify whether it is the industry appropriability 
regime or some other element of industry structure which drives a firm’s intangibles 
strategy.  In addition, the study adds to existing research by identifying whether the 
effects of the industry appropriability regime and other elements of industry structure 
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are consistent across the two different aspects of a firm’s intangibles strategy – 
investment and protection.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows.  Section 2.2 outlines the 
conceptual framework.  Firstly, two prominent views on the source of a firm’s 
competitive advantage are discussed.  The first – IO theory – identifies the 
environment (i.e. the structural forces that exist within an industry and the 
competitive environment) as the potential source of competitive advantage.  The 
second – the RBV theory of strategic management – identifies a firm’s internal 
resources and capabilities as the potential source.  Secondly, the appropriability 
regime and the structural factors which exist within an industry’s environment – both 
the focus of this study – are discussed in more detail.  Finally in this section, 
intangibles strategy and the issues surrounding intangibles strategy are discussed.  
Section 2.3 details the conceptual model and develops a number of hypotheses, 
Section 2.4 profiles the data used and the empirical approach adopted, Section 2.5 
describes the main empirical results, and Section 2.6 includes discussion and 
conclusions. 
2.2 Conceptual framework 
2.2.1 Competitive advantage 
Competitive advantage is considered to be the basis for superior firm performance 
(Omalaja and Eruola, 2011).  A firm is able to gain a competitive advantage by 
implementing a value-creating strategy not being simultaneously implemented by 
any current or potential competitor (Barney, 1991).  If a firm’s competitive 
advantage remains in place following unsuccessful imitation by competitors, the 
advantage is considered to be sustained (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982).  A firm with a 
competitive advantage is able to achieve a superior performance relative to other 
competing firms within the same industry group or relative to the industry average.  
The competitive advantage arises when the firm is able to offer consumers greater 
value than other firms.  It can do this by either charging lower prices than other firms 
or by providing consumers with a greater benefit than other firms, justifying higher 
prices.  Porter (1985) identified that a "Competitive advantage grows fundamentally 
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from the value a firm is able to create ... Value is what buyers are willing to pay, and 
superior value stems from offering lower prices than competitors for equivalent 
benefits or providing unique benefits that more than offset higher prices," (Porter, 
1985, p 3).   
Firms aim to make decisions and implement strategies which allow them to develop 
and sustain a competitive advantage (Hill and Jones, 2013); they aim to implement 
value-creating strategies.  However, in order to succeed in this, firms require an 
understanding of the causes of competitive advantage or the source of the advantage 
upon which its strategies are to be based.  The organisational processes by which 
firm strategies are developed provide an insight into firms’ understanding of 
competitive advantage and into where they believe the true source of the advantage 
lies.  Within the literature, two prominent views regarding the source of competitive 
advantage have emerged.  The first – IO theory – identifies the industry environment 
or the structural forces and competitive environment within the industry as the 
potential source.  Porter (1991) highlights four elements of a firm’s immediate 
environment that have the strongest influence upon firms’ competitive advantage: 
factor conditions (available labour and capital, for example), demand conditions (the 
size and nature of the customer base), related and supporting industries (upstream 
and downstream industries), and firm strategy, structure and rivalry (competition 
forces firms to find new ways to increase production).  The second – the RBV theory 
– identifies a firm’s internal resources and capabilities as the potential source.  The 
RBV theory emphasises strategic choice, with firm managers identifying, developing 
and positioning key resources in order to maximise returns (Fahy, 2000). 
2.2.1.1 The source of competitive advantage 
i. Industrial organisation (IO) theory  
IO theory identifies the industry environment as a potential source of a firm’s 
competitive advantage.  In their seminal work, Burns and Stalker (1961) were the 
first to introduce the idea that a firm is an open system and affected by its 
environment; they uncover the environment’s impact upon a firm’s internal 
structure.  Their study examines firms that, following the war, are faced with having 
to adapt their business strategies to changes in technologies and markets.  Some 
firms are able to adapt, others fail.  Two distinct groups of firms emerge from their 
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results; firms that adapt successfully and are innovative and firms that are 
unsuccessful in adapting to new conditions.  Those firms that successfully adapt and 
are able to operate in a dynamic and uncertain environment show a more ‘organic’ 
organisational structure (for example, individual tasks within the firm are adjusted 
and continually re-defined through interaction with others).  It is this ‘organic’ 
system which Burns and Stalker (1961) find to be closely linked to success in 
innovative activity.  Those firms that are unable to adapt, preferring a more stable 
environment, exhibit a more ‘mechanistic’ organisational structure (for example, 
individual tasks within the firm are defined and coordinated by a formal hierarchy of 
superiors) (Meadows, 1977). 
Following on from Burns and Stalker (1961), Thompson (1967) views firms as being 
open systems that are faced with technologies and environments of varying levels of 
uncertainty, and it is these uncertainties which limit a firm’s ability to plan and 
execute strategies in order to achieve a desired outcome.  Observed firm behaviour 
therefore reflects a firm’s efforts to resolve the tension between uncertainty and firm 
rationality (Davis and Powell, 1992).  Through their work, Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1967) measure a ‘formality of structure’ variable and find a positive correlation 
between environmental uncertainty and the formality of structure in the management 
of firms’ departments.  They suggest that different styles of organisation are 
observed across different departments within a firm (for example, R&D and 
manufacturing departments), and that these different styles depend upon the 
characteristics of the environment with which they are associated. 
These three studies combined (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Thompson, 1967; Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1967) provide the foundations of contingency theory.  Contingency 
theory recognises the need for firms to thoroughly investigate their external 
environment when formulating internal structures (Nilsson and Rapp, 2005) so that 
observed firm structures match contingent environmental conditions 
(Burns and Stalker, 1961).  In light of this, a change in a firm’s external environment 
(for example, a new technology), may cause the firm to act differently so that best 
practices depend upon the contingencies of the situation.  The essence of 
contingency theory is that firm performance is linked to the firm’s ability to ‘fit’ the 
characteristics of its structure to the contingencies that it faces (Burns and Stalker, 
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1961), and it is this link with performance which motivates firms to adjust to 
changing environmental conditions.  As the degree of ‘fit’ between strategy and the 
environment (Hofer, 1975; Prescott, 1986), or strategy and structure (Chandler, 
1962; Rumelt, 1974), has significant implications for performance, contingency has 
emerged as an important concept in both strategic management and organisational 
research (Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990).  Hofer (1975) develops a contingency 
theory of firm strategy in which strategically-significant environmental and 
organisational variables include economic conditions, demographic trends, political 
and legal factors, industry structure variables and competitor variables.  
Operationally, firms are required to find a match between the environment and their 
strategies. 
Strategic management researchers draw upon contingency theory, conceptualising 
the environment as a key variable for understanding organisational behaviour and 
performance.  The structure-conduct-performance paradigm of IO (Mason, 1949; 
Bain, 1959) is one approach to modelling the environment.  It emphasises the 
influence industry structure has, or the environment (contingency variable) has, upon 
firm strategy (conduct).  The theory makes the simplifying assumption that firms’ 
strategically-relevant resources are identical (Scherer, 1980; Porter, 1981; Rumelt, 
1984), and also assumes that resources are mobile so that any resource heterogeneity 
present is short lived (Barney, 1986). 
Porter (1980) bases his five-forces framework on the structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm in industrial organisational economics. Porter (1980) identifies five 
competitive forces which exist within industry structure that may affect firm 
strategy: the threat of new entrants into the industry, the intensity of rivalry among 
existing competitors, the pressure from producers of substitute products or services, 
the bargaining power of buyers of the industry's outputs and the bargaining power of 
suppliers to the industry's companies.  Within an industry, firms aim to position 
themselves in such a way so as to defend themselves against these competitive forces 
(Porter, 1979); they find ways to sustain their existence within the industry and to 
increase their own competitiveness.  The firm most successfully matching its 
strategy with the competitive forces that are present is most likely to achieve a 
competitive advantage.  Therefore, a strategy aligned with market and industry 
19 
 
conditions is the source of the competitive advantage.  This so-called ‘competitive 
forces’ theory was the dominant approach to achieving competitive advantage during 
the 1980s. 
Porter’s (1980) five-forces framework – a framework which draws upon the 
structure-conduct-performance approach to firm strategy – has both advantages and 
limitations.  An advantage of the five-forces framework is that it goes beyond the 
more simplistic focus on relative market growth rates as a way of determining 
industry attractiveness (Grundy, 2006).  Firm managers are encouraged to focus on 
the external environment in order to understand the foundations of competition and 
the root causes of profitability (Porter, 2008).  In addition, analysing the five 
competitive forces allows the complex interactions of competitors to be evaluated in 
a structured way.  In terms of limitations, firms within an industry are assumed to be 
able to make a judgement about an industry’s attractiveness and profitability 
(Johnson et al., 2008) based upon an assessment of the five competitive forces as 
defined by the model.  In identifying a firm’s strengths and weaknesses in this way, 
it is assumed that a strategy can be implemented which will strengthen the firm’s 
position within the industry.  In reality, firm managers may not have the ability to 
assimilate and assess the competitive forces which exist.  Furthermore, the 
competitive forces approach includes an over-simplification of micro-economic 
theory by only considering five competitive forces, and Porter (1980) provides no 
justification to prove the validity of his choice of five forces (Speed, 1989).  
Moreover, the five-forces model is static, taking no account of time (Grant, 1995).  
This makes it difficult to analyse dynamic markets which change quickly.  In 
addition, Porter’s model allows no role for the effects of digitalisation and 
globalisation – important factors affecting industry structures during recent years.  
Furthermore, although Porter’s contingency-theory approach suggests that key 
strategic requirements vary depending upon environmental conditions, it does not 
provide any guidance for predicting the form or strength of the strategy-environment 
relationship (Prescott, 1986).  Open questions therefore remain in relation to the 
effects different aspects of the industry environment have upon firm strategy as well 




ii. Resource-based view (RBV) theory  
One criticism of Porter’s five-forces model is that it provides no role for firms’ 
resources and capabilities.  In contrast, the RBV theory focuses upon the firm and its 
individual attributes rather than the wider industry environment to locate the source 
of competitive advantage.  The origins of the RBV theory lie with Penrose (1959), 
where firm-specific resources allow for diversification.  Penrose (1959) describes the 
firm as a collection of resources, and it is the heterogeneity of these resources across 
different firms which make a firm unique.  In addition, different firms are able to 
draw different services from the same type of resources (Foss, 2012).  These firm 
resources, or firm specific assets, enable the firm to create a cost or differentiation 
advantage.  In contrast to the competitive forces theory, firm resources in the RBV 
theory are assumed to be immobile assets – both tangible and intangible – and are 
thus tied to the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984).  It is upon these heterogeneous, immobile 
resources that the theory of competitive advantage is based (Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 
1984; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Barney (1991) defines firm resources as “all assets, capabilities, organisational 
processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that 
enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency 
and effectiveness” (Barney, 1991, p.101).  A firm’s capabilities are its ability to 
utilise its resources effectively.  Capabilities allow a firm to make better use of its 
resources as mere possession of resources is not sufficient (Penrose, 1959).  A firm’s 
internal resources and capabilities are the source of firm profitability as they enable 
the firm to achieve a cost or differentiation advantage and, in turn, a competitive 
advantage.  The heterogeneous and immobile resources are an essential requirement 
for a competitive advantage to be achieved, and in order for a competitive advantage 
to be sustained, firm resources are required to possess four attributes: resources are 
required to be valuable (V), rare (R), costly to imitate or inimitable (I) – embedding 
capabilities within firm routines makes them difficult for competitors to replicate – 
and non-substitutable (N).  Collectively, these attributes are known as VRIN 
(Barney, 1991).  Barney (1995) later extended VRIN to become VRIO by include 
resources that are organised (O) in such a way so as to capture value.  
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Teece et al. (1997) draw on and extend the RBV theory in their dynamic capabilities 
approach.  It is assumed that firms constantly adapt, renew, reconfigure and re-create 
their resources and capabilities in line with the competitive environment which they 
face.  In a highly dynamic business environment, the original RBV theory 
proposition is viewed as being static and neglects the influence of market dynamism, 
something the dynamic capabilities approach aims to address (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000). 
In reality, the RBV has limitations as a theory due to its limited value in generating 
managerial prescriptions (Lockett et al., 2009).  The RBV theory of the firm supports 
the view that a valuable resource can act as a source of competitive advantage for the 
firm.  In doing so, the theory assumes that firm managers are able to evaluate the 
potential resources that may provide more benefit to the firm and enable success for 
the firm in the emerging markets (Kozlenkova et al., 2014).  Some firm managers 
may not have the ability to do this.  VRIO has been proposed as a framework for 
understanding which resources are valuable to a firm and what makes them so, how 
vulnerable they are to imitation, and how the firm can exploit and manage them 
sustainably (Barney and Hesterly, 2009).  This proves problematic for firm 
managers; they find it difficult to identify the relevant resources that satisfy VRIO 
criteria (Arend and Lévesque, 2010).  It is also difficult for firm managers to 
determine how much to invest in specific resource characteristics to maintain 
performance in these criteria.  Previous literature identifies that many of the least 
imitable resources, such as competence embedded in the firm, for example, are 
difficult to identify effectively, and once identified are hard to manipulate (Teece et 
al., 1997; Priem and Butler, 2001).  In addition, embedded resources, identified by 
VRIO, tend to lose value quickly in high-velocity environments and hold firms back 
from strategic change (Jarzabkowski and Wilson, 2006).  Another limitation of the 
RBV approach is its managerial influence.  The framework implies that if any firm 
can acquire or develop resources at a cost advantage then those resources will be 
imitable and only a source of competitive parity.  The theory therefore suggests that 
managers have a limited ability to create a sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 
2007).  Furthermore, RBV perceives a firm to be a bundle of resources, and gaining 
access to such intra-organisational data is extremely difficult.  To carry out a 
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complete investigation of the firm (i.e. to identify resources), resources are required 
to be accessible (Barney, 2007). 
2.2.2 Structural factors 
The impact of industrial structure on firm performance was first exposed by Bain in 
1959 with the development of the IO structure-conduct-performance paradigm.  The 
paradigm relates industry structure (for example, the number of competing firms, 
homogeneity of products, costs of entry and exit) to firm conduct (i.e. strategies to 
gain competitive advantage – for example, price taking, product differentiation, tacit 
collusion, and exploitation of market power) and performance (for example, firm 
growth, national output and employment growth).  The range of options available to 
a firm and the constraints it faces are defined by industry attributes, and as a result of 
this, a firm’s conduct and performance are very much linked to industry structure.  
Porter (1980) draws upon this IO viewpoint to derive his own five-competitive-
forces model.  The model identifies the state of competition within a firm’s 
environment as being an important determinant of the firm’s value-creating strategy.  
Analysing an industry’s underlying structure in terms of Porter’s five competitive 
forces provides a method by which industry competition and profitability can be 
assessed and understood.  A firm can identify its strengths and weaknesses relative to 
the industry and implement offensive or defensive strategies in order to strengthen its 
position in relation to the five competitive forces (Porter, 1980). 
2.2.2.1 Competitive forces framework 
Porter (1980) identifies that competition within an industry depends upon five basic 
forces: the threat of new entrants, rivalry among existing competitors, the threat of 
substitute products or services, the bargaining power of buyers and the bargaining 
power of suppliers.  A firm’s “Knowledge of these underlying sources of 
competitive pressure provides the groundwork for a strategic agenda of action,” 
(Porter, 1979, p.138).  Firms plan for and respond to competitive forces so that their 
strategies take advantage of any opportunities and address any threats which exist 
within the industry environment.  As the collective strength of any competitive 
forces differs across industries, systematic differences result in the nature of 
competitive strategies available to individual firms (Kaniovski and Peneder, 2002). 
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The five competitive forces framework identifies the five most common threats firms 
face in their competitive environments and the conditions under which these threats 
are likely to be present (Barney and Hesterly, 2009).   Three competitive forces arise 
from horizontal competition (the threat of new entrants, the threat of substitute 
products or services and the threat of established rivals) and two come from vertical 
competition (the bargaining power of suppliers and the bargaining power of 
customers) (Porter, 1980). 
i. Threat of entry 
The first environmental threat identified is the threat of new entrants.  New entrants 
are firms who have recently started operating within an industry or are due to begin 
operating soon.  Any economic rents being earned by incumbent firms attract new 
firms into the industry.  Upon entry, the level of competition increases, and any 
economic rents and competitive advantages are eroded away.  New firms continue to 
enter the industry until competitive parity is reached (Barney and Hesterly, 2009). 
The ease with which new competing firms enter an industry is determined by the 
barriers to entry which exist.  In the absence of barriers to entry, competition is 
maximised, and any competitive advantages within an industry are quickly eroded.  
If barriers to entry are high, firms are deterred from entering the industry, and 
incumbents sustain any economic rents and competitive advantage (Barney and 
Hesterly, 2009).  Both structural and strategic barriers to entry exist, often referred to 
as economic and behavioural barriers to entry.  Structural barriers to entry come 
from basic industry characteristics such as technology, costs and demand.  The 
broadest definition of structural factors (Bain, 1956) suggests that barriers to entry 
arise from product differentiation, absolute cost advantages and economies of scale.  
Strategic barriers to entry exist due to the behaviour of incumbents.  Incumbents may 
choose to increase structural barriers or to make credible threats to potential new 
entrants.  For example, an incumbent might over-invest in capacity in order to 
threaten new entrants with a price war, or they might implement product 
differentiation strategies in the form of increased advertising, branding and superior 




Porter (1979) identifies six major sources of barriers to entry:  
 Existing economies of scale (incumbents’ costs are falling as a function of 
production volume) – new  entrants are forced to enter on a large scale or at a 
cost disadvantage 
 The need for new entrants to differentiate products – new entrants are forced 
to spend heavily in order to overcome customer loyalty 
 Large capital requirements – new entrants are forced to invest large financial 
resources in order to compete 
 Cost advantages for incumbents – entrants incur higher unit costs at every 
rate of output 
 Difficulties accessing product distribution channels – new entrants must 
create a new product/service-distribution channel 
 Government policy – new entrants require licenses and must operate 
according to regulation and standards 
ii. Threat of rivalry 
The second environmental threat in the five-competitive-forces framework is the 
extent of firm rivalry among existing firms within the industry.  Rivalry threatens 
firms by reducing economic rents (Barney and Hesterly, 2009), and for many 
industries, the intensity of competition among direct competitors is a major 
determinant of overall competitiveness.  Rivalry is more intense in industries where 
there are a large number of competing firms that are similar in size and power, where 
industry growth is slow, where there is a lack of product differentiation and where 
capacity is added in large increments (Porter, 1979).  A high level of rivalry within 
an industry is often indicated by frequent price cutting as customers switching from 
competitors are believed to be the only source of growth 
(Barney and Hesterly, 2009). 
iii. Threat of substitutes 
The ease with which a firm’s product or service can be substituted by another firm’s 
product or service reflects the third threat in the five-competitive-forces framework.  
The availability of substitutes within an industry places a ceiling on the prices firms 
can charge and upon the economic rents they can earn (Barney and Hesterly, 2009).  
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The threat of substitutes is high if the cost of switching is low, and in the extreme 
case where a substitute is viewed as being superior to the product or service, the 
product or service will be completely replaced, for example, video tapes have been 
replaced by digital versatile discs (DVDs).  Factors affecting the threat of substitutes 
include a buyer’s propensity to substitute, the relative price performance of 
substitutes, buyer-switching costs, a perceived level of product differentiation, fad 
and fashion, technology change and product innovation. 
iv. Threat of powerful customers 
The fourth threat in the competitive-forces framework is the bargaining power of 
customers, or the amount of pressure a customer is able to exert upon a firm.  
Powerful customers act in such a way so as to lower a firm’s revenues (Barney and 
Hesterly, 2009).  Customers do this by forcing down prices, demanding a higher 
quality or more service and playing one firm off against another (Porter, 1979).  If a 
customer impacts upon a firm so as to affect its margins and volumes, it holds a 
substantial amount of power.  Such customer power may exist when the number of 
buyers is small, customers purchase large volumes, switching to another 
(competitive) product is simple, customers can do without the good or service for a 
period of time or customers are price sensitive (Barney and Hesterly, 2009).  A firm 
is able to reduce customers’ bargaining power by partnering, improving its supply-
chain management, increasing customer incentives or increasing loyalty benefits, for 
example. 
v. Threat of powerful suppliers 
The fifth and final threat in the competitive-forces framework is the bargaining 
power of suppliers.  Suppliers can threaten a firm’s economic rents by increasing the 
price of their supplies or reducing their quality (Barney and Hesterly, 2009).  The 
more pressure a supplier can place on a firm, in terms of being able to affect its 
margins and volumes, the more power it has.  The number of potential suppliers 
within an industry determines the relative power of each seller.  Suppliers are 
powerful if very few exist for a particular product, there are no substitutes for that 
product or the product is extremely important to the buyer and they cannot do 
without it (Barney and Hesterly, 2009).  The bargaining power of suppliers can be 
reduced by a firm entering into a partnership, a firm taking over a supplier, a firm 
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improving its supply-chain management (for example, through training) or a firm 
increasing its knowledge about a supplier (for example, by gaining knowledge about 
supplier costs and methods) so that the supplier becomes more dependent upon the 
firm. 
2.2.2.2 Competitive forces and industry type 
When the collective forces within an industry are strong, there is a high level of 
competition, and the industry becomes relatively unattractive to new entrants.  Entry 
to the industry is very easy, and overall profitability is driven down to a level 
resembling that of the economist’s perfectly competitive market (Porter, 1979).  In a 
perfectly competitive industry, there are a large number of competing firms, products 
are homogeneous with respect to cost and product attributes, and costs of entry and 
exit are low i.e. there are low entry barriers.  Firms are price takers and respond to 
changes in industry supply or demand by adjusting price rather than attempting to 
influence the level of supply or demand themselves.  Price-taking firms can only 
expect to gain competitive parity (Barney, 2007).  Firms in such an industry have 
very few options and face many constraints; firms generate returns that just cover 
their cost of capital in the long run.  In such a situation, industry structure completely 
determines both firm conduct and long-run firm performance 
(Barney and Hesterly, 2009). 
When the collective forces within an industry are at their weakest, competition 
approaches the economist’s monopoly market (Barney, 2007).  Monopoly industries 
consist of a single firm, and entry into this type of industry is very costly (Barney, 
2007).  There are few examples of monopoly industries, although the personal 
computer operating systems industry, almost completely dominated by Microsoft, 
comes close.  Firms are able to use their market power to set prices and generate 
competitive advantages and significant economic rents (Barney, 2007).  
Two other types of competition within an industry that lie between perfect 
competition and monopoly have been identified by economists – oligopoly and 
monopolistic competition.  In both cases, the collective forces are moderately high 
(Barney, 2007).  Oligopoly is an industry characterised by a small number of 
competing firms.  Products are either homogeneous or heterogeneous, and costs of 
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entry and exit are high.  Firms face a variety of conduct options, and significant 
competitive advantages and economic rents can be earned (Barney, 2007). 
In monopolistically competitive industries, there are a large number of competing 
firms and low-cost entry and exit into and out of the industry exists, but unlike the 
case of perfect competition, products in these industries are not homogeneous with 
respect to costs or product attributes.  Firms successfully implement product 
differentiation strategies and are able to act as quasi-monopolists.  However, these 
monopoly positions are always threatened by the competitive actions of other firms 
within the industry.  Examples of monopolistically competitive industries include the 
tea and car industries.  Firms have a variety of conduct options and are able to gain 
competitive advantages (Barney, 2007). 
The underlying economic and technological conditions within an industry determine 
the strength of Porter’s five competitive forces and the overall level of competition 
within the industry.  The intensity of competition determines the degree to which 
investment inflows drive returns.  The competitive forces are strong in industries 
where no firm earns outstanding returns and weak in industries where high returns 
are common (Porter, 1980).  Across industries, the strongest competitive forces 
originate from different sources.  For example, foreign-competitor rivalry and 
competition from substitute materials are prominent within the steel industry.  In 
order for a firm to prosper within an industry, it assesses the overall strength of the 
competitive forces within its environment prior to positioning itself and shaping its 
strategy.  When shaping its strategy, a firm is required to position itself so that its 
capabilities provide the best defence against any competitive forces present.  In 
positioning itself, a firm takes the industry’s structure as given and matches its 
strengths and weaknesses accordingly.  A firm can build defences against the 
competitive forces, or it can position itself where the forces are weakest.  Through 
strategic moves, a firm is able to influence the balance of the competitive forces, and 
by anticipating shifts in the factors which underlie the forces, it can respond to them 
appropriately (Porter, 1979).   
Alongside the competitive forces which exist within an industry’s environment, lies 
the industry appropriability regime – the environmental factors a firm faces 
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(excluding firm and industry structure) which govern its ability to capture profits 
from an innovation (Teece, 1986).   
2.2.3 Appropriability 
Appropriability is a firm’s capacity to retain any added value it creates for its own 
benefit.  More specifically, here it represents the extent to which a firm can capture 
profits generated through innovation (Teece, 1986; Levin et al., 1987).  It is often the 
case that firms fail to appropriate the returns to their innovations (Ceccagnoli and 
Rothaermel, 2008).  Innovating firms are faced with a risk of imitation by both 
existing competitors and new competitors attracted into the market by the existence 
of high returns (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009).  It is possible that a fast second 
entrant into the market or even a slow third can outperform the innovator 
(Teece, 2012).  This appropriability problem (Arrow, 1962) has implications for both 
firm performance and survival (Ceccagnoli and Rothaermel, 2008), so that firms face 
the key strategic challenge of protecting any returns to their innovation.   
Firms that successfully innovate are able to exploit their competitive advantage and 
monopolise the market (Aghion and Howitt, 1996).  When an innovating firm is 
faced with imitation, its competitive advantage may be eroded.  Without an 
expectation of profiting from an innovation and a monopolistic power over an 
innovation, firms will be discouraged from investing in innovative activities – there 
will be no incentive to innovate (Schumpeter, 1942).  Protecting the returns to 
innovation stimulates further innovation and helps firms sustain any competitive 
advantage which exists. 
Two essential components of appropriability have been identified (Teece, 1986), the 
appropriability regime and specialised complimentary assets. A firm’s ability to 
profit from innovation – or appropriate returns to innovation – depends upon both 
components (Pisano, 2006). 
2.2.3.1 The appropriability regime 
The first essential component of appropriability is the appropriability regime – the 
environmental factors a firm faces (excluding firm and industry structure) which 
govern its ability to capture profits from an innovation (Teece, 1986).  The most 
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important dimensions of the appropriability regime are the nature of the technology 
within the industry (for example, whether it is a product or a process technology or 
whether knowledge is tacit or codified in nature) and the available and effective 
methods of IP protection within the industry to protect both the innovations 
themselves and any increased rents which flow from them (Teece, 1986, 1998, 
2000a; Levin et al., 1987; Teece and Pisano, 1998). 
Assessing the nature of a technology within an industry provides an indication of its 
ease of imitability (Pisano, 2006) or ‘accessibility’.  The accessibility of a 
technology (Jones Day, 2006) determines the likelihood of imitation.  Accessibility 
varies across both products and processes and tacit and codified knowledge. For 
example, many process technologies are not generally observable and are therefore 
highly inaccessible.  In contrast, new products are easily accessible to many; their 
technologies are observed and can be re-created through techniques such as reverse 
engineering.  In addition, some technologies are based upon tacit knowledge and are 
very difficult to understand, making them particularly inaccessible.  Other 
technologies use codified knowledge so that the technology is accessible to 
everyone.  In summary, the less (more) accessible the technology, the less (more) 
likely it will be subject to imitation and the more (less) likely returns will be 
appropriated. 
The second dimension of the industry appropriability regime is the effective methods 
of IP protection available to protect innovations and the rents which flow from them.  
For the purpose of this study, the knowledge-protection dimension of the 
appropriability regime is assumed to include both formal and informal protection 
mechanisms.  Formal protection mechanisms are legally enforceable protection 
mechanisms and typically include registered rights such as patents, design rights and 
trademarks and unregistered rights such as copyright.  Informal protection 
mechanisms are not based directly on regulated structures and statutory enforcement 
possibilities (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2014); they include secrecy, complexity of 
design and lead-time on competitors.  Within an industry, it is the availability and 
enforceability of both formal and informal knowledge-protection mechanisms which 
helps to shape the appropriability regime (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Jauhiainen, 
2004).   
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The industry appropriability regime, a combination of the two dimensions discussed 
above, determines the barriers to imitation which exist within an industry and, in 
turn, the ease with which competitors can imitate an innovation (Ceccagnoli and 
Rothaermel, 2008).  Appropriability regimes can be strong or weak (Teece, 1986), 
and their strength varies across industries.  An appropriability regime is ‘strong’ 
when innovations are easy to protect – knowledge about them is tacit or is well 
protected through the use of knowledge-protection mechanisms.  In this instance, 
innovations are hard to imitate because knowledge is embedded within firms’ 
routines and capabilities or it is well protected through the use of patents and 
secrecy, for example.  The pharmaceutical and chemical industries are examples 
where the appropriability regime is strong.  It is difficult for competitors to imitate 
innovations within these industries as patents, on molecules for example, are 
extremely effective.  The software industry is also characterised by a relatively 
strong appropriability regime as innovations are typically protected by patents and 
copyrights, and it is technically possible for firms to make imitation extremely 
difficult. 
An appropriability regime is ‘weak’ when innovations are difficult to protect – 
knowledge can be easily codified, and knowledge-protection mechanisms are 
ineffective.  When technologies are easily observed and reverse engineering is 
possible, the scope for patenting is small, imitation is easy, and alternatives can be 
easily developed.  The soft drinks industry, for example, Coca Cola and Pepsi is an 
example where the appropriability regime is relatively weak. The use of patent 
protection would be short lived, and imitation would be relatively easy thereafter.  
The use of secrecy combined with trademarks is more suitable here.  Another 
example where the appropriability regime is weak is the digital economy where 
firms rely upon branding and quality of services to maintain competitive advantages. 
In reality, appropriability regimes form a continuum, some emphasising knowledge-
protection mechanisms over the nature of technology and some emphasising the 
nature of technology over protection (Teece, 1998, 2000).  A strong regime can be 
achieved by different means; some industries may rely upon protection while others 
may rely upon tacit knowledge embedded deep within firms’ structure (Levin et al., 
1987).  Whatever the chosen combination, firms aim to create a first-mover 
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advantage and earn higher than average returns.  Strategically, the strongest 
appropriability regime is not always best.  Rather, a firm aims to maximise the value 
of its knowledge assets, and this will be achieved by having an efficient 
appropriability strategy (Shapiro and Varian, 1999), consistent with the industry 
appropriability regime. 
In the original Teece (1986) framework, appropriability regimes are assumed to be 
exogenously determined by the nature of technology and the means of knowledge 
protection used to protect innovations and the rents which flow from them.  Pisano 
(2006) suggests that appropriability regimes are increasingly being endogenously 
influenced by the behaviour and strategies of firms themselves and are the ‘product 
of conscious strategies of firms’ (Pisano, 2006, p.1122).  In some cases, firms take 
their complementary asset position as given and shape the appropriability regime to 
optimise the value of those assets.  Evidence of this behaviour can be found in the 
open-source software industry.  Here, the source code for computer programs is 
made publicly available so that other developers can build upon the code.  This 
behaviour represents a shift in the appropriability regime of the software industry.  
Traditional software development saw proprietors use a variety of IP protection 
mechanisms to protect their designs from imitation and illegal use. With open-source 
software, developers contribute and understand that their contributions can be used 
by others; a commonly shared base of technology is created (Pisano, 2006).  
Open-source software clearly represents a weakening of the appropriability regime.  
Granstrand (1999), Teece (2006) and Pisano and Teece (2007) support this 
viewpoint suggesting that it is possible for appropriability regimes to be 
endogenously shaped by firms, governments, and technological change. 
2.2.3.2 Specialised complementary assets 
The second fundamental component of appropriability is the ownership of 
specialised complementary assets (Teece, 1986).  Many innovators are unable to 
capture the economic rents which flow from their innovations because they lack the 
specialised complementary assets required to do so.  The successful 
commercialisation of an innovation ‘requires that the know-how in question be 
utilised in conjunction with other capabilities or assets.  Services such as marketing, 
competitive manufacturing, and after-sales support are almost always needed.  These 
32 
 
services are obtained from complementary assets, which are specialized’ (Teece, 
1986, p. 288). 
Teece (1986) highlights the importance of specialised complementary assets in 
understanding the performance implications of an innovation.  Firms accumulate 
specialised assets over long periods of time; they are path dependent and 
idiosyncratic (Teece et al., 1997).  Included in a firm’s stock of specialised 
complementary assets are its resources and capabilities that display VRIO 
characteristics.  Consequently, specialised complementary assets are a source of 
sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). 
The relationship between an innovator and the owner of complimentary assets – if 
the innovator does not own them – can be described in terms of dependency (Teece, 
1986).  The degree of dependence between the innovation and the complementary 
assets needed to produce and/or take the innovation to market affects an innovator’s 
ability to appropriate returns.  In his conceptual framework, Teece (1986) 
distinguishes between the owners of generic, specialised and co-specialised 
complementary assets.  Generic complimentary assets are not specific to an 
innovation; they are general-purpose assets, for example, general-purpose 
manufacturing equipment.  When complementary assets are generic, no profit-
sharing problems exist between an innovator and the owner of such assets 
(Hurmelinna et al., 2007) – generic complementary assets are readily accessible.  
The innovator appropriates returns provided that the appropriability regime is strong 
enough to prevent imitation (Hurmelinna et al., 2007).  Specialised complimentary 
assets exhibit one-way interdependence between themselves and the innovation.  If 
the innovator is dependent upon complementary assets, the complementary assets 
owner has more bargaining power than the innovator in price negotiations, and they 
receive more appropriated returns.  Co-specialised complementary assets are 
characterised by a two-way dependence between themselves and the innovation.  
The success of the relationship depends upon mutual participation of the innovator 
and the owner of the complementary assets.  In this case, bargaining power is 
balanced between the two parties. 
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2.2.3.3 The appropriability regime and specialised complementary assets: an 
interaction 
The interaction between appropriability-regime strength and the ownership of 
specialised complementary assets (i.e. the two components of appropriability), 
determines the degree to which firms are able to profit from their innovations 
(Ceccagnoli and Rothaermel, 2008).  In the presence of a weak appropriability 
regime, imitation is relatively easy, and firms require access to specialised 
complementary assets to enable themselves to gain a competitive advantage and 
capture the returns from an innovation.  In this case, the owners of specialised 
complementary assets are in a relatively powerful and controlling position.  In a 
weak appropriability regime, firm investment into specialised complementary assets 
(investment into marketing, sales efforts and customer service, for example) aids the 
appropriation of innovation returns (Cohen and Levin, 1989).  In a strong 
appropriability regime, imitation is relatively difficult.  Firms rely on knowledge-
protection mechanisms or tacit knowledge to appropriate the returns from an 
innovation; access to specialised complementary assets is less important.  This Teece 
(1986) framework suggests that appropriation requires an effective strategy, and that 
firms are required to choose the best complementary asset position given the strength 
of the appropriability regime that it faces: firm strategy is contingent upon the 
appropriability regime (Pisano, 2006). 
2.2.4 Intangibles strategy 
A firm’s management of its knowledge assets is an important determinant of whether 
or not the firm is able to successfully appropriate returns to innovation (Section 2.2.3 
above).  The strategic management of knowledge assets, or so-called intangible 
assets, is of growing importance in today’s world due to the arrival of the knowledge 
economy and the recognition that intangible assets are the main value creator for 
firms; they are a key driver of growth for many developed countries (Montresor et 
al., 2014).  According to Teece (1998), the competitive advantage of a firm lies in its 
"ability to create, transfer, assemble, integrate, and exploit knowledge assets" 
(Teece, 1998, p.75).  This importance of intangible assets to long-term firm success 
has meant a shift within firms towards the creation and management of knowledge 
assets.  The centrality of knowledge and IP introduces new managerial challenges to 
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firms; placing a value on intangible assets is difficult, and ‘the management of a 
completely invisible asset’ (Soo et. al., 2002, p.130) is demanding – it is difficult to 
manage something that cannot be measured.  In addition, a firm’s management of 
intangible assets is not simply an IP issue which can be delegated to a legal 
department within the firm; managerial decisions differ according to the firm’s 
underlying demand and cost structures, the appropriability regime within the firm’s 
environment, the nature of the innovation and the characteristics and complexity of 
the technology facing the firm (Teece, 2000a). 
In accordance with the RBV theory of the firm (see Section 2.2.1.1 above) where 
firm resources and capabilities influence growth and performance (Penrose, 1959; 
Wernerfelt, 1984), the successful management of intangible assets in order to 
appropriate innovation returns requires particular entrepreneurial skills and 
capabilities.  A firm’s knowledge – represented by know-how, culture, routines and 
experiences, for example – is characterised by its inimitability.  This inimitability 
generates added value for customers and scarcity for competitors (Barney, 1991): the 
firm’s knowledge is a source of competitive advantage. 
A strategy is defined as “a pattern in a stream of decisions” (Mintzberg, 1978, p. 
934).  In the present study, an intangibles strategy includes the formulation and 
execution of strategies relating to the investment into and the creation of intangible 
assets, and the protection of intangible assets in order to protect any income streams 
which flow from them.  A firm makes decisions on the investment into and the 
protection of its intangible assets, and the combination of these decisions represents 
its intangibles strategy. 
i. Intangibles investment 
When investing in intangible assets, firm managers make a series of quantitative 
decisions.  They decide how much money to spend, the scale of the investment and 
when the investment will take place.  In order to make these decisions, managers are 
required to understand conceptually what constitutes the firm’s intangible assets and 
to have the ability to apply the leadership skills needed to effectively invest in them.  
Key strategic questions and decisions surrounding a firm’s investment into 
intangible assets impact upon the firm’s innovation streams, and therefore it is 
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important that managerial decisions regarding intangibles investment are informed 
decisions.  For managerial decisions to be informed, information in relation to the 
investment into intangibles and the benefits which flow from them is required.  This 
way, managers obtain a clear picture of the firm and its performance.  If managerial 
decisions are uninformed, resources may be wasted, and consequently, returns to 
investment may be low.  To be informed, managers require an understanding of core 
business processes along with the complexity of the decisions that they need to 
make.  Some investment decisions require coordination and alignment with other 
strategic decisions, and the complexity of these decisions will determine the focus of 
any intangible-asset investments.  It is essential that firm managers are equipped 
with the knowledge-management tools and techniques required to make these 
decisions so that the focus of any intangible-asset investment can be determined. 
ii. Intangibles protection 
As well as being able to generate, acquire, transfer and combine intangible assets to 
meet customer needs, a firm has to be able to protect its intangible assets (Teece, 
2000a).  Intangible assets typically entail higher risks than those of a physical or 
financial nature.  Mismanagement, theft and IP crime require firms to actively 
protect intangible assets, mitigating the risks and preserving their value.  The 
protection of intangible assets limits imitation and, in accordance with the RBV 
theory of the firm, helps firms to gain a competitive advantage (Teece et al., 1997).   
When protecting its intangible assets, a firm typically chooses between formal and 
informal protection methods.  In the case of formal methods, protection is 
implemented through regulation (for example, patents, trademarks and copyright) 
(Hall, 1992), while more informal methods such as the complex nature of databases, 
networks and reputation hinder imitation by competitors in the short run (Fahy and 
Smithee, 1999). 
In some instances, the protection of intangible assets and innovation reveals 
information that competing firms can make great use of; it can enhance learning.  
For example, patents and patent applications are often viewed as a source of 
information enabling different sources and flows of technology to be monitored 
(Pitkethly, 2001).   
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Firms’ use of knowledge protection may have negative as well as positive effects.  
For example, protection may lead to a situation where strong appropriability 
conditions are created before a dominant design has been achieved, constraining 
firms and locking them into a particular concept (Teece, 1986).  The use of tacit 
knowledge and formal protection mechanisms obstructs the transfer of knowledge 
and may have a negative impact upon future innovation performance.  An overly-
strong protection of intangibles may therefore hinder the flow of knowledge and 
eliminate any benefits associated with imitation. 
2.2.4.1 Intangibles protection: Intra- and inter-sector differences 
Previous research suggests that a firm’s choice of formal and informal knowledge-
protection mechanisms differs across sectors and industries (due to the presence of 
tacit or codified knowledge, product and process technologies and the industry 
appropriability regime, for example) (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000), and 
across firms (due to resources and capabilities, for example) (Lopez, 2009; Hall et 
al., 2014).  A firm’s choice also depends upon the novelty of the innovation (Hanel, 
2005). 
i. Industry/technology characteristics 
Industry characteristics play an important part in determining whether firms use 
formal or informal protection methods to protect innovations.  Levin et al. (1987) – 
the Yale I survey – and Cohen et al. (2000) – the Carnegie Mellon survey – examine 
the extent to which firms in different industries choose formal and informal 
knowledge-protection methods to appropriate returns.  Both studies report broadly 
consistent findings.  For both product and process innovations, secrecy and lead time 
are viewed as important knowledge-protection mechanisms; a high percentage of 
firms are found to rely on informal mechanisms in their knowledge-protection 
strategies.  With the exception of the pharmaceutical and chemical industries, patents 
are found to be much less important.  However, patents are identified as being more 
important for product innovations than for process innovations.  One reason for this 
is that a patented process could easily be invented around once knowledge is 
disclosed.  This is supported by Harabi (1995), who in a study of Swiss firms finds 
the same result.  In this study, firms express concern regarding the disclosure of 
knowledge because it allows competitors an opportunity to invent around their 
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innovations.  Again, patents are identified as being most important to firms in the 
pharmaceutical, chemical and machinery industries.  As in Levin et al. (1987), lead 
time is found to be the protection mechanism most important for firms’ 
appropriation.  Results show that secrecy is also important, more so for process 
innovations; processes can be effectively retained within the firm and protected with 
trade secrets.  In a survey of one hundred manufacturing firms, Mansfield (1986) 
finds that in both the pharmaceutical and chemical industries, patent protection is 
necessary for at least 30 per cent of innovations.  Several other industries (petroleum, 
machinery, and fabricated metals) report patents to be necessary for 10 to 20 per cent 
of innovations.  The remaining industries do not rely on patent use. 
Cohen et al. (2000) find that R&D intensive industries, for example pharmaceuticals, 
report a high effectiveness of almost every protection mechanism.  The majority of 
other industries report a high effectiveness for two or more mechanisms and only a 
small number of industries report a high effectiveness of only one.  Cohen et al. 
(2000) find that patents are used more often than secrecy in discrete product 
industries, whereas in complex-product industries it is easier to invent around 
technologies, and therefore firms rely less on patents and more on informal methods 
of protection such as lead-time.  In their study of small Finnish manufacturing and 
service firms, Leiponen and Byma (2009) find that R&D intensive firms and 
science-based firms are more likely to protect knowledge formally.  Other firms use 
speed to market or secrecy as protection methods. 
Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999) examine Dutch manufacturing firms and find that 
those in high-technology industries are more likely to patent than those in other 
industries.  Their results are consistent with those of Levin et al. (1987) and Harabi 
(1995) who find patents to be most important within the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries.  Across all innovating firms, Levin et al. (1987) and 
Harabi (1995) find around half of firms report patents to be insignificant when 
protecting their knowledge – lead time and secrecy are reported to be more 
important. 
Some technologies are easier to protect formally than others.  For example, in the 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals sector, a patent is able to protect a specific compound 
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(or a specific chemical formula); it is clear what the patent protects and few disputes 
arise (Bessen and Meurer, 2008).  In other sectors, for example information 
technology, the range of patents is less precise.  The probability of dispute is higher, 
and patent use is less popular (Hall et al., 2014). 
Innovation in services is quite different from innovation in manufacturing, relying 
less on R&D and more on new information technology-based processes (Hall and 
Sena, 2017).  Contrary to the view that service sector firms may gain no benefit from 
using formal knowledge-protection mechanisms, Hall and Sena (2017) find formal 
protection mechanisms to be more important than informal protection mechanisms 
for service sector productivity.  Their results are ambiguous for the manufacturing 
sector as informal and formal knowledge protection has an equal effect on 
productivity, although the effect is negative.  This negative effect is attributed to 
there being longer lags between innovative activity and productivity within the 
manufacturing sector. 
Other studies which focus on services (Mairesse and Mohnen, 2004; Hipp and 
Herstatt, 2006) suggest that most service firms do not use any type of knowledge 
protection.  Those service firms that do protect their knowledge tend to use formal 
trademarks and copyrights and informal mechanisms such as customer, supplier and 
employee lock-ins.  Mairesse and Mohnen (2004) examine French firms’ use of 
knowledge-protection mechanisms in the manufacturing and service industries.  
Innovative service firms are found to use protection mechanisms less often than 
high-tech manufacturing firms but more often than low-tech manufacturing firms.  
Hipp and Herstatt (2006) find that service-intensive German firms use long-term 
labour contracts to protect their knowledge.  Secrecy, lead time and complexity are 
also identified as being important protection mechanisms, whereas only 6 per cent of 
service firms examined use formal protection mechanisms. 
Blind et al. (2003) find that the propensity to patent and the number of patent 
applications is significantly lower in services compared with manufacturing; 7 per 
cent of service firms applied for patents compared with 25 per cent of firms in the 
manufacturing industry.  Applying formal methods of protection to services is not 
straightforward (Blind et al., 2003; Maskus, 2008), for example, the tacit knowledge 
39 
 
included in services is not eligible for patenting.  It is the intangible nature of service 
innovations that determines the type of protection mechanisms which can be used 
successfully (Miles and Boden, 2000). 
Baldwin et al. (1998) examine the use of knowledge-protection mechanisms in 
Canadian service industries (for example, communications and financial services) 
using innovation survey data from 1996.  Less than half of innovators report using 
any of the knowledge-protection mechanisms available to them.  Of those used, 
copyright and trademarks are the most popular – particularly in the financial services 
industry.  Patents are used only by the technical business service industry.  Lead time 
is identified as the most effective knowledge-protection mechanism by all service 
industries.  Of the formal protection mechanisms available, trademarks are identified 
as being most effective. 
Päällysaho and Kuusisto (2006) examine a sample of Finnish and UK firms in three 
knowledge-intensive service industries (advertising, business and management 
consultancy, and software consultancy and supply).  Trademarks and copyright are 
the most popular formal knowledge-protection mechanisms whereas patents are 
rarely used.  The most popular protection mechanism used by firms in these service 
industries is restrictive contracts (for example, non-disclosure agreements).  Secrecy 
is also identified as being important in these industries. 
ii. Firm resources and capabilities 
Although all knowledge protection represents a cost to the firm, formal protection 
mechanisms are often viewed by firms as a more expensive option than informal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms.  Applying for a patent, for example, can be a 
costly process, and a firm will continue to incur costs whilst keeping a patent in force 
(Hall et al., 2014).  Patent enforcement requires firms to actively monitor markets for 
potential infringement.  If an infringement is detected, patent holders require 
financial resources to enable them to engage in litigation.  Informal protection 
mechanisms, often viewed as the least expensive method of innovation protection, 
are not without their costs.  For example, the use of secrecy by firms is often 
accompanied by confidentiality agreements (Hall et al., 2014). 
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As well as incurring costs when protecting innovations, firms face uncertainty when 
using both formal and informal protection mechanisms.  In the case of patents for 
example, this uncertainty relates to whether a patent will be granted, whether it will 
be invalidated at a point thereafter, whether any infringements will occur and if so, 
whether they will be proven.  A firm also faces uncertainty when using informal 
mechanisms, for example when a firm uses secrecy, it is uncertain as to whether the 
secret will be maintained and whether any breach of confidentiality will be proven, 
in court or otherwise. 
The strength of a firm’s formal knowledge protection often depends upon the 
resources it has available to threaten court action, and if necessary to take court 
action.  Small firms are likely to lack the necessary resources and capabilities to do 
this (West, 2006; Olander et al., 2009).  They are therefore more likely to choose 
informal mechanisms to protect their knowledge (Kitching and Blackburn, 1998; 
Leiponen and Byma, 2009). 
The costs and complexity associated with formal methods of protection make it more 
likely that small firms rely upon informal protection methods such as secrecy and 
speed to market (Arundel, 2001; Thomä and Bizer, 2013).  Arundel (2001) examines 
firms from seven European countries and analyses whether firm size influences the 
relative importance of particular knowledge-protection mechanisms.  The study finds 
that for firms of all sizes, secrecy is considered more relevant than patents, although 
in the case of product innovations, the relative importance of secrecy declines with 
firm size.  Regarding R&D intensive firms, all firms believe secrecy to be more 
effective than patents, but R&D intensive small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) attach more importance to patents than other SMEs. 
In their study, Coles et al. (2003) examine small firms in the textile-design sector of 
the UK, Italy and the United States.  Following an increase in computer-aided design 
and communication technologies, an increase in the speed and quality of design 
copying occurred.  This impacted upon some sectors more than others.  Coles et al. 
(2003) find that small firms are unable to increase their use of formal knowledge 
protection to address the imitation problem because they lack the resources to do so.  
It is suggested that the small firms that lack resources may have to adapt their 
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protection strategies in an alternative way, for example by frequently changing 
designs, implementing competitive pricing policies and increasing technical 
complexity so that designs are difficult to copy.   
In a qualitative study, Kitching and Blackburn (2003) examine how 389 small firms 
from four different sectors (computer software, design, electronics and mechanical 
engineering) exploit and protect their innovations.  They find that many small firms 
choose not to protect their innovations in any way and that many are unaware that 
protection mechanisms are available to them.  Small firms that do use formal 
protection methods to protect knowledge are identified as being the more innovative 
firms. 
Larger firms perceive patents to be effective (Combe and Pfister, 2000; Sattler, 
2003) and they attach more importance to them than smaller firms (Blind et al., 
2006).  Leiponen and Byma (2009) conduct an empirical study of small Finnish 
manufacturing and service firms.  They find that patents become more relevant as 
firm size increases. R&D-intensive small firms and science-based small firms are 
identified as those firms more likely to use formal methods of knowledge protection.  
Other small firms use speed to market or secrecy as protection methods.  In a study 
of Canadian firms, Hanel (2005) finds that the use of all formal protection 
mechanisms increases with firm size. 
iii. Innovation novelty 
Both the Yale I survey (Levin et al., 1987) and the Carnegie Mellon survey (Cohen 
et al., 2000) asked firms for the reasons why they did not use patents.  One of the 
most common firm responses was the lack of novelty of innovations (Lopez, 2009).  
The degree of novelty associated with an innovation reflects the degree to which new 
skills, knowledge and capabilities need to be developed in order to capture the 
commercial value of the innovation (Laursen et al., 2013).  An extremely novel 
(radical) innovation is likely to require significant R&D investment (Hewitt-Dundas 
et al., 2017) and has a significant impact upon a market and upon the economic 
activity of firms within that market.  Such a radical or new-to-the-market innovation 
exhibits possible technological spillovers (Veugelers and Schneider, 2018), more so 
than less novel, new-to-the-firm innovation.  It is therefore reasonable to expect 
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knowledge-protection mechanisms to be more extensively used in conjunction with 
new-to-the-market innovation than new-to-the-firm innovation.  It is also reasonable 
to expect formal knowledge-protection mechanisms to be used for novel, new-to-the-
market innovation. The lack of novelty associated with new-to-the-firm innovation 
suggests that formal protection mechanisms are less likely. 
Empirical studies tend to support these expectations.  Thomas (2003) interviews 120 
small firms in the biotechnology industry about their knowledge-protection practices.  
Strategies differ according to the firm’s stage of innovation.  Firms that took a 
product or service to the marketplace used patents as a protection method, whereas 
firms that supplied materials or services to other firms typically relied upon trade 
secrets.  Products developed by suppliers are characterised by rapid innovation, and 
the use of secrecy is deemed to be sufficient in such an environment where rapid 
changes in knowledge occur. 
In a study of Canadian manufacturing firms, Hanel (2005) finds that new-to-the-
market innovators rely more on formal protection than informal protection, although 
firms developing new markets are more likely to use trademarks than patents.  The 
stage of development of an innovation may determine which knowledge-protection 
mechanisms a firm uses.  When developing a new technology, firms are likely to use 
secrecy – they tend to apply for patents when taking a product to market (Hussinger, 
2006). 
2.3 Conceptual model and hypotheses 
2.3.1 Conceptual model 
The conceptual model underpinning the analysis carried out here is shown in 
Figure 2.1.  The appropriability regime and industry structure (4) are the 
arrangements within the industry environment that influence or limit the choices and 
opportunities available to a firm.  The proposed hypotheses are based upon the 
transmission mechanisms which exist between a firm’s intangibles strategy (2 and 3) 
and the appropriability regime and industry structure (4) within the industry 
environment.  The growth ambition of the firm (1), also a determinant of intangibles 
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strategy, represents the individual firm’s capacity to act independently and to make 
its own free choices.   







Innovation is an important means through which firms compete and grow (Mason et 
al., 2009) with many studies (for example, Geroski and Machin, 1992 and Yasuda, 
2005) finding a positive effect of innovation upon growth.  Intangible assets are an 
important strategic factor in this value creation as innovation involves the production 
of new knowledge through activities such as R&D, for example (Roper et al., 2008).  
These intangible assets are very much part of the innovation process, and therefore 
the strategy relating to intangible assets represents part of a firm’s innovation 
strategy (2).  From this, it follows that a firm’s growth ambition (1) leads to the 
development of an appropriate intangibles strategy to aid innovation (2) – a strategy 
which incorporates decisions about the investment into and the protection of 
intangible assets (3). 
The external environment impacts upon the firm at various stages during this growth 
process.  Within the model, the environment – the industry appropriability regime 
and industry structure – impacts upon a firm’s intangibles strategy by affecting 
firms’ decisions on the investment into and the protection of such assets (3).3  By 
                                                          
3 Some empirical studies suggest a potential for reverse causation from innovation (or innovation 
strategy) to industry structure (see for example, Levin and Reiss, 1984, 1988; Farber, 1981). The 
theoretical basis lies in Schumpeter's notion of "creative destruction", where industry structure is 
influenced by past and current innovative success and failures. More precisely, the innovation process 
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building stocks of intangible assets, a firm is able to target those that provide a 
source of differentiation within the industry in which it operates.  The firm can 
realise the full value of its intangible assets by internally exploiting them, and it is 
able to preserve their value and mitigate any associated risks by using some form of 
protection method. 
The semi-public good characteristics of knowledge (exclusion is rarely perfect) leads 
to the appropriability problem (Arrow, 1962), and therefore, unless an innovator is 
able to protect the knowledge which it creates (3), competitors will be able to imitate 
an innovation without incurring the high fixed costs of creating knowledge.  As a 
result of this, a firm’s expenditure on intangible assets is not only comprised of the 
investment into such assets (for example, R&D, design investment, training, 
software development etc.) but also includes the protection of intangible assets 
through the use of appropriability or knowledge-protection mechanisms (for 
example, patents, copyrights, lead-time, secrecy etc.).  
The analysis presented here investigates how the two separate elements of a firm’s 
intangibles strategy – the investment into and the protection of intangible assets – are 
affected by a change in the industry appropriability-regime strength and changes in 
the characteristics of other elements of industry structure.  It explores whether or not 
the two elements of a firm’s intangibles strategy are driven by a particular 
component of the industry environment and, if they are, whether the driver(s) of each 
element of intangibles strategy is (are) consistent with one another.  
2.3.2 Hypotheses 
i. Intangibles investment 
Much of the variation in intangible asset investment which exists can be explained 
by industry variables (Villalonga, 2004).  The industry environment is the factor 
most recognised for affecting a firm’s investment into intangible assets (Arighetti et 
al., 2011).  For example, both the propensity to innovate within an industry and the 
                                                          
generates transient market power which is in turn eroded by rival innovation and imitation 
(Pohlmeier, 1992).  
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appropriability conditions within an industry help determine a firm’s incentive to 
invest in intangible assets (Cockburn and Griliches, 1988).   
Firms invest into innovation with the aim of increasing profits – they produce new 
products and develop more efficient processes of production (Greenhalgh and 
Rogers, 2007).  R&D – one of the many intangible assets that a firm is able to 
investment into – is long considered an investment into firm knowledge.  A sizeable 
literature exists examining the determinants of R&D investment, the majority of 
which focuses upon two factors: the first of these factors adopts a Schumpeterian 
view, focusing on the effects of firm size and market power.  Here, large firms 
within a concentrated industry drive technological progress (Schumpeter, 1942).  
They exploit economies of scale in R&D and unforeseen innovations better than 
smaller firms.  Often, large firms possess monopoly power, and this allows them to 
prevent imitations – giving them an incentive to innovate.  Furthermore, the process 
of 'creative destruction' keeps these firms alert to the threat of rival and potential 
rival innovators.  The theory proposes that these large firms use monopoly profits to 
engage in further productive R&D activities.  Since the work of Schumpeter (1942), 
two suggestions have arisen as to why large firms may drive innovative progress 
(Symeonidis, 1996): first it is proposed that a positive relationship exists between 
market power and the incentive to innovate.  A large market power increases the 
certainty that a new product will be successful and generate future profits for the 
firm.  Firm profits in turn provide the finance required for further R&D, bypassing 
any issues which may be faced in gaining finance for uncertain projects, for 
example.  Second, it is proposed that firm size and innovation are positively 
correlated with one another.  In keeping with the thoughts of Schumpeter (1942), 
larger firms are viewed as being better equipped to benefit from innovation 
irrespective of where the innovation occurs in the firm’s product range.  In addition 
to this, larger firms are more able to finance the large fixed costs required to 
implement new research and are also more able to manage any risk associated with 
their innovations (by diversifying their innovation portfolio, for example). 
The second factor which much of the determinants-of-R&D literature focuses upon 
includes more fundamental, industry-specific determinants of inter-industry R&D 
investment such as demand pull, technological opportunities and appropriability 
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(Barge-Gil and Lopez, 2014).  The effect of industry appropriability conditions upon 
a firm’s R&D and innovative output is not straight forward (Klevorick et al., 1995).  
Strong appropriability conditions enhance a firm’s incentive to engage in R&D, and 
weak appropriability conditions lower the cost of research for other firms, effectively 
increasing their opportunities.  When a firm invests in R&D, it is important that the 
firm is able to appropriate the returns to its investment so that the investment 
becomes worthwhile (Levin et al., 1987).  However, an increased appropriability will 
not always lead to an increase in innovative effort more generally (Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001; Bessen and Maskin, 2009; Lerner, 2009).  For example, 
appropriable innovation may lead to a reduction in future innovation (Nelson, 2006): 
the higher appropriability leads to fewer spillovers, and consequently, any R&D 
designed to absorb such spillovers is subsequently reduced (Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990). 
When competition within an industry increases, one may expect investment into 
R&D to be lower as firms’ expected return on any investment is lower.  When 
competition within an industry falls, the presence of market power for some firms 
allows them to appropriate the returns from their investments, and the higher profit 
which they earn allows them to finance further investment (Schumpeter, 1942).  
However, in a competitive environment, Schumpeter (1942) also states that in the 
case when rival behaviour is predictable, any uncertainty associated with excessive 
rivalry is reduced, increasing the incentive to invest.  In contrast to the 
Schumpeterian viewpoint, Arrow (1962) suggests that market power is a disincentive 
to investment because an increase in investment displaces any economic profit that is 
already being earned.  Scherer (1980) and Porter (1990) support the negative 
relationship between market power and R&D investment arguing that the lack of 
competitive pressures discourages innovation. 
Empirical studies investigating the effects of market concentration or industry 
structure upon innovative behaviour do not reach a consensus.  Some studies support 
Schumpeter’s (1942) view while others, assuming perfect ex-post appropriability, 
find that a firm’s gains from innovation at the margin are larger within an industry 
that is competitive ex ante rather than under monopoly conditions (Arrow, 1962). 
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Using an indicator of R&D (the percentage of sales that can be attributed to products 
developed during the last five years), Kraft (1989) conducts a cross-section analysis 
for 57 German firms and finds a positive relationship between product innovation 
and concentration (given by the inverse of the number of competitors within the 
industry to which the firm belongs).  This result is supported by Artés (2009) who 
finds that market concentration positively affects the long-term decision of investing 
in R&D.  However, market concentration is found to have no effect upon the short-
term decision.  Farber (1981) finds R&D increases with buyer-market concentration 
when the sellers’ market is concentrated but may decline with buyer-market 
concentration when the sellers’ market is less concentrated.  Kathuria (1989) 
suggests that the effects of seller-market concentration upon R&D may be biased in 
an upward direction if buyer-market concentration is not controlled for.  Cabral 
(1994) finds that market power is associated with development activities in a static 
framework, but in later research Cabral extends the analysis to incorporate a 
dynamic framework using a one-leader one-laggard model (Cabral, 2003).  Results 
from the later research indicate that the optimal choice for leaders is to pursue safer 
projects and for laggards to pursue riskier projects. 
Acs and Audretsch (1987) examine the characteristics of firms and their effects upon 
innovation in both concentrated and less concentrated industries.  They find that 
large firms are more innovative in concentrated industries with high barriers to entry 
and that smaller firms are more innovative in less concentrated industries that are 
less mature.  A similar conclusion was reached by Dorfman (1987) in a comparative 
study of four electronics industries. 
Examining firms from two different technological opportunity groups, Rosenberg 
(1976) finds a weak negative relationship between market share and R&D intensity 
levels.  Aghion et al. (2005) find an inverted relationship between product market 
competition and innovation.  Using panel data, they develop a model where 
competition discourages those firms progressing slowly and lagging behind others 
from innovating but encourages those firms racing forward, side by side with one 
another, to innovate. 
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It is sometimes the case that measures of industry structure are statistically 
significant in explaining R&D intensity or innovation, but the magnitude of the 
effects is economically unimportant.  The industry-structure effect often disappears 
when other industry characteristics are included within the analysis (review in Cohen 
and Levin, 1989). 
The empirical evidence discussed above illustrates mixed findings.  Results typically 
depend upon the underlying assumptions and focus of each study.  Much of the 
empirical evidence fails to standardise R&D type, firm size and the definition of 
market power, all of which affect the R&D investment which takes place.  Another 
reason as to why the relationship between R&D and market concentration is 
ambiguous is the reverse-causality relationship concentration has with many 
variables, for example profits and entry barriers (Kathuria, 1989).  Many channels 
exist through which market concentration can influence R&D, and estimation results 
reflect the many different connections which occur simultaneously between R&D 
and market concentration.  
Given that no consensus has been reached as to the effects of industry 
competitiveness upon R&D investment and innovation, it is proposed that: 
Hypothesis 1a: A firm’s investment into intangible assets increases when industry 
competitiveness increases 
Hypothesis 1b: A firm’s investment into intangible assets decreases when industry 
competitiveness increases 
Empirically, evidence on the relationship between appropriability and R&D 
investment is inconclusive.  Some studies find no statistically-significant effect of 
appropriability upon R&D intensity (for example, Levin et al., 1985), while others 
find a positive effect for some industries (for example, Mansfield, 1986).  Levin et 
al. (1985) find R&D intensity to be greater in young industries, in those industries 
with a strong science base and in industries where the government makes a 
substantial contribution towards technological knowledge.  Although statistically 
insignificant, the sign on the appropriability variable is as expected, and Levin et al. 
(1985) conclude that inter-industry variations in R&D incentives can be further 
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explained by examining the underlying differences which exist in the technological 
opportunities and appropriability conditions within industries.  
Mansfield (1986) conducts an empirical analysis based upon data from 100 United 
States (US) manufacturing firms – excluding very small firms – spanning twelve 
different industries.  Appropriability is found to be more important for the 
introduction of new innovations in some industries: it is most important in the 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals industries, less so in the petroleum, machinery and 
fabricated metal products industries, and least of all in all other industries. 
The industry appropriability regime (discussed in Section 2.2.3.1 above) is often 
thought to influence the amount of innovation expenditure undertaken by firms (Hall 
and Sena, 2017), a reasonable assumption given that firms invest more if they expect 
to appropriate the returns (Arrow, 1962).  The particular appropriability regime a 
firm faces is determined by the nature of the technology within the industry and the 
knowledge-protection mechanisms that are available for the firms within the industry 
to use effectively.  Parker (1972) and Rosenberg (1974) describe the nature of the 
firm’s technology as an important determinant of its investment into innovative 
activities; firms are more likely, for example, to invest in innovative activities if 
natural protection against knowledge spillovers is offered to them in the form of tacit 
knowledge deep within their technological processes.  As the technological element 
of an appropriability regime functions as a contingency factor significantly affecting 
innovation in the firm and within the industry (Cohen and Levin, 1989; Castellacci, 
2007), firms facing similar technological regimes are likely to adopt similar 
innovation strategies (Revilla and Fernández, 2012). 
The knowledge-protection mechanisms that are available for effective use by firms 
within a particular industry – also part of the industry appropriability regime – 
provide competitive firms with an incentive to innovate and invest in R&D.  Arrow 
(1962) provides an analysis which counters the Schumpeterian (large firm/market 
power) theory discussed above.  Knowledge protection (in the form of IP rights) 
allows the competitive firm to become a temporary monopolist.  However, not all 
firms are able to take advantage of all knowledge-protection mechanisms, for 
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example, small firms may be financially constrained and some IP rights may be 
ineffective in particular industries (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007). 
Theoretically, there is no consensus within the literature over the welfare and 
efficiency effects of stronger knowledge-protection regimes (Park, 2005).  Bessen 
and Maskin (2009) develop a sequential and complementary innovation in which 
patent protection reduces innovation and social welfare, and Takalo and Kanniainen 
(2000) suggest that strengthening patent rights may delay the introduction of a new 
technology into the market.  In contrast, theoretical studies by Diwan and Rodrik 
(1991) and Taylor (1994) reveal that stronger IP protection may enhance global 
welfare and productivity. 
Empirically, evidence shows that knowledge protection impacts upon R&D 
investment to a varying extent across different industries.  Taking a sample of 27 
firms from four British industries, Taylor and Silberston (1973) examine the use and 
effectiveness of patents.  They find that 60 per cent of pharmaceutical R&D, 15 per 
cent of chemical R&D, 5 per cent of mechanical engineering R&D, and a negligible 
amount of electronics R&D is dependent upon patent protection. 
Lerner (2009) examines the impact of changes in patent policy upon innovation.  
Significant shifts in patent policy over 150 years in 60 countries are analysed.  
Results show that strengthening patent protection does not have a positive impact 
upon innovation.  This result fails to support economists’ view that incentives affect 
behaviour and is inconsistent with the literature which finds that stronger property 
rights encourage economic growth.  Several reasons are suggested as to why this 
unexpected result is observed, including the use of an inappropriate measure of 
innovative output and the chosen time frame being too short. 
Using data on 26 countries that established pharmaceutical patent laws during the 
1978–2002 period, Qian (2007) investigates whether a country’s implementation of 
pharmaceutical patents stimulates domestic pharmaceutical R&D expenditure and 
innovation.  Results show that the implementation of patent laws does not by itself 
stimulate innovation, but patent laws in countries with high levels of development, 
education, and economic freedom do stimulate innovation.  This study also provides 
empirical support for the theory that the relationship between innovation and IP 
51 
 
protection strength has an “inverted U” shape (Gallini, 1992; Horowitz and Lai, 
1996) – there is an optimal level of IP protection, above which additional 
strengthening discourages innovation. 
Sakakibara and Branstetter (1999) examine firm responses to the Japanese patent 
reforms of 1988.  Results from interviews carried out suggest that the average 
response to the reforms, in terms of additional R&D expenditure and innovation, was 
small.  Econometric analysis using Japanese and US patent data on 307 Japanese 
firms supports the interview findings that the magnitude of the response is minimal. 
The most important dimensions of the industry appropriability regime – the nature of 
the industry technology and the means of intellectual property protection available to 
protect both the innovations themselves and any increased rents that flow from them 
(Teece, 1986, 1998, 2000a; Levin et al., 1987; Teece and Pisano, 1998) – have been 
found to have differing effects upon a firm’s investment into R&D, and given this, it 
is proposed that:  
Hypothesis 2a: A firm’s investment into intangible assets increases when the 
industry appropriability regime strengthens 
Hypothesis 2b: A firm’s investment into intangible assets decreases when the 
industry appropriability regime strengthens 
ii. Intangibles protection 
The protection of knowledge assets and other intangibles limits imitation and helps 
firms to gain a competitive advantage (Teece et al., 1997).  Across industries, 
variations exist in the manner in which firms protect their knowledge assets, mainly 
due to the different competitive dynamics which are present.  As competition within 
an industry increases, one expects the use of both formal and informal knowledge-
protection mechanisms to increase.  By using knowledge-protection mechanisms, a 
firm is able to guard itself against imitation threats and appropriate the returns from 
its innovations – the firm becomes a temporary monopolist (Arrow, 1962).  The 
degree of industry competitiveness may therefore impact upon firms’ intangibles 
protection strategies.  For example, if a monopolist were to control the market, it 
would be inefficient for other firms within the industry to use costly protection 
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methods (Granstrand, 1999).  The knowledge-protection mechanisms firms choose 
differ across competitive environments as the pool of available knowledge and 
innovation, as well as the networking opportunities which exist within an industry, 
also differ across competitive environments.  Different industry environments also 
have different information and knowledge structures in terms of the degree of 
codification, complexity and observability of knowledge which exists.  Given this, it 
is expected that: 
Hypothesis 3: A firm’s intangibles protection (use of knowledge-protection 
mechanisms) increases when industry competitiveness increases 
The appropriability regime within an industry’s environment and the IP laws which 
prevail within a country also impact upon a firm’s intangibles protection strategy.  
For example, effective patent protection requires adequate patent laws and the 
enforcement of these laws by a governing body (Teece, 1986, 2006; Granstrand, 
2006). 
Across industrial sectors, the competitive strategies available to firms differ 
(Kaniovski and Peneder, 2002).  The different technological characteristics which 
exist across industries help determine the knowledge-protection mechanisms that are 
applicable within each industry.  For example, differences exist in the value of 
patents to firms in different industries (Levin et al., 1987; Harabi, 1995) and in how 
they are rated by firms (Granstrand, 1999) as a means of appropriating investments 
in innovation.  Empirically, the effectiveness of patents in preventing imitation has 
been shown to vary across industrial sectors.  In a study of Swiss firms for example, 
Harabi (1995) finds that patents are effective in the chemicals (including drugs) 
industry and occasionally in the machinery and electronics industries. 
In sectors which produce complex products that are costly to copy, or where barriers 
to entry are created by high investment costs and expertise levels, for example in the 
aerospace industry, lead-time advantages and technical complexity are relatively 
more important than patents as methods of knowledge protection 
(Arundel and Kabla, 1998).  However, firms in a complex product environment are 
more likely to patent; high-technology firms have a higher propensity to patent than 
low-technology firms (Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999).  Firms using complex 
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technologies may also require the use of more complex strategies as technological 
complexity affects the requirements in terms of intangible-asset management.  For 
example, firms using complex technologies may require the use of various types of 
licensing strategies to enable the freedom to operate (Cohen et al., 2000; Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001; Teece, 2009).  In sectors where standards are important, for 
example, the telecommunications industry, the possibility of reaching a strong 
position in the standard by patenting essential inventions is an important motive to 
patent (Granstrand, 1999; Bekkers et al., 2002).  
Coles et al. (2003) identify that the nature of the technology – one dimension of the 
industry appropriability regime – affects firms’ protection strategies.  Small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the textile-design sector of the UK, Italy and 
the US are examined.  An increase in computer-aided design and communication 
technologies has increased the speed and quality of design copying, and this has 
impacted upon some sectors more than others.  As enforcing protection may be 
problematic for some SMEs due to limited resources, the study concludes that SMEs 
need to be able to adapt their protection strategies in response to the problem; for 
example, they may need to frequently change designs, implement competitive 
pricing policies and increase technical complexity so that designs are difficult to 
copy.  Leiponen and Byma (2009) conduct an empirical study of 504 small, Finnish 
manufacturing and service firms in order to identify firms’ most-used mechanisms 
for protecting innovations.  Findings suggest that R&D-intensive firms and science-
based firms are more likely to use formal methods of innovation protection.  Other 
firms are more likely to use speed-to-market or secrecy to protect their innovations. 
Davis (2006) identifies considerable sectoral differences in the role and strategic 
value of patents.  Some industries, for example telecommunications, are 
characterised by a “cumulative systems” technology where firms are mutually 
dependent upon access to each other’s ideas or inventions.  Firms apply for patents 
and then cross-license them to each other.  In this case, the function of the patent is 
not to exclude others but to coordinate access to knowledge.  In other sectors, for 
example the software industry, appropriating returns from R&D investments can be 
difficult.  For instance, it is possible to perfectly reproduce digital information goods 
and distribute them easily via the internet (Shapiro and Varian, 1999).  Instead, firms 
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in such sectors can choose to appropriate returns by means such as secrecy or lead-
time advantage (being first to take a new program to the market).  In contrast, in the 
pharmaceutical-related biotechnology industry, patents are seen as the best means to 
appropriate returns from R&D investments (Davis, 2006).  Products have a long 
development time and equipment and production facilities are costly.  Patent 
protection is effectively used to ensure imitation is deterred; in such sectors, the cost 
of copying an innovation is considerably less than the initial cost of invention 
(Arundel and Kabla, 1998). 
The distinction has also been made between the service and manufacturing sectors 
(Miles and Boden, 2000) in relation to the use of knowledge-protection mechanisms.  
Services are intangible in nature and innovation and appropriability conditions are 
different to those within the manufacturing sector.  Thoma and Bizer (2013) examine 
small firms using German Community Innovation Survey (CIS) data, and they find 
that the specific firm context i.e. the type of innovator, the degree of innovativeness 
and the general industry conditions determine the importance of appropriation 
protection to the firm. 
Firms’ protection strategies differ across product and process innovations.  Patents 
are typically more effective for product innovations than for process innovations 
(Levin et al., 1987; Granstrand, 1999) so that product innovations rather than process 
innovations tend to be protected by patents (Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Brouwer and 
Kleinknecht, 1999; Granstrand, 1999).  Products released into the marketplace may 
be subject to reverse engineering and benefit from formal protection mechanisms, 
whereas processes can effectively be kept within the firm and protected with trade 
secrets, for example (Harabi, 1995).  Levin et al. (1987) provide an early empirical 
study of different protection methods that supports this argument.  In a survey of 650 
individuals representing 130 business sub-sectors in the US, the effectiveness of 
alternative means of protecting new or improved products and processes is 
examined.  Findings suggest that patents are more effective than secrecy for new 
products and secrecy is more effective for new processes.  However, sales or service 




Grindley and Teece (1997) examine the use of licensing in the semiconductor and 
electronics industries.  They find that the use of legal protection differs across 
industries due to regulatory and legal distortions.  Firms in the semiconductor and 
electronics industries had previously been deterred from using legal protection by 
courts forcing them to license their technologies below market value.  Once 
distortions in legal regimes are removed, firms realise the value of legal protection 
and its importance to success.  Evolving legal protection regimes may therefore lead 
to differences in firms’ intangibles protection strategies. 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Puumalainen (2007a) conduct a survey of 299 small 
Finnish companies, across nine different sectors.  The role, availability, strength and 
efficiency of appropriability mechanisms are determined.  The appropriability 
regime is found to be dynamic in nature with the availability and strength of 
protection mechanisms determining their usage.  The study suggests that parallel 
strategies exist within firms, and that different appropriability mechanisms are used 
at different stages of the product or process life cycle.  It is also suggested that some 
protection methods are difficult to implement in certain knowledge-intensive 
industries due to the legal restrictions which are in place.  The availability, efficacy 
(i.e. the capacity to prevent imitation) and efficiency of different knowledge-
protection mechanisms are analysed in order to examine the strength of the 
appropriability regime.  The availability and efficacy are to a large extent ‘given’ 
within an industry, but there are some ‘chosen’ determinants of the regime, for 
example, firm goals and decisions (based upon the perceived efficiency of the 
mechanisms).  The study suggests that the nature of the technology and the 
innovation itself largely define the ways in which the innovation can be protected. 
Many of the factors in the literature discussed above are encompassed in the two 
dimensions of the industry appropriability regime.  Evidence shows that the nature of 
the industry technology (for example, a technology characterised by tacit knowledge 
embedded deep within the production process) and the availability of effective 
knowledge-protection mechanisms together affect a firm’s intangibles-protection 
strategy.  Low usage of both formal and informal protection mechanisms across an 
industry contributes towards a weak appropriability regime, whereas high usage of 
protection mechanisms contributes towards a strong appropriability regime, and a 
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technology characterised by tacit knowledge contributes towards a strong 
appropriability regime, whereas a technology characterised by codified knowledge 
contributes towards a weak appropriability regime. 
The literature indicates that firms are more likely to use knowledge-protection 
mechanisms if they are faced with a strong appropriability regime in their industry as 
given by the knowledge-protection dimension of the appropriability regime, and 
more likely to use knowledge-protection mechanisms if they are faced with a weak 
appropriability regime in their industry as given by the nature of technology 
dimension of the appropriability regime (see for example Coles et al., 2003).  In this 
way, the industry appropriability regime sets limits on a firm’s intangibles 
knowledge-protection strategy and helps determine the knowledge-protection 
mechanisms that are used within an industry and whether they will be used at all.  
Given this, it is proposed that: 
Hypothesis 4a: A firm’s intangibles protection (use of knowledge-protection 
mechanisms) increases when the ‘nature of technology’ dimension of 
the industry appropriability regime weakens 
Hypothesis 4b: A firm’s intangibles protection (use of knowledge-protection 
mechanisms) increases when the knowledge-protection dimension of 
the industry appropriability regime strengthens 
2.4 Data and methods 
2.4.1 Data 
The empirical analysis in the present study is based upon five waves of the UK 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) covering the period 2002 to 2012 (CIS4 to 
CIS8) and data from the Business Structure Database (BSD) covering the period 
1997 to 2012.   
2.4.1.1 The UK Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 
The first data source, the UK CIS, represents the main source of innovation data in 
the UK and Europe, providing detailed information on firms’ innovation activity; it 
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is a data source widely used by innovation researchers (see for example, Laursen and 
Salter, 2005; Love et al., 2010; Hall and Sena, 2017). 
The UK CIS is based upon a core questionnaire developed by the European 
Commission (Eurostat) and Member States, and forms part of a wider CIS covering 
European countries – the European Union Community Innovation Survey.  
Background and motivation for the UK’s innovation survey can be found in the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Oslo manual 
(OECD, 2005), along with a description of the type of questions and definitions 
used.  In the UK, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) – the UK official 
government statistical office – manages the administration of and data collection for 
the UK CIS. 
The UK CIS is conducted every two years by means of a postal questionnaire and 
follow-up telephone interviews.  The surveys are non-compulsory and, for the waves 
analysed here, achieved a response rate ranging between 51 per cent in 2012 (CIS 8) 
and 58 per cent in 2004 (CIS 4)4.  The UK surveys provide detailed information on 
firms' innovation activity, an indication of the objectives of firms' innovation activity 
and their external innovation connections.  Questions relating to firm size and 
structure, customer base, firm product and process innovation activity, the sources of 
innovation, perceived barriers to innovation, the levels of public support and basic 
economic information about the firm are included.  The surveys contain up to 
approximately 16,000 firms with 10 or more employees.  The data is designed to be 
statistically representative of the 12 regions of the UK, most industrial sectors and all 
sizes of firms.  The sampling frame is taken from the Inter-departmental Business 
Register (IDBR), a UK-Government compiled register of all UK businesses based on 
tax and payroll records. 
2.4.1.2 The Business Structure Database (BSD) 
The second data source used in the empirical analysis is the BSD.  The BSD is 
derived primarily from the IDBR, which is a live register of data collected by Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs via Value Added Tax (VAT) and Pay As You Earn 
(PAYE) records.  In 2004 it was estimated that businesses listed on the IDBR 
                                                          
4 See: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/community-innovation-survey   
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accounted for almost 99 per cent of economic activity in the UK.  Only very small 
businesses, such as the self-employed, are not listed.  The BSD represents the IDBR 
at one particular moment in time and provides a version of the IDBR for research 
use.  The reporting period is the financial year, and there are up to approximately 5.5 
million firms included.  The dataset contains a small number of variables for almost 
all UK firms, and these include employment, turnover, foreign ownership, Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, start-up dates and termination dates. 
2.4.1.3 Dependent variables 
Using the CIS, two groups of dependent variables are defined which relate to a 
firm’s intangibles strategy.  The first group relates to a firm’s investment into 
intangible assets and the second group relates to a firm’s protection of intangible 
assets. 
i. Investment into intangible assets 
Corrado et al. (2006) divide intangible investment into three main types:  
computerised information, innovative property and economic competencies.  
Computerised information is investment that involves loading information into 
computers to make them more useful (Haskel and Westlake, 2018).  Examples of 
computerised information include software and databases.  Databases have become 
relatively more important in recent years following the growth of big data in the 
technology sector.  Innovative property includes R&D (scientific-oriented spending) 
and other types of product and service development that do not rely upon science and 
technology.  These include design and other forms of creation and discovery (for 
example, prospecting for oil) (Haskel and Westlake, 2018).  Economic competencies 
are other investments which do not directly involve innovation or computers.  This 
includes marketing and branding (investment in understanding customers’ needs, for 
example), organisational capital (the creation of business models or corporate 
cultures, for example) and firm-specific training.  Although thought of as intangible 
investment, economic competencies and design (part of innovative property) are not 
treated as investments in National Accounts (Corrado et al., 2013). 
The first group of dependent variables – firms’ investment into intangible assets – 
uses CIS data signalling firms’ innovation activities.  In the CIS surveys, the 
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following question is asked, ‘Did your enterprise engage in the following 
innovation-related activities / Did this business invest in any of the following, for the 
purposes of current or future innovation?’  Four innovation activities listed in the 
surveys represent intangible investment as defined in Carrado (2006) – R&D, design, 
training, and computer software.  Response data is binary indicating whether or not 
investment took place during the period.  The intangibles investment dependent 
variables are constructed as follows: 
a. R&D – The surveys examine both intramural and extramural investment into 
R&D, but for the purpose of this study, a firm is assumed to have made an 
R&D investment if either intramural or extramural investment has taken 
place during the period.  R&D investment data from all five CIS waves is 
used in the analysis.  The R&D dependent variable is set equal to one if 
investment took place and zero otherwise.  The use of R&D data here is 
consistent with Webster and Jensen (2006) who also use R&D data to 
investigate intangible investments. 
b. Design – The CIS question relating to design investment varies across the 
CIS waves.  For the CIS 4 to CIS 6 surveys (2002 to 2008), the question 
relates to expenditure on design for the development or implementation of 
new or improved goods, services or processes.  In CIS 7 and CIS 8 (2008 to 
2012), design investment includes strategic design activities.  For this reason, 
analysis of design investment is carried out in two parts, CIS 4 to CIS 6 and 
CIS 7 to CIS 8.  The design dependent variables are set equal to one if 
investment took place and zero otherwise. 
c. Training – Training investment in the CIS surveys relates to internal or 
external training which took place specifically for the development and/or 
introduction of innovations.  Training investment data from all five CIS 
waves is used in the analysis.  The training dependent variable is set equal to 
one if investment took place and zero otherwise. 
d. Computer software – The acquisition of computer software is addressed in 
CIS 5 to CIS 8 (2004 to 2012), and this data is used in the analysis.  In CIS 4, 
the question relating to the acquisition of computer software is combined 
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with the acquisition of machinery and equipment, and therefore data from 
this CIS wave is not used.  The computer-software dependent variable is set 
equal to one if investment took place and zero otherwise. 
ii. Protection of intangible assets 
The different forms of knowledge-protection mechanisms that can be used to protect 
innovation and the returns which flow from them are discussed in Section 2.2.3.1 
above.  Formal, legally enforceable, protection mechanisms typically include 
registered rights such as patents, design rights and trademarks and unregistered rights 
such as copyright whereas informal protection mechanisms such as secrecy, 
complexity of design and lead-time on competitors are not based directly on 
regulated structures and statutory enforcement possibilities (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 
2014). 
The second set of dependent variables in the analysis undertaken here relates to 
firms’ protection of intangible assets.  In CIS 4 and CIS 5 the firm is asked, ‘Please 
indicate the importance to your enterprise of each of the following methods to 
protect innovations’.  Responses to this question are subjective and reflect the 
manager’s viewpoint as to how important he/she thinks each of the protection 
mechanisms were to innovation carried out during the previous three-year period.  In 
addition, the response may reflect knowledge-protection mechanisms which were 
obtained by the firm more than three years ago and used to protect innovation carried 
out during the survey period as well as knowledge-protection mechanisms newly 
initiated during the survey period. 
Firms are asked to indicate the importance of eight different protection mechanisms.  
Formal protection mechanisms as defined above include registration of design, 
trademarks, patents, confidentiality agreements and copyright, and informal 
protection mechanisms as defined above include secrecy, complexity of design and 
lead time.  Respondents are able to choose their response from four possible answers 
– not used (0), low importance (1), medium importance (2), high importance (3).  
The number in parentheses represents the value assigned in the datasets.  This data 
form thus gives rise to an ordered-categorical dependent variable. 
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In CIS 6 and CIS 7, the question relating to the protection of knowledge asks, ‘Did 
this business apply for a patent, register an industrial design, register a 
trademark…?’ etc.  Formal protection mechanisms listed include patents, industrial 
design, trademarks and copyright; these are included in both CIS 6 and CIS 7.  
Informal protection mechanisms listed include secrecy, complexity of design and 
lead time; these are included in CIS 7 alone.  This data provides a binary dependent 
variable, set equal to one if new protection took place during the survey period and 
zero otherwise. 
2.4.1.4 Independent variables 
i. The industry appropriability regime 
The first group of independent variables in the analysis represent the industry 
appropriability regime.  The nature of the industry technology (for example, whether 
firms undertake product or process innovations and/or whether knowledge is tacit or 
codified) and the means of knowledge protection used to protect both the innovations 
themselves and any increased rents which flow from them are two important 
dimensions of the industry appropriability regime (Teece, 1986, 1998, 2000a; Levin 
et al., 1987; Teece and Pisano, 1998).  The appropriability regime is part of an 
industry’s environment, and its measure is created here using industry averages of 
the firm-level data.  Averages of firm-level data are often used to represent industry 
variables.  For example, in their study on informal and formal co-operations for 
innovation, Bonte and Keilbach (2005) compute an industry-level legal-
appropriation variable using the mean score of firm-level data, Laursen and Salter 
(2014) create an industry variable using averages of their firm-level importance-of-
appropriability measure in order to investigate the effects of inter-industry 
differences in appropriability regimes on the breadth of external search and formal 
collaboration for innovation, Hall and Sena (2017) create industry appropriability 
variables using binary firm-level data averaged over industries, and, although not 
subject related, Hansen and Wernerfelt (1989) in their study on the determinants of 
firm performance, define industry profitability as a sales weighted average of firm-
level return.  
In order to create the industry appropriability-regime measures, firms in the pooled 
CIS dataset are sorted into thirteen industry groups according to their five-digit UK 
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Standard Industrial Classification code in 2003 (SIC 2003).  Six industry-level 
measures are formulated for each industry group using data from the pooled CIS 
dataset; the six measures represent the different dimensions of the industry 
appropriability regime. 
Of these six measures, four reflect the nature of technology within each industry 
group: 
a. The first variable indicating the nature of the technology within the industry 
is a firm’s average propensity to be a product innovator (given its industry 
group), and this is calculated using the binary data indicating whether or not a 
firm is a product innovator.  The average of the firm-level responses within 
each industry group is calculated.  This calculated value represents the 
average propensity for a firm to be a product innovator within its industry 
group. 
b. The second variable reflecting the nature of the technology within an industry 
is a firm’s average propensity to be a process innovator (given its industry 
group).  This is calculated in a similar way to the firm’s average propensity to 
be a product innovator.  Binary data indicating whether or not a firm is a 
process innovator is averaged across each industry group.  This calculated 
average represents the average propensity for a firm to be a process 
innovator within its industry group. 
In order to identify whether knowledge is tacit or codified within an industry group, 
firm-level data obtained from the question, ‘How important to your firm’s 
innovation activities were each of the following information sources?’ is used.  Two 
of the sources listed are, ‘Scientific journals and trade/technical publications’ and 
‘Technical, industry or service standards’.  If firms identify these sources as being of 
medium or high importance to the firm’s innovations, knowledge is assumed to be 
more codified, and if these sources are not used or of low importance, knowledge is 
assumed to be more tacit.  Two further variables representing the nature of the 
technology within an industry group are created using this information. 
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c. A firm-level binary variable (for scientific journals and trade/technical 
publications) is created using all five CIS waves.  The variable is set equal to 
one if the source is of medium or high importance to firm innovations and set 
equal to zero if it is not used or of low importance. 
Using this data, a further variable indicating the nature of the technology in 
the industry is created by calculating the average of the firm-level binary data 
for each industry.  These average values represent the average propensity for 
firms to view scientific journals and trade/technical publications as being of 
medium or high importance to firm innovations within the industry group. 
d. A firm-level binary variable (for technical, industry or service standards) is 
created using all five CIS waves.  The variable is set equal to one if the 
source is of medium or high importance to firm innovations and set equal to 
zero if it is not used or of low importance. 
Using this data, a further variable indicating the nature of the technology in 
the industry is created by calculating the average of the firm-level binary data 
for each industry.  These average values represent the average propensity for 
firms to view technical, industry or service standards as being of medium or 
high importance to firm innovations within the industry group.   
The two variables created in c and d above are an indication of the average 
propensity for firm knowledge to be codified within the industry group. 
The remaining two measures represent the knowledge-protection dimension of the 
industry appropriability regime i.e. the available, effective knowledge-protection 
mechanisms within the industry.  CIS 4 to CIS 7 are used to create the industry-level 
protection measures despite the questions relating to knowledge protection being 
different across CIS waves.  As mentioned above in Section 2.4.1.3, the question in 
CIS 4 and CIS 5 asks about the importance of the various protection mechanisms to 
the firm’s innovations, whereas the question in CIS 6 and CIS 7 asks about new 
protection that has taken place during the survey period: 
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e. First, using CIS 4 and CIS 5 data, a formal-importance binary variable is 
created and set equal to one if any of the formal mechanisms of knowledge 
protection is of medium or high importance and zero otherwise.  The average 
of this variable is calculated for each industry group, and an industry-level 
average formal-importance variable is created for the entire CIS 4 to CIS 8 
period using this data.  If no observations exist in CIS 4 and CIS 5 for a 
particular industry group, the overall sample average is used. 
Second, using CIS 6 and CIS 7, a formal-new-protection binary variable is 
created and set equal to one if any new formal protection took place during 
the survey period and zero otherwise.  The average of this variable is 
calculated for each industry group, and an industry-level formal-new-
protection variable is created for the entire CIS 4 to CIS 8 dataset.  Again, the 
whole-sample average is used if no observations exist for a particular 
industry group within the CIS 6 and CIS 7 data. 
An industry-level formal-protection variable is created by averaging the 
industry-level formal-importance variable and the industry-level formal-new-
protection variable.  This variable represents the average propensity for firms 
to use formal knowledge protection or to view formal knowledge protection 
as being important within an industry.  It is an indication of the available and 
effective formal knowledge-protection mechanisms within the industry 
group. 
f. Third, using CIS 4 and CIS 5, an informal-importance binary variable is 
created and set equal to one if any of the informal mechanisms is of medium 
or high importance and zero otherwise.  The average of this variable is 
calculated for each industry group and an industry-level informal-importance 
variable is created for the entire CIS 4 to CIS 8 period.  If no observations 
exist for a particular industry group in CIS 4 or CIS 5, the overall sample 
average is used. 
Fourth, using CIS 7, an informal-new-protection binary variable is created 
and set equal to one if any informal new protection took place during the 
survey period and zero otherwise (new informal protection data is only 
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available in CIS 7).  The average of this variable is calculated for each 
industry group and an industry-level informal-new-protection variable is 
created for the entire CIS 4 to CIS 8 period.  Again, a whole-sample average 
is used if there are no observations for a particular industry group in the 
CIS 7 data. 
An industry-level informal-protection variable is created by averaging the 
industry-level informal-importance variable and the industry-level informal-
new-protection variable.  This variable represents the average propensity for 
firms to use informal knowledge protection or to view informal knowledge 
protection as being important within an industry.  It is an indication of the 
available and effective informal knowledge-protection mechanisms within 
the industry group. 
ii. Industry structure 
The second group of independent variables represent industry structure in the model.  
Drawing on the structure-conduct-performance paradigm and Porter’s five-
competitive forces framework (Porter, 1980) discussed in Section 2.2.2.1 above, the 
two industry-structure independent variables represent three of the underlying 
sources of competitive pressure which their strategies depend upon: the threat of new 
entrants, the threat of substitute products or services and the threat of established 
rivals i.e. the competitive forces which arise from horizontal competition.  The 
model assumes that firms plan for and respond to these competitive forces so that 
their strategies take advantage of any opportunities which exist as well as addressing 
any threats which exist within the industry environment. 
Typically, industry structure is summarised by the number of firms or some other 
measure of the distribution of firms, such as the relative market shares of the largest 
firms (Perloff et. al., 2007).  In the present study, the concentration ratio – the first 
industry structure variable – is used to represent the competitive forces coming from 
established rivals as well as competitive forces coming from the threat of substitute 
products or services. 
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The most commonly used methods in determining industry structures are the 
Concentration Ratio and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).5  The 
Concentration Ratio represents the sum of market shares of the n largest firms, where 
n is typically 3, 4 or 5 or 8.  Its calculation is relatively easy, and some countries’ 
statistics provide these statistics directly.  However, this measure does not take into 
account the size distribution within the top n firms and the size distribution of the 
firms outside the n firms. Therefore, it may only provide a very rough idea of the 
competition level (Du and Chen, 2010).  The HHI is equal to the sum of each firm's 
market share squared.  It has a maximum value equal to 1 (or 10,000), and it declines 
as the number of firms increases.  In a market where the number of firms is given, 
HHI is at its minimum when all firms are of equal size, and it increases with 
increasing variance of market shares.  The HHI reflects number and size distribution 
of firms as well as concentration. 
A large body of empirical literature uses the Concentration Ratio and the HHI as 
measures of market concentration: for example, both measures are used by Shukla 
and Thampy (2011) to investigate competition and market power in the wholesale 
electricity market in India; the concentration ratio is used by Roder et al. (2000) to 
represent market structure in their study investigating the determinants of product 
introductions in the US food industry, and by Ab-Rahim and Chiang (2016) to 
examine the relationship between the market structure and the financial performance 
of Malaysian commercial banks.  Following these studies, the present analysis uses 
the five-firm concentration ratio to represent market structure and the competitive 
forces which exist within the industry.6    
First, the five-firm concentration ratio is calculated for each industry group (the 
share of industry sales accounted for by the five largest firms).  This measure 
provides information about the relative distribution of market shares between the top 
five and the remaining firms, but does not provide information about changes in 
distribution within these groups.  The industry concentration ratio lies between zero 
and one hundred per cent.  In an industry with a large number of firms operating 
                                                          
5 Other measures of market concentration include the Hannah and Kay Index and the Gini Coefficient. 
6 A HHI was also constructed and used in the early stages of the analysis.  The performance of the 
five-firm concentration ratio was superior to that of the HHI, and the decision was taken to remove 
the HHI from the analysis.  
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with small market shares, the concentration ratio will be low.  Those firms producing 
homogeneous products have little market power and the industry operates close to a 
situation of perfect competition.  As the degree of market power and concentration 
increases within an industry, the market tends towards one of oligopoly or 
monopoly.  The level of competition within the industry is therefore given by the 
concentration ratio variable. 
Using the pooled BSD dataset (1997 to 2012) and the five-digit SIC 2003 codes, 
total turnover for each of the thirteen industry groups is calculated by summing the 
individual-firm turnover values.  This is repeated for all years which correspond with 
the CIS 4 to CIS 8 surveys.  Each firm’s market share is then calculated for each of 
the years.  For each year, the five largest market shares within each industry group 
are summed.  These summed values represent the concentration ratios for each 
industry group within each year.  Using these values, a concentration-ratio variable is 
created for the CIS 4 to CIS 8 pooled dataset. 
So as not to overemphasise the role of concentration, an additional dimension of 
market competition structure is included in the analysis.  Other dimensions, such as 
entry barriers and product differentiation, are often overlooked in empirical work due 
to the difficulty in obtaining an appropriate empirical measure.  In an attempt to 
overcome these shortcomings, a measure of market entry is included in the analysis.  
There are many studies detailing the effects of firm entry on competitiveness and 
market structure (see for example, Bresnahan and Reiss, 1990; Geroski, 1989).  In 
the present study, the industry birth rate is used as an indication to the number of 
new entrants in a market.  The industry birth rate represents competitive forces 
coming from the threat of new entrants and the threat of substitute products or 
services.  A higher birth rate may also indicate lower barriers to entry to the industry.  
As the birth rate increases and the level of competition within the industry increases, 
economic rents and competitive advantages may be eroded away. 
New entrants within an industry group are calculated using firm birth dates available 
in the pooled BSD dataset.  The number of firms born in each of the thirteen industry 
groups in each year between 2002 and 2012 is calculated.  Values are summed to 
calculate the total number of firms born within each industry group during each CIS 
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wave (three-year period).  Next, the total number of firms within each industry group 
during each CIS wave is calculated from the pooled BSD dataset.  Using this 
information, a birth rate for each industry group and for each CIS wave is calculated. 
2.4.1.5 Control variables 
A series of firm-level independent variables are included as control variables.  These 
are factors other than the industry appropriability regime and industry structure 
which may impact upon a firm’s intangibles strategy. 
i. Log of total employment 
Following Schumpeterian practice, the log of total employment is included to reflect 
the scale of firms’ resources.  Empirically, studies testing the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis regarding the advantages of firm size for R&D and innovative activity 
have not reached a consensus, although a number of stylised facts have emerged 
(Cohen and Klepper, 1996).  There are several reasons as to why a positive 
relationship may exist between firm size and R&D investment.  Firstly, smaller firms 
face financial constraints that limit R&D expenditure, whereas larger firms have 
more internal funds available.  Secondly, R&D is subject to a minimum project size 
and this prevents smaller firms from undertaking such investments (Galbraith, 1952).  
Thirdly, larger investments are more profitable for larger firms due to the existence 
of economies of scale.  Fourthly, economies of scope, in terms of the availability of 
complementary assets, gives larger firms an advantage over smaller firms (Cohen 
and Levin, 1989), and finally, R&D investment involves risk taking.  Larger firms 
are more able to mitigate these risks over different projects, whereas smaller firms 
typically focus on one or a few projects (Rammer et al., 2009).  These arguments 
supporting the positive relationship between firm size and R&D investment are 
based upon assumptions relating to the nature and size of transaction costs; these 
assumptions are rarely tested Cohen et al. (1987).  A series of arguments also exist in 
support of smaller firms investing relatively more in R&D than larger firms.  These 
include smaller firms being more efficient in performing R&D activities due to the 
managerial control that exists within their organisations (Holmstrom, 1989) and 
individuals in smaller firms being incentivised more due to there being a higher 




The protection of intangible assets also differs across large and small firms (Arundel 
and Kabla, 1998; Kitching and Blackburn, 1998; Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999; 
Davis, 2006).  There is a relatively low usage of formal protection mechanisms in 
SMEs compared with larger firms.  Larger firms invest in more of all forms of 
protection of innovation; 2.1 per cent of small firms protected an innovation with a 
patent during the 2008 to 2010 period, compared with 6.3 per cent of large firms 
(Hargreaves, 2011).  SMEs view the use of formal mechanisms as a complex 
process.  Owner-managers of small firms lack the knowledge and information 
required to pursue such protection.  They are reluctant to adopt formal mechanisms 
because they perceive protection-related costs (both money and time) to be high (for 
example, dealing with patent offices and patent lawyers and gaining the 
knowledge/skills needed to enforce protection).  Administering and enforcing 
protection is problematic for SMEs, especially when they are in dispute with larger 
firms.  In practice, SMEs rely more on informal methods of protection (maintaining 
a lead-time advantage, trust and secrecy, for example). 
ii. Graduate skills 
The level of graduate skills within a firm is introduced as two control variables – the 
proportion of science and engineering graduates and the proportion of other 
graduates.  These variables reflect the strength of human capital, and they are 
expected to be positively related to innovation activity (Freel, 2005; Leiponen, 
2005). 
iii. Exporter 
A binary export variable, indicating whether or not a firm exports, is the fourth 
control variable capturing any benefit firms derive from selling in international 
markets.  Previous studies have linked exporting and innovative activity through 
both competition and learning effects (Love and Roper, 2013). 
iv. Co-operator 
A binary innovation-co-operation variable, indicating whether or not a firm 
co-operates on any innovation activities, is the fifth control variable.  Chesborough 
(2003) suggests that engaging in open innovation widens the innovation 
opportunities available to the firm.  Firms can use internal and external ideas to 
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advance their technology.  Deliberately importing and exporting knowledge may 
promote innovative activity.  Firms make use of innovative processes, products and 
IP from other companies and through partnerships and licensing etc., external parties 
can make use of firms’ internal assets.  The greater the number of external 
relationships and the more varied these relationships are, the greater the probability 
of gaining useful knowledge from outside the firm (Leiponen and Helfat, 2010).  
Empirical evidence also suggests that any knowledge gained is likely to be 
complementary with a firm’s internal knowledge (Roper et al., 2008).  Through 
co-operation, firms find new ways of sharing new and existing knowledge, and the 
extent to which a firm engages in open innovation impacts upon its intangibles 
strategy.  Peeters and van Pottelsberghe (2006) identify that a firm’s appropriation 
strategy depends upon the extent to which it enters into collaborative R&D, and 
Laursen and Salter (2014) look at how a firm’s attitude towards appropriability is 
associated with the openness of the firm to external factors.  They show that ‘firm-
level choices concerning the strength of appropriability strategy are connected to 
firms’ relationships to external actors in the innovation system’ (Laursen and Salter, 
2014, p.876), although they do not make any claims about causality.   
v. Public support 
Finally, a binary public-support variable, indicating whether or not a firm has 
received any financial support for innovation activities from local or regional 
authorities, central government or the European Union, is included as a control.  
Unfortunately, this data is unavailable for CIS 5 and CIS 8.  It is expected that public 
support has a positive effect on innovation activity (Hewitt-Dundas and Roper 
2009).  Other studies examining the effectiveness of various forms of public support 
for R&D and innovation have generally found positive effects in terms of the scale 
of private R&D investments and innovation outputs (Hsu et al., 2009; Luukkonen, 
2000). 
To control for any temporal effects on the dependent variable, wave dummies are 
included in each model.  The industry-level independent variables within the models 
are assumed to summarise the effects of all industry-level variables, and for this 
reason, sectoral dummies are excluded.  Inclusion would lead to misspecification of 
the models (Hansen and Wernerfelt, 1989). 
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2.4.2 Estimation method 
The empirical approaches adopted here reflect the nature of the dependent variables 
being investigated.  Two different types of model are estimated.  The first – a probit 
model – is used to analyse firms’ intangibles investment and protection.  Firms 
choose to invest or not to invest and they choose to protect or not to protect.  The 
data is coded as a zero or a one, and the probit estimation procedure models the 
probability that the dependent variable will be equal to one i.e. it models the 
probability that intangibles investment or protection will take place.  The probit 
models are estimated using the maximum likelihood method, a method which is 
always consistent and efficient.  In order to use this method, it is assumed that the 
errors are normally distributed: the probit model is the cumulative distribution 
function of the standard normal distribution. 
The second model – an ordered-probit model – is used to analyse the importance 
firms attach to intangibles protection.  The ordered-probit estimation method is a 
generalisation of the probit analysis to the case where more than two outcomes of an 
ordinal dependent variable exist.  Firms indicate the importance to their business of 
various protection methods for innovation.  Data is coded as a 0 (not important), 1 
(low importance), 2 (medium importance) or a 3 (high importance) resulting in an 
ordered categorical dependent variable.  As the categories are rankings and the 
difference between different outcomes may not be uniform, it is difficult to interpret 
the response data.  Prediction with the ordered probit model is more complex than 
with the probit model as, in this case, there are four possible predicted probabilities 
(i.e. the number of possible values of the dependent variable).  As with the probit 
model, the errors are assumed to be normally distributed. 
The standard probit model assumes homoscedasticity (a constant error variance), a 
necessary characteristic to be able to give the estimation results a counterfactual 
interpretation.  As industry differences are expected to be present in the estimation 
data, heteroscedasticity (a non-constant error variance) is likely to be present.  In the 
presence of heteroscedasticity, the maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters 
of a standard probit model (homoscedastic model) lead to incorrect standard errors 
and biased and inconsistent parameters (Yatchew and Griliches, 1985).  The solution 
is to estimate a heteroscedastic probit model that allows the error variance to depend 
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upon some of the predictors in the regression model.  First, the heteroscedastic probit 
model tests if there is heteroscedasticity, and second, it makes an adjustment by 
relaxing the assumption that the error distribution of the latent model has a unit 
variance.  For each probit model, both the homoscedastic and heteroscedastic 
estimation results are obtained with the error variance in the heteroscedastic models 
being allowed to depend upon the industry-level variables (i.e. the appropriability 
regime, the five-firm concentration ratio and the birth rate). 
Unfortunately, many of the variables representing the industry appropriability regime 
are highly correlated with one another leading to multicollinearity problems.  
Therefore it is not possible to examine their impact upon intangibles strategy in the 
same estimated equation.  As a solution, each element of the industry appropriability 
regime is analysed separately.  This method has been used by other researchers when 
faced with a similar issue (see for example Hall and Sena (2017) who estimated 
separate productivity equations when faced with process and product innovation 
probabilities that were highly correlated with one another). 
2.5 Results  
2.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients are given in Tables 2.1 to 2.6.  
Section 2.2.4.1 above discusses firms’ choices of formal and informal protection 
mechanisms and details how they differ across sectors and industries (due to the 
presence of tacit or codified knowledge, product and process technologies and the 
industry appropriability regime, for example) (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000), 
across firms (due to resources and capabilities, for example) (Lopez, 2009; Hall et 
al., 2014), and across innovations according to the degree of novelty of the 
innovation (Hanel, 2005).  CIS 2008 to 2010 provides data on firms’ actual 
knowledge protection choices during the three-year survey period.  Table 2.1 shows 
the use of formal knowledge-protection mechanisms (patents, registered industrial 
designs, registered trademarks and copyright) and informal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms (secrecy – including non-disclosure agreements, complexity of design 
and lead-time advantage) within different groups of innovating firms.  Levin et al. 
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(1987) and Cohen et al. (2000) identify secrecy as being an important knowledge-
protection mechanism across all innovators, and the data here supports this finding 
as secrecy (including non-disclosure agreements) is the most used knowledge-
protection mechanism within each innovator group.  The highest values are 
experienced in the new-to-the-market, high-technology/knowledge-intensive and 
manufacturing groups with 36.3 per cent, 35.4 per cent and 34.0 per cent of firms 
respectively using secrecy (including non-disclosure agreements) to protect 
innovations during the 2008 to 2010 period.  The lowest values are in the low-
technology/less knowledge-intensive and the new-to-the-firm group: 20.2 per cent 
and 22.0 per cent of firms respectively use secrecy to protect innovations during the 
three-year period.  
Registered trademarks are the second most popular knowledge-protection 
mechanism used by all innovators in the UK CIS 2008 to 2010 (14.7 per cent of 
firms).  Trademarks are also the second most popular knowledge-protection 
mechanism for five of the individual innovator groups (new-to-the-firm, medium-
sized, large-sized, low-technology/less knowledge-intensive and service-sector 
innovators).  For three of the remaining four innovator groups (new-to-the-market, 
high-technology/knowledge-intensive and manufacturing-sector innovators), patents 
are the second most popular knowledge-protection mechanism: 22.8 per cent, 15.8 
per cent and 20.2 percent of firms respectively use patents to protect innovations.  
Previous studies (for example, Levin et al., 1987; Harabi, 1995; Cohen et al., 2000) 
find patents to be an important protection mechanism for firms in the pharmaceutical 
and chemical industries.  The data here is consistent with these studies as patents are 
more widely used by R&D-intensive innovators.  In the final innovator group – 
small-sized firms – copyright and lead-advantage time are the second most popular 
knowledge-protection mechanisms.  Around 12 per cent of firms in this small-sized-
firm group use these knowledge-protection mechanisms.  This is supported by 
Leiponen and Byma (2009) who find that small firms use secrecy and speed-to-
market to protect their knowledge.  Informal mechanisms such as secrecy, copyright 
and lead-advantage time are accessed more easily by small firms than the other 
knowledge-protection mechanisms as their use requires fewer firm resources and 
capabilities.  Given that small firms often lack resources and capabilities, the 
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popularity of secrecy, copyright and lead-advantage time amongst small firms is 
unsurprising. 
There is a relatively high use of all seven knowledge-protection mechanisms in the 
new-to-the-market and manufacturing sector innovator groups.  In each of these 
groups, the proportion of firms using each protection mechanism is similar. 
The least popular protection mechanism within all innovator groups is the 
registration of industrial designs.  The proportion of firms using the mechanism is 
highest in the manufacturing sector innovator group (7.9 per cent) and lowest in the 
new-to-the-firm innovator group (2.2 per cent).  The new-to-the-market and large-
sized innovator groups have values towards the top of this range; 6.5 per cent and 7.1 
per cent of firms respectively use the registration of design as a knowledge-
protection mechanism. 
The use of complexity of design as a protection mechanism is the sixth most popular 
knowledge-protection mechanism in all innovator groups.  The largest proportion of 
firms using this mechanism is found in both the new-to-the-market and 
manufacturing-sector innovator groups (13.6 per cent and 13.2 percent respectively), 
although 10.1 per cent of firms in the large-sized innovator group and 11.9 per cent 
of firms in the high-technology/knowledge-intensive innovator group use this 
protection mechanism. 
The proportion of firms using patents, registered industrial designs and registered 
trademarks – all formal knowledge-protection mechanisms – increases with firm size 
as does the proportion of firms using complexity of design – an informal protection 
method. 
The mean and standard deviation for each of the model variables included in the 
econometric analysis are also given in Table 2.1.  Minimum and maximum values 
are not given in compliance with the ONS’s rule on disclosure.  The mean of each 
binary (0/1) variable indicates the proportion of firms that gave a positive ‘yes’ 
response to the particular question being asked.  Of the four intangible investments 
that a firm is able to make, investment into Computer Software has the highest 
participation rate with, on average, 35 per cent of firms engaging in this investment.  
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Firm investment into R&D and Training is similar with, on average, 27 per cent and 
28 per cent of firms investing in these intangibles, respectively.  Investment into 
Design is the least popular intangible investment made by firms with, on average, 20 
per cent of CIS 4 to CIS 6 firms and 12 per cent of CIS 7 to CIS 8 firms investing 
into design activities. 
Turning to intangibles protection, binary (0/1) responses are obtained from firms in 
CIS 6 and CIS 7 when asked about the knowledge-protection mechanisms that they 
use.  Secrecy is the most used protection mechanism with, on average, 9 per cent of 
firms indicating that they used this knowledge-protection mechanism during the 
previous three-year period.  On average, 6 per cent and 5 per cent of firms indicate 
that they used Trademarks and Copyright, respectively.  Lead-time advantage and 
Patents were used by, on average, 4 per cent of firms, and Complexity of Design and 
Registered Designs were the least used knowledge-protection mechanisms with, on 
average, 3 per cent and 2 per cent of firms engaging in these types of protection, 
respectively. 
With regards to the industry appropriability regime, on average, 25 per cent of firms 
are product innovators within each industry group, whereas on average, 15 per cent 
of firms are process innovators within each industry group.  On average, 9 per cent 
of firms within each industry group view technical, industry or service standards as 
being of medium or high importance to firm innovations and 4 per cent of firms 
within each industry group view scientific journals and trade/technical publications 
as being of medium or high importance to firm innovations.  Examining the 
knowledge-protection dimension of the industry appropriability regime i.e. the 
effective protection mechanisms that are available for use, shows that on average, 22 
per cent of firms within an industry group use formal knowledge protection or view 
formal knowledge protection as being important to their innovations, and 23 per cent 
of firms within an industry group use informal knowledge protection or view 
informal knowledge protection as being important to their innovations. 
The industry structure variables – the industry five-firm concentration ratio and the 
industry birth rate – indicate that, on average, 12 per cent of the industry group’s 
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sales are accounted for by the five largest firms, and on average, the industry birth 
rate is 0.19 per cent.  
Tables 2.2 to 2.6 show the correlation coefficients for all variables included in the 
empirical analysis. The variables which represent the industry appropriability regime 
are highly correlated with one another (discussed in Section 2.4.2 above), although 
no other collinearity problems are indicated by the remaining correlations in the 
tables. 
2.5.2 Econometric results 
The econometric analysis in the present study is undertaken across all firms included 
in the CIS datasets so that results depict average effects across all firms in the 
sample.  Sub-sample groups of firms (the manufacturing sector, for example) are not 
analysed separately at this stage.  
The estimation results are given in Tables 2.7 to 2.38.  The parameters in the tables 
represent marginal effects which allow for some degree of interpretation.  A 
marginal effect is a rate of change: it is the probability per unit of the independent 
variable, not a probability itself and can therefore be greater than 1.  It is the 
derivative – i.e. the slope – of the prediction function, and the slope of a function can 
be greater than one, even if the values of the function are all between 0 and 1.7 
2.5.2.1 Intangibles investment 
Tables 2.7 to 2.16 show the probit regression results for the intangibles investment 
analysis.  The probit model estimates the probability that a firm will invest in an 
intangible asset based upon the industry appropriability regime and particular aspects 
of the industry’s structure.  Both the heteroscedastic probit-model results and the 
homoscedastic probit-model results are presented, although the discussion of results 
relates to the heteroscedastic models. 
The dependent variables – R&D, Design, Training and Computer Software – 
represent firms’ investment into intangible assets, one element of a firm’s intangibles 
strategy.  The results indicate the direction, strength and statistical significance of the 




independent-variable effects on each intangible investment.  They show the extent to 
which firms’ intangibles investments are contingent upon the industry 
appropriability regime and particular elements of industry structure. 
i. Industry structure variables 
Tables 2.7 to 2.11 report the probit-model results for the heteroscedastic models.  
The industry birth rate and the five-firm concentration ratio represent industry 
structure within the model and more specifically, the level of competition which 
exists.  A unit increase in the industry birth rate (ceteris paribus) has a significant, 
negative effect (at the 1 per cent level) on the probability that a firm will invest in 
R&D and Design (all CIS waves), and a significant, positive effect (at varying 
significance levels) on the probability that a firm will invest in Computer Software.  
The effects on the probability that a firm will invest in Training are generally 
positive and insignificant, although a negative, significant effect (at the 5 per cent 
level) is found in the Training regression which includes the ‘average propensity for 
firms to view scientific journals and trade/technical publications as being of medium 
or high importance to innovations within the industry’ variable. 
A unit increase in the industry five-firm concentration ratio (ceteris paribus) has a 
significant, positive effect (at the 1 per cent and 5 per cent levels) on the probability 
of investing in R&D, Training and Computer Software investment; a significant, 
negative effect (to varying significance levels) on the probability of investing in 
Design (CIS 4, 5 and 6); and a significant, negative effect (at the 1 per cent level) on 
the probability of investing in Design (CIS 7 and 8).  The positive effects on the 
probability of intangibles investment are similar in magnitude for Training, R&D 
and Computer Software, although slightly stronger for Computer Software 
investment. 
When the industry birth rate increases, competition within the industry also 
increases, whereas when the industry five-firm concentration ratio increases, 
competition within the industry falls.  One would therefore expect the direction of 
the effect on the intangible investments to differ when these industry structure 
variables change by one unit (ceteris paribus).  Indeed, this is the case as an increase 
in the industry birth rate is associated with a fall in the probability that a firm will 
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invest in R&D, Design and Training (for one regression).  In contrast, an increase in 
the industry five-firm concentration ratio is associated with an increase in the 
probability that a firm will invest in R&D, Training and Computer Software.  The 
results for R&D and Training are consistent with one another, whereas those for 
Design and Computer Software are not. 
In general, the results support the Schumpetarian viewpoint that an increase 
in competition leads to less market power for some firms.  It becomes more 
difficult for these firms to appropriate returns from their investments, firm 
profits fall and future investment is further reduced (Schumpeter, 1942).  
These results support earlier findings by Kraft (1989) and Artés (2009) and 
lead to the rejection of Hypothesis 1a in favour of Hypothesis 1b. 
ii. Industry appropriability regime variables 
The remaining explanatory variables together represent the industry appropriability 
regime.  A unit increase in the average propensity for a firm to be an innovator – 
either product or process – (ceteris paribus) has a significant, positive effect on the 
probability that a firm will invest in R&D and Training at the 1 per cent level and on 
Computer Software at the 5 per cent level.  The effect is also positive and significant, 
at the 1 per cent level, on the probability that a firm will invest in Design for CIS 4, 5 
and 6 data, but the effect is insignificant for CIS 7 and 8 data, although the sign is 
positive.  The effects are strongest for R&D investment, followed by Design 
investment (CIS 4, 5 and 6), Training investment and Computer Software 
investment.  The marginal effects are larger for the ‘average propensity for a firm to 
be a process innovator’ variable compared with those for the ‘average propensity for 
a firm to be a product innovator’ variable across all forms of intangible investment.  
These results indicate that firms’ intangibles investment is more responsive to firms’ 
process innovation activity within an industry than to firms’ product innovation 
activity within the same industry.  These variables are included in the model to 
indicate how the nature of the technology within an industry (one element of the 
industry appropriability regime) can influence a firm’s intangibles investment.  The 
results indicate that industries that are highly innovative are more likely to undertake 
intangible investment, and that the nature of the technology i.e. whether it is a 
product technology or a process technology, has implications for the extent to which 
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investment in intangibles takes place – a unit change in the average propensity for 
firms within an industry to be a process innovator leads to stronger positive effects 
upon the probability that a firm will invest in intangibles than a one unit change in 
the propensity for firms within an industry to be a product innovator.  Process 
technologies are more tacit in nature than product technologies, and this added 
natural protection may explain the stronger positive effects on the probability that a 
firm will invest in intangibles. 
The ‘average propensity for firms to view scientific journals and trade/technical 
publications as being of medium or high importance to innovations within the 
industry’ and the ‘average propensity for firms to view technical, industry or service 
standards as being of medium or high importance to innovations within the industry’ 
are included in the model to indicate the codified/tacit nature of knowledge 
embedded within the industry’s technology – another element of the nature of 
technology within the industry appropriability regime.  A unit increase in both of 
these variables (ceteris paribus) has a significant, positive effect (at the 1 per cent 
level) on the probability that a firm will invest in R&D, Design (CIS 4, 5 and 6) and 
Training.  There are also positive effects on the probability that a firm will invest in 
Design (CIS 7 and 8) and Computer Software, although the effects are insignificant.  
In Section 2.3.2 above, it is proposed that firms are more likely to invest in 
innovative activities if natural protection against knowledge spillovers – in the form 
of tacit knowledge, for example – exists (Parker, 1972; Rosenberg, 1974).  
Hurmelinna et al., (1997) suggest that as a firm becomes more engaged in 
standardisation, knowledge becomes less tacit (or more codified).  When knowledge 
becomes less tacit, the industry appropriability regime weakens, and firms’ expected 
returns to investment into innovation fall.  When expected returns to innovation are 
lower, actual investment into innovation is likely to fall.  In contrast, the opposite 
occurs in the estimation results here; the probability that a firm will invest in 
intangibles increases when standards and publications become more important to 
innovation activities i.e. when knowledge becomes less tacit.  The results here 
indicate that as knowledge becomes more codified (less tacit) and the ‘nature of 
technology’ dimension of the industry appropriability regime weakens, the 
probability of firms investing into intangible assets increases. 
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In summary, the estimation results indicate that the probability of a firm 
investing in intangible assets increases when the average propensity to be a 
product or a process innovator within the industry increases.  The 
probability of a firm investing in intangible assets increases by more for 
process technologies than for product technologies.  
The probability of a firm investing in intangibles increases if knowledge is 
made more codified by increasing the ‘average propensity for firms to view 
scientific journals and trade/technical publications as being of medium or 
high importance to innovations within the industry’ and the ‘average 
propensity for firms to view technical, industry or service standards as being 
of medium or high importance to innovations within the industry.’  This 
result leads to the rejection of Hypothesis 2a in favour of Hypothesis 2b. 
The knowledge-protection regime within an industry, discussed in Section 2.2.3.1 
above, is the second dimension of the industry appropriability regime – the first 
being the nature of the industry technology.  In the model, two variables represent 
the industry knowledge-protection regime or the effective, available knowledge-
protection mechanisms within the industry: ‘the average propensity for firms to use 
formal knowledge protection or to view formal knowledge protection as being 
important within an industry’ and ‘the average propensity for firms to use informal 
knowledge protection or to view informal knowledge protection as being important 
within an industry.’  A unit increase in these variables (ceteris paribus) has a 
significant, positive effect (at the 1 per cent level) on the probability that a firm will 
invest in R&D, Design (CIS 4, 5 and 6) and Training, and a significant, positive 
effect (at the 10 per cent level) on the probability that a firm will invest in Computer 
Software.  The effects are positive for the probability that a firm will invest in 
Design (CIS 7 and 8), although they are statistically insignificant.  The effects on the 
probability of a firm investing in intangible assets are generally stronger following a 
unit increase in the formal knowledge-protection variable (ceteris paribus) than those 
following a unit increase (ceteris paribus) in the informal knowledge-protection 
variable.  Overall, the positive effects imply that as the knowledge-protection 
dimension of the industry appropriability regime strengthens i.e. the effective, 
available knowledge-protection mechanisms within an industry increases, firms’ 
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investment into intangibles increases.  The stronger knowledge-protection element of 
the industry appropriability regime provides firms with knowledge-protection 
mechanisms that can be used to help in the appropriation of returns from their 
investments.  Using knowledge-protection mechanisms allows a firm to become a 
temporary monopolist (Arrow, 1962), and the higher expect returns to innovation 
investment leads to higher actual intangibles investment.   
Strengthening the industry appropriability regime through the knowledge-
protection dimension involves increasing the effectiveness and availability of 
knowledge-protection mechanisms within the industry.  The estimation 
results show that the probability of a firm investing in intangible assets 
increases if ‘the average propensity for firms to use formal knowledge 
protection or to view formal knowledge protection as being important within 
an industry’ and ‘the average propensity for firms to use informal knowledge 
protection or to view informal knowledge protection as being important 
within an industry’ increase.  This result provides evidence that firm 
investment into intangible assets increases when the industry appropriability 
regime strengthens, and therefore Hypothesis 2b can be rejected in favour of 
Hypothesis 2a. 
2.5.2.2 Intangibles protection: Importance to the firm 
Tables 2.17 to 2.24 show the knowledge-protection regression results for the 
ordered-probit models.  The parameters are marginal effects and indicate how much 
less likely (negative sign) or more likely (positive sign) a firm is to belong to the 
response group, given a one unit change in the independent variable (ceteris paribus) 
– where 0 indicates that the knowledge-protection mechanism is not important, 1 
indicates that it is of low importance, 2 indicates that it is of medium importance and 
3 indicates that it is of high importance.  Across the four different response groups, 
the parameters sum to one as a marginal effect indicating that a firm is less likely to 
belong to one response group, for example, is matched by another marginal effect or 
effects indicating that the firm is more likely to belong to another group or groups.  




i. Industry structure variables: Informal knowledge-protection mechanisms 
The effects of a unit increase in the industry birth rate (ceteris paribus) on the 
importance firms attach to Secrecy for their innovations within the industry are 
mixed.  Across the six different regressions, results are significant in only two cases 
– the regressions including the ‘average propensity for firms to view technical, 
industry or service standards as being of medium or high importance to innovations 
within the industry’ and the ‘average propensity for firms to view scientific journals 
and trade/technical publications as being of medium or high importance to 
innovations within the industry’.  Here, a unit increase in the industry birth rate 
(ceteris paribus) leads to a firm within the industry being more likely to belong to the 
‘not important’ response group and less likely to belong to each of the other three 
groups (at the 1 per cent level). The parameters indicate that firms are much less 
likely to belong to the ‘medium importance’ response group followed by the ‘high 
importance’ response group and then the ‘low importance’ response group. 
The effects of a unit increase in the industry birth rate (ceteris paribus) on the 
importance firms attach to Lead-time Advantage for their innovations within the 
industry are significant (at the 1 per cent level) across the six different regressions.  
As with those results that are significant for Secrecy, a unit increase in the industry 
birth rate (ceteris paribus) leads to a firm within the industry being more likely to 
belong to the ‘not important’ response group and less likely to belong to each of the 
other three groups, and the parameters indicate that firms are much less likely to 
belong to the ‘medium importance’ response group followed by the ‘high 
importance’ response group and then the ‘low importance’ response group. 
The effects of a unit increase in the industry birth rate (ceteris paribus) on the 
importance firms attach to Complexity of Design for their innovations within the 
industry are significant (at the 1 per cent level) across five of the regressions.  The 
results are significant at the 5 per cent level for the regression including the ‘average 
propensity for a firm to be a product innovator within an industry’ variable. As with 
Lead-time advantage, and the significant results for Secrecy, a unit increase in the 
industry birth rate (ceteris paribus) leads to a firm within the industry being more 
likely to belong to the ‘not important’ response group and less likely to belong to 
each of the other three groups.  The parameters indicate that firms are much less 
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likely to belong to the ‘medium importance’ response group followed by the ‘low 
importance’ response group and then the ‘high importance’ response group. 
The effects of a unit increase in the industry birth rate (ceteris paribus) on the 
importance firms attach to Confidentiality Agreements for their innovations within 
the industry are significant (at the 1 per cent level) in five of the six regressions.  The 
effects are insignificant in the regression containing the ‘average propensity for firms 
to view technical, industry or service standards as being of medium or high 
importance to innovations within the industry’ variable.  In contrast to the results for 
the other informal knowledge-protection mechanisms, four of the regressions show 
that a unit increase in the industry birth rate (ceteris paribus) leads to a firm within 
the industry being less likely to belong to the ‘not important’ response group and 
more likely to belong to each of the other three groups. Firms are much more likely 
to belong to the high importance response group followed by the medium 
importance response group and then the low importance response group.  In the 
regression including the ‘average propensity for firms to view scientific journals and 
trade/technical publications as being of medium or high importance to innovations 
within the industry’ variable, a unit increase in the industry birth rate (ceteris 
paribus) leads to a firm within the industry being more likely to belong to the ‘not 
important’ response group and less likely to belong to each of the other three groups 
– consistent with many of the results for the other informal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms.  A firm is much less likely to belong to the ‘high importance’ response 
group followed by the ‘medium importance’ response group and then the ‘low 
importance’ response group. 
In summary, in the ordered-probit models for Secrecy, Lead-time Advantage 
and Complexity of Design there is a general tendency for an increase in the 
industry birth rate to lead to an increase in the probability that a firm will 
belong to the ‘not important group’ and a decrease in the probability that a 
firm will belong to each of the other three groups.  The opposite is true for 
Confidentiality Agreements; as the industry birth rate increases, there is a 
reduction in the probability that a firm will belong to the ‘not important 
group’ and an increase in the probability that a firm will belong to each of 
the other three groups.   
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The effects of a unit increase in the industry five-firm concentration ratio (ceteris 
paribus) on the importance firms attach to Secrecy for their innovations within the 
industry are significant (at the 1 per cent level) in four of the six regressions.  The 
effects are insignificant in the regressions containing ‘the average propensity for a 
firm to be a product innovator’ and ‘the average propensity for a firm to be a process 
innovator’ variables, although the parameters do have the same sign as those in the 
other regressions.  In the regressions where the parameters are statistically  
significant, a unit increase in the five-firm concentration ratio (ceteris paribus) leads 
to a firm within the industry being less likely to belong to the ‘not important’ 
response group and more likely to belong to each of the other groups.  Firms are 
much more likely to belong to the ‘medium importance’ response group followed by 
the ‘high importance’ response group and then the ‘low importance’ response group. 
As with Secrecy, the effects of a unit increase in the industry five-firm concentration 
ratio (ceteris paribus) on the importance firms attach to Lead-time Advantage for 
their innovations within the industry are significant (at either the 1 per cent or 5 per 
cent levels) in four of the six regressions.  The effects are insignificant in the 
regressions containing ‘the average propensity for a firm to be a product innovator’ 
and ‘the average propensity for a firm to be a process innovator’ variables, although, 
as with Secrecy, the parameters do have the same sign as those in the other 
regressions.  In the regressions where the parameters are statistically  significant, a 
unit increase in the five-firm concentration ratio (ceteris paribus) leads to a firm 
within the industry being less likely to belong to the ‘not important’ response group 
and more likely to belong to each of the other groups.  Firms are much more likely to 
belong to the ‘medium importance’ response group followed by the ‘high 
importance’ response group and then the ‘low importance’ response group. 
The effects of a unit increase in the industry five-firm concentration ratio (ceteris 
paribus) on the importance firms attach to the Complexity of Design for their 
innovations within the industry are statistically significant in three of the six 
regressions.  The effects are insignificant in the regressions containing ‘the average 
propensity for a firm to be a product innovator’, ‘the average propensity for a firm to 
be a process innovator’ and ‘the average propensity for firms to use informal 
knowledge protection or to view informal knowledge protection as being important 
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within an industry’ variables.  In the regressions where the parameters are 
statistically  significant, a unit increase in the five-firm concentration ratio (ceteris 
paribus) leads to a firm within the industry being less likely to belong to the ‘not 
important’ response group and more likely to belong to each of the other groups, 
although the degrees of statistical significance vary.  Firms are much more likely to 
belong to the ‘medium importance’ response group followed by the ‘low 
importance’ response group and then the ‘high importance’ response group. 
The effects of a unit increase in the industry five-firm concentration ratio (ceteris 
paribus) on the importance firms attach to Confidentiality Agreements for their 
innovations within the industry are statistically significant in all six regressions (at 
the 1 per cent level in four of the regressions and at the 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
levels in the other two).  In all six regressions, a unit increase in the five-firm 
concentration ratio (ceteris paribus) leads to a firm within the industry being less 
likely to belong to the ‘not important’ response group and more likely to belong to 
each of the other groups.  Firms are much more likely to belong to the ‘high 
importance’ response group followed by the ‘medium importance’ response group 
and then the ‘low importance’ response group. 
In summary, in the ordered-probit models for all informal knowledge-
protection mechanisms, there is a general tendency for an increase in the 
five-firm concentration ratio to lead to a fall in the probability that a firm 
will belong to the ‘not important group’ and an increase in the probability 
that a firm will belong to each of the other three groups. 
Overall, the majority of the industry structure results suggest that as the level 
of competition within an industry increases, the probability of firms viewing 
informal knowledge-protection mechanisms as being important falls so that 
they are less likely to use informal protection methods.  This result leads to 
the rejection of Hypothesis 3 which proposes that the use of knowledge-




ii. Industry appropriability regime variables: Informal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms 
A unit increase in the average propensity for a firm to be an innovator – either 
product or process – (ceteris paribus) within an industry leads a firm within the 
industry to be less likely to belong to the group where informal knowledge-
protection mechanisms are ‘not important’ and more likely to belong to the other 
three groups (significant at the 1 per cent level for all four informal knowledge-
protection mechanisms).  The magnitude of this effect is greatest for process 
innovators across all four informal knowledge-protection mechanisms.  
Consequently, as firms within an industry become more likely to engage in 
innovation, they are more likely to view informal knowledge-protection mechanisms 
as being of low, medium or high importance if the innovation is a process rather than 
a product. 
As the average propensity for a firm to be an innovator within the industry increases 
(ceteris paribus), firms are more likely to view Secrecy, Complexity of Design and 
Lead-time Advantage as being of low, medium or high importance, although firms 
are much more likely to give a medium-importance response, followed by a high-
importance and then a low-importance response.  As for Confidentiality Agreements, 
firms are much more likely to give a ‘high-importance’ response followed by a 
‘medium-importance’ response and then a ‘low-importance’ response. 
A unit increase in the ‘average propensity for firms to view technical, industry or 
service standards as being of medium or high importance to innovations within the 
industry’ and the ‘average propensity for firms to view scientific journals and 
trade/technical publications as being of medium or high importance to innovations 
within the industry’ (ceteris paribus) leads to a firm within the industry being less 
likely to belong to the group where informal knowledge-protection mechanisms are 
‘not important’ and more likely to belong to the other three groups (significant at the 
1 per cent level for all four informal knowledge-protection mechanisms).  The 
magnitude of this effect is greatest for firms viewing scientific journals and 
trade/technical publications as being of medium or high importance to innovations 
within their industry, and consequently, as firms within an industry become more 
likely to view scientific journals and trade/technical publications as being of medium 
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or high importance to innovations, they are much more likely to view informal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms as being of low, medium or high importance than 
firms that are more likely to view technical, industry or service standards as being of 
medium or high importance to innovations within the industry. 
As the ‘average propensity for firms to view technical, industry or service standards 
as being of medium or high importance to innovations within the industry’ and the 
‘average propensity for firms to view scientific journals and trade/technical 
publications as being of medium or high importance to innovations within the 
industry’  increases (ceteris paribus), firms are more likely to view Secrecy, 
Complexity of Design and Lead-time Advantage as being of low, medium or high 
importance, although firms are much more likely to give a medium-importance 
response, followed by a high-importance and then a low-importance response for 
Secrecy and Lead-time Advantage, and a low-importance and then a high-
importance response for Complexity of Design.  Firms are much more likely to give 
a ‘high-importance’ response followed by a ‘medium-importance’ response and then 
a low-importance response when asked about Confidentiality Agreements. 
In summary, as the average propensity to become an innovator (product or 
process) increases within an industry, the probability of a firm belonging to 
the ‘not important’ group – for all four informal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms – falls, and the probability of a firm belonging to any of the 
other three groups increases.  As the ‘average propensity for firms to view 
technical, industry or service standards as being of medium or high 
importance to innovations within the industry’ and the ‘average propensity 
for firms to view scientific journals and trade/technical publications as being 
of medium or high importance to innovations within the industry’  variables 
increase, knowledge becomes more codified, and the probability of a firm 
belonging to the ‘not important’ group regarding all four forms of informal 
knowledge protection falls, and the probability of a firm belonging to any of 
the other three groups increases.  In general, these results support 
Hypothesis 4a which proposes that a firm’s intangibles protection increases 




A unit increase in the available, effective knowledge-protection mechanisms within 
an industry i.e. ‘the average propensity for firms to use formal knowledge protection 
or to view formal knowledge protection as being important within an industry’ and 
‘the average propensity for firms to use informal knowledge protection or to view 
informal knowledge protection as being important within an industry’ variables 
(ceteris paribus) leads to a firm within the industry being less likely to belong to the 
group where informal knowledge-protection mechanisms are ‘not important’ and 
more likely to belong to the other three groups (significant at the 1 per cent level for 
all four informal knowledge-protection mechanisms).  The magnitude of this effect is 
greatest for ‘the average propensity for firms to use formal knowledge protection or 
to view formal knowledge protection as being important within an industry’ variable,  
indicating that as firms within an industry become more likely to use formal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms or view formal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms as being important, they are much more likely to view informal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms as being of low, medium or high importance than 
when the ‘the average propensity for firms to use informal knowledge protection or 
to view informal knowledge protection as being important within an industry’ 
increases. 
As ‘the average propensity for firms to use formal knowledge protection or to view 
formal knowledge protection as being important within an industry’ and ‘the average 
propensity for firms to use informal knowledge protection or to view informal 
knowledge protection as being important within an industry’ increases (ceteris 
paribus), firms are more likely to view Secrecy, Complexity of Design and Lead-
time Advantage as being of low, medium or high importance, although firms are 
much more likely to give a medium-importance response, followed by a high-
importance and then a low-importance response for Secrecy and Lead-time 
Advantage, and a low-importance and then a high-importance response for 
Complexity of Design.  Firms are much more likely to give a high-importance 
response followed by a medium-importance response and then a low-importance 
response when asked about Confidentiality Agreements. 
In summary, when the available, effective informal and formal knowledge-
protection mechanisms within an industry increase, the probability of a firm 
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belonging to the ‘not important’ group – regarding informal knowledge-
protection mechanisms – falls and the probability of a firm belonging to the 
other three groups increases.  This provides evidence in support of 
Hypothesis 4b which states that a firm’s intangibles protection increases 
when the knowledge-protection dimension of the industry appropriability 
regime strengthens.  
iii. Industry structure variables: Formal knowledge-protection mechanisms 
The effects of a unit increase in the industry birth rate (ceteris paribus) on the 
importance firms attach to Copyright for their innovations within the industry are 
statistically significant in two out of the six regressions (at the 1 per cent level).  The 
effects are statistically significant when the ‘average propensity for firms to view 
technical, industry or service standards as being of medium or high importance to 
innovations within the industry’ and the ‘average propensity for firms to view 
scientific journals and trade/technical publications as being of medium or high 
importance to innovations within the industry’ are included in the regressions.  Here, 
a unit increase in the industry birth rate (ceteris paribus) leads a firm within the 
industry to be more likely to belong to the ‘not important’ response group and less 
likely to belong to each of the other three response groups.  Again, the magnitude of 
the effects is similar, although the likelihood of a firm giving a ‘low importance’ 
response is reduced by slightly more than the likelihood of a firm giving a ‘medium 
importance’ or a ‘high importance’ response. 
The effects of a unit increase in the industry birth rate (ceteris paribus) on the 
importance firms attach to Patents for their innovations within the industry are 
statistically significant in all six regressions (at the 1 per cent level).  In all six cases, 
the sign of the effects indicates that a firm is more likely to belong to the ‘not 
important’ response group and less likely to belong to the other three response 
groups.  The negative effects are slightly larger for the high and low importance 
responses indicating that the likelihood of a firm giving either of these responses is 




The effects of a unit increase in the industry birth rate (ceteris paribus) on the 
importance firms attach to Trademarks for their innovations within the industry are 
statistically significant in all six regressions (at the 1 per cent level).  A firm is more 
likely to belong to the ‘not important’ response group and less likely to belong to the 
other three response groups in all six cases.  The strongest effects are found when the 
‘average propensity for firms to view technical, industry or service standards as 
being of medium or high importance to innovations within the industry’ and the 
‘average propensity for firms to view scientific journals and trade/technical 
publications as being of medium or high importance to innovations within the 
industry’ variables are included in the regressions.  The likelihood of giving a ‘high 
importance’ response is reduced by more than the likelihood of giving a ‘medium 
importance’ response which is itself reduced by more than the likelihood of giving a 
low importance response. 
Similarly, the effects of a unit increase in the industry birth rate (ceteris paribus) on 
the importance firms attach to the Registration of Designs for their innovations 
within the industry are statistically significant in all six regressions (at the 1 per cent 
level).  Again, a firm is more likely to belong to the ‘not important’ response group 
and less likely to belong to the other three response groups in all six cases.  The 
magnitude of the parameters indicate that the likelihood of giving a ‘low’ or 
‘medium importance’ response is reduced by more than the likelihood of giving a 
‘medium importance’ response in all six regressions. 
In summary, the ordered-probit models show that an increase in the industry 
birth rate increases the probability that a firm will belong to the ‘not 
important’ group for all four formal knowledge-protection mechanisms and 
lowers the probability that the firm will belong to the other three groups 
where formal knowledge-protection mechanisms are of low, medium or high 
importance.  The strongest results occur with Patents, Trademarks and 
Registered Designs.   
The effects of a unit increase in the industry five-firm concentration ratio (ceteris 
paribus) on the importance firms attach to Copyright for innovations within their 
industry are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level in two of the six 
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regressions (i.e. those including the ‘average propensity for a firm to be a product 
innovator’ and the ‘average propensity for a firm to be a process innovator’ 
variables), and statistically significant at the 10 per cent level in one (i.e. the 
regression including the ‘average propensity for firms to use informal knowledge 
protection or to view informal knowledge protection as being important’ variable).  
Effects in the other three regressions are insignificant.  In the regressions where the 
parameters are statistically significant, a unit increase in the five-firm concentration 
ratio (ceteris paribus) leads a firm within the industry to be more likely to belong to 
the ‘not important’ response group and less likely to belong to each of the other 
groups.  The negative effects are similar across the responses – ‘low’, ‘medium’ and 
‘high importance’ – in each of the regressions where the coefficients are significant. 
The effects of a unit increase in the industry five-firm concentration ratio (ceteris 
paribus) on the importance firms attach to Patents for innovations within their 
industry are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level in five of the six 
regressions.  The effects are insignificant in the regression containing the ‘average 
propensity for firms to view scientific journals and trade/technical publications as 
being of medium or high importance to innovations within the industry’ variable.  In 
the five regressions where the parameters are statistically significant, a unit increase 
in the five-firm concentration ratio (ceteris paribus) leads a firm within the industry 
to be more likely to belong to the ‘not important’ response group and less likely to 
belong to each of the other groups with the negative effects in these three response 
groups are similar in magnitude. 
The effects of a unit increase in the industry five-firm concentration ratio (ceteris 
paribus) on the importance firms attach to Trademarks for innovations in their 
industry are statistically significant in only one of the six regressions (at the 10 per 
cent level).  The significant effects occur when the ‘average propensity for firms to 
view technical, industry or service standards as being of medium or high importance 
to innovations within the industry’ variable is included in the regression, and the sign 
of the effects indicate that a unit increase in the five-firm concentration ratio (ceteris 
paribus) leads firms to be more likely to belong to the ‘not important’ response 
group and less likely to belong to each of the other three response groups.  The 
negative effect is similar in magnitude across the three response groups. 
92 
 
The effects of a unit increase in the industry five-firm concentration ratio (ceteris 
paribus) on the importance firms attach to the Registration of Design for innovations 
in their industry are statistically significant in five of the six regressions.  The 
regression including the ‘average propensity for firms to view scientific journals and 
trade/technical publications as being of medium or high importance to innovations 
within the industry’ variable gives statistically insignificant effects.  The statistically 
significant effects show that a unit increase in the five-firm concentration ratio 
(ceteris paribus) leads a firm within the industry to be more likely to belong to the 
‘not important’ response group and less likely to belong to each of the other groups.  
Although similar in magnitude, the negative effects on the ‘low importance’ and the 
‘medium importance’ parameters are slightly larger than that on the ‘high 
importance’ parameter. 
In summary, the ordered-probit models show that an increase in the industry 
five-firm concentration ratio (a fall in industry competition) leads to an 
increase in the probability that a firm will belong to the ‘not important’ 
group and a reduction in the probability that a firm will belong to the other 
three groups for all formal knowledge-protection mechanisms, although the 
effects are strongest for Patents and Registered Designs. 
Overall, the industry structure results provide contrasting results.  As new 
entrant competition within an industry increases, the probability that a firm 
will view formal knowledge-protection mechanisms as being important falls, 
and as the level of incumbent competition within an industry increases, the 
probability that a firm will view formal knowledge-protection mechanisms as 
being important rises.  These results indicate that the type of competition is 
important.  An increase in incumbent competition within the industry leads to 
results which support Hypothesis 3, whereas an increase in new entrant 
competition leads to results which reject Hypothesis 3. 
iv. Industry appropriability regime variables: Formal protection mechanisms 
As with the informal knowledge-protection mechanisms discussed above, a unit 
increase in the average propensity for a firm to be an innovator – either product or 
process – (ceteris paribus) within an industry leads to a firm within the industry 
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being less likely to belong to the group where formal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms are ‘not important’ and more likely to belong to the other three groups 
(significant at the 1 per cent level for all four formal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms).  The magnitude of the effects is greatest for process innovators across 
all four formal knowledge-protection mechanisms.  Consequently, as a firm within 
an industry becomes more likely to engage in innovation, the likelihood that they 
will view formal knowledge-protection mechanisms as being of low, medium or 
high importance is increased by more if the innovation is a process rather than a 
product. 
The magnitude of the parameters for the Patents and Trademarks regressions indicate 
that the increase in the likelihood that a firm will give a ‘high importance’ response 
is greater than the increase in the likelihood that a firm will give a ‘low’ or ‘medium 
importance’ response.  As for Copyright, the increase in the likelihood that a firm 
will give a ‘low importance’ response is greater than the increase in the likelihood 
that a firm will give a ‘medium’ or ‘high importance’ response, and the parameters 
for the Registration of Design regressions indicate that the increase in the likelihood 
that a firm will give a ‘low importance’ response is the same as the increase in the 
likelihood that a firm will give a ‘medium importance’ response, both of which are 
greater than the increase in the likelihood that a firm will give a ‘high importance’ 
response. 
A unit increase in the ‘average propensity for firms to view technical, industry or 
service standards as being of medium or high importance to innovations within the 
industry’ and the ‘average propensity for firms to view scientific journals and 
trade/technical publications as being of medium or high importance to innovations 
within the industry’ (ceteris paribus) leads a firm within the industry to be less likely 
to belong to the group where formal knowledge-protection mechanisms are ‘not 
important’ and more likely to belong to the other three groups.  The parameters for 
both variables are significant (at the 1 per cent level) for three formal knowledge-
protection mechanisms – Copyright, Patents and Registered Designs.  The 
parameters in the Trademark regressions are significant (at the 1 per cent level) when 
the ‘average propensity for firms to view technical, industry or service standards as 
being of medium or high importance to innovations within the industry’ is included 
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in the regression, but they are insignificant when the ‘average propensity for firms to 
view scientific journals and trade/technical publications as being of medium or high 
importance to innovations within the industry’ variable is included in the regression.   
As with the results for informal knowledge-protection mechanisms, the magnitude of 
the effects is greatest for firms viewing scientific journals and trade/technical 
publications as being of medium or high importance to innovations within their 
industry, and consequently, as firms within an industry become more likely to view 
scientific journals and trade/technical publications as being of medium or high 
importance to innovations, the increase in the likelihood that they will view formal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms as being of low, medium or high importance is 
greater than the increase in the likelihood that firms within the industry experience 
when they become more likely to view technical, industry or service standards as 
being of medium or high importance to innovations within the industry. 
As the ‘average propensity for firms to view technical, industry or service standards 
as being of medium or high importance to innovations within the industry’ and the 
‘average propensity for firms to view scientific journals and trade/technical 
publications as being of medium or high importance to innovations within the 
industry’ increases (ceteris paribus), the likelihood of a firm viewing Copyright, 
Patents and Registered Designs as being of low, medium or high importance also 
increases.  The likelihood of a firm viewing Trademarks as being of low, medium or 
high importance also increases when the ‘average propensity for firms to view 
scientific journals and trade/technical publications as being of medium or high 
importance to innovations within the industry’ increases.  The parameters indicate 
that the increase in the likelihood that a firm will give a ‘low importance’ response 
when asked about Copyright is greater than the increase in the likelihood that a firm 
will give a ‘medium’ or ‘high importance’ response.  The increase in the likelihood 
that a firm will give a ‘high importance’ response is greater than the increase in the 
likelihood that a firm will give a ‘medium’ or ‘low importance’ response for Patents 
and Trademarks.  As for Registered Designs, the increase in the likelihood that a 
firm will give a ‘low importance’ response is equal to the increase in likelihood that 
a firm will give a ‘medium importance’ response, greater than the increase in 
likelihood that a firm will give a ‘high importance’ response. 
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In summary, as the average propensity to become an innovator (product or 
process) increases within an industry, the probability of a firm belonging to 
the ‘not important’ group – for all four formal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms – falls, and the probability of a firm belonging to any of the 
other three groups increases.  As the ‘average propensity for firms to view 
technical, industry or service standards as being of medium or high 
importance to innovations within the industry’ and the ‘average propensity 
for firms to view scientific journals and trade/technical publications as being 
of medium or high importance to innovations within the industry’  variables 
increase, knowledge becomes more codified, and the probability of a firm 
belonging to the ‘not important’ group regarding all four forms of formal 
knowledge protection falls, and the probability of a firm belonging to any of 
the other three groups increases.  In general, these results support 
Hypothesis 4a which proposes that a firm’s intangibles protection increases 
when the ‘nature of technology’ dimension of the industry appropriability 
regime weakens. 
A unit increase in the available, effective knowledge-protection mechanisms within 
an industry i.e. ‘the average propensity for firms to use formal knowledge protection 
or to view formal knowledge protection as being important within an industry’ and 
‘the average propensity for firms to use informal knowledge protection or to view 
informal knowledge protection as being important within an industry’ variables 
(ceteris paribus) leads a firm within the industry to be less likely to belong to the 
group where formal knowledge-protection mechanisms are ‘not important’ and more 
likely to belong to the other three groups (significant at the 1 per cent level for all 
four formal knowledge-protection mechanisms).  The magnitude of these effects is 
larger when the available, effective formal knowledge-protection mechanisms within 
the industry increases than when the available, effective informal knowledge-
protection mechanisms within the industry increases.   
As ‘the average propensity for firms to use formal knowledge protection or to view 
formal knowledge protection as being important within an industry’ and ‘the average 
propensity for firms to use informal knowledge protection or to view informal 
knowledge protection as being important within an industry’ increases (ceteris 
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paribus), the likelihood of a firm viewing Copyright, Patents, Trademarks and 
Registered Designs as being of low, medium or high importance also increases.  The 
parameters indicate that the increase in the likelihood that a firm will view Copyright 
as being of ‘low importance’ is greater than the increase in the likelihood that a firm 
will view it with ‘medium’ or ‘high importance’.  As for Patents and Trademarks, the 
increase in the likelihood that a firm will give a ‘high importance’ response is greater 
than the increase in the likelihood that a firm will give a ‘medium’ or ‘low 
importance’ response.  With Registered Designs, the increase in the likelihood that a 
firm will give a ‘low importance’ response is equal to the increase in likelihood that 
a firm will give a ‘medium importance’ response, greater than the increase in 
likelihood that a firm will give a ‘high importance’ response. 
In summary, when the available, effective informal and formal knowledge-
protection mechanisms within an industry increase, the probability of a firm 
belonging to the ‘not important’ group – for all four formal knowledge-
protection mechanisms – falls and the probability of a firm belonging to the 
other three groups increases.  This provides evidence in support of 
Hypothesis 4b which states that a firm’s intangibles protection increases 
when the knowledge-protection dimension of the industry appropriability 
regime strengthens.  
2.5.2.3 Intangibles protection: Actual protection decisions 
Tables 2.25 to 2.38 show the probit regression results for the new intangibles 
protection analysis.  The probit model estimates the probability that a firm will 
protect an intangible asset (using a particular knowledge-protection method) based 
upon the industry appropriability regime and particular aspects of the industry’s 
structure.  As with the intangibles investment estimations discussed above, both the 
heteroscedastic probit-model results and the homoscedastic probit-model results are 
presented, although the discussion here relates to the heteroscedastic models alone. 
The dependent variables – Secrecy, Complexity of Design, Lead-time Advantage, 
Patents, Registered Designs, Trademarks and Copyright – represent firms’ new 
protection of intangible assets, another element of a firm’s intangibles strategy.  The 
results indicate the direction, strength and statistical significance of the independent-
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variable effects on each intangible knowledge-protection method.  They show the 
extent to which firms’ intangibles knowledge protection are contingent upon 
particular elements of industry structure and the industry appropriability regime. 
i. Industry structure variables 
Tables 2.25 to 2.31 report the probit-model results for the heteroscedastic models.   
The industry birth rate and the industry five-firm concentration ratio represent 
industry structure within the model and more specifically are an indication of the 
competition which exists within the industry. 
A unit increase in the industry birth rate (ceteris paribus) has a significant, negative 
effect (at the 1 per cent level) on the probability that a firm will use Patents, 
Registered Designs and Trademarks.  The parameters indicate that the reduction in 
the probability of use is greatest for Trademarks followed by Patents and then 
Registered Designs.  There is a significant, negative effect on the probability that a 
firm will use Lead-time Advantage – at the 10 per cent level when the ‘average 
propensity for a firm to be a product innovator’ is include in the regression equation 
and at the 1 per cent level when each of the other variables representing elements of 
the industry appropriability regime are included in the regression equations.  The 
effects on the probability that a firm will use Copyright are negative, although only 
significant for the ‘average propensity for firms to view technical, industry or service 
standards as being of medium or high importance to innovations within the industry’ 
and the ‘average propensity for firms to view scientific journals and trade/technical 
publications as being of medium or high importance to innovations within the 
industry’ variables (at the 5 per cent and 1 per cent level respectively).  The effects 
on the probability that a firm will use Complexity of Design are negative but 
insignificant.  As for the probability that a firm will use Secrecy, effects are mixed.  
When three of the industry appropriability regime variables (the ‘average propensity 
for a firm to be a product/process innovator’ and the ‘average propensity for firms to 
view technical, industry or service standards as being of medium or high importance 
to innovations within the industry’) are included in the regressions, there is a 
significant, positive effect on the probability that a firm will use Secrecy. 
98 
 
The effects of a unit increase in the industry five-firm concentration ratio on the 
probability that a firm will use knowledge protection are mixed.  There are 
insignificant effects on the probability of a firm using Secrecy, Lead-time 
Advantage, Patents, Registered Designs and Copyright.  Effects are significant for 
the probability of using Complexity of Design and Trademarks, although the 
direction of the effects differ.  The effects on the probability of using Complexity of 
Design are negative and significant at the 5 and 10 per cent level, whereas the effects 
on the probability of using Trademarks are positive and significant at the 5 and 10 
per cent level (apart from the effect being insignificant when the ‘average propensity 
for firms to view technical, industry or service standards as being of medium or high 
importance to innovations within the industry’ variable is included in the regression). 
In summary, the regressions suggest that as the level of competition within an 
industry increases (the industry birth rate increases or the industry five-firm 
concentration ratio falls), there is likely to be a negative effect (birth rate) or 
no significant effect (five-firm concentration ratio) on the probability that a 
firm will use knowledge-protection mechanisms.  In only two cases – Secrecy 
(birth rate) and Complexity of Design (five-firm concentration ratio) – does 
the probability of a firm’s use increase when there is an increase in 
competition within the industry.  These results lead to the rejection of 
Hypothesis 3 which proposes that the use of knowledge-protection 
mechanisms increases when industry competitiveness increases. 
ii. Industry appropriability regime variables 
The industry appropriability regime is represented by six industry variables.  The 
first two signal the nature of the industry technology.  A unit increase in the average 
propensity for a firm to be an innovator – either product or process – (ceteris 
paribus) has a significant, positive effect on the probability of a firm using Secrecy 
and Lead-time advantage (at the 1 per cent level) and Copyright (at the 5 per cent 
level) as knowledge-protection mechanisms.  The effects are strongest for Secrecy 
followed by Lead-time advantage and then Copyright.  There are statistically 
insignificant effects on the probability of a firm using Complexity of Design, Patents 
and Registered Designs following a unit increase in both variables.  There is a 
significant, negative effect (at the 5 per cent level) on the probability of a firm using 
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Trademarks when both variables increase by one unit.  As with the ordered-probit 
regression results, the results here indicate that firms’ new intangibles protection is 
more responsive to firms’ process innovation activity within an industry than to 
firms’ product innovation in the same industry. 
The ‘average propensity for firms to view scientific journals and trade/technical 
publications as being of medium or high importance to innovations within the 
industry’ and the ‘average propensity for firms to view technical, industry or service 
standards as being of medium or high importance to innovations within the industry’ 
are included in the model to indicate the codified/tacit nature of knowledge 
embedded within the industry’s technology.  A unit increase in both of these 
variables (ceteris paribus) has a significant, positive effect (at the 1 per cent level) on 
the probability that a firm will protect their knowledge using Secrecy, Lead-time 
Advantage and Copyright.  As knowledge becomes less tacit and the industry 
appropriability regime weakens, firms are more likely to undertake new use of these 
knowledge-protection mechanisms.  A unit increase in the ‘average propensity for 
firms to view scientific journals and trade/technical publications as being of medium 
or high importance to innovations within the industry’ variable leads to a greater 
increase in the probability that a firm will protect knowledge using these three 
mechanisms than a unit increase in the ‘average propensity for firms to view 
technical, industry or service standards as being of medium or high importance to 
innovations within the industry’ variable.  The increase in the probability of 
protection is greatest for Secrecy followed by Lead-time Advantage and then 
Copyright.  The effects on the probability of protecting knowledge using Patents, 
Complexity of Design and Registered Designs are insignificant.  As for the 
probability of protecting knowledge using Trademarks, the effects are negative and 
significant at the 10 per cent and 1 per cent levels for the ‘average propensity for 
firms to view scientific journals and trade/technical publications as being of medium 
or high importance to innovations within the industry’ and the ‘average propensity 
for firms to view technical, industry or service standards as being of medium or high 
importance to innovations within the industry’ variables respectively. 
In summary, as the average propensity to become an innovator (product or 
process) increases within an industry, the probability that a firm will use 
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Secrecy, Lead-time Advantage and Copyright increases as does the 
probability that a firm will use these three knowledge-protection mechanisms 
when the ‘average propensity for firms to view technical, industry or service 
standards as being of medium or high importance to innovations within the 
industry’ and the ‘average propensity for firms to view scientific journals and 
trade/technical publications as being of medium or high importance to 
innovations within the industry’  variables increase.  The effects on a firm’s 
probability of using Patents, Registered Designs and Complexity of Design 
are insignificant.  When knowledge becomes more codified, the probability of 
a firm using easily-accessible informal and formal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms increases.  These results support Hypothesis 4a which proposes 
that a firm’s intangibles protection increases when the ‘nature of technology’ 
dimension of the industry appropriability regime weakens. 
The effective and available knowledge-protection mechanisms within an industry – 
given by the knowledge-protection regime – is the second element of the industry 
appropriability regime.  A unit increase in the variables representing the industry 
knowledge-protection regime (the ‘average propensity for firms to use formal 
knowledge protection or to view formal knowledge protection as being important 
within an industry’ and the ‘average propensity for firms to use informal knowledge 
protection or to view informal knowledge protection as being important within an 
industry’) – ceteris paribus – has a significant, positive effect (at the one per cent 
level) on the probability that a firm will protect knowledge using Secrecy, Lead-time 
Advantage and Copyright.  The effects are largest for Secrecy followed by Lead-
time Advantage and then Copyright.  In addition, the one unit increase in the 
‘average propensity for firms to use formal knowledge protection or to view formal 
knowledge protection as being important within an industry’ leads to larger, positive 
effects than a one unit increase in the ‘average propensity for firms to use informal 
knowledge protection or to view informal knowledge protection as being important 
within an industry’ for all three knowledge-protection mechanisms.  The effects on 
the probability that a firm will protect knowledge using Complexity of Design, 
Patents and Registered Designs are insignificant, but the effect on the probability 
that a firm will protect knowledge using Trademarks is negative and significant at 
the 5 per cent level when there is a unit increase in the ‘average propensity for firms 
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to use informal knowledge protection or to view informal knowledge protection as 
being important within an industry’, although insignificant following a unit increase 
in the ‘average propensity for firms to use formal knowledge protection or to view 
formal knowledge protection as being important within an industry’. 
In summary, when the available, effective informal and formal knowledge-
protection mechanisms within an industry increase, the probability of a firm 
using the more easily accessible informal and formal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms increases, whereas there is no significant effect on the 
probability of a firm using the less accessible knowledge-protection 
mechanisms – Patents, Registered Designs and Complexity of Design.  This 
provides some evidence in support of Hypothesis 4b which states that a 
firm’s intangibles protection increases when the knowledge-protection 
dimension of the industry appropriability regime strengthens. 
2.6 Discussion and conclusions 
During recent years, new technologies have emerged which have led firms to 
increase their investment into intangible assets.  Indeed, intangible investment has 
risen above that of tangibles (Haskel et al., 2011).  A firm’s intangible assets reflect 
value in the firm, and therefore firm strategy relating to them requires careful 
thought and attention.  A firm’s intangibles strategy – its investment into and its 
protection of intangible assets – is the focus of this study. 
The IO viewpoint lies at the heart of this study.  Firms’ decisions relating to 
intangibles – their intangibles strategies – are assumed to depend upon the market 
environment in which the firm operates (Scott, 1982).  Using UK CIS data covering 
the 2002 to 2012 period and BSD data covering the 1997 to 2012 period, a series of 
probit and ordered-probit models are estimated to examine a firm’s investment into 
and protection of intangible assets and to explore whether a firm’s investment and 
protection strategy is contingent upon the appropriability regime of the industry 
within which the firm operates or some other element of industry structure. 
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This study adds to existing literature by examining factors which influence both firm 
investment into intangibles and firm-protection strategies.  Previous studies examine 
the link which exists between intangibles investment and performance (for example, 
Nesta, 2008), and how the protection of intangible assets influences performance (for 
example, Hu, 2013).  The present study examines the determinants of intangibles 
strategy itself and asks whether the industry appropriability regime, or some other 
element of industry structure, drives a firm’s intangibles investment and protection 
decisions. 
The present analysis adds to the existing body of knowledge by examining how the 
strength of the industry appropriability regime and the level of industry 
competitiveness impacts upon a firm’s intangible investment, the importance firm 
managers attach to informal and formal knowledge-protection mechanisms and a 
firm’s informal and formal knowledge-protection choices.  The study contributes to 
knowledge by asking if any one element of the industry environment being examined 
matters more than another in determining a firm’s intangible investment and 
protection strategies, or whether each element is equally important in determining a 
firm’s intangibles strategy.  In addition, the study adds to knowledge by examining if 
the relative importance of the different elements of the industry environment is 
consistent across the investment and protection components of firm strategy. 
This study deepens our understanding of how firms make intangible investment and 
protection decisions.  The empirical analysis leads to a number of key findings. 
i. First, the results suggest that new industry competition impacts negatively on 
a firm’s intangibles investment into R&D and Training.  New industry 
competition originates from two sources – new entrants and existing 
incumbents.  In addition to the negative effects on firm investment into R&D 
and Training, new competition from new entrants has a negative effect on 
investment into Design, whereas new competition from incumbents has a 
negative effect on Computer Software investment. 
The reduction in a firm’s intangibles investment following an increase in the birth 
rate (an increase in new-entrant competition) provides evidence of creative 
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destruction – the increase in competition within the industry lowers a firm’s expected 
returns to the intangibles investment.   
ii. Second, as the ‘nature of technology’ dimension of the industry 
appropriability regime weakens, there is a consistent, positive effect on the 
investment component of a firm’s intangibles strategy. 
It was proposed that as knowledge becomes more codified and the natural protection 
against knowledge spillovers is reduced, a firm’s investment into innovative 
activities falls.  In contrast, the results here indicate that the importance of standards 
and publications to innovation activities proves to be a source of benefit for a firm.  
With standards come related network externalities (Farrell and Saloner, 1985), for 
example, producers are able to obtain inputs more cheaply through the exploitation 
of economies of scale (Bekkers et al., 2002).  Standards can also facilitate pro-
competitive effects, for example, competitive markets for replacement parts 
(Lemley, 2002).  Standards also protect the market share and bargaining power of 
the firm or firms controlling them, and ‘‘under some conditions, firms that share 
technological knowledge may achieve higher innovative performance than firms that 
do not share knowledge.  Knowledge-sharing strategies can help a firm shape the 
institutional environment in favour of its own technological design.’’ (Spencer, 2003 
p.218). 
iii. Third, as the ‘knowledge-protection dimension’ of the industry 
appropriability regime strengthens, there is a clear, consistent, positive effect 
on the investment component of a firm’s intangibles strategy. 
As the available, effective knowledge-protection mechanisms within an industry 
increase, there are more effective tools for competitive firms to use to enable them to 
appropriate the returns from their investment – knowledge-protection mechanisms 
enable a firm to become a temporary monopolist (Arrow, 1962).  Stronger 
appropriability conditions increase a firm's incentives to commit to internally 
developing resources due to the greater certainty of the returns from such 
investments (Levin et al., 1987). 
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iv. Fourth, as new industry competition increases, firms are less likely to view 
informal and formal knowledge-protection mechanisms as being important if 
the increased competition is due to new entrants.  When new industry 
competition is due to incumbents, firms are more likely to view formal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms as being important. 
As the level of competition in the industry increases, economic rents and competitive 
advantages may be eroded away.  The industry birth rate is an indication to the 
number of new entrants in a market and reflects the proportion of young firms 
present.  When the industry birth rate increases, the new, young firms may not have 
the necessary resources and capabilities to compete and be successful.  Older firms 
(incumbents), on the other hand, may have accumulated resources and capabilities 
over time and represent a credible threat.  Given this, firms may be more likely to 
view formal knowledge-protection mechanisms as being important when industry 
competition is increased due to incumbents.  In contrast, firm managers are not so 
concerned with knowledge protection when the increased competition is from new 
firms entering the industry. 
v. Fifth, as the ‘nature of technology’ dimension of the industry appropriability 
regime weakens, firms are more likely to view informal and formal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms as being important. 
When knowledge within an industry becomes more codified, the use of knowledge-
protection mechanisms allows a firm to guard against imitation and appropriate 
returns from investment.  It is therefore expected that firms will view informal and 
formal knowledge-protection mechanisms as being more important when the degree 
of knowledge codification increases. 
vi. Sixth, as the ‘knowledge-protection dimension’ of the industry 
appropriability regime strengthens, firms are more likely to view both 
informal and formal knowledge-protection mechanisms as being important – 
there is a clear, consistent, positive effect on the importance to the firm of all 
knowledge-protection mechanisms in order to protect innovations.  
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The available, effective knowledge-protection mechanisms within an industry 
increases so that there are more effective tools for firms to use to enable them to 
appropriate the returns from their investment.  Firms are therefore more likely to 
view knowledge-protection mechanisms as being important. 
vii. Seventh, new industry competition from new entrants into the industry leads 
to an increase in the probability that a firm will use Secrecy and Complexity 
of Design.  There is a reduction in the probability that a firm will use the 
other knowledge-protection mechanisms. 
viii. Eighth, as the ‘nature of technology’ dimension of the industry 
appropriability regime weakens, the probability that a firm will use informal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms – Secrecy, Lead-time Advantage and 
Copyright – increases. 
ix. Ninth, as the ‘knowledge-protection dimension’ of the industry 
appropriability regime strengthens, the probability that a firm will use 
informal knowledge-protection mechanisms – Secrecy, Lead-time Advantage 
and Copyright – increases. 
The results of this study show that in reality, a firm’s actual knowledge-protection 
decisions differ from what managers say is important.  As competition levels within 
an industry change and the industry appropriability regime changes in strength, there 
is a positive effect on intangibles protection where protection is easy to implement or 
has a low cost of implementation, for example Secrecy, Lead-time Advantage and 
Copyright.  Where protection is more difficult to implement, for example, the 
Complexity of Designs and Registered Designs, a change in appropriability-regime 
strength has no significant effect.  It is clear from the results that a firm’s view of the 
importance of knowledge-protection mechanisms to innovation does not translate 
into practice. 
Many previous studies (for example, Laursen and Salter, 2005; Hall and Sena, 2017) 
use the data reflecting importance of knowledge-protection mechanisms to reflect 
actual protection decisions made by firms.  These results show that this data may be 
prone to subjectivity bias (Veugelers and Schneider, 2018), and therefore may not 
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reflect the actual protection decisions that firms make.  It may therefore be the case 
that managers’ subjective viewpoints enter into the survey responses.  The survey 
responses depend upon a manager’s understanding of knowledge-protection 
mechanisms as well as their attitudes towards knowledge-protection mechanisms i.e. 
whether they think that they are important or not.  A deeper understanding of what 
this data is saying is needed, but it is clear from the results that the responses are not 
a reflection of the actual knowledge-protection decisions which take place during the 
previous three-year period. 
2.6.1 The drivers of a firm’s intangibles strategy 
The analysis undertaken in this study shows that both industry structure and the 
industry appropriability regime play a part in driving a firm’s intangibles investment 
strategy.  An increase in industry competition – from new entrants or from 
incumbents – has a consistent, negative effect on R&D investment.  For other 
intangible investments, it seems that the source of the increase in competition 
matters for the direction of the effect.  The probability of a firm investing in 
Computer Software is reduced following an increase in competition from 
incumbents, whereas the probability of a firm investing in Computer Software 
increases if the additional competition is from new entrants, for example. 
In addition, the study also finds that the industry appropriability regime affects a 
firm’s intangibles-investment strategy.  In contrast to the results following a change 
in industry competition, a change in the industry appropriability regime has a similar 
impact – in terms of the direction of the effect – on the different intangible 
investments being examined. 
With regards to knowledge protection, the analysis shows that both industry 
structure and the industry appropriability regime influence the importance firms 
attach to different informal and formal knowledge-protection mechanisms, although 
following a change in industry structure, it is only formal protection mechanisms that 
are viewed by firms as being more important (i.e. when competition from 
incumbents increases).  Firms view both informal and formal knowledge-protection 




Whereas both industry structure and the industry appropriability regime influence 
intangibles investment and the importance firms attach to different knowledge-
protection mechanisms, industry structure is less important for firms’ actual 
protection decisions.  Competition from incumbents has an insignificant effect on the 
probability of a firm using most knowledge-protection mechanisms.  In contrast, as 
the industry appropriability regime strengthens, there is a significant, positive effect 
on a firm’s use of the easier-to-implement protection mechanisms. 
It is clear from the results that both industry structure and the industry 
appropriability regime drive firms’ intangibles strategies.  It is not possible to single 
out one component of the industry environment as having the greatest impact upon a 
firm’s intangibles strategy – different parts of the industry environment impact on 
the different elements of a firm’s intangibles strategy to varying extents. 
2.6.2 Policy implications 
The analysis here provides policymakers with an understanding of how different 
elements of the industry environment – industry structure and the industry 
appropriability regime – impact upon firms’ innovation strategies.  By ensuring that 
the correct policy levers are in place, the government can help firms foster the 
accumulation of intangibles and, in turn, unleash potential growth. 
Policy designed to increase the available, effective protection mechanisms that firms 
have access to within an industry or policy designed to help firms strengthen natural 
protection – by promoting the use of tacit knowledge, for example (i.e. policy 
designed to strengthen industry appropriability regimes) will encourage firms to 
invest in innovative activities.  Some industries, for example the pharmaceutical 
industry, have strong appropriability regimes.  Some firms in these industries may 
face barriers to formal protection (for example, smaller firms), and government 
policy should target these firms; innovation vouchers should be issued to help those 
firms facing financial constraints, firms should be helped to identify the IP that they 
own, firms should be guided through the formal-IP application process, and firms 
should be able to seek advice if an IP-infringement occurs.  Other industries, for 
example the soft-drinks industry, have weak appropriability regimes. Typically, 
formal protection such as patents is ineffective, and firms rely on trademarks, 
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copyright and easier-to-implement protection such as secrecy.  In the case of the 
soft-drinks industry, secret recipes help deter imitation, for example. Government 
policy should help firms in these industries develop a protection strategy using 
formal protection mechanisms such as trademarks and copyright and informal 
protection mechanisms such as secrecy.  Examples of ways in which government 
policy initiatives can support firms to increase their informal protection include: 
designating an individual within the firm to identify intellectual property and 
implement and enforce secrecy compliance; making IP protection part of the 
employees’ orientation and training program, and informing those employees who 
have access to firm-specific knowledge and confidential information of their 
continuing duty to prevent disclosure; prohibiting individuals from making copies of 
confidential information unless it is necessary for them to perform their duties; and 
prohibiting employees from downloading proprietary software onto portable 
computers without prior authorisation and maintain detailed records of employees 
permitted to download proprietary software.  The Intellectual Property Office (IPO) 
(the official UK government body responsible for intellectual property rights) 
should, in the same way as they do for formal protection, provide events, tool-kits, 
case studies and guidance to help firms use these and other informal strategies as a 
way of protecting their knowledge in an informal way.  In summary, government 
policy aimed at increasing appropriability strength across all industries – by 
promoting both informal and formal knowledge protection – will encourage 
innovative investment in all firms. 
An increase in industry competition sees firms increase their use of informal 
protection mechanisms and identify formal mechanisms as having an increased level 
of importance in the innovation process.  Firms should be encouraged to know their 
market – they should actively monitor the market in which they are engaged as firms 
can only react to changes in their competitive environment if they know that they 
have happened.  Monitoring competitors’ behaviour can be costly - both financially 
and in terms of time.  Large firms may employ market analysts to keep abreast of the 
industry climate, whereas small firms may be resource constrained.  Policy 
initiatives should be put in place to help firms monitor their market and set up 
appropriate strategies in order to protect themselves. 
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2.6.3 Limitations and future work 
There are several limitations to this study.  First, the high degree of correlation 
between the variables designed to represent the industry appropriability regime 
means that each element of the regime is analysed in a separate regression model – it 
is not possible to examine the impact of the industry appropriability regime on a 
firm’s intangibles strategy in a single estimated equation.  Future work will aim to 
address this issue and seek ways to create a single measure representing the industry 
appropriability regime.  Second, the analysis here considers the UK only.  Some 
countries are more intangible-intensive than others.  For example, Spain and Italy 
have relatively lower shares of intangibles as a proportion of GDP and tend to be 
more tangible-intensive.  Germany, France and the Netherlands have a low-to-
moderate intensity whereas Finland, the UK, the US and Sweden have the highest 
intangible intensities.  IP systems vary from country to country, and the availability 
and effectiveness of knowledge-protection mechanisms may differ in different 
countries.  Consequently, the findings in this study may not be observed in other 
countries.  Future work aims to carry out a similar analysis in other countries, 
providing that the data is available.  Third, the UK CIS data on knowledge protection 
is binary data indicating whether protection took place or not.  There is no indication 
as to how much knowledge protection firms use.  Future research will attempt to link 
firms’ IP application and acquisition data – more specifically, data for patents, 
trademarks and registered designs – with a pooled UK CIS panel dataset in order to 
address this limitation and enable a more in-depth analysis to be carried out.  Fourth, 
the analysis here is carried out across all industries and all sizes of firm.  Using a 
pooled UK CIS panel dataset and matched IP data, future research will conduct a 
more detailed exploration of a firm’s intangibles strategy.  Results for different sizes 
of firm and different sectoral contexts will be explored – for example individual-
industry comparisons will be made as well as comparisons between high-
technology/knowledge-intensive industries and low-technology/less knowledge-
intensive industries.  Fifth, the analysis assumes that the industry appropriability 
regime is exogenous, and firms are required to consider the protection mechanisms 
that are available.  The assumption that firms only adjust their knowledge-protection 
strategies in this way may be too narrow.  Sixth, the theoretical framework here 
reflects the knowledge-protection mechanisms which are currently available to firms 
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in the UK.  It is becoming increasingly acknowledged that these knowledge-
protection mechanisms may not be suitable in economies with a growing role for 
intangible capital.  The fundamental shift in technology and in the economic 
landscape which has taken place in recent years has made the current system of 
intellectual property rights unworkable and ineffective (Thurow, 1997).  The present 
IP system, designed more than one hundred years ago, may have worked when 
patents were granted for mechanical devices, for example, but the so-called ‘brain-
power’ economy of today, poses additional challenges.  It is clear, for example, that 
“the invention of a new gene cannot be handled in the same way as the invention of a 
new gearbox,” (Thurow, 1997 p.98).  The software industry is an example where 
firms have suffered due to patenting and copyright laws not keeping up with 
technology.  Courts ruled that the look and feel of software programs could not be 
patented, opening the door to imitators.  Programmers with the knowledge to write 
their own code have been able to imitate successfully because they know what the 
program is supposed to do and how the final program is supposed to look and feel.  
It is desirable that a new, optimal IP system be different across industries, types of 
knowledge and types of inventors.  For example, the electronics industry wants 
speed and short-term protection, whereas the pharmaceuticals industry wants long-
term protection because most of its money is earned after a long period of testing to 
prove a drug's effectiveness and the absence of adverse side effects.  Advances in 
knowledge need to be distinguished from one another and patents awarded on that 
basis.  In addition, a differentiated patent system may offer innovators the 
opportunity to choose from a selection of protection mechanisms.  An overhaul of 
the current one-size-fits-all, one-dimensional IP system is required to accommodate 
fast-developing knowledge-based economies.  Finally, this study is limited because 
the estimations adopt a reductionist perspective (Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990) – 
this has the advantage of being able to separate out specified theoretical links but the 

















        
R&D investment (0/1) 74,427 0.27 0.44 
Design investment (0/1) (CIS 4, 5, 6) 43,423 0.20 0.40 
Design investment (0/1) (CIS 7, 8) 28,829 0.12 0.32 
Training (0/1) 72,275 0.28 0.45 
Computer software (0/1) 56,439 0.35 0.48 
Importance of secrecy (0/1/2/3) 28,594 0.79 1.09 
Importance of complexity of design (0/1/2/3) 28,589 0.60 0.94 
Importance of lead time (0/1/2/3) 28,604 0.84 1.12 
Importance of confidentiality agreements (0/1/2/3) 28,638 0.89 1.17 
Importance of copyright (0/1/2/3) 28,579 0.51 0.96 
Importance of patents (0/1/2/3) 28,591 0.46 0.94 
Importance of trademarks (0/1/2/3) 28,610 0.60 1.03 
Importance of registration of designs (0/1/2/3) 28,595 0.47 0.92 
Use of secrecy (0/1) 14,342 0.09 0.28 
Use of complexity of design (0/1) 14,342 0.03 0.16 
Use of lead time (0/1) 14,342 0.04 0.18 
Use of patents (0/1) 28,623 0.04 0.20 
Use of registration of designs (0/1) 28,623 0.02 0.12 
Use of trademarks (0/1) 28,623 0.06 0.24 
Use of copyright (0/1) 28,623 0.05 0.22 
Employment (log) 63,149 3.87 1.76 
Exporter (0/1) 74,427 0.29 0.45 
Engaged in co-operation - any innovation activity (0/1) 74,427 0.20 0.40 
Science graduates (% workforce) 58,438 6.35 15.96 
Other graduates (% workforce) 59,918 9.35 19.31 
Received public financial support for innovation (0/1) 45,068 0.08 0.27 
Average propensity for a firm to be a product innovator within the 
industry 13 0.25 0.08 
Average propensity for a firm to be a process innovator within the 
industry 13 0.15 0.06 
Average propensity within the industry to view industry standards 
as being important to innovation activities  13 0.09 0.02 
Average propensity within the industry for a firm to view industry 
publications as being important to innovation activities  13 0.04 0.01 
Average propensity within the industry for a firm to use new 
informal methods of protection or to view them as being important  13 0.23 0.09 
Average propensity within the industry for a firm to use new 
formal methods of protection or to view them as being important  13 0.22 0.07 
Industry birth rate (%) * 65 0.19 0.07 
Industry concentration ratio (five-firm) ** 65 0.12 0.10 
Notes: * The proportion of new firms entering the industry group during the three-year CIS period 
** The share of industry-group turnover accounted for by the five largest firms within the industry group – 
in terms of turnover (individual year values are averaged across each CIS wave) 





Table 2.1 (continued): Descriptive statistics 
 






















































Patent 12.8 22.8 7.2 9.6 14.7 17.0 15.8 9.8 8.9 20.2 
Registered industrial 
design 
4.5 6.5 2.2 3.0 5.0 7.1 4.5 4.5 2.7 7.9 
Registered trademark 14.7 18.9 10.8 10.9 15.3 21.5 15.0 14.4 13.0 17.9 
Copyright 12.6 16.7 8.6 12.2 11.2 15.7 15.4 9.7 11.5 14.6 
Secrecy (including non-
disclosure agreements) 
27.8 36.3 22.0 26.9 29.0 28.8 35.4 20.2 24.5 34.0 
Complexity of design 9.0 13.6 6.7 8.3 9.5 10.1 11.9 6.0 6.8 13.2 
Lead-advantage time 11.8 16.5 8.3 12.3 11.1 12.0 13.1 10.5 9.1 16.9 












Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
(1) R&D investment (0/1) 1.00                                 
(2) Training investment (0/1) 0.49 1.00                               
(3) Computer software investment (0/1) 0.42 0.46 1.00                             
(4) Employment (log) 0.08 0.07 0.02 1.00                           
(5) Exporter (0/1) 0.32 0.17 0.16 0.10 1.00                         
(6) Engaged in co-operation - any innovation 
activity (0/1) 0.48 0.38 0.35 0.09 0.26 1.00                       
(7) Science graduates (% workforce) 0.25 0.18 0.15 -0.01 0.26 0.21 1.00                     
(8) Other graduates (% workforce) 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.15 0.12 0.14 1.00                   
(9) Received public financial support for 
innovation (0/1) 0.28 0.22 0.18 0.01 0.19 0.27 0.24 0.03 1.00                 
(10) Average propensity for a firm to be a 
product innovator within the industry 0.22 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.30 0.14 0.05 -0.01 0.14 1.00               
(11) Average propensity for a firm to be a 
process innovator within the industry 0.23 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.29 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.98 1.00             
(12) Average propensity within the industry 
to view industry standards as being 
important to innovation activities  0.19 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.19 0.12 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.73 0.81 1.00           
(13) Average propensity within the industry 
for a firm to view industry publications as 
being important to innovation activities  0.17 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.19 0.11 0.20 0.13 0.12 0.68 0.72 0.85 1.00         
(14) Average propensity within the industry 
for a firm to use new informal methods of 
protection or to view them as being 
important 0.22 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.29 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.98 0.99 0.83 0.79 1.00       
(15) Average propensity within the industry 
for a firm to use new formal methods of 
protection or to view them as being 
important 0.22 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.28 0.14 0.11 0.06 0.13 0.95 0.95 0.82 0.85 0.97 1.00     
(16) Industry birth rate (%) * -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.20 -0.07 0.14 0.13 -0.05 -0.39 -0.31 0.07 0.16 -0.30 -0.23 1.00   
(17) Industry concentration ratio (five-firm) ** -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 -0.30 -0.22 -0.31 -0.39 -0.30 -0.36 0.01 1.00 
Notes: * The proportion of new firms entering the industry group during the three-year CIS period 
** The share of industry-group turnover accounted for by the five largest firms within the industry group – 
in terms of turnover (individual year values are averaged across each CIS wave) 







Table 2.3: Correlation matrix: Design investment (CIS 4, CIS 5 and CIS 6, N=30,020) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
(1) design investment (0/1) 1.00                             
(2) Employment (log) 0.12 1.00                           
(3) Exporter (0/1) 0.25 0.16 1.00                         
(4) Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.32 0.13 0.22 1.00                       
(5) Science graduates (% workforce) 0.17 0.02 0.23 0.19 1.00                     
(6) Other graduates (% workforce) 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.10 0.16 1.00                   
(7) Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.21 0.03 0.19 0.24 0.23 0.05 1.00                 
(8) Average propensity for a firm to be 
a product innovator within the industry 0.21 0.05 0.32 0.11 0.04 -0.01 0.15 1.00               
(9) Average propensity for a firm to be 
a process innovator within the industry 0.20 0.05 0.31 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.15 0.98 1.00             
(10) Average propensity within the 
industry to view industry standards as 
being important to innovation activities 0.16 0.03 0.22 0.11 0.15 0.08 0.13 0.74 0.81 1.00           
(11) Average propensity within the 
industry for a firm to view industry 
publications as being important to 
innovation activities 0.14 0.05 0.22 0.10 0.19 0.10 0.14 0.70 0.72 0.83 1.00         
(12) Average propensity within the 
industry for a firm to use new informal 
methods of protection or to view them 
as being important 0.21 0.05 0.31 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.15 0.98 0.99 0.84 0.79 1.00       
(13) Average propensity within the 
industry for a firm to use new formal 
methods of protection or to view them 
as being important 0.20 0.06 0.30 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.15 0.95 0.96 0.82 0.85 0.98 1.00     
(14) Industry birth rate (%) * -0.12 -0.10 -0.17 -0.08 0.15 0.13 -0.02 -0.46 -0.38 -0.08 0.06 -0.38 -0.32 1.00   
(15) Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) ** -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 -0.21 -0.13 -0.27 -0.38 -0.23 -0.30 0.11 1.00 
 
 
Notes: * The proportion of new firms entering the industry group during the three-year CIS period 
** The share of industry-group turnover accounted for by the five largest firms within the industry group – 
in terms of turnover (individual year values are averaged across each CIS wave) 







Table 2.4: Correlation matrix: Design investment (CIS 7 and CIS 8, N=8,384) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
(1) Design investment 1.00                             
(2) Employment (log) 0.09 1.00                           
(3) Exporter (0/1) 0.26 0.15 1.00                         
(4) Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.41 0.15 0.24 1.00                       
(5) Science graduates (% workforce) 0.19 0.03 0.26 0.21 1.00                     
(6) Other graduates (% workforce) 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.11 1.00                   
(7) Received public financial support for 
innovation (0/1) 0.22 0.05 0.17 0.29 0.24 0.01 1.00                 
(8) Average propensity for a firm to be a 
product innovator within the industry 0.21 0.08 0.36 0.17 0.06 0.00 0.13 1.00               
(9) Average propensity for a firm to be a 
process innovator within the industry 0.20 0.08 0.35 0.17 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.98 1.00             
(10) Average propensity within the industry 
to view industry standards as being 
important to innovation activities 0.15 0.05 0.21 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.13 0.72 0.80 1.00           
(11) Average propensity within the industry 
for a firm to view industry publications as 
being important to innovation activities 0.13 0.03 0.23 0.13 0.21 0.16 0.12 0.70 0.74 0.85 1.00         
(12) Average propensity within the industry 
for a firm to use new informal methods of 
protection or to view them as being 
important 0.20 0.08 0.35 0.17 0.09 0.03 0.14 0.98 0.99 0.83 0.80 1.00       
(13) Average propensity within the industry 
for a firm to use new formal methods of 
protection or to view them as being 
important 0.19 0.07 0.34 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.95 0.96 0.80 0.86 0.97 1.00     
(14) Industry birth rate (%) * -0.11 -0.06 -0.22 -0.07 0.17 0.20 -0.03 -0.43 -0.30 0.16 0.16 -0.30 -0.26 1.00   
(15) Industry concentration ratio (five-





Notes: * The proportion of new firms entering the industry group during the three-year CIS period 
** The share of industry-group turnover accounted for by the five largest firms within the industry group – 
in terms of turnover (individual year values are averaged across each CIS wave) 







Table 2.5: Correlation matrix: Importance of knowledge-protection mechanisms (CIS 4 and CIS 5, N=15,648) 
 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(1) Importance of secrecy (0/1/2/3) 1.00                     
(2) Importance of complexity of design (0/1/2/3) 0.72 1.00                   
(3) Importance of lead time (0/1/2/3) 0.71 0.74 1.00                 
(4) Importance of confidentiality agreements (0/1/2/3) 0.76 0.64 0.64 1.00               
(5) Importance of copyright (0/1/2/3) 0.60 0.59 0.53 0.63 1.00             
(6) Importance of patents (0/1/2/3) 0.56 0.59 0.52 0.59 0.65 1.00           
(7) Importance of trademarks (0/1/2/3) 0.56 0.54 0.52 0.58 0.67 0.72 1.00         
(8) Importance of registration of designs (0/1/2/3) 0.54 0.59 0.52 0.56 0.67 0.76 0.74 1.00       
(9) Employment (log) 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.20 1.00     
(10) Exporter (0/1) 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.27 0.33 0.29 0.27 0.23 1.00   
(11) Engaged in co-operation - any innovation activity (0/1) 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.30 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.18 1.00 
(12) Science graduates (% workforce) 0.24 0.25 0.20 0.28 0.22 0.22 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.21 0.17 
(13) Other graduates (% workforce) 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.17 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.06 
(14) Received public financial support for innovation (0/1) 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.17 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.07 0.19 0.25 
(15) Average propensity for a firm to be a product innovator within the 
industry 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.22 0.18 0.24 0.18 0.21 0.10 0.36 0.09 
(16) Average propensity for a firm to be a process innovator within the 
industry 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.23 0.17 0.23 0.17 0.20 0.10 0.35 0.09 
(17) Average propensity within the industry to view industry standards as 
being important to innovation activities 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.15 0.18 0.12 0.15 0.08 0.26 0.09 
(18) Average propensity within the industry for a firm to view industry 
publications as being important to innovation activities 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.19 0.13 0.16 0.08 0.27 0.08 
(19) Average propensity within the industry for a firm to use new 
informal methods of protection or to view them as being important 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.23 0.18 0.24 0.18 0.21 0.11 0.36 0.09 
(20) Average propensity within the industry for a firm to use new formal 
methods of protection or to view them as being important 0.23 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.18 0.20 0.11 0.34 0.10 
(21) Industry birth rate (%) * -0.08 -0.13 -0.13 -0.05 -0.06 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.07 -0.19 -0.03 















Variable 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
(12) Science graduates (% workforce) 1.00                     
(13) Other graduates (% workforce) 0.16 1.00                   
(14) Received public financial support for innovation (0/1) 0.22 0.05 1.00                 
(15) Average propensity for a firm to be a product innovator within the 
industry 0.04 -0.01 0.16 1.00               
(16) Average propensity for a firm to be a process innovator within the 
industry 0.06 0.02 0.16 0.98 1.00             
(17) Average propensity within the industry to view industry standards as 
being important to innovation activities 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.74 0.81 1.00           
(18) Average propensity within the industry for a firm to view industry 
publications as being important to innovation activities 0.19 0.08 0.15 0.72 0.74 0.83 1.00         
(19) Average propensity within the industry for a firm to use new 
informal methods of protection or to view them as being important 0.07 0.01 0.16 0.98 0.99 0.83 0.81 1.00       
(20) Average propensity within the industry for a firm to use new formal 
methods of protection or to view them as being important 0.09 0.04 0.16 0.96 0.96 0.81 0.85 0.98 1.00     
(21) Industry birth rate (%) * 0.14 0.12 -0.04 -0.51 -0.43 -0.18 0.00 -0.44 -0.39 1.00   
(22) Industry concentration ratio (five-firm) ** -0.04 0.00 -0.05 -0.16 -0.07 -0.25 -0.35 -0.18 -0.24 0.22 1.00 
Table 2.5 (continued): Correlation matrix: Importance of knowledge-protection mechanisms (CIS4 and CIS5, N=15,648) 
Notes: * The proportion of new firms entering the industry group during the three-year CIS period 
** The share of industry-group turnover accounted for by the five largest firms within the industry group – 
in terms of turnover (individual year values are averaged across each CIS wave) 











Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(1) Use of secrecy (0/1) 1.00                     
(2) Use of complexity of design (0/1) 0.37 1.00                   
(3) Use of lead time (0/1) 0.32 0.34 1.00                 
(4) Use of patents (0/1) 0.36 0.29 0.18 1.00               
(5) Use of registration of designs (0/1) 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.44 1.00             
(6) Use of trademarks (0/1) 0.29 0.17 0.15 0.35 0.33 1.00           
(7) Use of copyright (0/1) 0.39 0.31 0.24 0.33 0.32 0.35 1.00         
(8) Employment (log) 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.05 1.00       
(9) Exporter (0/1) 0.32 0.18 0.15 0.25 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.15 1.00     
(10) Engaged in co-operation - any innovation activity (0/1) 0.36 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.15 0.21 0.23 0.15 0.24 1.00   
(11) Science graduates (% workforce) 0.31 0.19 0.12 0.25 0.06 0.09 0.19 0.03 0.26 0.21 1.00 
(12) Other graduates (% workforce) 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.14 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.11 
(13) Received public financial support for innovation (0/1) 0.29 0.21 0.17 0.27 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.05 0.17 0.29 0.24 
(14) Average propensity for a firm to be a product innovator within the 
industry 0.19 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.36 0.17 0.06 
(15) Average propensity for a firm to be a process innovator within the 
industry 0.20 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.35 0.17 0.08 
(16) Average propensity within the industry to view industry standards as 
being important to innovation activities 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.21 0.14 0.17 
(17) Average propensity within the industry for a firm to view industry 
publications as being important to innovation activities 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.23 0.13 0.21 
(18) Average propensity within the industry for a firm to use new 
informal methods of protection or to view them as being important 0.20 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.35 0.17 0.09 
(19) Average propensity within the industry for a firm to use new formal 
methods of protection or to view them as being important 0.20 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.34 0.17 0.12 
(20) Industry birth rate (%) * -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.02 -0.06 -0.22 -0.07 0.17 













Variable 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
(12) Other graduates (% workforce) 1.00                   
(13) Received public financial support for innovation (0/1) 0.01 1.00                 
(14) Average propensity for a firm to be a product innovator within the 
industry 0.00 0.13 1.00               
(15) Average propensity for a firm to be a process innovator within the 
industry 0.03 0.13 0.98 1.00             
(16) Average propensity within the industry to view industry standards as 
being important to innovation activities 0.12 0.13 0.72 0.80 1.00           
(17) Average propensity within the industry for a firm to view industry 
publications as being important to innovation activities 0.16 0.12 0.70 0.74 0.85 1.00         
(18) Average propensity within the industry for a firm to use new informal 
methods of protection or to view them as being important 0.03 0.14 0.98 0.99 0.83 0.80 1.00       
(19) Average propensity within the industry for a firm to use new formal 
methods of protection or to view them as being important 0.08 0.13 0.95 0.96 0.80 0.86 0.97 1.00     
(20) Industry birth rate (%) * 0.20 -0.03 -0.43 -0.30 0.16 0.16 -0.30 -0.26 1.00   
(21) Industry concentration ratio (five-firm) ** -0.02 -0.05 -0.30 -0.25 -0.32 -0.33 -0.29 -0.33 0.11 1.00 
Notes: * The proportion of new firms entering the industry group during the three-year CIS period 
** The share of industry-group turnover accounted for by the five largest firms within the industry group – 
in terms of turnover (individual year values are averaged across each CIS wave) 







Table 2.7:  R&D investment – Heteroscedastic probit model (marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 
 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.379*** 0.378*** 0.370*** 0.374*** 0.377*** 0.375*** 
 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support for 
innovation (0/1) 0.242*** 0.243*** 0.236*** 0.241*** 0.240*** 0.241*** 
 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.096* -0.179*** -0.607*** -0.805*** -0.197*** -0.282*** 
 0.057 0.054 0.049 0.048 0.054 0.052 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) 0.136*** 0.105** 0.211** 0.199*** 0.204*** 0.238*** 
 0.049 0.046 0.084 0.066 0.051 0.054 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.861***      
 0.041      
Av. propensity to be a process 
innovator within the industry  1.128***     
  0.052     
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   2.517***    
   0.145    
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry publications as being 
important to innovation    4.112***   
    0.268   
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use informal knowledge 
protection/view informal methods as 
being important      0.760***  
     0.037  
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use formal knowledge 
protection/view formal methods as 
being important      0.925*** 
      0.045 
N 39046.000 39046.000 39046.000 39046.000 39046.000 39046.000 
Chi-squared 308.382 413.988 297.969 326.615 377.156 328.392 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
bic 37588.753 37571.987 37683.436 37791.550 37609.235 37613.409 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 10 
per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 





Table 2.8:  Design investment (CIS 4, CIS 5 and CIS 6) – Heteroscedastic probit 
model (marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) 0.079*** 0.081*** 0.082*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 
 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.216*** 0.215*** 0.209*** 0.210*** 0.215*** 0.212*** 
 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support for 
innovation (0/1) 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 
 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.279*** -0.330*** -0.518*** -0.582*** -0.327*** 
-
0.385*** 
 0.050 0.047 0.042 0.041 0.048 0.047 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) -0.101** -0.129*** -0.082** -0.051 -0.071* -0.076* 
 0.039 0.038 0.041 0.046 0.040 0.041 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.419***      
 0.035      
Av. propensity to be a process 
innovator within the industry  0.537***     
  0.045     
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   1.138***    
   0.108    
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry publications as being 
important to innovation    1.794***   
    0.225   
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use informal knowledge 
protection/view informal methods as 
being important      0.364***  
     0.032  
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use formal knowledge 
protection/view formal methods as 
being important      0.382*** 
      0.038 
N 30020.000 30020.000 30020.000 30020.000 30020.000 30020.000 
Chi-squared 282.964 355.035 296.151 349.623 338.929 310.840 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
bic 24824.256 24825.149 24859.198 24906.366 24835.583 24864.479 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 




Table 2.9:  Design investment (CIS 7 and CIS 8) – Heteroscedastic probit model 
(marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Exporter (0/1) 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.082*** 
 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.256*** 0.257*** 0.257*** 
 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.077*** 
 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.704*** -0.716*** -0.785*** -0.767*** -0.718*** -0.745*** 
 0.147 0.138 0.135 0.132 0.138 0.137 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) -0.714*** -0.712*** -0.715*** -0.745*** -0.719*** -0.731*** 
 0.144 0.139 0.135 0.133 0.136 0.133 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.065      
 0.072      
Av. propensity to be a process 
innovator within the industry  0.102     
  0.089     
Av. propensity within the industry 
to view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   0.251    
   0.203    
Av. propensity within the industry 
to view industry publications as 
being important to innovation    0.141   
    0.373   
Av. propensity within the industry 
to use informal knowledge 
protection/view informal methods 
as being important      0.064  
     0.060  
Av. propensity within the industry 
to use formal knowledge 
protection/view formal methods as 
being important      0.071 
      0.069 
N 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 
Chi-squared 46.830 66.620 79.436 89.513 68.876 67.295 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
bic 6567.730 6567.169 6567.479 6568.421 6567.582 6565.936 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 10 
per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 




Table 2.10:  Training investment – Heteroscedastic probit model (marginal effects) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 
 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.311*** 0.311*** 0.310*** 0.311*** 0.311*** 0.311*** 
 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.170*** 0.173*** 0.171*** 0.172*** 
 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.087 0.067 -0.053 -0.104** 0.049 0.006 
 0.054 0.053 0.047 0.046 0.052 0.050 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) 0.158*** 0.154*** 0.218*** 0.168*** 0.175*** 0.165*** 
 0.041 0.042 0.044 0.044 0.043 0.042 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.269***      
 0.038      
Av. propensity to be a process 
innovator within the industry  0.372***     
  0.050     
Av. propensity within the industry 
to view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   1.041***    
   0.123    
Av. propensity within the industry 
to view industry publications as 
being important to innovation    0.952***   
    0.242   
Av. propensity within the industry 
to use informal knowledge 
protection/view informal methods 
as being important      0.231***  
     0.035  
Av. propensity within the industry 
to use formal knowledge 
protection/view formal methods as 
being important      0.222*** 
      0.041 
N 38404.000 38404.000 38404.000 38404.000 38404.000 38404.000 
Chi-squared 243.632 318.368 281.225 309.270 303.988 269.146 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
bic 41481.630 41474.279 41458.317 41516.461 41486.390 41502.705 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 




Table 2.11:  Computer software investment – Heteroscedastic probit model 
(marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Exporter (0/1) 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 
 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.332*** 0.332*** 0.332*** 0.332*** 0.332*** 0.332*** 
 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.157*** 0.158*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 
 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.206*** 0.187*** 0.120* 0.119* 0.178** 0.168** 
 0.074 0.071 0.067 0.068 0.071 0.069 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) 0.386*** 0.385*** 0.340*** 0.337*** 0.379*** 0.376*** 
 0.089 0.089 0.087 0.089 0.090 0.089 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.125**      
 0.055      
Av. propensity to be a process 
innovator within the industry  0.159**     
  0.070     
Av. propensity within the industry 
to view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   0.172    
   0.163    
Av. propensity within the industry 
to view industry publications as 
being important to innovation    0.268   
    0.316   
Av. propensity within the industry 
to use informal knowledge 
protection/view informal methods 
as being important      0.095*  
     0.049  
Av. propensity within the industry 
to use formal knowledge 
protection/view formal methods as 
being important      0.109* 
      0.057 
N 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 
Chi-squared 89.800 117.690 121.783 138.808 118.610 110.035 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
bic 26551.681 26551.252 26553.419 26552.324 26551.579 26551.521 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 




Table 2.12:  R&D investment – Homoscedastic probit model (marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) 0.152*** 0.154*** 0.168*** 0.164*** 0.154*** 0.156*** 
 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.385*** 0.385*** 0.384*** 0.386*** 0.385*** 0.385*** 
 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.253*** 0.254*** 0.258*** 0.259*** 0.254*** 0.257*** 
 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.130** -0.233*** -0.641*** -0.784*** -0.259*** -0.339*** 
 0.052 0.050 0.046 0.046 0.050 0.049 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) 0.128*** 0.086** 0.164*** 0.240*** 0.175*** 0.213*** 
 0.041 0.040 0.043 0.046 0.042 0.043 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.891***      
 0.039      
Av. propensity to be a process 
innovator within the industry  1.157***     
  0.050     
Av. propensity within the industry 
to view industry standards as 
being important to innovation   2.277***    
   0.125    
Av. propensity within the industry 
to view industry publications as 
being important to innovation    3.966***   
    0.251   
Av. propensity within the industry 
to use informal knowledge 
protection/view informal methods 
as being important      0.769***  
     0.035  
Av. propensity within the industry 
to use formal knowledge 
protection/view formal methods as 
being important      0.906*** 
      0.042 
N 39046.000 39046.000 39046.000 39046.000 39046.000 39046.000 
Chi-squared 11660.676 11675.167 11471.786 11391.346 11622.963 11600.827 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.237 0.238 0.234 0.232 0.237 0.236 
bic 37590.633 37576.142 37779.523 37859.963 37628.346 37650.481 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 




Table 2.13:  Design investment (CIS 4, CIS 5 and CIS 6) – Homoscedastic probit 
model (marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) 0.083*** 0.085*** 0.092*** 0.090*** 0.084*** 0.087*** 
 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.228*** 0.227*** 0.227*** 0.229*** 0.227*** 0.228*** 
 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.112*** 0.115*** 
 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.273*** -0.332*** -0.563*** -0.657*** -0.337*** -0.415*** 
 0.045 0.043 0.039 0.038 0.043 0.042 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) -0.055 -0.085** -0.034 0.015 -0.019 -0.017 
 0.036 0.036 0.038 0.042 0.038 0.038 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.516***      
 0.035      
Av. propensity to be a process 
innovator within the industry  0.660***     
  0.045     
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   1.351***    
   0.114    
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry publications as being 
important to innovation    2.246***   
    0.230   
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use informal knowledge 
protection/view informal methods as 
being important      0.455***  
     0.031  
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use formal knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being important      0.483*** 
      0.038 
N 30020.000 30020.000 30020.000 30020.000 30020.000 30020.000 
Chi-squared 4951.204 4945.996 4870.704 4823.315 4939.064 4890.689 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.167 0.167 0.164 0.162 0.166 0.165 
bic 24875.303 24880.510 24955.803 25003.191 24887.442 24935.818 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 10 
per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 




Table 2.14:  Design investment (CIS 7 and CIS 8) – Homoscedastic probit model 
(marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Exporter (0/1) 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.085*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 
 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.269*** 0.268*** 0.268*** 0.269*** 0.268*** 0.269*** 
 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 
 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.719*** 
-
0.746*** -0.883*** -0.876*** -0.752*** -0.779*** 
 0.137 0.127 0.118 0.119 0.126 0.123 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) -0.810*** 
-
0.807*** -0.826*** -0.901*** -0.816*** -0.852*** 
 0.142 0.137 0.131 0.125 0.135 0.129 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.131*      
 0.071      
Av. propensity to be a process innovator 
within the industry  0.186**     
  0.087     
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   0.462**    
   0.198    
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry publications as being 
important to innovation    0.469   
    0.365   
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important      0.126**  
     0.058  
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use formal knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being important      0.134** 
      0.068 
N 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 
Chi-squared 1793.352 1794.570 1795.407 1791.580 1794.682 1793.844 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.217 0.218 0.218 
bic 6545.430 6544.212 6543.375 6547.202 6544.101 6544.938 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 




Table 2.15:  Training investment – Homoscedastic probit model 
(marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 
 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.312*** 0.312*** 0.312*** 0.313*** 0.312*** 0.312*** 
 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.172*** 0.170*** 0.171*** 
 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.067 0.044 -0.074* -0.121*** 0.028 -0.015 
 0.050 0.048 0.045 0.045 0.048 0.047 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) 0.163*** 0.156*** 0.232*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.171*** 
 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.044 0.040 0.041 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.269***      
 0.038      
Av. propensity to be a process 
innovator within the industry  0.372***     
  0.048     
Av. propensity within the industry 
to view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   1.067***    
   0.121    
Av. propensity within the industry 
to view industry publications as 
being important to innovation    0.951***   
    0.239   
Av. propensity within the industry 
to use informal knowledge 
protection/view informal methods 
as being important      0.231***  
     0.034  
Av. propensity within the industry 
to use formal knowledge 
protection/view formal methods as 
being important      0.220*** 
      0.040 
N 38404.000 38404.000 38404.000 38404.000 38404.000 38404.000 
Chi-squared 6710.081 6717.920 6736.332 6674.502 6705.349 6688.553 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.139 0.140 0.139 
bic 41450.883 41443.045 41424.632 41486.462 41455.616 41472.411 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 





Table 2.16:  Computer software investment – Homoscedastic probit model 
(marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Exporter (0/1) 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 
 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.332*** 0.331*** 0.331*** 
 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 
 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.220*** 0.201*** 0.133** 0.125* 0.194*** 0.182*** 
 0.073 0.070 0.065 0.066 0.070 0.068 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.413*** 0.413*** 0.374*** 0.376*** 0.414*** 0.410*** 
 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.094 0.093 0.092 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.132**      
 0.054      
Av. propensity to be a process 
innovator within the industry  0.169**     
  0.070     
Av. propensity within the industry 
to view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   0.225    
   0.165    
Av. propensity within the industry 
to view industry publications as 
being important to innovation    0.379   
    0.322   
Av. propensity within the industry 
to use informal knowledge 
protection/view informal methods as 
being important      0.107**  
     0.048  
Av. propensity within the industry 
to use formal knowledge 
protection/view formal methods as 
being important      0.126** 
      0.057 
N 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 
Chi-squared 3421.963 3422.008 3417.988 3417.511 3421.026 3420.990 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.115 
bic 26515.953 26515.908 26519.927 26520.405 26516.889 26516.926 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 






 Table 2.17: Importance of Secrecy – Homoscedastic ordered-probit model (marginal effects) 
 
 


















Employment (log) -0.047*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.017***  Employment (log) -0.047*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.164*** 0.033*** 0.064*** 0.067***  Exporter (0/1) -0.166*** 0.033*** 0.065*** 0.068*** 
 0.009 0.002 0.004 0.004   0.009 0.002 0.004 0.004 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity 
(0/1) -0.197*** 0.031*** 0.075*** 0.091***  
Engaged in co-operation 
- any innovation activity 
(0/1) -0.196*** 0.031*** 0.074*** 0.090*** 
 0.010 0.001 0.004 0.006   0.010 0.001 0.004 0.006 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.004*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.004*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation 
(0/1) -0.155*** 0.026*** 0.059*** 0.070***  
Received public 
financial support for 
innovation (0/1) -0.156*** 0.026*** 0.060*** 0.070*** 
 0.012 0.002 0.005 0.007   0.012 0.002 0.005 0.007 
Av. propensity to be a 
product innovator within 
the industry -0.812*** 0.184*** 0.325*** 0.304***  
Av. propensity to be a 
process innovator within 
the industry -1.081*** 0.245*** 0.432*** 0.404*** 
 0.057 0.014 0.024 0.022   0.074 0.018 0.031 0.028 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.106 0.024 0.042 0.040  Industry birth rate (%) -0.032 0.007 0.013 0.012 
 0.073 0.017 0.029 0.027   0.070 0.016 0.028 0.026 
Industry concentration 
ratio (five-firm) -0.084 0.019 0.033 0.031  
Industry concentration 
ratio (five-firm) -0.053 0.012 0.021 0.020 
 0.056 0.013 0.022 0.021   0.055 0.013 0.022 0.021 
N 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000  N 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000 
Chi-squared 3870.073 3870.073 3870.073 3870.073  Chi-squared 3879.041 3879.041 3879.041 3879.041 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114  R-squared (pseudo) 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114 







Table 2.17 (continued):  Importance of Secrecy – Homoscedastic ordered-probit model (marginal effects) 
c. Average propensity within the industry to view industry standards as being 
important to innovation  
d. Average propensity within the industry to view industry publications as 


















Employment (log) -0.047*** 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.018***  Employment (log) -0.047*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.179*** 0.035*** 0.070*** 0.075***  Exporter (0/1) -0.167*** 0.033*** 0.065*** 0.069*** 
 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.004   0.009 0.002 0.004 0.004 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.194*** 0.031*** 0.073*** 0.089***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.196*** 0.031*** 0.074*** 0.090*** 
 0.010 0.001 0.004 0.006   0.010 0.001 0.004 0.006 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.004*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.004*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.162*** 0.027*** 0.062*** 0.074***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.159*** 0.026*** 0.061*** 0.072*** 
 0.012 0.002 0.005 0.007   0.012 0.002 0.005 0.007 
Av. propensity within the 
industry to view industry 
standards as being 
important to innovation -2.423*** 0.545*** 0.967*** 0.910***  
Av. Propensity within the 
industry to view industry 
publications as being 
important to innovation -5.408*** 1.221*** 2.161*** 2.026*** 
 0.197 0.047 0.081 0.075   0.405 0.098 0.167 0.154 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.262*** -0.059*** -0.105*** -0.098***  Industry birth rate (%) 0.467*** -0.105*** -0.187*** -0.175*** 
 0.065 0.015 0.026 0.024   0.063 0.015 0.025 0.024 
Industry concentration 
ratio (five-firm) -0.268*** 0.060*** 0.107*** 0.101***  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) -0.500*** 0.113*** 0.200*** 0.187*** 
 0.061 0.014 0.024 0.023   0.069 0.016 0.028 0.026 
N 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000  N 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000 
Chi-squared 3817.355 3817.355 3817.355 3817.355  Chi-squared 3845.571 3845.571 3845.571 3845.571 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112  R-squared (pseudo) 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 









Table 2.17 (continued):  Importance of Secrecy – Homoscedastic ordered-probit model (marginal effects) 
e. Average propensity within the industry to use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important  
f. Average propensity within the industry to use formal knowledge protection/view 


















Employment (log) -0.047*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.017***  Employment (log) -0.046*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.165*** 0.033*** 0.065*** 0.068***  Exporter (0/1) -0.166*** 0.033*** 0.065*** 0.068*** 
 0.009 0.002 0.004 0.004   0.009 0.002 0.004 0.004 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.196*** 0.031*** 0.075*** 0.091***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.196*** 0.031*** 0.074*** 0.090*** 
 0.010 0.001 0.004 0.006   0.010 0.001 0.004 0.006 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.004*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.004*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.156*** 0.026*** 0.060*** 0.070***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.158*** 0.026*** 0.061*** 0.071*** 
 0.012 0.002 0.005 0.007   0.012 0.002 0.005 0.007 
Av. propensity within the 
industry to use informal 
knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being 
important -0.737*** 0.167*** 0.295*** 0.276***  
Av. propensity within the 
industry to use formal 
knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being 
important -0.901*** 0.204*** 0.360*** 0.337*** 
 0.052 0.013 0.021 0.020   0.063 0.015 0.026 0.024 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.024 0.005 0.010 0.009  Industry birth rate (%) 0.028 -0.006 -0.011 -0.011 
 0.070 0.016 0.028 0.026   0.069 0.016 0.027 0.026 
Industry concentration 
ratio (five-firm) -0.170*** 0.038*** 0.068*** 0.064***  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) -0.239*** 0.054*** 0.096*** 0.089*** 
 0.057 0.013 0.023 0.021   0.059 0.013 0.024 0.022 
N 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000  N 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000 
Chi-squared 3867.663 3867.663 3867.663 3867.663  Chi-squared 3873.746 3873.746 3873.746 3873.746 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114  R-squared (pseudo) 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114 
bic 30222.763 30222.763 30222.763 30222.763  bic 30216.680 30216.680 30216.680 30216.680 
 
  Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, 
** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 































Employment (log) -0.040*** 0.008*** 0.016*** 0.016***  Employment (log) -0.040*** 0.008*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.164*** 0.028*** 0.065*** 0.071***  Exporter (0/1) -0.166*** 0.028*** 0.066*** 0.072*** 
 0.009 0.002 0.004 0.004   0.009 0.002 0.004 0.004 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.194*** 0.026*** 0.074*** 0.093***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.193*** 0.026*** 0.074*** 0.093*** 
 0.010 0.001 0.004 0.006   0.010 0.001 0.004 0.006 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.155*** 0.022*** 0.060*** 0.073***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.157*** 0.022*** 0.061*** 0.074*** 
 0.012 0.001 0.005 0.007   0.012 0.001 0.005 0.007 
Average propensity to be 
a product innovator 
within the industry -0.921*** 0.182*** 0.376*** 0.362***  
Average propensity to be 
a process innovator 
within the industry -1.210*** 0.240*** 0.495*** 0.476*** 
 0.057 0.012 0.024 0.023   0.074 0.016 0.032 0.030 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.209*** -0.041*** -0.086*** -0.082***  Industry birth rate (%) 0.300*** -0.059*** -0.123*** -0.118*** 
 0.074 0.015 0.030 0.029   0.071 0.014 0.029 0.028 
Industry concentration 
ratio (five-firm) -0.040 0.008 0.016 0.016  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 0.056 0.011 0.023 0.022   0.056 0.011 0.023 0.022 
N 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000  N 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 
Chi-squared 3673.773 3673.773 3673.773 3673.773  Chi-squared 3677.154 3677.154 3677.154 3677.154 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.107  R-squared (pseudo) 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.107 







Table 2.18 (continued):  Importance of Lead-time Advantage – Homoscedastic ordered-probit model (marginal effects) 
 
 
c. Average propensity within the industry to view industry standards as being 
important to innovation  
d. Average propensity within the industry to view industry publications as 


















Employment (log) -0.040*** 0.008*** 0.016*** 0.016***  Employment (log) -0.040*** 0.008*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.181*** 0.030*** 0.072*** 0.079***  Exporter (0/1) -0.168*** 0.029*** 0.067*** 0.073*** 
 0.008 0.001 0.004 0.004   0.009 0.002 0.004 0.004 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.190*** 0.026*** 0.073*** 0.092***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.193*** 0.026*** 0.074*** 0.093*** 
 0.010 0.001 0.004 0.006   0.010 0.001 0.004 0.006 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.163*** 0.023*** 0.063*** 0.078***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.160*** 0.022*** 0.062*** 0.076*** 
 0.012 0.001 0.005 0.007   0.012 0.001 0.005 0.007 
Av. propensity within the 
industry to view industry 
standards as being 
important to innovation -2.718*** 0.535*** 1.107*** 1.076***  
Av. propensity within the 
industry to view industry 
publications as being 
important to innovation -6.124*** 1.210*** 2.500*** 2.414*** 
 0.198 0.042 0.084 0.080   0.408 0.089 0.173 0.164 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.637*** -0.125*** -0.259*** -0.252***  Industry birth rate (%) 0.861*** -0.170*** -0.352*** -0.340*** 
 0.066 0.013 0.027 0.026   0.064 0.014 0.027 0.026 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) -0.245*** 0.048*** 0.100*** 0.097***  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) -0.511*** 0.101*** 0.208*** 0.201*** 
 0.062 0.012 0.025 0.024   0.070 0.014 0.029 0.028 
N 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000  N 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 
Chi-squared 3598.711 3598.711 3598.711 3598.711  Chi-squared 3637.888 3637.888 3637.888 3637.888 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.105  R-squared (pseudo) 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 











e. Average propensity within the industry to use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important  
f. Average propensity within the industry to use formal knowledge protection/view 


















Employment (log) -0.040*** 0.008*** 0.016*** 0.016***  Employment (log) -0.039*** 0.008*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.165*** 0.028*** 0.066*** 0.071***  Exporter (0/1) -0.168*** 0.029*** 0.067*** 0.072*** 
 0.009 0.002 0.004 0.004   0.009 0.002 0.004 0.004 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.194*** 0.026*** 0.074*** 0.093***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.193*** 0.026*** 0.074*** 0.093*** 
 0.010 0.001 0.004 0.006   0.010 0.001 0.004 0.006 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.156*** 0.022*** 0.060*** 0.074***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.159*** 0.022*** 0.062*** 0.076*** 
 0.012 0.001 0.005 0.007   0.012 0.001 0.005 0.007 
Av. propensity within the 
industry to use informal 
knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being 
important -0.849*** 0.168*** 0.347*** 0.334***  
Av. propensity within the 
industry to use formal 
knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being 
important -0.971*** 0.192*** 0.397*** 0.383*** 
 0.052 0.011 0.022 0.021   0.063 0.014 0.027 0.025 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.293*** -0.058*** -0.120*** -0.115***  Industry birth rate (%) 0.384*** -0.076*** -0.157*** -0.151*** 
 0.071 0.014 0.029 0.028   0.070 0.014 0.029 0.028 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) -0.143** 0.028** 0.058** 0.056**  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) -0.199*** 0.039*** 0.081*** 0.079*** 
 0.058 0.011 0.024 0.023   0.059 0.012 0.024 0.023 
N 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000  N 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 
Chi-squared 3676.884 3676.884 3676.884 3676.884  Chi-squared 3650.729 3650.729 3650.729 3650.729 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.107  R-squared (pseudo) 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.107 
bic 30714.294 30714.294 30714.294 30714.294  bic 30740.449 30740.449 30740.449 30740.449 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, ** at 
the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 































Employment (log) -0.038*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.008***  Employment (log) -0.038*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.007*** 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 
Exporter (0/1) -0.173*** 0.056*** 0.078*** 0.039***  Exporter (0/1) -0.175*** 0.057*** 0.079*** 0.039*** 
 0.009 0.003 0.004 0.002   0.008 0.003 0.004 0.002 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.159*** 0.048*** 0.072*** 0.039***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.158*** 0.048*** 0.072*** 0.039*** 
 0.010 0.003 0.005 0.003   0.010 0.003 0.005 0.003 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.004*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.004*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.158*** 0.046*** 0.072*** 0.040***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.159*** 0.047*** 0.072*** 0.040*** 
 0.012 0.003 0.006 0.004   0.012 0.003 0.006 0.004 
Average propensity to be 
a product innovator 
within the industry -0.901*** 0.324*** 0.400*** 0.177***  
Average propensity to be 
a process innovator 
within the industry -1.177*** 0.423*** 0.522*** 0.231*** 
 0.055 0.021 0.025 0.012   0.072 0.028 0.033 0.016 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.180** -0.065** -0.080** -0.035**  Industry birth rate (%) 0.272*** -0.098*** -0.121*** -0.053*** 
 0.073 0.026 0.032 0.014   0.070 0.025 0.031 0.014 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.035 -0.013 -0.015 -0.007  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.074 -0.027 -0.033 -0.014 
 0.055 0.020 0.025 0.011   0.055 0.020 0.024 0.011 
N 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000  N 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 
Chi-squared 4030.728 4030.728 4030.728 4030.728  Chi-squared 4030.646 4030.646 4030.646 4030.646 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.132  R-squared (pseudo) 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.132 







Table 2.19 (continued):  Importance of Complexity of Design – Homoscedastic ordered-probit model (marginal effects) 
 
 
c. Average propensity within the industry to view industry standards as being 
important to innovation  
d. Average propensity within the industry to view industry publications as 


















Employment (log) -0.038*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.008***  Employment (log) -0.038*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.008*** 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 
Exporter (0/1) -0.190*** 0.061*** 0.085*** 0.044***  Exporter (0/1) -0.179*** 0.058*** 0.080*** 0.041*** 
 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.003   0.008 0.003 0.004 0.002 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.156*** 0.047*** 0.071*** 0.038***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.158*** 0.047*** 0.072*** 0.039*** 
 0.010 0.003 0.005 0.003   0.010 0.003 0.005 0.003 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.004*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.004*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.166*** 0.048*** 0.076*** 0.043***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.163*** 0.047*** 0.074*** 0.042*** 
 0.012 0.003 0.006 0.004   0.012 0.003 0.006 0.004 
Av. propensity within the 
industry to view industry 
standards as being 
important to innovation -2.623*** 0.938*** 1.165*** 0.520***  
Av. propensity within the 
industry to view industry 
publications as being 
important to innovation -5.559*** 1.990*** 2.468*** 1.100*** 
 0.194 0.073 0.088 0.041   0.398 0.151 0.182 0.085 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.613*** -0.219*** -0.272*** -0.122***  Industry birth rate (%) 0.828*** -0.296*** -0.368*** -0.164*** 
 0.064 0.023 0.029 0.013   0.061 0.023 0.028 0.013 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) -0.150** 0.054** 0.067** 0.030**  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) -0.377*** 0.135*** 0.167*** 0.075*** 
 0.060 0.022 0.027 0.012   0.069 0.025 0.031 0.014 
N 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000  N 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 
Chi-squared 3948.693 3948.693 3948.693 3948.693  Chi-squared 3960.747 3960.747 3960.747 3960.747 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.129  R-squared (pseudo) 0.130 0.130 0.130 0.130 











e. Average propensity within the industry to use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important  
f. Average propensity within the industry to use formal knowledge protection/view 


















Employment (log) -0.038*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.008***  Employment (log) -0.038*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.007*** 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 
Exporter (0/1) -0.174*** 0.056*** 0.078*** 0.039***  Exporter (0/1) -0.177*** 0.057*** 0.080*** 0.040*** 
 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.002   0.008 0.003 0.004 0.002 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.158*** 0.048*** 0.072*** 0.039***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.158*** 0.047*** 0.072*** 0.039*** 
 0.010 0.003 0.005 0.003   0.010 0.003 0.005 0.003 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.004*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.004*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.159*** 0.047*** 0.072*** 0.040***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.162*** 0.047*** 0.074*** 0.041*** 
 0.012 0.003 0.006 0.004   0.012 0.003 0.006 0.004 
Av. propensity within the 
industry to use informal 
knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being 
important -0.825*** 0.297*** 0.366*** 0.162***  
Av. propensity within the 
industry to use formal 
knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being 
important -0.917*** 0.329*** 0.407*** 0.181*** 
 0.050 0.020 0.023 0.011   0.061 0.023 0.028 0.013 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.266*** -0.096*** -0.118*** -0.052***  Industry birth rate (%) 0.374*** -0.134*** -0.166*** -0.074*** 
 0.070 0.025 0.031 0.014   0.068 0.025 0.030 0.014 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) -0.063 0.023 0.028 0.012  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) -0.105* 0.038* 0.047* 0.021* 
 0.057 0.020 0.025 0.011   0.058 0.021 0.026 0.012 
N 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000  N 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 
Chi-squared 4030.326 4030.326 4030.326 4030.326  Chi-squared 3989.185 3989.185 3989.185 3989.185 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.132  R-squared (pseudo) 0.131 0.131 0.131 0.131 
bic 26658.518 26658.518 26658.518 26658.518  bic 26699.659 26699.659 26699.659 26699.659 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, 
** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 






























Employment (log) -0.045*** 0.008*** 0.017*** 0.020***  Employment (log) -0.045*** 0.008*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 
 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.159*** 0.025*** 0.057*** 0.076***  Exporter (0/1) -0.159*** 0.026*** 0.057*** 0.077*** 
 0.009 0.001 0.003 0.005   0.009 0.001 0.003 0.005 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.236*** 0.027*** 0.078*** 0.132***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.235*** 0.027*** 0.078*** 0.131*** 
 0.010 0.001 0.003 0.007   0.010 0.001 0.003 0.007 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.005*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.005*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.162*** 0.021*** 0.055*** 0.086***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.163*** 0.021*** 0.056*** 0.086*** 
 0.013 0.001 0.004 0.008   0.013 0.001 0.004 0.008 
Average propensity to be 
a product innovator 
within the industry -0.886*** 0.163*** 0.327*** 0.395***  
Average propensity to be 
a process innovator 
within the industry -1.220*** 0.225*** 0.451*** 0.543*** 
 0.057 0.012 0.022 0.026   0.075 0.016 0.029 0.034 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.383*** 0.071*** 0.141*** 0.171***  Industry birth rate (%) -0.318*** 0.059*** 0.118*** 0.142*** 
 0.073 0.014 0.027 0.033   0.070 0.013 0.026 0.031 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) -0.126** 0.023** 0.046** 0.056**  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) -0.096* 0.018* 0.036* 0.043* 
 0.056 0.010 0.021 0.025   0.055 0.010 0.020 0.025 
N 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000  N 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 
Chi-squared 4267.254 4267.254 4267.254 4267.254  Chi-squared 4295.218 4295.218 4295.218 4295.218 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.126  R-squared (pseudo) 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127 







  Table 2.20 (continued):  Importance of Confidentiality Agreements – Homoscedastic ordered-probit model (marginal effects) 
 
 
c. Average propensity within the industry to view industry standards as being 
important to innovation  
d. Average propensity within the industry to view industry publications as 


















Employment (log) -0.045*** 0.008*** 0.017*** 0.020***  Employment (log) -0.045*** 0.008*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 
 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.172*** 0.027*** 0.061*** 0.083***  Exporter (0/1) -0.160*** 0.026*** 0.057*** 0.077*** 
 0.009 0.001 0.003 0.005   0.009 0.001 0.003 0.005 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.233*** 0.027*** 0.077*** 0.129***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.236*** 0.027*** 0.078*** 0.131*** 
 0.010 0.001 0.003 0.007   0.010 0.001 0.003 0.007 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.005*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.005*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.168*** 0.022*** 0.057*** 0.089***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.166*** 0.021*** 0.057*** 0.088*** 
 0.013 0.001 0.004 0.008   0.013 0.001 0.004 0.008 
Av. propensity within the 
industry to view industry 
standards as being 
important to innovation -3.114*** 0.574*** 1.151*** 1.388***  
Av. propensity within the 
industry to view industry 
publications as being 
important to innovation -6.291*** 1.160*** 2.326*** 2.805*** 
 0.200 0.041 0.078 0.091   0.409 0.084 0.159 0.185 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.016 0.003 0.006 0.007  Industry birth rate (%) 0.246*** -0.045*** -0.091*** -0.110*** 
 0.065 0.012 0.024 0.029   0.063 0.012 0.023 0.028 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) -0.392*** 0.072*** 0.145*** 0.175***  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) -0.621*** 0.115*** 0.230*** 0.277*** 
 0.061 0.011 0.023 0.027   0.069 0.013 0.026 0.031 
N 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000  N 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 
Chi-squared 4273.224 4273.224 4273.224 4273.224  Chi-squared 4268.152 4268.152 4268.152 4268.152 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.126  R-squared (pseudo) 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.126 











e. Average propensity within the industry to use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important  
f. Average propensity within the industry to use formal knowledge protection/view 


















Employment (log) -0.045*** 0.008*** 0.017*** 0.020***  Employment (log) -0.045*** 0.008*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 
 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.159*** 0.025*** 0.057*** 0.077***  Exporter (0/1) -0.159*** 0.026*** 0.057*** 0.077*** 
 0.009 0.001 0.003 0.005   0.009 0.001 0.003 0.005 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.236*** 0.027*** 0.078*** 0.131***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.235*** 0.027*** 0.078*** 0.131*** 
 0.010 0.001 0.003 0.007   0.010 0.001 0.003 0.007 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.005*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.005*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.163*** 0.021*** 0.056*** 0.086***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.165*** 0.021*** 0.056*** 0.087*** 
 0.013 0.001 0.004 0.008   0.013 0.001 0.004 0.008 
Av. propensity within the 
industry to use informal 
knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being 
important -0.822*** 0.152*** 0.304*** 0.367***  
Av. propensity within the 
industry to use formal 
knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being 
important -1.021*** 0.189*** 0.378*** 0.454*** 
 0.052 0.011 0.020 0.024   0.063 0.013 0.025 0.029 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.302*** 0.056*** 0.112*** 0.135***  Industry birth rate (%) -0.250*** 0.046*** 0.093*** 0.111*** 
 0.070 0.013 0.026 0.031   0.068 0.013 0.025 0.030 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) -0.224*** 0.041*** 0.083*** 0.100***  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) -0.308*** 0.057*** 0.114*** 0.137*** 
 0.057 0.011 0.021 0.025   0.059 0.011 0.022 0.026 
N 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000  N 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 
Chi-squared 4275.827 4275.827 4275.827 4275.827  Chi-squared 4292.432 4292.432 4292.432 4292.432 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.126  R-squared (pseudo) 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127 
bic 29725.083 29725.083 29725.083 29725.083  bic 29708.478 29708.478 29708.478 29708.478 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, 
** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 






























Employment (log) -0.029*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009***  Employment (log) -0.029*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.130*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.046***  Exporter (0/1) -0.132*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 
 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003   0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.099*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.036***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.098*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.036*** 
 0.010 0.003 0.003 0.004   0.010 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.078*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.028***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.080*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 
 0.011 0.003 0.004 0.004   0.011 0.003 0.004 0.004 
Average propensity to be 
a product innovator 
within the industry -0.471*** 0.162*** 0.156*** 0.153***  
Average propensity to be 
a process innovator 
within the industry -0.592*** 0.204*** 0.196*** 0.192*** 
 0.050 0.018 0.017 0.016   0.065 0.023 0.022 0.021 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.020 0.007 0.007 0.006  Industry birth rate (%) 0.039 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 
 0.065 0.022 0.022 0.021   0.063 0.022 0.021 0.020 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.138*** -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.045***  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.160*** -0.055*** -0.053*** -0.052*** 
 0.051 0.017 0.017 0.016   0.050 0.017 0.017 0.016 
N 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000  N 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 
Chi-squared 2519.708 2519.708 2519.708 2519.708  Chi-squared 2512.866 2512.866 2512.866 2512.866 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099  R-squared (pseudo) 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099 







Table 2.21 (continued):  Importance of Copyright – Homoscedastic ordered-probit model (marginal effects) 
 
 
c. Average propensity within the industry to view industry standards as being 
important to innovation  
d. Average propensity within the industry to view industry publications as 


















Employment (log) -0.029*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009***  Employment (log) -0.029*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.141*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.050***  Exporter (0/1) -0.132*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.047*** 
 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003   0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.098*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.036***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.099*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.036*** 
 0.010 0.003 0.003 0.004   0.010 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.084*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.030***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.081*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 
 0.011 0.003 0.004 0.004   0.011 0.003 0.004 0.004 
Av. propensity within the 
industry to view industry 
standards as being 
important to innovation -1.118*** 0.383*** 0.370*** 0.365***  
Av. propensity within the 
industry to view industry 
publications as being 
important to innovation -3.032*** 1.042*** 1.005*** 0.985*** 
 0.171 0.060 0.057 0.057   0.353 0.125 0.120 0.117 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.231*** -0.079*** -0.076*** -0.075***  Industry birth rate (%) 0.322*** -0.111*** -0.107*** -0.105*** 
 0.057 0.020 0.019 0.019   0.055 0.019 0.018 0.018 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.080 -0.027 -0.026 -0.026  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) -0.090 0.031 0.030 0.029 
 0.055 0.019 0.018 0.018   0.063 0.022 0.021 0.020 
N 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000  N 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 
Chi-squared 2471.737 2471.737 2471.737 2471.737  Chi-squared 2503.190 2503.190 2503.190 2503.190 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.097  R-squared (pseudo) 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.098 











e. Average propensity within the industry to use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important  
f. Average propensity within the industry to use formal knowledge protection/view 


















Employment (log) -0.029*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009***  Employment (log) -0.028*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.131*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.046***  Exporter (0/1) -0.131*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 
 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003   0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.099*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.036***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.098*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 
 0.010 0.003 0.003 0.004   0.010 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.079*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.028***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.081*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 
 0.011 0.003 0.004 0.004   0.011 0.003 0.004 0.004 
Av. propensity within the 
industry to use informal 
knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being 
important -0.415*** 0.143*** 0.137*** 0.135***  
Av. propensity within the 
industry to use formal 
knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being 
important -0.507*** 0.174*** 0.168*** 0.165*** 
 0.045 0.016 0.015 0.015   0.055 0.019 0.019 0.018 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.035 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011  Industry birth rate (%) 0.070 -0.024 -0.023 -0.023 
 0.063 0.022 0.021 0.020   0.061 0.021 0.020 0.020 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.092* -0.032* -0.030* -0.030*  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.055 -0.019 -0.018 -0.018 
 0.052 0.018 0.017 0.017   0.053 0.018 0.018 0.017 
N 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000  N 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 15657.000 
Chi-squared 2512.810 2512.810 2512.810 2512.810  Chi-squared 2515.071 2515.071 2515.071 2515.071 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099  R-squared (pseudo) 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099 
bic 23031.390 23031.390 23031.390 23031.390  bic 23029.129 23029.129 23029.129 23029.129 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, 
** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 































Employment (log) -0.031*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.011***  Employment (log) -0.031*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.145*** 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.056***  Exporter (0/1) -0.147*** 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.057*** 
 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003   0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.084*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.032***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.083*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.032*** 
 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.004   0.009 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.126*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.052***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.128*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.052*** 
 0.011 0.003 0.003 0.005   0.011 0.003 0.003 0.005 
Average propensity to be 
a product innovator 
within the industry -0.452*** 0.154*** 0.138*** 0.159***  
Average propensity to be 
a process innovator 
within the industry -0.557*** 0.190*** 0.171*** 0.196*** 
 0.047 0.017 0.015 0.017   0.061 0.022 0.019 0.022 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.335*** -0.114*** -0.103*** -0.118***  Industry birth rate (%) 0.398*** -0.136*** -0.122*** -0.140*** 
 0.064 0.022 0.020 0.023   0.061 0.021 0.019 0.022 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.221*** -0.075*** -0.068*** -0.078***  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.245*** -0.084*** -0.075*** -0.086*** 
 0.049 0.017 0.015 0.017   0.049 0.017 0.015 0.017 
N 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000  N 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 
Chi-squared 3063.060 3063.060 3063.060 3063.060  Chi-squared 3052.023 3052.023 3052.023 3052.023 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.132  R-squared (pseudo) 0.131 0.131 0.131 0.131 







Table 2.22 (continued):  Importance of Patents – Homoscedastic ordered-probit model (marginal effects) 
 
 
c. Average propensity within the industry to view industry standards as being 
important to innovation  
d. Average propensity within the industry to view industry publications as 


















Employment (log) -0.031*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.011***  Employment (log) -0.031*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.157*** 0.049*** 0.047*** 0.061***  Exporter (0/1) -0.149*** 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.058*** 
 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.004   0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.083*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.032***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.083*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.032*** 
 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.004   0.009 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.133*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.055***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.130*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.053*** 
 0.011 0.003 0.003 0.006   0.011 0.003 0.003 0.005 
Av. propensity within the 
industry to view industry 
standards as being 
important to innovation -0.972*** 0.330*** 0.297*** 0.345***  
Av. propensity within the 
industry to view industry 
publications as being 
important to innovation -2.661*** 0.907*** 0.815*** 0.940*** 
 0.163 0.056 0.051 0.058   0.339 0.118 0.106 0.121 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.599*** -0.203*** -0.183*** -0.212***  Industry birth rate (%) 0.670*** -0.228*** -0.205*** -0.236*** 
 0.055 0.020 0.018 0.020   0.053 0.019 0.017 0.019 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.184*** -0.063*** -0.056*** -0.065***  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.032 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 
 0.054 0.018 0.016 0.019   0.061 0.021 0.019 0.022 
N 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000  N 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 
Chi-squared 3004.015 3004.015 3004.015 3004.015  Chi-squared 3030.811 3030.811 3030.811 3030.811 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.129  R-squared (pseudo) 0.130 0.130 0.130 0.130 











e. Average propensity within the industry to use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important  
f. Average propensity within the industry to use formal knowledge protection/view 


















Employment (log) -0.031*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.011***  Employment (log) -0.031*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.146*** 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.056***  Exporter (0/1) -0.149*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.058*** 
 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003   0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.083*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.032***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.083*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.032*** 
 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.004   0.009 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.127*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.052***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.130*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.053*** 
 0.011 0.003 0.003 0.005   0.011 0.003 0.003 0.005 
Av. propensity within the 
industry to use informal 
knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being 
important -0.406*** 0.139*** 0.124*** 0.143***  
Av. propensity within the 
industry to use formal 
knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being 
important -0.430*** 0.147*** 0.132*** 0.152*** 
 0.043 0.015 0.014 0.015   0.052 0.018 0.016 0.019 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.382*** -0.130*** -0.117*** -0.134***  Industry birth rate (%) 0.452*** -0.154*** -0.138*** -0.160*** 
 0.061 0.021 0.019 0.022   0.060 0.021 0.019 0.021 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.173*** -0.059*** -0.053*** -0.061***  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.164*** -0.056*** -0.050*** -0.058*** 
 0.050 0.017 0.015 0.018   0.052 0.018 0.016 0.018 
N 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000  N 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 
Chi-squared 3058.162 3058.162 3058.162 3058.162  Chi-squared 3036.974 3036.974 3036.974 3036.974 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.131 0.131 0.131 0.131  R-squared (pseudo) 0.130 0.130 0.130 0.130 
bic 20355.934 20355.934 20355.934 20355.934  bic 20377.121 20377.121 20377.121 20377.121 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, 
** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 






























Employment (log) -0.038*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.015***  Employment (log) -0.038*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.149*** 0.037*** 0.050*** 0.063***  Exporter (0/1) -0.152*** 0.037*** 0.051*** 0.064*** 
 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.004   0.008 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.083*** 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.035***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.082*** 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.035*** 
 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.004   0.010 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.087*** 0.021*** 0.029*** 0.037***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.088*** 0.021*** 0.029*** 0.038*** 
 0.012 0.003 0.004 0.005   0.012 0.003 0.004 0.005 
Average propensity to be 
a product innovator 
within the industry -0.302*** 0.081*** 0.104*** 0.118***  
Average propensity to be 
a process innovator 
within the industry -0.333*** 0.089*** 0.114*** 0.130*** 
 0.051 0.014 0.018 0.020   0.067 0.018 0.023 0.026 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.395*** -0.106*** -0.135*** -0.154***  Industry birth rate (%) 0.455*** -0.122*** -0.156*** -0.177*** 
 0.069 0.019 0.024 0.027   0.066 0.018 0.023 0.026 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.059 -0.016 -0.020 -0.023  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.078 -0.021 -0.027 -0.030 
 0.052 0.014 0.018 0.020   0.052 0.014 0.018 0.020 
N 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000  N 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000 
Chi-squared 2386.483 2386.483 2386.483 2386.483  Chi-squared 2376.202 2376.202 2376.202 2376.202 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088  R-squared (pseudo) 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 







Table 2.23 (continued):  Importance of Trademarks – Homoscedastic ordered-probit model (marginal effects) 
 
 
c. Average propensity within the industry to view industry standards as being 
important to innovation  
d. Average propensity within the industry to view industry publications as 


















Employment (log) -0.038*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.015***  Employment (log) -0.038*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.161*** 0.039*** 0.054*** 0.069***  Exporter (0/1) -0.154*** 0.038*** 0.051*** 0.065*** 
 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.004   0.008 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.083*** 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.035***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.083*** 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.035*** 
 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.004   0.010 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.093*** 0.022*** 0.031*** 0.040***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.090*** 0.022*** 0.030*** 0.039*** 
 0.012 0.003 0.004 0.006   0.012 0.003 0.004 0.005 
Av. propensity within the 
industry to view industry 
standards as being 
important to innovation -0.151 0.040 0.052 0.059  
Av. propensity within the 
industry to view industry 
publications as being 
important to innovation -1.464*** 0.393*** 0.501*** 0.570*** 
 0.175 0.047 0.060 0.068   0.362 0.098 0.124 0.141 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.604*** -0.162*** -0.207*** -0.236***  Industry birth rate (%) 0.612*** -0.164*** -0.209*** -0.238*** 
 0.060 0.017 0.021 0.024   0.058 0.016 0.021 0.023 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.100* -0.027* -0.034* -0.039*  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) -0.035 0.009 0.012 0.014 
 0.057 0.015 0.020 0.022   0.064 0.017 0.022 0.025 
N 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000  N 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000 
Chi-squared 2351.887 2351.887 2351.887 2351.887  Chi-squared 2367.546 2367.546 2367.546 2367.546 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.087  R-squared (pseudo) 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 











e. Average propensity within the industry to use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important  
f. Average propensity within the industry to use formal knowledge protection/view 


















Employment (log) -0.038*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.015***  Employment (log) -0.038*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.151*** 0.037*** 0.050*** 0.064***  Exporter (0/1) -0.152*** 0.037*** 0.051*** 0.064*** 
 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.004   0.008 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.082*** 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.035***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.082*** 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.035*** 
 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.004   0.010 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.088*** 0.021*** 0.029*** 0.038***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.089*** 0.021*** 0.030*** 0.038*** 
 0.012 0.003 0.004 0.005   0.012 0.003 0.004 0.005 
Av. propensity within the 
industry to use informal 
knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being 
important -0.240*** 0.065*** 0.082*** 0.094***  
Av. propensity within the 
industry to use formal 
knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being 
important -0.289*** 0.078*** 0.099*** 0.112*** 
 0.047 0.013 0.016 0.018   0.056 0.015 0.019 0.022 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.447*** -0.120*** -0.153*** -0.174***  Industry birth rate (%) 0.468*** -0.126*** -0.160*** -0.182*** 
 0.066 0.018 0.023 0.026   0.065 0.018 0.022 0.025 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.037 -0.010 -0.013 -0.014  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.017 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 
 0.053 0.014 0.018 0.021   0.055 0.015 0.019 0.021 
N 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000  N 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000 15658.000 
Chi-squared 2377.598 2377.598 2377.598 2377.598  Chi-squared 2377.377 2377.377 2377.377 2377.377 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088  R-squared (pseudo) 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 
bic 24723.413 24723.413 24723.413 24723.413  bic 24723.634 24723.634 24723.634 24723.634 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, 
** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 






























Employment (log) -0.030*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***  Employment (log) -0.030*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.123*** 0.039*** 0.042*** 0.042***  Exporter (0/1) -0.126*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003   0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.064*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.064*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.003   0.009 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.076*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.026***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.077*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 
 0.011 0.003 0.004 0.004   0.011 0.003 0.004 0.004 
Average propensity to be 
a product innovator 
within the industry -0.400*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.126***  
Average propensity to be 
a process innovator 
within the industry -0.488*** 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.154*** 
 0.048 0.017 0.017 0.015   0.062 0.022 0.022 0.020 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.387*** -0.132*** -0.133*** -0.122***  Industry birth rate (%) 0.445*** -0.152*** -0.153*** -0.140*** 
 0.065 0.023 0.023 0.021   0.063 0.022 0.022 0.020 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.195*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.061***  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.216*** -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.068*** 
 0.050 0.017 0.017 0.016   0.049 0.017 0.017 0.016 
N 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000  N 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 
Chi-squared 2151.914 2151.914 2151.914 2151.914  Chi-squared 2142.256 2142.256 2142.256 2142.256 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.090  R-squared (pseudo) 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.090 







Table 2.24 (continued):  Importance of Registered Designs – Homoscedastic ordered-probit model (marginal effects) 
 
 
c. Average propensity within the industry to view industry standards as being 
important to innovation  
d. Average propensity within the industry to view industry publications as 


















Employment (log) -0.030*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***  Employment (log) -0.030*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.134*** 0.042*** 0.045*** 0.046***  Exporter (0/1) -0.127*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 
 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.003   0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.063*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.022***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.064*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.003   0.009 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.081*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.028***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.079*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 
 0.011 0.003 0.004 0.004   0.011 0.003 0.004 0.004 
Av. propensity within the 
industry to view industry 
standards as being 
important to innovation -0.848*** 0.289*** 0.290*** 0.269***  
Av. propensity within the 
industry to view industry 
publications as being 
important to innovation -2.259*** 0.771*** 0.774*** 0.714*** 
 0.165 0.057 0.057 0.053   0.341 0.118 0.119 0.109 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.620*** -0.211*** -0.212*** -0.196***  Industry birth rate (%) 0.682*** -0.233*** -0.234*** -0.215*** 
 0.057 0.020 0.020 0.019   0.055 0.020 0.020 0.018 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.163*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.052***  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.038 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 
 0.054 0.019 0.019 0.017   0.062 0.021 0.021 0.019 
N 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000  N 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 
Chi-squared 2107.142 2107.142 2107.142 2107.142  Chi-squared 2124.810 2124.810 2124.810 2124.810 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088  R-squared (pseudo) 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.089 







Table 2.24 (continued):  Importance of Registered Designs – Homoscedastic ordered-probit model (marginal effects) 
 
 
e. Average propensity within the industry to use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important  
f. Average propensity within the industry to use formal knowledge protection/view 


















Employment (log) -0.030*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***  Employment (log) -0.030*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) -0.124*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.043***  Exporter (0/1) -0.127*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003   0.008 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.064*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022***  
Engaged in co-operation - 
any innovation activity (0/1) -0.064*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.003   0.009 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000***  
Science graduates (% 
workforce) -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  
Other graduates (% 
workforce) -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.077*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.027***  
Received public financial 
support for innovation (0/1) -0.079*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 0.011 0.003 0.004 0.004   0.011 0.003 0.004 0.004 
Av. propensity within the 
industry to use informal 
knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being 
important -0.353*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.111***  
Av. propensity within the 
industry to use formal 
knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being 
important -0.373*** 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.118*** 
 0.044 0.015 0.015 0.014   0.053 0.018 0.018 0.017 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.432*** -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.136***  Industry birth rate (%) 0.493*** -0.168*** -0.169*** -0.156*** 
 0.063 0.022 0.022 0.020   0.061 0.021 0.021 0.020 
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.154*** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.049***  
Industry concentration ratio 
(five-firm) 0.147*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.046*** 
 0.051 0.018 0.018 0.016   0.053 0.018 0.018 0.017 
N 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000  N 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 15656.000 
Chi-squared 2145.958 2145.958 2145.958 2145.958  Chi-squared 2130.479 2130.479 2130.479 2130.479 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.090  R-squared (pseudo) 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.089 
bic 21806.367 21806.367 21806.367 21806.367  bic 21821.845 21821.845 21821.845 21821.845 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, 
** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 








Table 2.25:  Use of Secrecy – Heteroscedastic probit model (marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Exporter (0/1) 0.103*** 0.104*** 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.103*** 0.104*** 
 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.158*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.160*** 0.158*** 0.159*** 
 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 
 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.302*** 0.180* -0.112 -0.127 0.185* 0.137 
 0.115 0.107 0.102 0.102 0.107 0.105 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) 0.216 0.145 0.048 -0.044 0.141 0.042 
 0.135 0.128 0.125 0.114 0.132 0.119 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.384***      
 0.066      
Av. propensity to be a process innovator 
within the industry  0.461***     
  0.080     
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   0.929***    
   0.192    
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry publications as being 
important to innovation    1.610***   
    0.342   
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important      0.320***  
     0.057  
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use formal knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being important      0.376*** 
      0.064 
N 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 
Chi-squared 45.892 65.536 78.078 90.430 69.306 67.421 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
bic 5166.554 5167.011 5176.201 5178.252 5167.740 5165.827 
 
 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 




Table 2.26: Use of Lead-time Advantage – Heteroscedastic probit model 
(marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) -0.002* -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* -0.002** -0.002* 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 
 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 
 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 
 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.130* -0.175*** -0.318*** -0.300*** -0.176*** -0.205*** 
 0.068 0.063 0.061 0.061 0.063 0.062 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) -0.004 -0.019 -0.021 -0.097 -0.024 -0.084 
 0.081 0.079 0.079 0.073 0.078 0.074 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.158***      
 0.040      
Av. propensity to be a process innovator 
within the industry  0.201***     
  0.050     
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   0.545***    
   0.126    
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry publications as being 
important to innovation    0.690***   
    0.209   
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important      0.143***  
     0.034  
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use formal knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being important      0.124*** 
      0.038 
N 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 
Chi-squared 36.975 50.170 50.327 71.326 51.023 55.134 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
bic 3179.377 3178.558 3174.649 3183.941 3176.844 3184.395 
 
 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 




Table 2.27:  Use of Complexity of Design – Heteroscedastic probit model 
(marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 
 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.023 -0.028 -0.042 -0.038 -0.027 -0.035 
 0.051 0.048 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.046 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) -0.102* -0.105* -0.107* -0.115** -0.102* -0.115** 
 0.062 0.060 0.057 0.056 0.059 0.057 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.014      
 0.028      
Av. propensity to be a process innovator 
within the industry  0.020     
  0.035     
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   0.055    
   0.081    
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry publications as being 
important to innovation    0.013   
    0.140   
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important      0.015  
     0.023  
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use formal knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being important      0.006 
      0.026 
N 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 
Chi-squared 41.377 57.077 66.274 78.313 60.186 59.728 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
bic 2481.094 2480.846 2479.222 2480.063 2480.242 2480.834 
 
 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 





Table 2.28:  Use of Copyright – Heteroscedastic probit model (marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 
 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 
 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.022 -0.031 -0.061** -0.081*** -0.028 -0.022 
 0.030 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.029 0.028 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) -0.022 -0.026 -0.033 0.087 -0.013 0.012 
 0.042 0.042 0.040 0.062 0.042 0.041 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.054**      
 0.022      
Av. propensity to be a process innovator 
within the industry  0.067**     
  0.028     
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   0.171***    
   0.065    
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry publications as being 
important to innovation    0.660***   
    0.131   
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important      0.054***  
     0.019  
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use formal knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being important      0.109*** 
      0.023 
N 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 
Chi-squared 155.237 206.239 215.661 259.689 201.723 191.257 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
bic 8549.117 8549.986 8549.759 8528.079 8546.705 8532.095 
 
 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 





Table 2.29:  Use of Patents – Heteroscedastic probit model (marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Exporter (0/1) 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.085*** -0.087*** -0.102*** -0.104*** -0.085*** -0.088*** 
 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.020 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) 0.067 0.067 0.042 0.039 0.069 0.057 
 0.054 0.054 0.049 0.047 0.052 0.051 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.013      
 0.017      
Av. propensity to be a process innovator 
within the industry  0.014     
  0.021     
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   0.055    
   0.049    
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry publications as being 
important to innovation    0.141   
    0.095   
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important      0.015  
     0.014  
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use formal knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being important      0.016 
      0.017 
N 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 
Chi-squared 146.294 187.784 182.634 210.267 183.318 171.984 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
bic 6885.332 6885.131 6887.395 6884.658 6884.111 6885.185 
 
 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 





Table 2.30:  Use of Trademarks – Heteroscedastic probit model (marginal 
effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 
 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 
 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.235*** -0.228*** -0.200*** -0.197*** -0.230*** -0.216*** 
 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.033 0.032 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) 0.133* 0.135* 0.088 0.153** 0.130* 0.168** 
 0.074 0.072 0.061 0.064 0.071 0.068 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry -0.054**      
 0.027      
Av. propensity to be a process innovator 
within the industry  -0.074**     
  0.033     
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   -0.283***    
   0.075    
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry publications as being 
important to innovation    -0.273*   
    0.145   
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important      -0.052**  
     0.022  
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use formal knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being important      -0.022 
      0.026 
N 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 
Chi-squared 182.542 235.757 216.483 248.993 227.118 213.976 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
bic 10250.143 10249.101 10232.782 10248.113 10248.794 10252.984 
 
 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 




Table 2.31:  Use of Registered Designs – Heteroscedastic probit model 
(marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Exporter (0/1) 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.037*** -0.040*** 
 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.014 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) 0.021 0.018 -0.005 0.002 0.020 0.019 
 0.020 0.019 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.034 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.000      
 0.010      
Av. propensity to be a process innovator 
within the industry  -0.002     
  0.013     
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   -0.025    
   0.029    
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry publications as being 
important to innovation    -0.007   
    0.056   
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important      0.000  
     0.009  
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use formal knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being important      0.001 
      0.010 
N 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 
Chi-squared 95.873 117.209 112.259 124.655 113.452 116.006 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 




Table 2.32:  Use of Secrecy – Homoscedastic probit model (marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Exporter (0/1) 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.165*** 0.166*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 
 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 
 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
Industry birth rate (%) 0.228** 0.119 -0.179** -0.212** 0.107 0.059 
 0.104 0.096 0.090 0.091 0.095 0.092 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) 0.092 0.050 -0.057 -0.134 0.040 -0.021 
 0.121 0.116 0.112 0.105 0.116 0.109 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.372***      
 0.062      
Av. propensity to be a process innovator 
within the industry  0.459***     
  0.075     
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   0.909***    
   0.177    
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry publications as being 
important to innovation    1.596***   
    0.322   
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important      0.310***  
     0.052  
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use formal knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being important      0.374*** 
      0.060 
N 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 
Chi-squared 1910.971 1912.315 1901.245 1898.961 1911.336 1914.071 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.275 0.275 0.273 0.273 0.275 0.275 
bic 5141.073 5139.728 5150.799 5153.083 5140.708 5137.973 
 
 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 








 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* -0.002** -0.002** 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 
 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 
 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 
 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.124* -0.168*** -0.289*** -0.300*** -0.166*** -0.208*** 
 0.064 0.058 0.053 0.053 0.058 0.056 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) 0.007 -0.013 -0.031 -0.092 -0.011 -0.072 
 0.073 0.069 0.066 0.061 0.069 0.064 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.144***      
 0.036      
Av. propensity to be a process innovator 
within the industry  0.175***     
  0.044     
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   0.424***    
   0.102    
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry publications as being 
important to innovation    0.623***   
    0.186   
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important      0.125***  
     0.030  
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use formal knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being important      0.116*** 
      0.034 
N 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 
Chi-squared 632.544 632.710 634.167 627.714 634.322 627.724 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.171 0.172 0.171 
bic 3144.693 3144.526 3143.070 3149.523 3142.915 3149.513 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 




Table 2.34:  Use of Complexity of Design – Homoscedastic probit model 
(marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 
 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 
 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 
 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.083* -0.089** -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.088** -0.102** 
 0.047 0.043 0.039 0.040 0.043 0.042 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) -0.146*** -0.145*** -0.139*** -0.167*** -0.144*** -0.163*** 
 0.053 0.052 0.049 0.047 0.051 0.048 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.030      
 0.026      
Av. propensity to be a process innovator 
within the industry  0.041     
  0.032     
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   0.134*    
   0.074    
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry publications as being 
important to innovation    0.113   
    0.133   
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important      0.030  
     0.021  
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use formal knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being important      0.021 
      0.025 
N 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 8384.000 
Chi-squared 654.886 655.300 657.020 654.317 655.591 654.302 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.218 
bic 2452.493 2452.079 2450.359 2453.062 2451.788 2453.077 
 
 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 




Table 2.35:  Use of Copyright – Homoscedastic probit model (marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 
 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.067*** 
 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.002 -0.012 -0.038* -0.058*** -0.006 0.003 
 0.026 0.025 0.022 0.022 0.025 0.023 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) -0.036 -0.041 -0.042 0.015 -0.025 0.007 
 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.039 0.038 0.038 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.053**      
 0.021      
Av. propensity to be a process innovator 
within the industry  0.064**     
  0.026     
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   0.160**    
   0.062    
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry publications as being 
important to innovation    0.625***   
    0.125   
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important      0.054***  
     0.019  
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use formal knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being important      0.108*** 
      0.022 
N 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 
Chi-squared 2211.974 2211.263 2212.049 2230.871 2214.075 2229.272 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.209 0.209 0.209 0.210 0.209 0.210 




Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 




Table 2.36:  Use of Patents – Homoscedastic probit model (marginal effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.120*** -0.125*** -0.143*** -0.150*** -0.118*** -0.124*** 
 0.021 0.020 0.017 0.017 0.020 0.019 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) -0.097*** -0.098*** -0.099*** -0.085*** -0.084*** -0.088*** 
 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.028 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.034**      
 0.015      
Av. propensity to be a process innovator 
within the industry  0.044**     
  0.020     
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   0.108**    
   0.046    
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry publications as being 
important to innovation    0.285***   
    0.093   
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important      0.040***  
     0.014  
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use formal knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being important      0.048*** 
      0.017 
N 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 
Chi-squared 2500.193 2500.347 2500.851 2504.868 2504.137 2503.786 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.270 0.270 0.270 0.270 0.270 0.270 
bic 6885.054 6884.900 6884.395 6880.378 6881.109 6881.461 
 
 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 





Table 2.37: Use of Trademarks – Homoscedastic probit model (marginal 
effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Exporter (0/1) 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 
 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 
 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 
 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.251*** -0.240*** -0.198*** -0.190*** -0.238*** -0.213*** 
 0.033 0.031 0.029 0.029 0.031 0.030 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) -0.010 -0.008 -0.035 0.004 -0.010 0.027 
 0.042 0.042 0.040 0.043 0.042 0.042 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry -0.077***      
 0.024      
Av. propensity to be a process innovator 
within the industry  -0.098***     
  0.030     
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   -0.352***    
   0.068    
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry publications as being 
important to innovation    -0.337**   
    0.142   
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important      -0.064***  
     0.021  
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use formal knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being important      -0.035 
      0.025 
N 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 
Chi-squared 1668.925 1669.054 1684.390 1664.022 1667.926 1660.343 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.142 0.142 0.143 0.141 0.142 0.141 
bic 10231.862 10231.732 10216.397 10236.765 10232.860 10240.443 
 
Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 




Table 2.38:  Use of Registered Designs – Homoscedastic probit model (marginal 
effects) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Employment (log) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Exporter (0/1) 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Engaged in co-operation - any 
innovation activity (0/1) 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Science graduates (% workforce) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other graduates (% workforce) 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Received public financial support 
for innovation (0/1) 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Industry birth rate (%) -0.066*** -0.068*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.067*** -0.069*** 
 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.011 
Industry concentration ratio (five-
firm) -0.026 -0.027* -0.038** -0.031** -0.025 -0.028* 
 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.016 
Av. propensity to be a product 
innovator within the industry 0.012      
 0.009      
Av. propensity to be a process 
innovator within the industry  0.013     
  0.011     
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry standards as being 
important to innovation   -0.002    
   0.025    
Av. propensity within the industry to 
view industry publications as being 
important to innovation    0.037   
    0.053   
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use informal knowledge protection/view 
informal methods as being important      0.011  
     0.008  
Av. propensity within the industry to 
use formal knowledge protection/view 
formal methods as being important      0.011 
      0.010 
N 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 22653.000 
Chi-squared 832.843 832.516 831.040 831.523 833.030 832.377 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared (pseudo) 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.194 





Notes: See Table 2.6 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors below. Models contain wave dummies, * denotes significance at the 
10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 





Appropriability regimes and the complexity and variability of 
knowledge-protection strategies within industries 
3.1 Introduction 
Successful firm innovation, in the form of higher profits, increased market value, 
improved credit ratings or an increased chance of survival (Geroski et al., 1993; Hall, 
2000; Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2004; Cefis and Marsili, 2005) is not guaranteed.  
Indeed, there are many reasons why innovative behaviour may fail to reward the 
innovator.  In the case of technological innovations, for example, innovations may be 
unsuccessful because they are unreliable and imperfectly designed (Klein and Ralls, 
1995); the newer the technology, the more likely it is to have bugs or break, or an 
innovation may be unsuccessful because it require users to acquire new technical 
knowledge and skills, for example, a requirement which may lower user satisfaction 
and adoption rates (Aiman-Smith and Green, 2002).  Furthermore, a successful firm 
innovation does not necessarily guarantee higher profits, increased market value, 
improved credit ratings or an increased chance of survival for the innovating firm 
either.  The outcome depends upon the firm’s ability to appropriate the returns to its 
innovation i.e. the firm’s ability to capture profits generated through innovation 
(Teece, 1986; Levin et al., 1987).  The appropriability problem (Arrow, 1962) arises 
when an innovating firm is unable to limit other firms from imitating its innovations 
– the innovating firm fails to appropriate returns (Ceccagnoli and Rothaermel, 2008) 
and retain the value added it creates for its own benefit. 
However, an innovating firm can guard against imitation by utilising knowledge-
protection mechanisms – practical ways of making knowledge less transferable.  
Knowledge-protection mechanisms allow innovators to appropriate returns by 
making their innovative knowledge excludable.  These mechanisms include both 
formal and informal methods of knowledge protection.  Formal knowledge-
protection mechanisms are implemented through regulation and are effective by 
legally excluding imitators, examples include patents and trademarks (Hall, 1992).  
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Informal protection methods are not based upon structures and statutory enforcement 
possibilities, examples include secrecy and lead-time (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 
2014).      
In order to profit from innovation, an innovator requires the ability to formulate an 
effective knowledge-protection strategy – encompassing different knowledge-
protection mechanisms – to prevent or delay the imitation of its knowledge and 
technology (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen et al., 2008).  Although a variety of protection 
mechanisms exist, not all protection mechanisms are available and effective for all 
firms.  The industry appropriability regime – the environmental factors a firm faces 
(excluding firm and industry structure) – defines the knowledge-protection 
mechanisms that are available and effective within an industry to protect both 
innovations themselves and any increased rents which flow from them (Teece, 1986, 
1998, 2000a; Levin et al., 1987; Teece and Pisano, 1998); it governs a firm’s ability 
to capture profits from an innovation (Teece, 1986).  Formal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms, for example patents, are more effective at protecting product 
innovations and knowledge in industries which specialise in the production of 
discrete products, for example in the pharmaceuticals and chemical industries 
(Mansfield, 1986; Harabi, 1995), and they therefore form part of the appropriability 
regime in these industries.  Informal knowledge-protection mechanisms are more 
effective at protecting process innovations and knowledge in complex-product 
industries (Cohen et al., 2000), and as a result, they form part of the appropriability 
regime in these industries.  Appropriability regimes also vary in strength across 
different industries.  As the available and effective protection increases, the 
appropriability regime becomes stronger – innovation becomes easier to protect and 
firms are more able to appropriate returns.   
Despite firms within a given industry being faced with identical knowledge-
protection opportunities as defined by the industry appropriability regime, firms 
make different knowledge-protection choices.  Firms within an industry are 
characterised by their resources and capabilities; indeed, each firm can be thought of 
as a collection of resources (Penrose, 1959).   It is the heterogeneous nature of firm-
specific resources and capabilities, for example the amount of finance a firm has 
available or its managerial capabilities, which gives rise to the variation in firms’ 
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knowledge-protection choices within an industry.  Small firms, for instance, may 
lack the necessary resources and capabilities to protect innovation using formal 
methods – for example, they may lack the finance to apply for patents and to take 
court action if it becomes necessary to do so (Olander et al., 2009). 
In summary, within any given industry, firms optimise their knowledge-protection 
choices according to their resources and capabilities and the available and effective 
knowledge-protection mechanisms within the industry which are defined by the 
industry appropriability regime. 
The present study acknowledges that the complexity of firms’ knowledge-protection 
choices (or strategies) within a given industry – in terms of the amount of 
knowledge-protection firms adopt – is jointly determined by the industry 
appropriability regime and firms’ individual resources and capabilities.  As the 
industry appropriability regime strengthens, firms have more effective knowledge-
protection mechanisms available to them.  The strategy space increases, and given 
that firms have the resources and capabilities to do so, they are able to increase the 
amount of protection that they adopt to protect their knowledge and innovations.  In 
addition, this study acknowledges that the variability of firms’ knowledge-protection 
choices within an industry is due to the heterogeneous nature of firms’ resources and 
capabilities.  As the industry appropriability regime strengthens, the increased 
strategy space leads to an increased variability in knowledge-protection choices 
amongst firms.  The increased availability of effective protection options allows for a 
greater range of firm positioning and, in turn, an increase in the chance that firms 
will receive any added value for their own benefit.  By being able to select a unique 
position relative to other firms within the industry, a firm reduces the competition 
that it faces and increases its chances of success in terms of performance 
(Deephouse, 1999). 
Given the benefits to firms of more complex knowledge-protection choices and an 
increase in the variability of knowledge-protection choices within an industry, this 
study seeks to examine how relaxing the limit on the available and effective 
knowledge-protection mechanisms within an industry i.e. strengthening the 
knowledge-protection dimension of the industry appropriability regime, affects the 
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complexity and variability of firms’ knowledge-protection choices within the 
industry.  
Previous studies examining the factors which affect firms’ choice of knowledge-
protection mechanisms are numerous.  Many studies identify industry characteristics 
(for example, the level of technology and research and development – R&D – 
intensity) as being important determinants of the knowledge-protection mechanisms 
firms use to appropriate the returns to innovation (Mansfield, 1986; Levin et al., 
1987; Harabi, 1995; Cohen et al., 2000).  Others studies examine how the 
availability of firm resources (Kitching and Blackburn, 1998; Leiponen and Byma, 
2009) and the novelty of an innovation (Thomas, 2003; Hanel, 2005; Hussinger, 
2006) impact upon firms’ knowledge-protection choices.  Adding to these findings, 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen et al. (2017) in their study identify three different 
appropriability profiles among firms (patterns of knowledge-protection choice) with 
industry factors and firm-resource factors jointly determining the profile group to 
which a firm belongs.  Their findings suggest that firms are better to approach the 
appropriability problem by considering protection mechanisms as a whole rather 
than by comparing one protection mechanism with another, and they suggest that 
firms are likely to benefit from having a wide range of protection mechanisms 
available to them.  The present study adds to this body of knowledge by taking a 
holistic view of knowledge protection and examining how strengthening the 
protection dimension of the industry appropriability regime impacts upon firms’ 
protection choices within the industry.  Rather than examining the nature of firms’ 
knowledge-protection profiles across different industries, this study is concerned 
with firms’ knowledge-protection profiles within an industry.  In contrast to previous 
studies, it investigates how firms’ knowledge-protection choices respond to changing 
industry appropriability conditions.  Many previous studies acknowledge that 
industry characteristics have implications for firms’ knowledge-protection choices, 
and the analysis here examines, quantitatively, the relationship between the strength 
of the protection dimension of the industry appropriability regime and the 
complexity and variability of knowledge-protection choices (or strategies) made by 
firms within the industry.  In addition, the analysis considers whether the effects on 
firms’ knowledge-protection choices differ across industries by undertaking a 
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comparison of high-technology/knowledge-intensive industries and low-
technology/less knowledge-intensive industries. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows.  Section 3.2 introduces the 
concepts of the industry appropriability regime and a firm’s knowledge-protection 
strategy.  Knowledge protection in relation to the resource-based view of strategy is 
discussed along with the ways in which firms’ knowledge-protection strategies are 
influenced by the industry appropriability regime.  A description of the conceptual 
framework and hypotheses concludes this section.  Section 3.3 profiles the data and 
methodology used in this study, Section 3.4 contains the empirical results and 
Section 3.5 includes discussion and conclusions. 
3.2 Conceptual development 
3.2.1 The industry appropriability regime 
Appropriability – a firm’s capacity to retain any added value it creates for its own 
benefit – represents the extent to which a firm can capture profits generated through 
innovation (Teece, 1986; Levin et al., 1987).  The appropriability regime, the 
environmental factors a firm faces (excluding firm and industry structure) which 
govern its ability to capture profits from an innovation (Teece, 1986), has been 
identified, along with specialised complimentary assets, as an influence upon this 
appropriability (Teece, 1986); it affects a firm’s ability to profit from its innovation 
(Pisano, 2006).   
There are two important dimensions of the appropriability regime: the nature of the 
technology within the industry (for example, whether the industry is characterised by 
product or process technologies and whether technology is based upon tacit or 
codified knowledge), and the legal methods of knowledge protection available to 
protect both innovations themselves and any increased rents which flow from them 
(Teece, 1986, 1998, 2000a; Levin et al., 1987; Teece and Pisano, 1998).  Some 
researchers extend this appropriability regime definition to include other formal 
(legally binding) knowledge-protection methods (for example, contracts and labour 
legislation) as well as less formal (not legally binding) knowledge-protection 
methods (for example secrecy and lead time) (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and 
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Puumalainen, 2007b).  For the purpose of this study, the appropriability regime is 
defined to include both formal and informal knowledge-protection mechanisms. 
The first dimension of the appropriability regime – the nature of the technology 
within the industry – provides ‘natural protection against imitation’ (Pisano and 
Teece, 2007) and is an indication of the ease of its imitability (Pisano, 2006).  For 
example, the accessibility of a technology – whether or not it can be obtained by and 
used by others – determines the likelihood of imitation (Jones Day, 2006).  The level 
of accessibility varies across both product and process technologies and tacit and 
codified knowledge.  Many process technologies, for example, are not generally 
observable and are therefore highly inaccessible.  In contrast, new products are easily 
accessible to many, their technologies are observed and they can be re-created 
through techniques such as reverse engineering.  Some technologies are based upon 
tacit knowledge and are very difficult to understand, making them particularly 
inaccessible.  Other technologies use codified knowledge so that the technology is 
accessible to everyone.  In summary, the less (more) generally accessible the 
technology, the less (more) likely it will be subject to imitation and the more (less) 
likely returns will be appropriated by the innovating firm.  As the nature of the 
technology – or characteristics of the technology – varies across different industries, 
appropriability regimes become industry specific and defined by the technological 
profiles of the industry to which they apply.   
The second dimension of the appropriability regime is the formal and informal 
methods of knowledge protection used by firms to protect their innovations and the 
rents which flow from them, for example patents, copyright and secrecy.  It is the 
availability and enforceability of these protection methods which helps to shape the 
appropriability regime of a particular industry (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and 
Jauhiainen, 2004).  Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al. (2000) examine the extent to 
which firms in different industries choose formal and informal knowledge-protection 
methods to protect knowledge and innovation.  Both studies find that a high 
percentage of firms rely on informal knowledge-protection mechanisms, for 
example, secrecy and lead time are found to be important protection methods for 
both product and process innovations; patents are found to be much less important, 
with the exception of the pharmaceutical and chemical industries.  Patents, however, 
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are identified as being more important for product innovations than for process 
innovations.  One reason for this is that a patented process can easily be invented 
around once knowledge is disclosed.  This is supported by Harabi (1995), who, in a 
study of Swiss firms, finds that firms are concerned about disclosing knowledge.  
Some firms believe disclosing knowledge allows competitors an opportunity to 
invent around their innovations.  Patents, on the other hand, are identified as being 
important to firms in the pharmaceutical, chemical and machinery industries.  
Secrecy, an informal protection mechanism, is found to be important for process 
innovations; processes can be effectively retained within the firm and protected with 
trade secrets.  In a survey of one hundred manufacturing firms, Mansfield (1986) 
also finds that firms in both the pharmaceutical and chemical industries use patent 
protection; at least 30 per cent of innovations are protected using this method.  R&D 
intensive firms and science-based firms have been identified as being more likely to 
protect knowledge formally (Cohen et al., 2000; Leiponen and Byma, 2009), high-
technology industries tend to rely more on formal methods (Brouwer and 
Kleinknecht, 1999), and the propensity to patent and the number of patent 
applications is significantly lower in services compared with manufacturing (Blind et 
al., 2003).  The evidence shows that formal mechanisms are used more often than 
informal mechanisms in discrete product industries (Cohen et al., 2000), whereas in 
complex-product industries it is easier to invent around technologies, and 
consequently, firms rely on more informal methods of protection based upon 
secrecy. 
The appropriability regime determines the barriers to imitation which exist within an 
industry and therefore the ease with which competitors can imitate an innovation 
(Ceccagnoli and Rothaermel, 2008).  Appropriability regimes can be strong or weak 
(Teece, 1986), and their strength varies across industries.  This is in part due to the 
effectiveness of knowledge-protection mechanisms – to achieve a desired or 
intended effect – varying significantly across industries (Levin et al., 1987). 
An appropriability regime is ‘strong’ when innovations are easy to protect – 
knowledge about them is tacit or they are well protected by formal/informal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms.  In a strong environment with tacit knowledge, 
innovations are hard to imitate because knowledge is embedded within firms’ 
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routines and capabilities.  The technology in the software industry, for example, 
enjoys a relatively strong appropriability regime (Pisano and Teece, 2007).  Here, 
imitation is difficult because it is technically possible to shield source code from 
users and competitors. 
An appropriability regime is ‘weak’ when innovations are difficult to protect – 
knowledge is easily codified or formal/informal knowledge-protection mechanisms 
are ineffective.  When technologies are easily observed and reverse engineering is 
possible, imitation is easy, and alternatives can be easily developed.  The rate and 
volume of knowledge spillovers is higher in a weak appropriability regime compared 
with a strong regime.  The effects of this are not all negative as there is a positive 
impact upon the rate of technological change; the technological opportunity for all 
firms within an industry is increased (Klevorick et al., 1995).  On the downside, the 
knowledge embedded within firm innovations quickly diffuses to other firms, and 
the innovating firm’s appropriated returns quickly diminish (Teece et al., 1997).  For 
a firm to achieve continuous returns in a weak appropriability environment, it may 
need to innovate continuously (Roberts, 1999).  In addition, the risk of knowledge 
spillovers in a weak regime means that there is a great uncertainty related to the 
returns from committing to long periods of resource development (Sakakibara, 
2002).  Firms may therefore need to develop new resources for innovation speedily.  
In a strong appropriability regime, however, firms are more able to commit to long 
periods of resource development due to the greater certainty of returns from their 
investment (Levin et al., 1987).   
When faced with a weak appropriability regime, firms unable to use formal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms to protect their innovations and the returns which 
flow from them can strengthen their appropriability conditions by acquiring 
complementary assets (Gans and Stern, 2003) – the  appropriability regime’s 
counterpart in determining appropriability (Teece, 1986) – or by using less formal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms, for example a firewall to protect the leakage of 
confidential information (Markham et al., 2005).  The soft drinks industry is an 
example where the appropriability regime is relatively weak.  For example, Royal 
Crown Cola first developed a diet soft drink, yet its rivals – Pepsi and Coca-Cola – 
profited from the innovation (Dodgson et al., 2014).  Within the soft-drinks industry, 
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the use of patent protection would be short lived, and imitation would be relatively 
easy thereafter.  The use of secrecy combined with trademarks and/or brand 
positioning – where the brand is perceived as being more favourable and credible in 
consumers’ minds – is more suitable here. 
In reality, appropriability regimes form a continuum, some emphasising knowledge-
protection mechanisms over the nature of technology and some emphasising the 
nature of technology over knowledge protection (Teece, 1998, 2000a).  A strong 
regime can be achieved by different means; some industries may rely upon 
knowledge-protection mechanisms while others may rely upon tacit knowledge 
embedded deep within the structure of firms (Levin et al., 1987).  Whatever the 
chosen combination, a firm’s aim is to create a first-mover advantage and earn 
higher than average returns.  It follows from this that the industry appropriability 
regime can be strengthened by increasing the tacit nature of knowledge within an 
industry or by increasing the amount of effective and available knowledge protection 
within the industry for firms to use to help in the appropriation of innovation.  The 
knowledge-protection dimension of the industry appropriability regime is the main 
focus of the study, with an increase in the amount of effective and available 
protection within an industry representing an increase in the strength of the 
appropriability regime. 
3.2.2 A firm’s knowledge-protection strategy 
Knowledge, an intangible asset, typically entails higher risks than assets of a 
physical or financial nature.  Mismanagement of, theft of and crime relating to 
knowledge requires firms to actively protect their knowledge, mitigating its risks and 
preserving its value.  The protection of knowledge – whether using formal or 
informal protection mechanisms – limits imitation and helps firms gain a competitive 
advantage (Teece et al., 1997). 
A strategy is defined as “a pattern in a stream of decisions” (Mintzberg, 1978, p. 
934).  A knowledge-protection strategy is a pattern in a stream of decisions relating 
to the protection of a firm’s innovations – ideas, information and knowledge – and 
any income streams which flow from them.  A prerequisite for profiting from 
innovation is that the innovator is able to prevent or delay the imitation of its 
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intellectual assets and technology (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen et al., 2008).  In 
formulating a knowledge-protection strategy, a firm attempts to prevent or delay the 
imitation of its intellectual assets.  A firm’s knowledge-protection strategy represents 
just one part of its overall appropriability strategy8, which is its approach to 
protecting knowledge against imitation and to ensuring that the returns from 
innovative activities are appropriated (Laursen and Salter, 2014).   
For many firms, knowledge is a primary source of market value, and by making 
knowledge-protection strategies an integrated process rather than allowing 
technology or legal departments to make protection decisions (Reitzig, 2004), 
knowledge protection can be managed alongside the overall business model design 
and corporate strategy of the firm.  Top management personnel can ensure that the 
decisions relating to knowledge protection are integrated into corporate strategy with 
guidance from R&D/technology managers.  By managing knowledge-protection 
strategy in this way, the commercial success of the firm is more likely (Al-Aali and 
Teece, 2013). 
There are a number of knowledge-protection mechanisms available to firms which 
allow them to capture returns from their intellectual property (Laursen and Salter, 
2014) or knowledge assets.  A firm’s knowledge-protection strategy may include the 
use of formal protection methods implemented through regulation, such as patents 
and trademarks (Hall, 1992), and informal protection methods, such as secrecy and 
lead-time.  Other protection mechanisms, such as the complex nature of databases, 
networks and reputation, can be used to curb imitation in the short term (Fahy and 
Smithee, 1999).  The protection mechanisms which make up a firm’s knowledge-
protection strategy reflect the importance the firm attributes to the various protection 
mechanisms available: the more concerned a firm is with appropriability, the more 
importance it attributes to the different protection mechanisms (Laursen and Salter, 
2014).   
The use of knowledge-protection mechanisms to appropriate the returns from 
innovation requires considerable firm resources, for example managerial and 
                                                          
8 A firm’s appropriability strategy also includes decisions relating to its technology and the 
acquisition of complementary assets. 
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financial resources are needed to apply for patents and keep technologies secret from 
competitors (Teece, 1986; Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; Ceccagnoli, 2009).  These 
required resources influence a firm’s approach to the external environment in 
relation to who it works with, where it looks for ideas and how it organises its own 
innovative activities (Gans and Stern, 2003; Chesbrough, 2006; Laursen and Salter, 
2014). 
As knowledge protection often represents a cost to the firm, it is important that a 
firm’s chosen strategy is an efficient option.  Choosing to patent, for example, can be 
more expensive than first envisaged as during times of dispute, expensive court costs 
are inevitable, or firms may attempt to retain knowledge embodied within employees 
by offering high salaries.  Both of these protection strategies may be at the expense 
of firm profit (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 2007b). 
In formulating its knowledge-protection strategy, a firm may choose complementary 
protection mechanisms, for example trademarks and registered designs – many 
formal and informal protection mechanisms have a tendency to be compliments 
(Cohen et al., 2000).  Given this, one firm’s knowledge-protection strategy may 
inform other firms, and this may lead to the acquisition of complementary forms of 
protection through collaborative activities (Cohen et al., 2000).  Individual 
knowledge-protection mechanisms interact with others to generate 
complementarities.  Some protection mechanisms are pre-requisites or supportive of 
other forms of protection, for example, encryption to prevent unauthorised 
disclosures (a so-called technical mean) may be a pre-requisite for keeping a trade 
secret, and patents or secrecy may help to create lead-time advantages (Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 2007a).  Also, different protection mechanisms may be 
more suited to different stages of the innovation process, for example, prior to 
commercialisation, firms may rely upon secrecy.  Later, firms may apply for a patent 
and/or use lead-time strategies.  In addition to this, more than one protection 
mechanism may be used at the same time for a given innovation when there are 
separately protectable components or features (Cohen et al., 2000) or when 




3.2.3 A firm’s knowledge-protection strategy – a resource-based approach 
A firm’s resources and capabilities, and its position relative to other firms’ resources 
and capabilities, provide useful information on ways in which a firm can formulate 
an effective knowledge-protection strategy and create barriers against imitation.  In 
this study, a firm’s knowledge-protection strategic position is supported by its 
resources and capabilities, reflecting the idea that resources and positions are closely 
related (Wernerfelt, 1984).  Firms differ in the mechanisms that they use to protect 
the knowledge which they create, and these differences mainly relate to firm-specific 
factors such as size, finance and managerial capabilities.  Thus, it is assumed here 
that the heterogeneous nature of firms’ resources and capabilities gives rise to 
differences in firms’ knowledge-protection strategies.  The origins of such a 
resource-based view (RBV) of strategy lie with Penrose (1959) who describes a firm 
as a collection of resources.  In this view of strategy determination, each firm is 
unique due to the heterogeneity of the services it extracts from its resources.  Firm-
specific resources, or firm-specific assets, allow for diversification and enable a firm 
to create a cost or differentiation advantage.  Individual firm resources are assumed 
to be immobile – tied to the firm – and encompass both tangible and intangible assets 
(Wernerfelt, 1984), and it is upon these heterogeneous, immobile resources that this 
theory of competitive advantage is based (Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 
1984): they are a source of heterogeneity in firm performance (Lu et al., 2008).     
Firm resources are defined as “all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm 
attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to 
conceive of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness” 
(Barney, 1991, p.101).  A firm’s capabilities are its ability to utilise these resources 
effectively.  They allow firms to make better use of their resources as mere 
possession of resources is not sufficient (Penrose 1959).  These internal resources 
and capabilities are the source of firm profitability; they lead to a cost or 
differentiation advantage and in turn a competitive advantage.  Heterogeneous and 
immobile resources are an essential requirement for firms to be able to achieve a 
competitive advantage, but in order to achieve a sustained competitive advantage, 
the resources need to be valuable (V), rare (R), costly to imitate or inimitable (I) (by 
embedding capabilities within firm routines, for example) and non-substitutable (N) 
– characteristics collectively known as VRIN (Barney, 1991).  Barney (1995) later 
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extended VRIN to include resources that are organised (O) in such a way so as to 
capture value (VRIO).  
Teece et al. (1997) draw on and extend the RBV in their dynamic capabilities 
approach.  Here, firms constantly adapt, renew, reconfigure and re-create their 
resources and capabilities in line with the competitive environment which they face.  
In a highly dynamic business environment, the original RBV proposition is static and 
neglects the influence of market dynamism, something the dynamic capabilities 
approach aims to address (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). 
In order to sustain a competitive advantage, a firm develops a business strategy to 
make use of its resources and capabilities (Grant, 1991).  A firm’s available 
resources and capabilities may therefore provide an insight into its ability to 
successfully implement a strategy, or for the purpose of the present study, a 
knowledge-protection strategy.  For example, firms require the capabilities to handle 
fragile protection mechanisms such as tacitness: once it is lost, it cannot be retrieved 
(Winter, 1995; Zander and Kogut, 1995), firms may lack the know-how to acquire 
knowledge protection (Olander et al., 2014) and firms may lack the required finance 
to protect knowledge – patent protection, for example, is associated with high costs, 
and this often deters firms from using them (Lerner, 1995; Arundel and Kabla 1998).  
Generally, many types of resources are required to implement and maintain an 
effective knowledge-protection strategy (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 
2007b) and to ensure the efficacy (or perceived strength) of protection mechanisms.  
A firm’s ability to protect knowledge represents a capability (Gold et al., 2001), and 
in order to protect knowledge, a firm requires both a knowledge-infrastructure 
capability and a knowledge-process capability.  The knowledge protection itself is 
part of the knowledge-process capability, a capability which is essential for a firm to 
be able to generate new knowledge and competitive advantage.   
A firm’s managerial capabilities have a strong impact upon its knowledge-protection 
strategy.  Managers are required to know how and when to implement protection 
(Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 2007b), and the decision on whether or 
not to protect depends upon a manager’s perceived strength of the mechanisms 
(Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 2007a).  Managers have to take into 
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account the efficiency of protection mechanisms, and when considering a range of 
knowledge-protection options, they have to compare the benefits of protection with 
the costs (Al-Aali and Teece, 2013).  Choosing to patent, for example, can be more 
expensive than first envisaged and be at the expense of firm profit.  In contrast, 
undertaking an expensive protection strategy may be justified when protecting 
technologies that underlie a core competency or are critical for the firm’s 
competitive advantage (Al-Aali and Teece, 2013).  Managers need the ability to 
select appropriate protection mechanisms and choose the best ways of exploiting 
them according to the strategic goals of the firm.  A firm’s resources, both in terms 
of money and capabilities, are important when considering the firm’s ability to 
protect knowledge using the various protection mechanisms available. 
Management capabilities vary across firms and are important factors affecting the 
knowledge-protection strategies of firms within an industry.  Managers are called 
upon to identify effective protection mechanisms and to assess their strength in 
protecting knowledge and innovations before any appropriate protection mechanisms 
can be selected and exploited to achieve the strategic goals of the firm (Hurmelinna 
and Puumalainen, 2005).  They are required to understand the protection 
mechanisms and their applicability before making an informed strategic choice.  Not 
all protection mechanisms are at the firm’s disposal, and those that are, may not be 
effective.  Availability and efficacy (Hurmelinna and Puumalainen, 2005) are the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a strong knowledge-protection strategy that is 
effective in preventing imitation, and managers need an understanding of both 
availability and efficacy to make an informed choice.  
Formal protection mechanisms may be difficult to obtain, and consequently, not all 
of them are available to the firm (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009).  Patent protection 
requires a complicated and lengthy process of research, application and 
correspondence, and it is a costly process.  Small firms, for example, may have 
limited resources and find it difficult to implement patent protection, and service-
sector firms may find it difficult to protect their innovations with knowledge-
protection mechanisms more traditionally associated with product innovations 
(Olander et al., 2009).  Furthermore, even if a firm possesses the resources and 
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capabilities to implement protection, for example patent protection, the firm may not 
have an enforcing and monitoring capacity (Olander et al., 2014). 
There is a need for managers to be able to acknowledge the constraints related to 
attaining protection mechanisms and gaining adequate protective power 
(Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 2007b).  For example, at the theoretical 
level, there are reasons to expect that small firms may find patents more valuable 
than large firms, but there are also arguments that imply the opposite.  While small 
firms could use patents to create a temporary barrier against competitors in order to 
build the capabilities required to become a successful innovator, patent application 
costs and the costs of protecting patents from infringement could cause them to value 
secrecy more highly (Arundel, 2001).  Large firms often have knowledge-protection 
departments which might lead them to have a greater propensity to patent.  Large 
firms often have the resources to enforce intellectual property rights and ensure the 
efficacy of protection mechanisms, although organisational barriers, such as a lack of 
knowledge, may also exist in large firms and hinder the integration of a firm’s 
knowledge-protection strategy and its corporate strategy (Al-Aali and Teece, 2013).  
Firms require the capabilities ‘to sense and then to seize new opportunities, and to 
reconfigure and protect knowledge assets, competences, and complementary assets 
and technologies to achieve sustainable competitive advantage’ (Teece, 2000b, p. 
26), i.e. they are required to find the most efficient uses for the protection 
mechanisms (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 2007b).  In addition, careful 
firm management is required to successfully protect knowledge assets in the 
presence of emerging opportunities and threats (Teece, 2000b).  Firm strategies may 
therefore be dynamic in nature and be required to adjust to changing conditions, in 
line with the dynamic capabilities theory proposed by Teece et al. (1997). 
Firms continuously seek to maximise the value of their resources and capabilities, 
and their strategic choices relating to knowledge protection are made in line with this 
maximisation process.  However, in any given industry, the technology opportunities 




3.2.4 The industry appropriability regime and a firm’s knowledge-protection 
strategy 
Section 3.2.1 above describes how firms’ knowledge-protection choices within a 
given industry or sector – both formal and informal – are shaped by the industry 
appropriability regime.  As a consequence of this, a firm’s knowledge-protection 
strategy – or appropriability profile (Hurmelinna- Laukkanen et al., 2017) – is not 
only determined by firm-specific resources and capabilities as discussed in Section 
3.2.3 above, but is also contingent upon the appropriability regime of the industry 
within which the firm operates.   
Contingency has emerged as an important concept in both strategic management and 
organisational research (Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990).  The degree of fit 
between strategy and the environment (Hofer, 1975; Prescott, 1986) or strategy and 
structure (Chandler, 1962; Rumelt, 1974) has significant positive implications for 
performance.  In his research, Hofer (1975) develops a contingency theory of firm 
strategy.  Economic conditions, demographic trends, political and legal factors, 
industry structure variables and competitor variables are all identified as being 
strategically significant environmental and organisational variables.  Operationally, a 
firm is required to find a match between the environment, its available resources and 
its strategy.  Given this, a firm within a particular industry is required to find a match 
between the industry appropriability regime (part of the industry environment), its 
resources and capabilities and its knowledge-protection strategy. 
The availability and efficacy of knowledge-protection mechanisms within a specific 
industry are ‘given’ determinants of the industry’s appropriability regime, and both 
this availability and efficacy set the limits on a firm’s knowledge-protection strategy 
(Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 2007a).  The appropriability regime 
places constraints upon the knowledge-protection choices individual firms make and 
has an important influence upon a firm’s strategic behaviour.  Therefore, in order to 
fully understand a firm’s knowledge-protection strategy, it is first necessary to 
understand the appropriability regime of the industry to which the firm belongs. 
The industry within which a firm is located is an important factor determining a 
firm’s appropriability profile (Hurmelinna- Laukkanen et al., 2017) – the 
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combination of protection mechanisms used by a firm to appropriate the benefits 
from innovation.  The nature of the technology and innovations, for example whether 
they are incremental or radical, defines the ways in which they can be protected 
(Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 2007b).  In addition to this, other factors 
such as legal restrictions (Rao and Klein, 1994) and a high mobility of labour 
(leading to a high risk of knowledge leakage) (Atkins, 1998) for example, may 
determine the protection mechanisms that a firm uses.  This is the case in the 
information and communications technology (ICT) sector where secrecy, lead time 
and human-resource practices are the most effective protection mechanisms and 
feature in the industry appropriability regime.  In technology-intensive industries 
with a high rate of new inventions, formal knowledge protection is too slow and too 
costly to effectively protect innovations (Deakin and Wilkinson, 1998), and because 
protecting knowledge formally is time-consuming, formal knowledge protection is 
inefficient in industries that are developing quickly (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and 
Puumalainen, 2007b).  Firms of this type are strategically constrained to choose less 
formal protection methods from the available and effective set given by the industry 
appropriability regime.  Older and more established industries, such as the metal 
industry, pharmaceuticals and chemical industry, have a longer tradition of using 
formal knowledge protection (Teece, 1986), and more formal protection 
mechanisms, for example patents, are characteristic of their industry appropriability 
regimes. 
Within a particular industry, a firm makes decisions about its knowledge-protection 
strategy based upon the appropriability regime it faces in its environment and its 
individual resources and capabilities.  As industry appropriability regimes become 
stronger, firms within an industry have more effective knowledge-protection 
mechanisms available to them.  The number of tools available to protect knowledge 
and innovation within an industry increases creating a larger strategy space for firms 
to work within the bounds of.  As firms are less limited in terms of the effective 
protection mechanisms which are available, one would expect firms’ knowledge-
protection strategies to be more complex – comprised of more knowledge-protection 
mechanisms – within industries characterised by strong appropriability regimes. 
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Firms’ heterogeneous resources and capabilities mean that, in any given industry, 
firms may implement different knowledge-protection strategies despite the industry 
appropriability regime being common to all: firms seek to position themselves 
optimally subject to the appropriability regime which they face.  For example, small 
firms with limited resources may find it difficult to use complex and expensive 
patent protection – the resources of the firm determine whether the firm can pay 
patent fees or not, and with limited resources, it is difficult to establish strong 
protection (Kitching and Blackburn, 1998; Leiponen and Byma, 2009).  As firms 
within an industry are differently equipped to make use of any effective and 
available protection mechanisms (Hurmelinna- Laukkanen et al., 2017), variability 
exists in firms’ knowledge-protection strategies within an industry.  In an industry 
characterised by a strong appropriability regime, the increased availability of 
effective protection options gives more strategic options and allows for a greater 
range of firm positioning and, in turn, an increase in the chance that firms will 
receive any added value which they create for their own benefit.  Firms in such an 
industry are more able to select a unique position relative to other firms (given their 
available resources and capabilities), and are therefore more able to reduce the 
competition which they face, increasing their chance of performance success 
(Deephouse, 1999).  It follows that there may be more variability in knowledge-
protection strategies within an industry characterised by a strong appropriability 
regime compared with one characterised by a weak appropriability regime.   
3.2.5 Conceptual framework and hypothesis development 
The conceptual model at the centre of this study seeks to explain how firms’ value-
maximising knowledge-protection strategies are determined and, more importantly, 
how firms’ value-maximising knowledge-protection strategies are influenced by the 
appropriability regime of the industry to which the firm belongs.    
Section 3.2.4 above describes how a firm, when formulating a knowledge-protection 
strategy, chooses protection mechanisms in line with its own resources and 
capabilities and the appropriability regime of the industry to which it belongs.  
Rather than seeking to maximise protection itself, the firm seeks to maximise the 
value of its protection; it seeks to maximise the expected net profits from its 
knowledge assets (Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and 
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Puumalainen, 2007b).  In order to implement a value-maximising knowledge-
protection strategy, the firm not only assesses the benefits of each protection 
mechanism but also assesses the costs of implementation. 
When assessing the value or benefit of different knowledge-protection mechanisms, 
firms are concerned with the marginal value of protection i.e. the extra benefit or 
value received from adopting one extra protection mechanism.  The model assumes 
that the marginal value of protection falls as the number of protection mechanisms 
adopted increases – firms choose to adopt the protection mechanism which provides 
the greatest value or benefit first.  Figure 3.1 shows the marginal-value-of-protection 
(MVP) schedule sloping downwards in the marginal-value-of-protection/number-of-
protection-mechanisms space. 
The additional cost to the firm of obtaining one more protection mechanism is the 
marginal cost of protection.  The model assumes that the marginal cost of protection 
falls as the number of protection mechanisms adopted by a firm increases.  
Typically, initial costs of protection are high as obtaining protection can be a timely, 
costly and complicated process.  As the number of protection mechanisms used by a 
firm increases, the firm becomes more familiar with the protection process.  
Proprietary knowledge, skills and capabilities useful for protecting knowledge 
increase so that the protection process is easier and less costly for the firm.  Figure 
3.1 shows the downward-sloping marginal-cost-of-protection (MCP) schedule in the 
marginal-cost-of-protection/number-of-protection-mechanisms space. 
The model assumes that the marginal value a firm receives from implementing its 
first protection mechanism is greater than the cost to the firm of adopting that 
mechanism.  This assumption reflects a firm’s initial incentive to protect.  The firm 
believes that there is some value or benefit to be gained from protecting; otherwise 
protection would not take place.  This incentive is represented by the marginal-
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In an unconstrained world, it is assumed that rational firms make decisions about the 
amount of knowledge protection they adopt based upon the marginal value and 
marginal cost of protection – firms undertake a costs verses benefits comparison.  A 
firm continues to add to its protection up to the point where the marginal value of 
protection is equal to the marginal cost of protection (point A in Figure 3.1).  Once 
the additional value received is at a greater cost per benefit, it is no longer reasonable 
for the firm to increase the number of protection mechanisms it uses: the firm’s value 
of protection is maximised.  The firm’s optimal knowledge-protection strategy is 
thus given by P* in Figure 3.1. 
The value a firm gains from using a protection mechanism varies across firms within 
a given industry.  ‘Value’ is determined by firm-specific factors such as firm 
presence in international markets, size, age and firm goals, for example 
(Hurmelinna-Laukkenen et al., 2017).  From this, it follows that each firm has its 
own individual marginal-value-of-protection schedule.  Similarly, the marginal cost 
of protection is determined by a firm’s individual resources and capabilities, and 
therefore each firm has its own marginal-cost-of-protection schedule.  Given that 
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each firm has its own individual marginal-value-of-protection and marginal-cost-of-
protection schedules, the value of protection is maximised at a different point for 
each firm.  Figure 3.2 shows the value-maximising knowledge-protection positions 
for three different firms within a given industry (points B, C and D), with the number 
of knowledge-protection mechanisms maximising value being different for each firm 
(P1*, P2* and P3*, respectively). 
In a constrained world, the model assumes that rational firms make decisions about 
the amount of knowledge protection they adopt based upon the marginal value of 
protection and the marginal cost of protection, subject to a constraint.  Firms assess 
the potential of and the restrictions related to the use of each available protection 
mechanism – in terms of its availability, efficacy and efficiency (Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 2007b) – before deciding upon which protection 
mechanisms to implement.  They reach optimising decisions by considering the 
constraint which they face i.e. the appropriability regime, itself the object of their 
calculating considerations (Vanberg, 1994).  This results in a range of knowledge-
protection choices – or profiles (Hurmelinna- Laukkanen et al., 2017). 
In an industry characterised by a weak appropriability regime, the knowledge-
protection mechanisms available to a firm are more limited than in an industry 
characterised by a strong appropriability regime.  In Figure 3.2, W represents the 
maximum number of effective knowledge-protection mechanisms available to firms 
in a weak appropriability regime.  When faced with the weak regime, Firm 1 is able 
to optimise and maximise the value of its knowledge protection given the constraint 
(where MVP1=MCP1), but Firm 2 and Firm 3 are limited and are forced to adopt the 
sub-optimal knowledge-protection strategy given by W.  In an industry characterised 
by a strong appropriability regime, the knowledge-protection mechanisms available 
to a firm are less limited.  The maximum number of effective knowledge-protection 
mechanisms available to firms in a strong appropriability regime is given by S.  
When faced with the strong regime, Firm 2 is no longer constrained; it is able to 
maximise the value of its knowledge protection (where MVP2=MCP2).  Firm 3 
continues to be limited and is forced to adopt the sub-optimal knowledge-protection 
strategy given by S. 
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Figure 3.2: The value-maximising knowledge-protection positions for three 
different firms within a given industry 
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To see the effects of this more clearly, Figure 3.3 shows both the constrained and the 
unconstrained industry-level distribution of firms’ value-maximising knowledge-
protection choices or strategies within industry j.  Figure 3.3a illustrates the 
constrained industry-level distribution of individual-firm knowledge-protection 
strategies, given a weak (W) and a strong (S) appropriability regime constraint.  The 
unconstrained industry-level distribution in Figure 3.3b illustrates how knowledge-
protection strategies within industry j vary due to firm-specific factors, resources and 
capabilities when there is no appropriability regime constraint in place. 
In a weak appropriability regime (W), the constrained proportion of firms within the 
industry adopt the knowledge-protection strategy given by w.  Firms choose the 
protection strategy given by w rather than any protection strategy below w because 
they seek to implement the protection strategy which is closest to their optimum 
level.  Up to point w, the industry distribution of knowledge-protection strategies is 
the same as in the unconstrained case (Figure 3.3b), but at w, there is a concentration 
of firms adopting the knowledge-protection strategy given by w.  This concentration 
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includes those firms limited by the weak appropriability regime.  The dotted and 
hatched areas in Figure 3.3b represents the proportion of firms within the industry 
that are constrained by the weak appropriability regime. 
Figure 3.3: The constrained and unconstrained distribution of firms’ value-
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In a strong appropriability regime, the constrained proportion of firms within the 
industry adopts the knowledge-protection strategy given by z.  Again, the 
constrained firms choose to implement the knowledge-protection strategy which is 
closest to their optimum level i.e. a protection strategy given by z.  In the strong 
appropriability regime case, the industry distribution of knowledge-protection 
strategies is the same as in the unconstrained case (Figure 3.3b) up to point z.  At this 
point, there is a concentration of firms adopting the knowledge-protection strategy 
given by z.  This concentration includes those firms limited by the strong 
appropriability regime.  The hatched area in Figure 3.3b represents the proportion of 
firms within the industry that are constrained by the strong appropriability regime. 
Within an industry, the proportion of firms limited in terms of their knowledge-
protection strategy when the appropriability regime is weak is greater than that when 
the appropriability regime is strong (the dotted and hatched area combined is greater 
than the hatched area alone in Figure 3.3b).  The industry appropriability regime 
places limits on a firm’s knowledge-protection choices; the stronger the 
appropriability regime, the less limited firms are in terms of their knowledge-
protection strategy. 
3.2.5.1 Hypotheses 
The conceptual framework discussed in Section 3.2.5 above describes how a firm’s 
knowledge-protection strategy – or choice of knowledge-protection mechanisms – 
depends upon the value to the firm and the cost to the firm of protecting its 
knowledge, both of which depend upon the appropriability regime of the industry to 
which the firm belongs. 
Firms’ protection choices depend upon the efficacy of the available protection 
mechanisms i.e. the perceived strength (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 
2007b).  The firm’s perceived strength of protection is related to the value the firm 
believes it will receive from using the protection mechanisms to protect its 
knowledge.  For example, firm managers often take the viewpoint that patents do not 
prevent imitation and it is therefore pointless pursuing them (Harabi, 1995; Cohen et 
al., 2000), and hence they do not use patents, whereas firms that perceive 
mechanisms to be effective, use them, for example Arundel (2001) finds that firms 
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use trade secrets because they perceive them to be an effective knowledge-protection 
mechanism. 
The conceptual framework here illustrates how a firm determines its value-
maximising protection decision; it compares its marginal value and marginal cost of 
protection.  The model shows that the industry appropriability regime can, for some 
firms within an industry, act as a constraint upon this value-maximising protection 
decision; the appropriability regime limits the range of potential strategic options 
available for protecting knowledge (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 
2007b).  The present study is concerned with the effects of this appropriability 
regime limit on firms’ protection choices and the distribution of firms’ protection 
choices within an industry setting.  In particular, the analysis examines the effects of 
an increase in the strength of an industry’s appropriability regime on the average 
protection strategy and the variability of protection strategies within an industry. 
An increase in the strength of the industry appropriability regime is represented by a 
rightwards shift of the vertical line at point W to point S in Figures 3.2 and 3.3.  The 
stronger appropriability regime leads to fewer constrained firms within the industry.   
More firms are able to maximise the value of their protection and use a higher 
number of protection mechanisms.  Figure 3.3 shows that a smaller proportion of 
firms within the industry are constrained in a strong appropriability regime than are 
in a weak appropriability regime.  The area of the distribution in Figure 3.3b between 
the constraint at W and the constraint at S represents the proportion of firms who are 
no longer constrained once the industry appropriability regime is strengthened. 
As the regime strengthens, there are more effective protection options available to 
the firms within the industry.  Firms previously limited by the appropriability regime 
can now, given their resources and capabilities, maximise the value of their 
knowledge protection.  They are able to adopt more protection mechanisms, given 
the cost of adopting.   The stronger appropriability regime creates more strategic 
options for the firm and increases a firm’s flexibility.  As there are more effective 
protection mechanisms available to them within the industry, the firm will, given its 
resources and capabilities, choose to adopt more mechanisms.  By adopting more 
protection mechanisms, a firm increases the strength of its knowledge-protection 
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strategy (Laursen and Salter, 2005), and the probability that its protection will be 
effective increases. 
As more firms within the industry are able to use a higher number of knowledge-
protection mechanisms, it is expected that, on average, firms’ protection strategies 
within the industry will be stronger when the strength of the industry appropriability 
regime increases.  This leads to the first hypothesis that: 
Hypothesis 1:  On average, firms’ knowledge-protection strategies are 
strengthened when the knowledge-protection dimension of the 
industry appropriability regime strengthens. 
At any given point in time, a finite level of resources and capabilities exists.  If firms 
target similar resources using similar capabilities, the industry approaches a situation 
of perfect competition and the opportunity to earn economic rents disappears.  A 
firm that conforms to the strategies of others has many similar competitors; this 
limits performance and increases failure rates (Henderson, 1981; Hannan et al., 
1990; Baum and Singh, 1994).  Competition within the industry is reduced and firm 
performance is improved through firms’ rational differentiation, ‘the firm must stake 
out a distinct position from its rivals.  Imitation almost ensures a lack of competitive 
advantage and hence mediocre performance,’ (Porter, 1991, p102).  Taking a 
different position to competitors enables a firm to earn higher economic rents; they 
face less competition (Porter, 1980, 1991; Hannan et al., 1990; Baum and Mezias, 
1992; Baum and Singh, 1994).  Firms therefore have an incentive to be different, 
because by being different, they are able to reduce the competition they face for 
resources (Deephouse, 1999). 
The heterogeneous nature of firms’ resources and capabilities gives rise to variability 
in firms’ knowledge-protection strategies.  These resources and capabilities are the 
source of firm profitability as they lead to a cost or differentiation advantage and in 
turn a competitive advantage.  In a weak appropriability regime, some firms are 
unable to maximise the value of their knowledge protection given their resources and 
capabilities.  These firms are limited by the industry appropriability regime and are 
forced to conform to the strategies of others.  They implement sub-optimal 
knowledge-protection strategies, face higher levels of competition and are less able 
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to earn returns.  In a strong appropriability regime, more protection mechanisms are 
available; fewer firms are constrained and more are able to maximise the value of 
their knowledge protection.  The previously constrained firms no longer have to 
conform to the strategies of others but instead are able to use their resources and 
capabilities to take a different strategic position to competitors.  Overall, firms within 
the industry have access to a greater range of strategic options.  More firms are able 
to implement optimal knowledge-protection strategies, competition is lower and 
there are more opportunities for firms to earn returns.  From this it can be 
hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 2:  When the knowledge-protection dimension of the industry 
appropriability regime strengthens, firms have access to a wider 
range of strategic options, and this leads to more variable 
knowledge-protection strategies within the industry. 
3.3 Data and methods 
The empirical analysis in this study is based upon four waves of the United Kingdom 
(UK) Community Innovation Survey (CIS) covering the period 2002 to 2010 (CIS 4 
to CIS 7) and data from the Business Structure Database (BSD) covering the period 
1997 to 2008. 
3.3.1 The UK Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 
Innovation surveys are conducted by many governments and agencies around the 
world: they are the main source of innovation data within the UK and Europe.  
Background and motivation for the UK’s innovation survey – the UK counterpart of 
the European Union Community Innovation Survey – can be found in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Oslo manual 
(OECD, 2005), along with a description of the type of questions and definitions 
used.  In the UK, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) – the UK official 
government statistical office – manages the administration of and data collection for 
the UK CIS. 
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The UK CIS provides detailed information on firms' innovation activity.  It provides 
an insight into the objectives of this innovation activity and firms’ external 
innovation connections.  Questions relating to firm size and structure, customer base, 
firm product and process innovation activity, the sources of innovation, perceived 
barriers to innovation, the levels of public support and basic economic information 
about the firm are included.  The surveys contain up to approximately 16,000 firms 
with 10 or more employees and are designed to be statistically representative of the 
12 regions of the UK, most industrial sectors and all sizes of firms.  The sampling 
frame is taken from the Inter-departmental Business Register (IDBR), a UK-
Government compiled register of all UK businesses based on tax and payroll 
records.  The survey is conducted every two years by means of a postal questionnaire 
and follow-up telephone interviews.  For the waves analysed here, the non-
compulsory interviews achieved a response rate ranging between 50 per cent in 2010 
(CIS 7) and 58 per cent in 2004 (CIS 4). 9  
3.3.2 The Business Structure Database (BSD) 
The BSD is derived primarily from the IDBR, a live register of data collected by Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs via Value Added Tax (VAT) and Pay As You Earn 
(PAYE) records.  In 2004 it was estimated that businesses listed on the IDBR 
accounted for almost 99 per cent of economic activity in the UK.  Only very small 
businesses, such as the self-employed, are not included.  The BSD represents the 
IDBR at one particular moment in time and provides a version of the IDBR for 
research use.  The reporting period is the financial year, and there are up to 
approximately 5.5 million firms included.  The dataset contains a small number of 
variables for almost all UK firms, including employment, turnover, foreign 
ownership, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, start-up dates and 
termination dates. 
3.3.3 Dependent variables 
Two dependent variables are defined using data related to the protection of 
innovation and intellectual property.  To investigate how the strength of firms’ 
knowledge-protection strategies change when the strength of the appropriability 
                                                          
9 See: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/community-innovation-survey   
196 
 
regime changes, the first dependent variable is defined as the average knowledge-
protection strategy within an industry.  To investigate how the range or variability of 
strategic options available to a firm changes when the strength of the appropriability 
regime changes, the second dependent variable is defined as the variability of 
knowledge-protection strategies within an industry.  The nature and detail of the 
innovation survey question addressing the protection of innovation and intellectual 
property differs across the different waves of CIS data.  Of the waves available, the 
2008 to 2010 dataset (CIS 7) provides the most detailed insight into firms’ new 
knowledge protection for the purpose of this study – both legal (formal) and non-
legal (informal) knowledge-protection mechanisms are explored, with emphasis 
placed on new protection which has taken place during the previous three years. 
The CIS 7 survey asked the firm whether, during the 2008 to 2010 period, it 
protected innovation and intellectual property.  The survey listed seven protection 
types: the application for a patent, the registration of an industrial design, the 
registration of a trademark, the use of copyright, the use of secrecy (including non-
disclosure agreements), the use of complexity of design and the use of lead-time on 
competitors.  Addressing each protection mechanism separately, firms were asked to 
indicate whether or not they engaged in the protection activity during the previous 
three-year period.  Firm responses are recorded in the CIS 7 dataset as a 0/1 binary 
variable, with a 1 denoting that the protection took place. 
The seven knowledge-protection mechanisms have a high degree of internal 
consistency (Cronbach Alpha Coefficient = 0.75), and in light of this, the individual 
firm responses indicating whether or not the protection type took place can be 
summed to create a single cumulative knowledge-protection variable for each firm 
(Laursen and Salter, 2005).  The cumulative knowledge-protection variable is a 
count variable having a minimum value of 0 (no new protection took place during 
the previous three-year period) and a maximum value of 7 (all seven protection 
mechanisms were used to protect knowledge during the previous three-year period).  
In line with Laursen and Salter (2005), this cumulative variable represents the 
strength of the firm’s knowledge-protection strategy.   
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This study is concerned with the knowledge-protection behaviour of firms within an 
industry setting.  To conduct the analysis, the 14,342 firms within CIS 7 are 
separated into industry groups.  Initially, firms are divided into 188 industry groups 
according to their three-digit UK Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code in 
2003.10  Those industry groups with only a small number of firms are combined with 
others (according to their two-digit SIC code in 2003) to give a final 103 industry 
groups for the analysis – the smallest group having 29 firms and the largest group 
having 1005 firms. 
Two dependent variables are constructed using the newly-defined firm-level 
cumulative knowledge-protection variable and the 103 industry groups. 
i. Dependent variable 1 
The average knowledge-protection strategy within an industry: To calculate the 
average knowledge-protection strategy within an industry, the mean of firms’ 
cumulative knowledge-protection responses within each of the 103 industries is 
found. 
ii. Dependent variable 2 
The variability of knowledge-protection strategies within an industry: To calculate 
the variability of knowledge-protection strategies within an industry, the variance of 
firms’ cumulative knowledge-protection responses within each of the 103 industries 
is found. 
3.3.4 Explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables in the model represent the industry appropriability regime.  
The most important dimensions of the industry appropriability regime are the nature 
of the industry technology (i.e. whether the industry is characterised by product or 
process technologies and whether technology is based upon tacit or codified 
knowledge), the legal methods of knowledge protection (Teece, 1986, 1998, 2000a; 
Levin et al., 1987; Teece and Pisano, 1998), other formal methods of knowledge 
                                                          
10 The use of SIC codes for segmenting firms by industry has served as a mainstay methodology: 
Bhojraj et al. (2003) survey seven journals from the 2000 and 2001 period and find 116 studies using 




protection (for example, contracts and labour legislation) and less formal knowledge-
protection methods (for example, the use of secrecy and lead time) used to protect 
firms’ innovations and any increased rents which flow from (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen 
and Puumalainen, 2007a). 
For each of the 103 industry groups, seven explanatory variables representing the 
industry appropriability regime are defined – four variables represent the nature of 
the technology within each industry group and three variables represent available 
and effective knowledge-protection mechanisms within each industry group. 
i. The nature of the industry technology 
a. The industry average propensity for a firm to be a product innovator 
The industry average propensity for a firm to be a product innovator is calculated 
using the CIS 4, CIS 5 and CIS 6 datasets.11  The binary 0/1 data indicating whether 
or not a firm is a product innovator is taken, and the average of the firm-level 
responses across the three CIS waves is calculated for each of the 103 industry 
groups.  The calculated values provide an indication of the breadth or extension of 
product innovation within each industry group. 
b. The industry average propensity for a firm to be a process innovator 
The industry average propensity for a firm to be a process innovator is calculated 
using the CIS 4, CIS 5 and CIS 6 datasets.  The binary 0/1 data indicating whether or 
not a firm is a process innovator is taken, and the average of the firm-level responses 
across the three CIS waves is calculated for each of the 103 industry groups.  The 
calculated values provide an indication of the breadth or extension of process 
innovation within each industry group. 
c. The industry average propensity for a firm to view technical, industry or 
service standards as being important to innovation activities 
The industry average propensity for a firm to view technical, industry or service 
standards as being important to innovation activities is calculated using the CIS 4, 
CIS 5 and CIS 6 datasets.  Knowledge is assumed to be codified if firms identify 
                                                          
11 CIS7 data is used to construct the two dependent variables, it is therefore excluded from the 
construction of any explanatory variables.   
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technical, industry or service standards as being of medium or high importance to 
their innovation activities.  If technical, industry or service standards are not used or 
are of low importance to firms, knowledge is assumed to be tacit.  A 0/1 binary 
variable is generated for all firms across the three waves of data.  This variable is set 
equal to 1 if the sources are of medium or high importance to firm innovation 
activities and set equal to 0 if they are not used or are of low importance.  The 
average of the firm-level responses across the three CIS waves is then calculated for 
each of the 103 industry groups.  This yields the industry average propensities for 
firms to view technical, industry or service standards as being important to 
innovation activities. 
d. The industry average propensity for a firm to view scientific journals and 
trade/technical publications as being important to innovation activities 
The industry average propensity for a firm to view scientific journals and 
trade/technical publications as being important to innovation activities is calculated 
using the CIS 4, CIS 5 and CIS 6 datasets.  Knowledge is assumed to be codified if 
firms identify scientific journals and trade/technical publications as being of medium 
or high importance to their innovation activities.  If scientific journals and 
trade/technical publications are not used or are of low importance to firms, 
knowledge is assumed to be tacit.  A 0/1 binary variable is generated for all firms 
across the three waves of data.  This variable is set equal to 1 if the sources are of 
medium or high importance to firm innovation activities and set equal to 0 if they are 
not used or are of low importance.  The average of the firm-level responses across 
the three CIS waves is then calculated for each of the 103 industry groups.  This 
yields the industry average propensities for firms to view scientific journals and 
trade/technical publications as being important to innovation activities. 
ii. The effective and available knowledge-protection mechanisms within the 
industry 
Three variables are constructed to represent effective and available knowledge-
protection mechanisms within the industry.  The variables encompass both the 
importance of protection mechanisms within the industry and the extent to which 
knowledge-protection mechanisms are adopted within the industry. 
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As the nature and detail of the CIS survey question addressing the protection of 
innovation and intellectual property differs across the different waves of CIS data, 
different waves of the data are used to construct each variable: CIS 4 and CIS 5 ask 
firms about the importance of various protection mechanisms to their innovations, 
whereas CIS 6 asks firms about any new protection which may have taken place 
during the survey period. 
a. The industry average propensity for a firm to view formal knowledge-
protection mechanisms as being important to innovations 
Using the data from CIS 4 and CIS 5, a formal-protection importance binary variable 
is created using responses to the formal-protection mechanism questions (i.e. the 
questions asking firms about the importance of the use of design registration, 
trademarks, patents, confidentiality agreements and copyright).  The formal-
protection importance variable is set equal to 1 if any of the formal mechanisms is of 
medium or high importance and 0 otherwise.  For each of the 103 industry groups, 
the average of the firm-level responses across the two CIS waves is then calculated.  
This yields the industry average propensities for firms to view formal knowledge-
protection mechanisms as being important to innovations.  
b. The industry average propensity for a firm to view informal knowledge-
protection mechanisms as being important to innovations 
Using data from CIS 4 and CIS 5, an informal-protection importance binary variable 
is created using responses to the informal protection mechanism questions (i.e. the 
questions asking firms about the importance of the use of secrecy, complexity of 
design and lead-time advantage on competitors).  The informal protection 
importance variable is set equal to 1 if any of the informal protection mechanisms is 
of medium or high importance and 0 otherwise.  For each of the 103 industry groups, 
the average of the firm-level responses across the two CIS waves is then calculated.  
This yields the industry average propensities for firms to view informal knowledge-





c. The industry average propensity for a firm to adopt new formal knowledge-
protection mechanisms 
A new formal-protection binary variable is created using data from CIS 6.  Firms are 
asked if they applied for a patent, registered a design, registered a trademark or 
produced materials eligible for copyright during the survey period.  The new 
formal-protection variable is set equal to 1 if any of the four formal protection 
mechanisms were adopted and 0 otherwise.  For each of the 103 industry groups, the 
average of the firm-level responses is then calculated.  This yields the industry 
average propensities for firms to adopt new formal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms. 
3.3.5 Control variables 
A series of industry-level control variables are included in the model.  These 
variables represent factors other than the appropriability regime which may impact 
upon the average knowledge-protection strategy and the variability of knowledge-
protection strategies within an industry.  They include collaboration, 
internationalisation, firm size and market structure. 
i. Collaboration: Industry engagement in cooperation on any innovation 
activity 
In recent decades there has been a tendency towards collaboration in firms’ R&D 
strategy (Olander et al., 2014).  An increase in the complexity of technological 
development, the pace of innovation cycles and higher risks and costs has led to 
more firms using external partners in their R&D (Bader, 2008).  During 
collaboration, a firm reveals knowledge to collaboration partners and, due to this 
increased openness, is at risk of knowledge theft (Gans and Stern, 2003; 
Chesborough, 2006).  It follows that firms need to protect knowledge when engaging 
in external collaboration (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002). 
The literature illustrates conflicting views regarding the relationship between a 
firm’s level of openness and its knowledge-protection strategy.  Firm-level openness 
is viewed by some as being negatively linked with a strong level of knowledge 
protection.   Chesbrough (2003) promotes firm openness and encourages firms to 
become less concerned about protecting ideas.  Firms who implement strong 
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protection eliminate any opportunities to exchange knowledge with other firms (von 
Hippel, 2005) – they become overly concerned with the legalities of protection and 
less concerned about new innovations themselves (Bessen and Maskin, 2009).  Firms 
overly concerned with knowledge protection are unable to share the ideas and 
benefits of their innovations with others (Laursen and Salter, 2005).  They become 
obsessed with secrecy and legal protection.  Rather than becoming open and 
collaborative, they become inward and afraid that outsiders may steal their 
“precious” technology (Laursen and Salter, 2005). 
In contrast to this view, Chesbrough (2006) describes how firm-level openness can 
be positively linked with a firm’s knowledge-protection strategy.  Firms who protect 
their knowledge may be more willing to engage with external firms as they are 
protected against others’ opportunistic behaviour (Teece, 2000b).  Cohen et al. 
(2000) view a firm’s knowledge-protection strategy as being important to ensure that 
knowledge is not stolen and to inform negotiations over collaboration with a range of 
external parties.   
Laursen and Salter (2014) provide evidence which supports both views.  They 
examine how a firm’s appropriability strategy is connected to the openness of the 
firm and find that firm attitudes to openness and knowledge protection are very 
closely connected – without providing any direct evidence of causality.  Their study 
suggests a concave relationship between the strength of a firm’s appropriability 
strategy and collaboration as very strong knowledge-protection strategies are found 
to reduce formal collaborations. 
The specific knowledge-protection mechanisms a firm uses may depend upon the 
specific knowledge in the R&D collaboration.  Knowledge protection allows firms to 
safely participate in knowledge sharing collaboration, and it may also protect the 
outputs of the knowledge exchange from imitation.  A broad range of protection 
mechanisms may therefore be preferred in order to protect knowledge during the 
collaboration and any outputs which exist as a result of the collaboration.  
Collaboration is therefore expected to be positively related to the number of 
protection mechanisms used by the firm (Olander et al., 2014), and therefore 
positively related to the industry’s average knowledge-protection strategy. 
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An industry engagement in cooperation variable is constructed to represent 
collaboration in the model.  CIS 4 and CIS 5 asked firms if they cooperated (on any 
innovation activity) with any other enterprises or institutes during the previous 
three-year period.  The resulting 0/1 binary response data is combined with a 0/1 
binary variable created from the response data obtained from the question addressing 
cooperation in the CIS 6 survey.  In the CIS 6 survey, firms were not asked a general 
yes/no cooperation question but were only asked about specific types of cooperation.  
The newly-created binary variable for CIS 6 was set equal to 1 if the firm cooperated 
in any of the stated ways in any part of the world and set equal to 0 if no cooperation 
took place.  Using the 0/1 binary cooperation data for CIS 4, CIS 5 and CIS 6, the 
average propensity for a firm to cooperate on any innovation activity is created for 
each of the 103 industries by averaging the firm-level responses across the three CIS 
waves.  Using these values, a 0/1 binary industry engagement in cooperation variable 
is created to indicate whether the industry displays a high or low average propensity 
for a firm to cooperate on any innovation activity.  The industry engagement in 
cooperation variable is set equal to 1 if the industry average propensity for a firm to 
cooperate is greater than or equal to 40 per cent and set equal to 0 if the industry 
average propensity for a firm to cooperate is less than 40 per cent. 
ii. Internationalisation: Extent of internationalisation within the industry 
While knowledge flow is required for both innovation and internationalisation 
(Martin and Salomon, 2003; Feinberg and Gupta, 2004), protection of knowledge 
and innovations is important (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2014).  Internationalisation 
entails risk (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2014).  It increases the risk of imitation by 
competing firms (Olander et al., 2010) because it involves the replication of routines 
and procedures in foreign locations (Martin and Salomon, 2003).  The increased risk 
of imitation means that firms operating in international markets often require 
protection mechanisms in order to manage in those markets (de Faria and Sofka, 
2010).  Firms operating in international markets without protection mechanisms in 
place to protect against imitation and theft of knowledge face competition that could 
otherwise be avoided (Zoltan et al., 1997). 
Some informal protection mechanisms become more effective when used by firms 
who internationalise (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2014).  For example, language 
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barriers encountered can be effective in strengthening lead-time and practical means 
of concealment.  Characteristics specific to foreign markets can themselves act as a 
barrier to the theft of knowledge and imitation – unfamiliarity can lead firms to 
misinterpret information creating a barrier to imitation (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
Institutional protection varies across countries (Acs et al., 1997), and this leads firms 
who internationalise to form different knowledge-protection strategies to those who 
do not operate in foreign markets.  Firms with access to a wide range of knowledge-
protection mechanisms are better prepared for internationalisation (Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen, 2014).  When firms enter foreign markets, the structure of the industry 
appropriability regime may differ to that in the domestic industry.  The availability 
and effectiveness of knowledge-protection mechanisms may be different in the 
foreign regime (Keupp et al., 2012).  For this reason, an exporting firm may benefit 
from gaining access to additional protection mechanisms.  A firm with access to a 
wide range of knowledge-protection mechanisms is likely to be more able to adjust 
to the foreign appropriability regime (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2014). 
For these reasons, it is expected that a firm’s engagement in exporting will be 
positively related to its cumulative knowledge protection, increasing the industry’s 
average knowledge-protection strategy and variability of knowledge-protection 
strategies. 
An industry engagement in exporting variable is constructed to represent 
internationalisation within the model.  CIS 4, CIS 5 and CIS 6 asked firms if they 
sold goods and/or services to other European Union (EU) and non-EU countries 
during the previous three years.  The response data is used to create a 0/1 binary 
variable set equal to 1 if the firm exported goods and/or services elsewhere and set 
equal to 0 otherwise.  For each of the 103 industry groups, the firm-level responses 
are averaged across the three waves of data creating the industry average 
propensities for a firm to be an exporter.  Using these values, a 0/1 binary industry 
engagement in exporting variable is created to indicate whether the industry displays 
a high or low average propensity for a firm to be an exporter.  The industry 
engagement in exporting variable is set equal to 1 if the industry average propensity 
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for a firm to be an exporter is greater than or equal to 50 per cent and set equal to 0 if 
the industry average propensity for a firm to be an exporter is less than 50 per cent. 
iii. Firm size: Average firm employment within the industry 
It is assumed that small firms lack resources (Olander, 2009).  Employment is 
included in the model to represent the level of firm resources that can be used for 
knowledge protection.  Previous studies find that the use of knowledge and 
innovation protection varies across large and small firms (Arundel and Kabla, 1998; 
Kitching and Blackburn, 1998; Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999; Davis, 2006).  
There is a relatively low usage of formal protection mechanisms in small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) compared with larger firms.  Larger firms invest in 
more of all forms of protection of innovation; 2.1 per cent of small firms protected 
an innovation with a patent during the 2008 to 2010 period, compared with 6.3 per 
cent of large firms (Hargreaves, 2011).  SMEs view the use of formal mechanisms as 
a complex process.  Owner-managers of small firms lack the knowledge and 
information required to pursue such protection.  They are reluctant to adopt formal 
mechanisms because they perceive protection-related costs (both money and time) to 
be high, for example dealing with patent offices and patent lawyers and gaining the 
knowledge/skills required to enforce protection.  Administering and enforcing 
protection is problematic for SMEs, especially when they are in dispute with larger 
firms.  In practice, SMEs are found to rely more on informal methods of protection 
(Leiponen and Byma, 2009). 
Firm employment is expected to be positively related to a firm’s cumulative 
knowledge protection, and therefore an increase in average firm employment within 
an industry is expected to have a positive impact upon the average knowledge-
protection strategy and the variability of knowledge-protection strategies within the 
industry. 
An industry average firm employment variable is constructed to indicate the average 
level of firm resources within an industry.  In CIS 4, CIS 5 and CIS 6, firms were 
asked how many employees they had in the year prior to the survey taking place.  
For each of the 103 industry groups, response data is averaged across the three 
waves of data creating an industry average firm employment variable. 
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iv. Market structure: Industry birth rate 
The birth rate within an industry reflects the proportion of young firms present.  The 
firm resources and capabilities required to protect firm knowledge and innovations 
may not be present during the early years of a firm’s life, whereas older firms may 
have accumulated resources and capabilities over time and be better equipped to use 
a wide range of knowledge-protection mechanisms.  Given this, it may be expected 
that the average knowledge-protection strategy and the variability of protection 
strategies within an industry falls as the birth rate increases.  In contrast, new firms 
within an industry also represent new competition for incumbents.  Firm knowledge 
and innovations may require protection from this new threat meaning that both the 
average protection strategy and the variability of protection strategies within an 
industry increase when the industry birth rate is higher.  Given the two contrasting 
views, the effect of a change in the industry birth rate on the distribution of 
knowledge-protection strategies within the industry is ambiguous.  
An industry birth rate variable is constructed using the pooled BSD dataset.  The 
number of firms born during the 2006 to 2008 period – consistent with the years 
covered in the CIS 6 survey – is counted for each of the 103 industry groups.  Using 
the same dataset, the total number of firms in each of the 103 industries in 2008 is 
counted using birth data for the 1997 to 2008 period (firms born prior to 1997 are 
given a 1997 birth date in the pooled BSD dataset).  A birth rate is then calculated 
for each of the 103 industry groups. 
v. Market structure: Industry five-firm concentration ratio 
Industry competitiveness impacts upon a firm’s knowledge and innovation 
protection decisions.  For example, if a monopolist controls the industry, it is 
inefficient for other firms to use costly protection methods (Granstrand, 1999).  The 
manner in which firms protect knowledge assets differs across industries due to the 
different competitive dynamics that exist.  It follows that as competition within an 
industry increases, the use of knowledge-protection mechanisms is expected to 
increase.  In the model, the industry five-firm concentration ratio (CR5) is included 
to capture the effects of industrial concentration and firms’ market power.  The 
industry CR5 is the combined market share of the five largest firms within the 
industry.  As the industry CR5 increases, competition within the industry falls and 
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knowledge protection is also expected to fall.  An increase in the industry CR5 is 
therefore expected to lead to a fall in the industry average knowledge-protection 
strategy and a fall in the variability of the industry’s knowledge-protection strategies. 
A five-firm concentration ratio variable is constructed for each of the 103 industry 
groups.  Using the pooled BSD dataset, 2008 turnover data – a year consistent with 
the final year of the CIS 6 survey – is sorted into the 103 industry groups, and the 
total turnover for each of the 103 industry groups is calculated.  Within each industry 
group, each firm’s turnover share is calculated.  The five largest turnover shares are 
then summed to give the five-firm concentration ratio for each of the 103 industry 
groups. 
3.3.6 Estimation method 
The estimation method adopted is dictated largely by the nature of the two dependent 
variables under investigation.  The first dependent variable – the mean of firms’ 
cumulative knowledge-protection choices within an industry (or the average 
knowledge-protection strategy within an industry) is bounded between the values of 
0 and 7.  The average knowledge-protection strategy within an industry takes on the 
value 0 with positive probability; for some industries, the optimal average protection 
strategy is equal to 0 i.e. the model includes a corner solution outcome (Wooldridge, 
2010).  In addition to this, the average protection strategy within an industry is 
censored from above.  The knowledge-protection questions in the UK CIS 2008 to 
2010 survey restrict the average knowledge-protection strategy within an industry to 
have a threshold value which is equal to 7.  A data problem arises because the 
average knowledge-protection strategy within an industry is censored above this 
value.  The Tobit regression model (Tobin, 1958) – a censored regression application 
– is an appropriate estimation method for response data of this kind.  The 
relationship between an independent variable and a censored-dependent variable is 
inherently nonlinear (Tobin, 1958; Greene, 1993) making the use of ordinary least 
squares (OLS) inappropriate.  OLS regression may yield biased parameter estimates 
and standard errors, predicted values that fall below zero and heteroskedastic error 
terms (Greene, 1993).  Log transformation of the OLS model – a method commonly 
employed to eliminate such statistical issues – is inappropriate here due to zero 
values in the dependent variable data.  The Tobit model uses the maximum-
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likelihood estimation procedure to model the nonlinear relationship between the 
independent variable and the censored-dependent variable.  It takes into account both 
the qualitative (probability of a zero response) and the continuous components 
(magnitude of a non-zero response) of the dependent variable avoiding the problems 
associated with OLS estimation (Tobin, 1958; Greene, 1993; Frone et al., 1994). 
The second dependent variable – the variance of firms’ cumulative knowledge-
protection choices within an industry (or the variability of knowledge-protection 
strategies within an industry) – has a minimum value of 0.  For some industries, the 
optimal variability of knowledge-protection strategy will be 0.  Thus, the response 
variable includes a corner solution outcome.  Again, the Tobit censored regression 
model (or the more appropriately named corner solution model) is an appropriate 
estimation method for response data of this kind. 
Unfortunately, many of the variables representing the industry appropriability regime 
are highly correlated with one another leading to multicollinearity problems.  
Therefore it is not possible to examine their impact upon intangibles strategy in the 
same estimated equation.  As a solution, each element of the industry appropriability 
regime is analysed separately.  This method has been used by other researchers when 
faced with a similar issue (see for example Hall and Sena (2017) who estimated 
separate productivity equations when faced with process and product innovation 
probabilities that were highly correlated with one another). 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Descriptive results 
Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients are given in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.  
Table 3.1 shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for 
each of the variables described in Section 3.3 above and used in the empirical 
analysis.  UK CIS data for the 2008 to 2010 period indicates that across the 103 
industries, on average, the average number of knowledge-protection mechanisms 
used within an industry (i.e. the average knowledge-protection strategy) is 0.41 
protection mechanisms; the minimum average knowledge protection strategy across 
the industries is 0 mechanisms and the maximum is 1.38 mechanisms.  On average, 
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the variance of knowledge-protection strategies within an industry is 0.99; the 
minimum and maximum values of the protection-strategy variance across the 103 
industries are 0 and 3.66 respectively. 
UK CIS data for the 2002 to 2008 period is used to formulate the variables that 
represent the industry appropriability regime in the analysis.  On average, across all 
industry groups, 31 per cent of firms within an industry are product innovators; the 
smallest proportion of product innovators within an industry is 11 per cent and the 
largest proportion is 64 per cent.  On average, 19 per cent of firms within an industry 
are process innovators; the smallest proportion of process innovators within an 
industry is 4 per cent and the largest proportion is 44 per cent.  On average, across all 
industry groups, 7 per cent of firms within an industry view technical, industry or 
service standards as being important to innovation activities; the smallest proportion 
within an industry is 2 per cent of firms and the largest proportion is 21 per cent of 
firms.  On average, 3 per cent of firms within an industry view scientific journals and 
trade/technical publications as being important to innovation activities; the smallest 
proportion within an industry is 0 per cent and the largest proportion is 17 per cent.   
Examining the three variables that represent the effective and available knowledge-
protection mechanisms within an industry shows that first, on average, 39 per cent of 
firms within an industry view formal knowledge-protection mechanisms as being 
important to innovations; the smallest proportion within an industry is 7 per cent and 
the largest proportion is 80 per cent, second, on average, 40 per cent of firms within 
an industry view informal or strategic knowledge-protection mechanisms as being 
important to innovations; the smallest proportion within an industry is 10 per cent 
and the largest proportion is 77 per cent, and third, on average, 15 per cent of firms 
within an industry adopt formal protection mechanisms; the smallest proportion 
within an industry is 1 per cent and the largest proportion is 48 per cent.     
As for the control variables, the mean of each binary (0/1) independent variable 
indicates the proportion of industries that have a positive response: UK CIS data 
from the 2002 to 2008 period indicates that 7 per cent of industries have 40 per cent 
or more firms co-operating on any innovation activity and 41 per cent of industries 
have 50 per cent or more firms engaging in exporting.  The same data indicates that 
210 
 
on average, the average firm employment within an industry is approximately 311 
employees; the minimum average employment in an industry is around 37 
employees and the maximum average employment within an industry is around 
2,630 employees.  Turnover data for 2008 in the BSD indicates that across the 103 
industries, on average, 28 per cent of an industry’s market share is attributable to the 
largest five firms (in terms of their individual market shares); the minimum CR5 is 2 
per cent and the maximum CR5 is 77 per cent.  The industry birth rate data indicates 
that on average, 0.17 per cent of firms in an industry are born during the 2006 to 
2008 period; the minimum birth rate is 0.06 per cent and the maximum birth rate is 
0.51 per cent. 
Table 3.2 shows the correlation coefficients for all variables included in the analysis.  
Many of the variables included to represent the industry appropriability regime are 
highly correlated, for example, the correlation between the industry propensity to 
view formal knowledge-protection mechanisms as being important and the industry 
propensity to view informal knowledge-protection mechanisms as being important is 
0.96.  The high correlation between many of these variables is not surprising given 
that they essentially measure similar attributes, for example the knowledge-
protection variables measure the protection of knowledge and innovation 
(Hurmelinna-Laukkanen et al. (2017).  Due to these high correlations, the two 
models are estimated seven times – each estimation including a different variable 
from the industry appropriability regime.  This is quite often the approach 
undertaken when estimating highly correlated variables (for example, Hall and Sena, 
2017). 
3.4.2 Econometric results 
The estimation results are given in Tables 3.3 to 3.8.  As the proportion of industries 
having zero scores for the mean of firms’ cumulative knowledge-protection choices 
within an industry and the variance of firms’ cumulative knowledge-protection 
choices within an industry is low, and there is no clear indication as to the proportion 
of zero responses required to justify the use of the Tobit regression model, both 
Tobit (Table 3.3 and Table 3.4) and OLS (Table 3.5 and Table 3.6) regression results 
are reported here for comparison purposes. 
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The Tobit regression analysis estimates the latent dependent variable rather than the 
observed outcome.  Consequently, the coefficients indicate the linear effect of a one 
unit change in the independent variable upon the uncensored latent variable, ceteris 
paribus.  The Tobit model coefficients are therefore not readily interpretable as size 
effects, and the discussion of results focuses upon the sign of the coefficient 
(whether positive or negative) and whether or not the coefficient is statistically 
significant. 
i. The mean or average number of knowledge-protection mechanisms used by 
firms within an industry 
Table 3.3 shows the results for the Tobit regression to investigate how the strength of 
the industry appropriability regime affects the mean number of knowledge-
protection mechanisms used by firms within an industry i.e. the average strength of 
knowledge-protection strategies (Laursen and Salter, 2005) within an industry.  In 
total, there are seven variables which represent the different elements of the industry 
appropriability regime.  Four variables represent the first dimension of the industry 
appropriability regime – the nature of technology within an industry (the industry 
average propensity to be a product/process innovator and the industry average 
propensity to view technical, industry or service standards/scientific journals and 
trade or technical publications as being important to innovation activities) and three 
variables represent the second dimension of the industry appropriability regime – the 
available and effective knowledge-protection mechanisms within an industry (the 
industry average propensity to view formal/informal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms as being important and the industry average propensity to adopt new 
formal knowledge-protection mechanisms). 
The industry average propensity to be a product innovator and the industry average 
propensity to be a process innovator have significant, positive effects (at the 1 per 
cent level) on the mean number of knowledge-protection mechanisms used within an 
industry.  As expected, when innovation becomes more popular within an industry – 
be it product or process innovation – the mean or average number of protection 
mechanisms used by firms within that industry increases, although the positive 
impact upon protection is slightly stronger when an industry’s  average propensity to 
be a product innovator increases.  This may be due to knowledge that is linked to 
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process innovations being more tacit in nature and more effectively retained within 
firms than knowledge linked to product innovations (product innovations may be 
subject to reverse engineering, for example). For this reason, the average number of 
knowledge-protection mechanisms required to retain knowledge increases by more 
when the average propensity to be a product innovator increases than when the 
average propensity to become a process innovator increases. 
The industry average propensity to view technical, industry or service standards, and 
scientific journals and trade or technical publications as being important to 
innovation activities has a significant, positive effect (at the 1 per cent and 10 per 
cent levels respectively) on the average number of protection mechanisms used by 
firms within an industry.  As these two variables increase, the knowledge that the 
industry technology is based upon becomes more codified and open to imitation.  
Thus, the average number of knowledge-protection mechanisms used by firms 
within an industry may increase in an attempt to protect innovations and combat any 
risk of imitation.  
The three variables which represent the knowledge-protection dimension of the 
industry appropriability regime i.e. the available and effective knowledge-protection 
methods within an industry, have a significant, positive effect (at the 1 per cent level) 
on the average number of knowledge-protection mechanisms used by firms within an 
industry.  The industry average propensity to adopt new formal knowledge-
protection mechanisms has the strongest effect with a parameter equal to 1.458 
compared with 1.262 and 1.195 for the industry average propensity to view informal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms as being important and the industry average 
propensity to view formal knowledge-protection mechanisms as being important, 
respectively.  When the industry appropriability regime strengthens, the number of 
available and effective knowledge-protection mechanisms increases.  This represents 
an increase in the three variables which represent available and effective knowledge-
protection mechanisms within an industry in the model.  Firms within the industry 
that were previously limited by knowledge-protection mechanisms defined by the 
appropriability regime are now able to maximise the value of their knowledge 
protection and protect their knowledge and innovations using a higher number of 
knowledge-protection mechanisms (see Figure 3.2).  The heterogeneous nature of 
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firm resources and capabilities allow some firms within the industry to utilise the 
extra available and effective knowledge-protection mechanisms following the 
appropriability regime shift.  Consequently, the mean number of knowledge-
protection mechanisms used by firms within an industry increases i.e. the average 
knowledge-protection strategy within the industry strengthens.  Therefore, the 
estimation results support Hypothesis 1which states that on average, firms’ 
knowledge-protection strategies are strengthened when the knowledge-protection 
dimension of the industry appropriability regime strengthens. 
ii. The variance or variability of cumulative knowledge-protection mechanisms 
used by firms within an industry 
Table 3.4 shows the results for the Tobit regression to investigate how the strength of 
the industry appropriability regime affects the variance of cumulative knowledge-
protection mechanisms used by firms within an industry.  The industry average 
propensity to be a product innovator and the industry average propensity to be a 
process innovator have significant, positive effects (at the 1 per cent level) on the 
variance of cumulative knowledge-protection mechanisms used by firms within an 
industry.  The industry average propensity to be a product innovator has a stronger, 
positive effect on the variance than the industry average propensity to be a process 
innovator.  As the propensity to innovate within an industry increases, the average 
amount of protection used by firms within the industry increases.  The heterogeneous 
nature of firms’ resources and capabilities leads to an increase in the variance of the 
cumulative knowledge-protection mechanisms used by firms within the industry.  
The industry average propensity to view technical, industry or service standards as 
being important to innovation activities has a significant, positive effect (at the 5 per 
cent level) on the variance of cumulative knowledge-protection mechanisms used by 
firms within an industry, whereas the industry average propensity to view scientific 
journals and trade or technical publications as being important to innovation 
activities has an insignificant effect.  As the codified nature of knowledge increases, 
the average amount of protection used by firms within the industry increases, and the 
heterogeneous nature of firms’ resources and capabilities leads to an increase in the 
variance of the cumulative knowledge-protection mechanisms used by firms. 
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The three variables which represent available and effective knowledge-protection 
mechanisms within an industry have a significant, positive effect (at the 1 per cent 
level) on the variance of cumulative knowledge-protection mechanisms used by 
firms within an industry.  The industry average propensity to adopt new formal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms has the strongest effect with a parameter equal to 
3.305 compared with 2.819 and 2.533 for the industry average propensity to view 
informal knowledge-protection mechanisms as being important and the industry 
average propensity to view formal knowledge-protection mechanisms as being 
important, respectively.  As the three knowledge-protection propensities increase, the 
effective and available protection options for firms within an industry increases.  
Firms that were previously limited by the appropriability regime are able to 
maximise the value of their knowledge protection given their resources and 
capabilities and the new, stronger appropriability regime.  The variance of firms’ 
cumulative knowledge-protection choices increases because firms choose to optimise 
the value of their knowledge protection.  As more strategic options exist, the 
previously constrained firms choose to no longer conform to the strategies of others; 
they have an incentive to differentiate their protection strategies.  By taking a 
different position to their rivals, these rational firms within the industry face less 
competition and increase their chances of success.  These results provide evidence in 
support of Hypothesis 2 which states that firms are faced with a wider range of 
strategic options when the knowledge-protection dimension of the industry 
appropriability strengthens, and in turn, this leads to more variable knowledge-
protection strategies within the industry. 
Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 show the estimation results when using OLS regression.  
The sign and significance level of the estimated parameters is the same as in the 
Tobit regression case.  Given the presence of high correlations between some control 
variables and appropriability regime variables (Table 3.2), variance inflation factor 
(VIF) tests are carried out following the OLS regressions to test for the presence of 
multicollinearity.   The VIF values in Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 are all below 2.5 




3.4.3 High-technology/knowledge-intensive industries and low-technology/less 
knowledge-intensive industries: a comparison 
The estimations discussed in Section 3.4.3 above assume that the model parameters 
are the same for all of the industries included in the analysis.  The question therefore 
remains as to whether the strength of the industry appropriability regime affects the 
mean number of knowledge-protection mechanisms used by firms within an industry 
and the variance of cumulative knowledge-protection mechanisms within an industry 
to the same extent across different industry groups. 
To investigate this, two different industry types are defined – high-
technology/knowledge-intensive industries and low-technology/less knowledge-
intensive industries.  First, following the OECD in 2011, manufacturing industries 
are categorised into four groups based upon their level of technology: high-
technology industries, medium-high-technology industries, medium-low-technology 
industries or low-technology industries.  In its classification, the OECD uses 
expenditure on R&D to determine the technological input of each manufacturing 
industry.  Both direct and indirect expenditure on R&D are considered, including the 
purchase of machinery, equipment and intermediary inputs (Hatzichronoglou, 1997).  
For the purpose of this study, each industry’s economic activity is classified 
according to the level of technology and knowledge given by its SIC code.   
Second, the service industries are sorted into six categories based upon the OECD’s 
proposal for knowledge-intensive services (Eurostat, 2007) – each is identified as 
belonging to one of the industry types: knowledge-intensive high-technology 
services, knowledge-intensive market services, knowledge-intensive financial 
services, other knowledge-intensive services, less knowledge-intensive market 
services or other less knowledge-intensive services.  The most knowledge-intensive 
services generally show higher investment in R&D, a greater use of information 
technology and a tendency to hire highly qualified personnel.  Each service 
industry’s economic activity is classified according to the level of technology and 
knowledge given by its SIC code. 
Third, in order to obtain two groups of industries with contrasting 
technology/knowledge levels, industries belonging to the high-technology and 
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medium high-technology manufacturing groups are merged with those belonging to 
the four knowledge-intensive service-sector groups – forming a group of high-
technology/knowledge-intensive industries, and industries belonging to the medium 
low-technology and low-technology manufacturing groups are merged with those 
belonging to the two less knowledge-intensive service groups – forming a group of 
low-technology/less knowledge-intensive industries. 
A new binary 0/1 variable signalling each industry’s technology/knowledge level is 
generated using this information: the variable is set equal to 1 if the industry belongs 
to the high-technology/knowledge-intensive group and set equal to 0 if the industry 
belongs to the low-technology/less knowledge-intensive group.     
The Tobit and OLS regressions are once again estimated, incorporating this added 
information.  The estimated model is given by equation (1): 
𝑀𝐾𝑃𝑖  𝑜𝑟 𝑉𝐾𝑃𝑖 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑖𝐴𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽3 (𝐴𝑅𝑖 − 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑖𝐴𝑅𝑖) + 𝜇𝑖       (1) 
where MKPi is the mean number of knowledge-protection mechanisms used by 
firms in industry i, VKPi is the variance of cumulative knowledge-protection 
mechanisms used by firms in industry i, Ci is a set of industry-level control 
variables, TECHi is the binary technology/knowledge indicator for industry i, ARi is 
the appropriability regime of industry i and µi is the error term.  The β2 parameter 
indicates how the strength of the appropriability regime in a high-
technology/knowledge-intensive industry affects the mean number of knowledge-
protection mechanisms used by firms and the variance of cumulative knowledge-
protection mechanisms used by firms in that industry, and the β3 parameter indicates 
how the strength of the appropriability regime in a low-technology/less knowledge-
intensive industry affects the mean number of knowledge-protection mechanisms 
used by firms and the variance of cumulative knowledge-protection mechanisms 
used by firms within that industry.  An F-test is performed to test the null hypothesis 
that β2 is equal to β3 i.e. that there is no significant difference between the effect the 
strength of the appropriability regime has on the dependent variable across the two 
industry types (the alternative hypothesis being that the two parameters are 
significantly different from one another, and that the effect on the dependent variable 
varies across the two industry types). 
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Tables 3.9 to 3.12 show the regression results which allow for the comparison of the 
two industry types. Again, Tobit regression (Tables 3.9 and 3.10) and OLS 
regression (Tables 3.11 and 3.12) results are presented here for comparison purposes. 
i. The mean or average number of knowledge-protection mechanisms used by 
firms within an industry  
Table 3.9 shows the results for the Tobit regression to investigate how the strength of 
the industry appropriability regime affects the mean number of knowledge-
protection mechanisms used by firms within a high-technology/knowledge-intensive 
industry and a low-technology/less knowledge-intensive industry.  The industry 
average propensity to be a product innovator has a significant, positive effect (at the 
1 per cent level) on the mean number of knowledge-protection mechanisms used by 
firms in both a high-technology/knowledge-intensive industry and a low-
technology/less knowledge-intensive industry.  The F statistic indicates that there is 
no significant difference at the 5 per cent level between the parameters of the two 
industry groups, but that there is a significant difference between the parameters of 
the two industry groups at the 10 per cent level. 
The industry average propensity to be a process innovator has a significant, positive 
effect on the mean number of knowledge-protection mechanisms used by firms in 
both a high-technology/knowledge-intensive industry and a low-technology/less 
knowledge-intensive industry, although the level of significance is higher for the 
high-technology/knowledge-intensive industry group (significant at the 1 per cent 
level compared with the 5 per cent level for the low-technology/less knowledge-
intensive industry group).  The F statistic indicates that the null hypothesis stating 
that the parameters are equal to one another should be rejected – there is a significant 
difference (at the 5 per cent level) between the parameters of the two industry 
groups. 
The industry average propensity to view technical, industry or service standards, and 
scientific journals and trade or technical publications as being important to 
innovation activities has a significant, positive effect (at the 1 per cent level) on the 
mean number of protection mechanisms used by firms within a high-
technology/knowledge-intensive industry – the effect in a low-technology/less 
218 
 
knowledge-intensive industry is insignificant.  The F statistic indicates that the null 
hypothesis stating that the parameters are equal to one another should be rejected – 
there is a significant difference (at the 5 per cent level) between the parameters of the 
two industry groups. 
The extent to which knowledge is codified within an industry is an important 
determinant of the mean number of knowledge-protection mechanisms used by firms 
within a high-technology/knowledge intensive industry but not in a low-
technology/less knowledge-intensive industry.  This result is unsurprising given that 
firms in high-technology/knowledge-intensive industries face a higher risk of 
imitation – they have more knowledge to lose.  Firms in these industries are 
therefore more inclined to increase the number of knowledge-protection mechanisms 
which they use to protect knowledge when knowledge within the industry becomes 
more codified.  In turn, the mean number of knowledge-protection mechanisms used 
by firms within the high-technology/knowledge intensive industry increases. 
The three variables which represent available and effective knowledge-protection 
mechanisms within an industry have a significant, positive effect (at the 1 per cent 
level) on the mean number of knowledge-protection mechanisms used by firms 
within a high-technology/knowledge-intensive industry and a low-technology/less 
knowledge-intensive industry.  The F statistic indicates that the null hypothesis 
stating that the parameters are equal to one another cannot be rejected for the 
industry average propensity to view informal knowledge-protection mechanisms as 
being important variable and the industry average propensity to view formal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms as being important variable – there is no 
significant difference (at the 5 per cent level) between the parameters for the two 
industry groups in both cases.  In contrast, the F statistic indicates that the null 
hypothesis stating that the parameters are equal to one another should be rejected for 
the industry average propensity to adopt new formal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms variable – the parameters for the two industry groups are significantly 
different to one another at the 5 per cent level.  The difference in these results may 
be explained by the fact that a change in the propensity to adopt new formal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms within an industry represents an actual change in 
the strength of the industry appropriability regime, whereas a change in the industry 
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average propensity to view informal knowledge-protection mechanisms as being 
important or the industry average propensity to view formal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms as being important represents a subjective change in the strength of the 
appropriability regime.  When the average propensity to adopt new formal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms within an industry increases, the appropriability 
regime strengthens, and the number of available and effective knowledge-protection 
mechanisms increases.  Some firms in high-technology/knowledge-intensive 
industries and low-technology/less knowledge-intensive industries that were 
previously limited by the industry appropriability regime are now able to optimise 
and maximise the value of their knowledge protection.  But it is likely that more 
firms in high-technology/knowledge intensive industries will adopt the newly 
available knowledge-protection mechanisms as firms in these industries undertake 
more knowledge-intensive innovations.  Thus, there is a significant difference (at the 
5 per cent level) between the parameters for the two industry types. 
ii. The variance or variability of cumulative knowledge-protection mechanisms 
used by firms within an industry 
Table 3.10 shows the results for the Tobit regression to investigate how the strength 
of the industry appropriability regime affects the variance of cumulative knowledge-
protection mechanisms used by firms within a high-technology/knowledge-intensive 
industry and a low-technology/less knowledge-intensive industry.  The industry 
average propensity to be a product innovator has a significant, positive effect (at the 
1 per cent level) on the variance of cumulative knowledge-protection mechanisms 
used by firms in both a high-technology/knowledge-intensive industry and a low-
technology/less knowledge-intensive industry.  The F statistic indicates that there is 
no significant difference at the 5 per cent level between the parameters of the two 
industry groups.  The null hypothesis that the parameters are the same cannot be 
rejected. 
The industry average propensity to be a process innovator has a significant, positive 
effect on the variance of cumulative knowledge-protection mechanisms used by 
firms in both a high-technology/knowledge-intensive industry and a low-
technology/less knowledge-intensive industry, although the level of significance is 
higher for the high-technology/knowledge intensive industry group (significant at the 
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1 per cent level compared with the 5 per cent level for the low-technology/less 
knowledge-intensive industry group).  The F statistic indicates that there is a 
significant difference (at the 5 per cent level) between the parameters of the two 
industry groups, and therefore the null hypothesis that the parameters are equal to 
one another is rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis that they are 
significantly different from one another. 
The industry average propensities to view technical, industry or service standards, 
and scientific journals and trade or technical publications as being important to 
innovation activities have insignificant effects on the variance of cumulative 
knowledge-protection mechanisms used by firms within both industry types. 
The extent to which knowledge is codified within an industry does not impact upon 
the variance of cumulative knowledge-protection mechanisms used by firms within 
an industry as much as it does on the mean number of knowledge-protection 
mechanisms used by firms within an industry.  It is only when the industry average 
propensity to be a process innovator increases that the parameters for the high-
technology/knowledge-intensive industry group and the low-technology/less 
knowledge-intensive industry group differ from one another.  As the mean number 
of knowledge-protection mechanisms used by firms in a high-
technology/knowledge-intensive industry increases by more than the mean number 
of knowledge-protection mechanisms used by firms in a low-technology/less 
knowledge-intensive industry when the industry average propensity to be a process 
innovator increases, it is not surprising that the variance of cumulative knowledge-
protection mechanisms used by firms within a high-technology/knowledge-intensive 
industry is also higher.  As more knowledge-protection options exist for a high-
technology/knowledge-intensive industry and firms have an incentive to differentiate 
their protection strategies in order to reduce the competition which they face and 
increase their chances of success, the variability or variance of knowledge-protection 
strategies within a high-technology/knowledge-intensive industry will be higher. 
The three variables which represent available and effective knowledge-protection 
mechanisms within an industry have a significant, positive effect (at the 1 per cent 
level) on the variance of cumulative knowledge-protection mechanisms in a high-
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technology/knowledge- intensive industry and a low-technology/less knowledge-
intensive industry.  The F statistic indicates that there is no significant difference 
between the two industry group’s estimated parameters on two of these protection 
variables – the industry average propensity to view informal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms as being important and the industry average propensity to view formal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms as being important.  In both cases, the null 
hypothesis that the parameters are equal to one another cannot be rejected.  As with 
the analysis of the mean number of knowledge-protection mechanisms used by firms 
within high-technology/knowledge-intensive and low-technology/less knowledge-
intensive industries,  an increase in the industry average propensity to adopt new 
formal knowledge-protection mechanisms is the only protection variable to have 
parameters which are significantly different from one another for the two industry 
groups, although the null hypothesis stating that the parameters are equal to one 
another is rejected here at the 10 per cent level rather than the 5 per cent level. 
As the knowledge-protection dimension of the appropriability regime strengthens 
within an industry, the number of effective and available knowledge-protection 
mechanisms increases.  In turn, the mean number of knowledge-protection 
mechanisms adopted by firms in a high-technology/knowledge-intensive industry 
increases by more than in a low-technology/less knowledge-intensive industry.  As a 
result of this, the number of additional strategic options available to firms in a high-
technology/knowledge intensive industry is greater than that in a low-
technology/less knowledge-intensive industry.  Previously constrained firms – in 
both industries – choose to no longer conform to the strategies of others; they have 
an incentive to differentiate their protection strategies as by taking a different 
position to their rivals, these rational firms within the industry face less competition 
and increase their chances of success.  As the number of strategic options is higher in 
a high-technology/knowledge intensive industry, the variability or variance of 
knowledge-protection strategies within a high-technology/knowledge-intensive will 
be greater than in a low-technology/less knowledge-intensive industry. 
Tables 3.11 and 3.12 show the estimation results for the two industry types when 
using OLS regression.  The sign and significance level of the estimated parameters is 
the same as in the Tobit regression case.  
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3.5 Discussion and conclusions 
When a firm successfully innovates, success – in terms of higher firm profits, 
increased market value, improved credit ratings or an increased chance of survival – 
is not assured (Geroski et al., 1993; Hall, 2000; Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2004; Cefis 
and Marsili, 2005); it is the innovating firm’s ability to appropriate innovation 
returns which determines the outcome (Teece, 1986; Levin et al., 1987).  In order to 
aid appropriation and guard against imitation, a firm can formulate an effective 
knowledge-protection strategy – incorporating formal, legally-enforceable protection 
mechanisms and informal knowledge-protection mechanisms based upon secrecy 
and non-disclosure – to prevent or delay the imitation of its knowledge and 
technology (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen et al., 2008).  In this study, it is assumed that a 
firm’s chosen knowledge-protection strategy is determined by two factors: the 
appropriability regime of the industry to which the firm belongs, defining the 
available and effective knowledge-protection mechanisms within the industry 
(Teece, 1986, 1998, 2000a; Levin et al., 1987; Teece and Pisano, 1998), and the 
individual resources and capabilities that the firm has available to aid in the 
protection of its knowledge. 
The present study acknowledges that firms in an industry with a strong 
appropriability regime have more knowledge-protection options available to them 
than firms in an industry with a weak appropriability regime.  It is therefore expected 
that firms faced with a strong appropriability environment are likely, given that they 
have the resources and capabilities available to do so, to make more complex 
knowledge-protection choices i.e. implement stronger knowledge-protection 
strategies – in terms of the amount of protection that they use – than firms faced with 
a weak appropriability environment.  It is also expected that the increased 
availability of effective knowledge-protection options in an industry with a strong 
appropriability regime will lead to more variability in knowledge-protection choices 
amongst firms than in an industry with a weak appropriability regime.  Given that 
they have the resources and capabilities available to do so, firms in an industry with 
a strong appropriability regime will seek to position themselves differently to other 




This industry-level study examines the knowledge-protection dimension of the 
industry appropriability regime and asks how relaxing the limit on the available and 
effective knowledge-protection mechanisms within an industry i.e. strengthening the 
knowledge-protection dimension of the industry appropriability regime, affects the 
complexity (or strength) and variability of firms’ knowledge-protection choices 
within the industry.  Using UKCIS data covering the period 2002 to 2010 (CIS4 to 
CIS7) and BSD data covering the period 1997 to 2008, Tobit models are estimated to 
investigate how firms’ knowledge-protection choices, or strategies, change when the 
industry appropriability regime they face strengthens, and how the variability of 
firms’ knowledge-protection choices or strategies change when the industry 
appropriability regime they face strengthens.  Initially, the analysis examines all 
industries and then moves on to examine and compare the results for high-
technology/knowledge-intensive industries and low-technology/less knowledge-
intensive industries. 
This study adds to the existing literature on the determinants of firms’ knowledge-
protection strategies by asking how increasing the strength of the knowledge-
protection dimension of an industry appropriability regime affects the complexity 
and variability of firms’ knowledge-protection choices or strategies within the 
industry.  Previous studies identify industry characteristics (Mansfield, 1986; Levin 
et al., 1987; Harabi, 1995; Cohen et al., 2000), firm resources (Kitching and 
Blackburn, 1998; Leiponen and Byma, 2009) and the novelty of the innovation 
(Thomas, 2003; Hanel, 2005; Hussinger, 2006) as being important determinants of a 
firm’s knowledge-protection strategy.  In their study, Hurmelinna-Laukkanen et al. 
(2017) identify three types of firm appropriability profile with industry factors and 
firm-resource factors jointly determining the profile group to which a firm belongs.  
Building upon this study and adding to the existing body of knowledge, this study 
examines the nature of firms’ knowledge-protection profiles within an industry 
setting (rather than across different industries).  It assumes that industry factors and 
resources are behind firms’ knowledge-protection profiles and investigates how 
firms’ knowledge-protection choices or strategies respond to an increase in strength 
of the knowledge-protection dimension of the industry appropriability regime. 
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This study deepens our understanding of how the knowledge-protection dimension 
of the industry appropriability regime influences the complexity and variability of 
firms’ knowledge-protection strategies within an industry.  The empirical analysis 
leads to a number of key findings. 
i. First, the results suggest that the average protection strategy within an 
industry strengthens – or the complexity of firms’ knowledge-protection 
strategies increases – when the knowledge-protection dimension of the 
industry appropriability regime strengthens.  When the knowledge-protection 
dimension of the industry appropriability regime strengthens, firms equipped 
with the necessary resources and capabilities to do so are able to increase the 
number of knowledge-protection mechanisms that they use in order to 
optimise their knowledge-protection strategies.  The results suggest that 
increasing the strategy space within an industry, or the number of effective 
and available protection mechanisms within an industry, allows more firms to 
optimise their knowledge-protection strategies, increasing firms’ chances of 
appropriating innovation returns.  As the chances of appropriating returns to 
innovation increase within an industry, the incentive for firms to innovate 
within the industry also increases because firms’ decisions to invest in 
innovation depend upon expected post-innovation returns (Du et al., 2007).  
A firm’s ability to appropriate or capture the benefits of an innovation is 
central to a firm being able to gain and sustain a competitive advantage 
(Laursen and Salter, 2005). 
By optimising their use of knowledge-protection mechanisms, firms within 
an industry are able to capture the private benefits or returns to innovation 
(Laursen and Salter, 2005; Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007), reduce 
competition and be incentivised to carry out further innovations (Granstrand, 
1999). 
ii. Second, the analysis suggests that the diversity or variability of firms’ 
knowledge-protection strategies within an industry increases when the 
knowledge-protection dimension of the industry appropriability regime 
strengthens.  As the knowledge-protection dimension of the industry 
appropriability regime strengthens, some firms within the industry are able to 
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increase the number of protection mechanisms that they use, given their 
resources and capabilities, and maximise the value of their knowledge 
protection.  As the industry strategy space increases and more effective 
knowledge-protection options exist for firms within an industry, some firms 
(with the necessary resources and capabilities to do so) are able to position 
themselves differently to other firms and are no longer forced to conform to 
the protection strategies of others.  The variability of firms’ protection 
strategies within the industry therefore increases, firms face less competition 
and in turn, their chances of success increase. 
iii. Third, results suggest that the increase in strength – or complexity – of the 
average protection strategy within an industry following an increase in the 
strength of the knowledge-protection dimension of the industry 
appropriability regime (in terms of formal mechanisms) is not the same 
across all industries.  Results show that it is likely that the strength of the 
average protection strategy within high-technology/knowledge intensive 
industries will increase by more than the strength of the average protection 
strategy within the low-technology/less knowledge-intensive industries.  This 
result is not surprising given that firms in high-technology/knowledge 
intensive industries are more likely to undertake knowledge-intensive 
innovations and, in turn, have more knowledge to protect. 
iv. Fourth, results suggest that the increase in the diversity or variability of 
protection strategies within an industry following an increase in the strength 
of the knowledge-protection dimension of the industry appropriability regime 
(in terms of formal mechanisms) is not the same across all industries.  
Results show that it is likely that the variability of protection strategies within 
high-technology/knowledge intensive industries will increase by more than 
the variability of protection strategies within the low-technology/less 
knowledge-intensive industries, although the difference between the two 
groups of industries is less significant than in the average protection strategy 
case. As the knowledge-protection dimension of the industry appropriability 
regime strengthens, the average protection strategy within high-
technology/knowledge-intensive industries increases by more than the 
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average protection strategy in low-technology/less knowledge-intensive 
industries.  Firms in high-technology/knowledge-intensive industries have 
more strategic options available to them to protect knowledge and therefore 
more opportunities to act differently to other firms within the industry, 
reducing competition and improving their chances of success.  
Policy surrounding firms’ use of knowledge-protection mechanisms is very much 
focused on formal knowledge protection.  However, the results of this study suggest 
that, within an industry, the average knowledge-protection strategy is strengthened 
and the diversity of knowledge-protection strategies is increased when the 
importance of informal knowledge-protection mechanisms increases as well as when 
the importance of formal knowledge-protection mechanisms increases – the 
availability of both formal and informal knowledge-protection mechanisms matter 
for a firm’s strategic choice.  It is important, therefore, that in addition to the current 
policy which surrounds formal knowledge protection, new policy initiatives are 
directed towards the promotion and use of informal protection mechanisms across all 
firms. This will enable firms to seize valuable, strategic opportunities by engaging in 
informal protection practices.  The likelihood of a firm finding a strategic 
opportunity is increased if it is able to use its resources and capabilities in a unique 
way – differentiating itself from other firms.  Therefore, government policy aimed at 
promoting the use of informal protection will enable those firms that face barriers to 
the use of formal mechanisms to position themselves differently to other firms when 
new opportunities arise.  In doing so, a firm is more likely to receive the benefits 
from its positioning (Denrell et al., 2003).  Government policy supporting informal 
protection will increase firms’ chances of receiving the returns to its innovation, 
increase the probability of further innovative investment and, in turn, promote long-
run growth.  Government policy supporting informal knowledge protection will 
encourage firms that do have the resources and capabilities to use formal knowledge 
protection to also invest in informal protection.  This may allow both the innovations 
and the knowledge-protection to be used more widely (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 
2014).  A wide set of knowledge-protection mechanisms will give firms the 
readiness to change direction and, at the same time, it will increase their chances of 
performance success in new ventures – given that performance outcomes depend 
upon a firm’s ability to protect assets. 
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Examples of ways in which government policy initiatives can support firms to 
increase their informal protection include: designating an individual within the firm 
to identify intellectual property and implement and enforce secrecy compliance.  The 
individual should keep records, distribute and collect operations manuals, conduct 
exit interviews and respond to questions relating to the protection of the firm’s IP; 
making IP protection part of the employees’ orientation and training program, and 
informing those employees who have access to firm-specific knowledge and 
confidential information of their continuing duty to prevent disclosure; prohibiting 
individuals from making copies of confidential information unless it is necessary for 
them to perform their duties; and prohibiting employees from downloading 
proprietary software onto portable computers without prior authorisation and 
maintain detailed records of employees permitted to download proprietary software.  
The Intellectual Property Office (IPO) (the official UK government body responsible 
for intellectual property rights) should, in the same way as they do for formal 
protection, provide events, tool-kits, case studies and guidance to help firms use 
these and other informal strategies as a way of protecting their knowledge in an 
informal way. 
In addition, the results suggest that government policies supporting formal 
knowledge-protection will have stronger positive effects upon the average 
knowledge-protection strategy and the diversity of knowledge-protection strategies 
in high-technology/knowledge intensive industries than in low-technology/less 
knowledge-intensive industries.  Government policy should provide extra formal-
protection support for firms in high-technology/knowledge-intensive industries. The 
IPO should target high-technology/knowledge-intensive firms – particularly those 
that may find it difficult to engage in formal knowledge protection (small firms, for 
example) and help them to identify their intellectual property (through tool-kits, for 
example) and suggest appropriate formal protection mechanisms.  Resource-
constrained high-technology/knowledge-intensive firms should also be directed 





3.5.1 Limitations and future work 
There are several limitations to this study.  First, the high degree of correlation 
between the variables designed to represent the industry appropriability regime 
means that each element of the regime is analysed in a separate regression model – it 
is not possible to examine the impact of the industry appropriability regime on a 
firm’s intangibles strategy in a single estimated equation.  Future work will aim to 
address this issue and seek ways to create a single measure representing the industry 
appropriability regime.  Second, the analysis here examines how changing the 
strength of the knowledge-protection dimension of the industry appropriability 
regime affects the average knowledge-protection strategy within the industry and the 
diversity or variability of knowledge-protection strategies within the industry.  
Rather than examining individual protection mechanisms, this study is concerned 
with firms’ cumulative protection choices, and therefore provides no understanding 
as to how the strength of the industry appropriability affects firms’ use of individual 
mechanisms nor any indication as to which mechanisms formulate firms’ protection 
strategies.  Future work may examine the responses of particular mechanisms to a 
change in strength of the industry appropriability regime so that complementarities 
and connections between particular protection mechanisms can be identified.  Third, 
the study examines how the results differ across high-technology/knowledge-
intensive industries and low-technology/less knowledge-intensive industries.  
Ideally, a comparison across individual industries is preferred, but the analysis here 
is limited by the number of observations in the dataset.  As the nature of the 
knowledge-protection questions changes across different waves of the UK CIS 
surveys, further waves of the data could not be used to formulate the dependent 
variables.  Future work aims to link other formal knowledge-protection data to the 
UKCIS and BSD datasets so that the response of firms’ formal knowledge-protection 
strategies to a change in strength of the industry appropriability regime within 
particular industries can be examined.  Fourth, the analysis considers UK data only.  
Knowledge-protection availability and effectiveness varies across countries, and 
therefore the findings here may not be observed in other countries.  Future work 
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Industry birth rate * 
102 0.17 0.08 0.06 0.51 
Notes: * The proportion of new firms entering the industry group during the three-year CIS period 
** The share of industry-group turnover accounted for by the five largest firms within the industry 
group – in terms of turnover (individual year values are averaged across the CIS wave) 
Source: UK CIS 2002 to 2010 and BSD 1997 to 2008 
 
 
Table 3.2: Correlation matrix (N=98) 
 
Variable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
(1) Average knowledge-protection strategy 
within an industry 
1.00              
(2) Variability of knowledge-protection 
strategies within an industry   
0.94 1.00             
(3) Industry average propensity to be a 
product innovator 
0.83 0.76 1.00            
(4) Industry average propensity to be a 
process innovator 
0.68 0.62 0.86 1.00           
(5) Industry average propensity to view 
standards as being important to innovation 
0.56 0.48 0.64 0.63 1.00          
(6) Industry average propensity to view 
publications as being important to 
innovation 
0.46 0.37 0.54 0.58 0.56 1.00         
(7) Industry average propensity to view 
formal knowledge-protection mechanisms 
as being important to innovation 
0.81 0.73 0.91 0.81 0.63 0.54 1.00        
(8) Industry average propensity to view 
informal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms as being important to 
innovation 
0.83 0.77 0.92 0.83 0.62 0.43 0.96 1.00       
(9) Industry average propensity to adopt 
new formal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms 
0.74 0.68 0.73 0.62 0.44 0.67 0.78 0.70 1.00      
(10) Industry engagement in cooperation 
on any innovation activity 
0.47 0.42 0.39 0.43 0.41 0.64 0.34 0.32 0.47 1.00     
(11) Extent of internationalisation within 
the industry 
0.71 0.69 0.68 0.53 0.39 0.26 0.69 0.75 0.56 0.26 1.00    
(12) Average firm employment within the 
industry 
-0.17 -0.17 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.04 -0.12 -0.11 0.01 -0.21 1.00   
(13) Ind. five-firm concentration ratio ** 0.22 0.18 0.27 0.33 0.23 0.20 0.30 0.25 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.35 1.00  
(14) Industry birth rate * -0.27 -0.28 -0.29 -0.27 -0.01 0.03 -0.19 -0.29 -0.16 -0.02 -0.31 0.07 -0.08 1.00 
Notes: * The proportion of new firms entering the industry group during the three-year CIS period 
** The share of industry-group turnover accounted for by the five largest firms within the industry group – in terms of turnover (individual year 
values are averaged across the CIS wave) 







Table 3.3: The mean or average number of knowledge-protection mechanisms 
used by firms within an industry – Tobit model 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Ind. cooperation on any 
innovation activity 0.286*** 0.332*** 0.395*** 0.350** 0.361*** 0.380*** 0.250** 
  (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) 
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation  0.132*** 0.279*** 0.319*** 0.361*** 0.112** 0.08 0.237*** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Av. firm employment 
within industry -0.000** -0.000* 0.00 0.00 -0.000** 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry birth rate -0.05 -0.12 -0.46 -0.40 -0.399* -0.14 -0.32 
  (0.24) (0.28) (0.30) (0.30) (0.24) (0.24) (0.26) 
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio 0.09 0.14 0.22 0.256* 0.04 0.06 0.229** 
  (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Industry average 
propensity to be a 
product innovator 1.597***       
  (0.19)       
Industry average 
propensity to be a 
process innovator  1.356***      
   (0.29)      
Industry average 
propensity to view 
standards as being 
important to innovation   2.209***     
    (0.68)     
Ind. av. propensity to 
view publications as 
being important to 
innovation    2.111*    
     (1.10)    
Ind. av. propensity to 
view formal protection as 
important     1.195***   
      (0.15)   
Ind. av. propensity to 
view informal protection 
as important      1.262***  
       (0.15)  
Ind. av. propensity to 
adopt new formal 
protection       1.458*** 
        (0.23) 
Constant -0.125* 0.05 0.168** 0.229*** -0.02 -0.10 0.120* 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
N 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 
Chi-squared 137.98 104.44 94.91 88.64 135.32 138.07 118.66 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared (Pseudo) 2.02 1.53 1.39 1.30 1.98 2.02 1.74 
bic -32.90 0.64 10.17 16.44 -30.24 -32.99 -13.58 
Notes: See Table 3.2 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10 per 
cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 




Table 3.4: The variance or variability of cumulative knowledge-protection 
mechanisms used by firms within an industry – Tobit model 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Ind. cooperation on any 
innovation activity 0.683** 0.772** 0.952*** 1.038** 0.857*** 0.883*** 0.583* 
  (0.30) (0.33) (0.34) (0.41) (0.29) (0.29) (0.32) 
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation  0.448*** 0.763*** 0.870*** 0.961*** 0.420** 0.316* 0.667*** 
  (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) 
Av. firm employment 
within industry -0.000* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry birth rate -0.52 -0.67 -1.38 -1.21 -1.284* -0.71 -1.11 
  (0.75) (0.82) (0.85) (0.86) (0.76) (0.74) (0.78) 
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio 0.18 0.26 0.47 0.60 0.09 0.10 0.47 
  (0.33) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.34) (0.33) (0.34) 
Industry average 
propensity to be a 
product innovator 3.487***       
  (0.61)       
Industry average 
propensity to be a 
process innovator  3.047***      
   (0.85)      
Industry average 
propensity to view 
standards as being 
important to innovation   4.289**     
    (1.96)     
Ind. av. propensity to 
view publications as 
being important to 
innovation    1.92    
     (3.11)    
Ind. av. propensity to 
view formal protection as 
important     2.533***   
      (0.47)   
Ind. av. propensity to 
view informal protection 
as important      2.819***  
       (0.48)  
Ind. av. propensity to 
adopt new formal 
protection       3.305*** 
        (0.69) 
Constant -0.16 0.21 0.499** 0.653*** 0.09 -0.13 0.360* 
  (0.23) (0.24) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.23) (0.20) 
N 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 
Chi-squared 103.11 86.43 78.98 74.70 100.01 104.71 95.10 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared (Pseudo) 0.40 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.39 0.41 0.37 
bic 192.48 209.16 216.61 220.89 195.58 190.88 200.50 
Notes: See Table 3.2 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10 per 
cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 




Table 3.5: The mean or average number of knowledge-protection mechanisms 
used by firms within an industry – OLS model 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Ind. cooperation on any 
innovation activity 0.285*** 0.333*** 0.393*** 0.349** 0.360*** 0.380*** 0.251** 
  (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) 
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation  0.137*** 0.283*** 0.322*** 0.363*** 0.118** 0.09 0.242*** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Av. firm employment 
within industry -0.000** -0.000* 0.00 0.00 -0.000** 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry birth rate -0.04 -0.12 -0.45 -0.40 -0.39 -0.13 -0.31 
  (0.24) (0.29) (0.30) (0.31) (0.25) (0.24) (0.27) 
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio 0.10 0.14 0.22 0.257* 0.05 0.07 0.231* 
  (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
Industry average 
propensity to be a 
product innovator 1.583***       
  (0.20)       
Industry average 
propensity to be a 
process innovator  1.336***      
   (0.30)      
Industry average 
propensity to view 
standards as being 
important to innovation   2.205***     
    (0.70)     
Ind. av. propensity to 
view publications as 
being important to 
innovation    2.101*    
     (1.13)    
Ind. av. propensity to 
view formal protection as 
important     1.180***   
      (0.15)   
Ind. av. propensity to 
view informal protection 
as important      1.244***  
       (0.16)  
Ind. av. propensity to 
adopt new formal 
protection       1.439*** 
        (0.24) 
Constant -0.12 0.05 0.166** 0.227*** -0.02 -0.10 0.120* 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
N 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
bic -42.83 -9.06 0.10 6.50 -39.87 -42.46 -23.26 
 
Notes: See Table 3.2 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10 per 
cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 




Table 3.6: The variance or variability of cumulative knowledge-protection 
mechanisms used by firms within an industry – OLS model 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Ind. cooperation on any 
innovation activity 0.682** 0.773** 0.945*** 1.033** 0.855*** 0.880*** 0.586* 
  (0.30) (0.34) (0.35) (0.42) (0.30) (0.29) (0.33) 
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation  0.464*** 0.777*** 0.878*** 0.970*** 0.441*** 0.340** 0.682*** 
  (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) 
Av. firm employment 
within industry -0.000* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Industry birth rate -0.51 -0.66 -1.36 -1.19 -1.26 -0.69 -1.09 
  (0.77) (0.84) (0.87) (0.89) (0.78) (0.76) (0.80) 
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio 0.19 0.27 0.47 0.61 0.10 0.12 0.48 
  (0.34) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35) 
Industry average 
propensity to be a 
product innovator 3.438***       
  (0.62)       
Industry average 
propensity to be a 
process innovator  2.981***      
   (0.87)      
Industry average 
propensity to view 
standards as being 
important to innovation   4.276**     
    (2.02)     
Ind. av. propensity to 
view publications as 
being important to 
innovation    1.89    
     (3.20)    
Ind. av. propensity to 
view formal protection as 
important     2.483***   
      (0.48)   
Ind. av. propensity to 
view informal protection 
as important      2.760***  
       (0.49)  
Ind. av. propensity to 
adopt new formal 
protection       3.243*** 
        (0.71) 
Constant -0.16 0.21 0.492** 0.646*** 0.09 -0.12 0.358* 
  (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.21) 
N 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
bic 185.10 201.79 208.91 213.25 188.40 183.84 193.20 
 
Notes: See Table 3.2 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10 per 
cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 




Table 3.7: Variance inflation factor tests - mean or average knowledge-
protection regressions 
Variable        VIF 1/VIF     Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Industry average propensity 
to be a product innovator 2.17 0.460414   
Ind. av. propensity to view 
formal protection as 
important 2.16 0.463455 
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation 1.93 0.519115   
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation 2.07 0.482158 
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio 1.26 0.790934   
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio 1.31 0.764883 
Av. firm employment within 
industry 1.21 0.825603   
Av. firm employment within 
industry 1.21 0.825431 
Ind. cooperation on any 
innovation activity 1.2 0.834716   
Ind. cooperation on any 
innovation activity 1.14 0.875184 
Industry birth rate 1.14 0.878466   Industry birth rate 1.12 0.896315 
MEAN VIF 1.49     MEAN VIF 1.5   
              
Industry average propensity 
to be a process innovator 1.76 0.568692   
Ind. av. propensity to view 
informal protection as 
important 2.42 0.412418 
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation 1.48 0.677417   
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation 2.26 0.443057 
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio 1.3 0.768626   
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio 1.29 0.777716 
Av. firm employment within 
industry 1.25 0.799946   
Av. firm employment within 
industry 1.22 0.819097 
Ind. cooperation on any 
innovation activity 1.21 0.825015   
Ind. cooperation on any 
innovation activity 1.13 0.885632 
Industry birth rate 1.15 0.873317   Industry birth rate 1.13 0.888226 
MEAN VIF 1.36     MEAN VIF 1.57   
              
Industry average propensity 
to view standards as being 
important to innovation 1.42 0.70204   
Ind. av. propensity to adopt 
new formal protection 1.7 0.586778 
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation 1.38 0.723219   
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation 1.55 0.646287 
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio 1.25 0.799638   
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio 1.2 0.830404 
Av. firm employment within 
industry 1.22 0.81862   
Av. firm employment within 
industry 1.22 0.819183 
Ind. cooperation on any 
innovation activity 1.22 0.818897   
Ind. cooperation on any 
innovation activity 1.29 0.772226 
Industry birth rate 1.13 0.883027   Industry birth rate 1.11 0.897195 
MEAN VIF 1.27     MEAN VIF 1.35   
              
Ind. av. propensity to view 
publications as being 
important to innovation 1.81 0.552704         
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation 1.26 0.795647         
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio 1.24 0.806885         
Av. firm employment within 
industry 1.24 0.809357         
Ind. cooperation on any 
innovation activity 1.73 0.577708      
Industry birth rate 1.13 0.885032         
MEAN VIF 1.4           
 
Notes: See Table 3.2 




Table 3.8: Variance inflation factor tests – variance or variability of knowledge-
protection regressions 
Variable        VIF 1/VIF     Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Industry average propensity 
to be a product innovator 2.17 0.460414   
Ind. av. propensity to view 
formal protection as 
important 2.16 0.463455 
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation 1.93 0.519115   
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation 2.07 0.482158 
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio 1.26 0.790934   
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio 1.31 0.764883 
Av. firm employment within 
industry 1.21 0.825603   
Av. firm employment within 
industry 1.21 0.825431 
Ind. cooperation on any 
innovation activity 1.2 0.834716   
Ind. cooperation on any 
innovation activity 1.14 0.875184 
Industry birth rate 1.14 0.878466   Industry birth rate 1.12 0.896315 
MEAN VIF 1.49    MEAN VIF 1.5  
          
Industry average propensity 
to be a process innovator 1.76 0.568692   
Ind. av. propensity to view 
informal protection as 
important 2.42 0.412418 
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation 1.48 0.677417   
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation 2.26 0.443057 
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio 1.3 0.768626   
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio 1.29 0.777716 
Av. firm employment within 
industry 1.21 0.825015   
Av. firm employment within 
industry 1.22 0.819097 
Ind. cooperation on any 
innovation activity 1.25 0.799946   
Ind. cooperation on any 
innovation activity 1.13 0.885632 
Industry birth rate 1.15 0.873317   Industry birth rate 1.13 0.888226 
MEAN VIF 1.36    MEAN VIF 1.57  
          
Industry average propensity 
to view standards as being 
important to innovation 1.42 0.70204   
Ind. av. propensity to adopt 
new formal protection 1.7 0.586778 
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation 1.38 0.723219   
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation 1.55 0.646287 
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio 1.25 0.799638   
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio 1.2 0.830404 
Av. firm employment within 
industry 1.22 0.81862   
Av. firm employment within 
industry 1.22 0.819183 
Ind. cooperation on any 
innovation activity 1.22 0.818897   
Ind. cooperation on any 
innovation activity 1.29 0.772226 
Industry birth rate 1.13 0.883027   Industry birth rate 1.11 0.897195 
MEAN VIF 1.27    MEAN VIF 1.35  
            
Ind. av. propensity to view 
publications as being 
important to innovation 1.81 0.552704         
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation 1.26 0.795647         
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio 1.24 0.806885         
Av. firm employment within 
industry 1.24 0.809357         
Ind. cooperation on any 
innovation activity 1.73 0.577708      
Industry birth rate 1.13 0.885032         
MEAN VIF 1.4          
 
Notes: See Table 3.2 




Table 3.9: The mean or average number of knowledge-protection mechanisms   
in high-technology/knowledge-intensive industries and low-
technology/less knowledge-intensive industries – Tobit model 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Ind. cooperation on 
any innovation 
activity   0.258*** 0.245** 0.366*** 0.243* 0.330*** 0.349*** 0.13 
    (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) 
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation   0.150*** 0.280*** 0.330*** 0.352*** 0.131** 0.100* 0.246*** 
    (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Av. firm 
employment within 
industry   -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* 0.00 -0.000** -0.000* 0.00 
    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Industry birth rate   -0.14 -0.30 -0.522* -0.559* -0.449* -0.21 -0.438* 
    (0.24) (0.27) (0.29) (0.30) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) 
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio   0.08 0.10 0.215* 0.220* 0.04 0.05 0.17 
    (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Industry average 
propensity to be a 
product innovator GP1 1.544***       
    (0.19)       
  GP2 1.334***       
    (0.24)       
F statistic   3.23       
prob>F   0.08       
Industry average 
propensity to be a 
process innovator GP1  1.492***      
     (0.28)      
  GP2  0.835**      
     (0.32)      
F statistic    10.84      
prob>F    0.00      
Industry average 
propensity to view 
standards as being 
important to 
innovation GP1   1.809***     
      (0.68)     
  GP2   0.07     
      (1.08)     
F statistic     6.26     






Table 3.9 (continued): The mean or average number of knowledge-protection 
mechanisms   in high-technology/knowledge-intensive industries and 
low-technology/less knowledge-intensive industries – Tobit model 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Ind. av. propensity 
to view publications 
as being important 
to innovation GP1    2.874***    
       (1.09)    
  GP2    -0.89    
       (1.51)    
F statistic      7.76    
prob>F      0.01    
Ind. av. propensity 
to view formal 
protection as 
important GP1     1.165***   
        (0.15)   
  GP2     1.015***   
        (0.18)   
F statistic       2.59   
prob>F       0.11   
Ind. av. propensity 
to view informal 
protection as 
important GP1      1.225***  
         (0.15)  
  GP2      1.073***  
         (0.19)  
F statistic        2.86  
prob>F        0.09  
Ind. av. propensity 
to adopt new formal 
protection GP1       1.710*** 
          (0.23) 
  GP2       0.946*** 
          (0.26) 
F statistic         11.74 
prob>F         0.00 
Constant   -0.06 0.13 0.261*** 0.298*** 0.03 -0.05 0.170** 
    (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
           
N   99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 
Chi-squared  141.15 114.71 100.97 96.10 137.87 140.88 129.74 
p   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 
(pseudo)  2.07 1.68 1.48 1.41 2.02 2.06 1.90 
bic   -31.47 -5.03 8.70 13.57 -28.20 -31.21 -20.06 
 
  
Notes: See Table 3.2 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent 
level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 
GP1=High-technology/knowledge-intensive firms 
GP2=Low-technology/less knowledge-intensive firms 




Table 3.10: The variance or variability of knowledge-protection mechanisms   
in high-technology/knowledge-intensive industries and low-





  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Ind. cooperation on 
any innovation 
activity   0.643** 0.595* 0.876*** 0.825* 0.803*** 0.833*** 0.40 
    (0.30) (0.33) (0.33) (0.42) (0.30) (0.29) (0.33) 
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation   0.473*** 0.765*** 0.898*** 0.944*** 0.454*** 0.350** 0.680*** 
    (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) 
Av. firm 
employment within 
industry   -0.000* -0.000* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Industry birth rate   -0.65 -1.03 -1.551* -1.516* -1.372* -0.82 -1.297* 
    (0.77) (0.82) (0.83) (0.86) (0.76) (0.75) (0.77) 
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio   0.16 0.19 0.47 0.53 0.07 0.08 0.38 
    (0.33) (0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.34) (0.33) (0.34) 
Industry average 
propensity to be a 
product innovator GP1 3.411***       
    (0.61)       
  GP2 3.111***       
    (0.76)       
F statistic   0.64       
prob>F   0.42       
Industry average 
propensity to be a 
process innovator GP1  3.323***      
     (0.84)      
  GP2  1.992**      
     (0.95)      
F statistic    5.01      
prob>F    0.03      
Industry average 
propensity to view 
standards as being 
important to 
innovation GP1   3.26     
      (1.97)     
  GP2   -1.21     
      (3.12)     
F statistic     4.97     
prob>F     0.03     
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Table 3.10 (continued): The variance or variability of knowledge-protection 
mechanisms   in high-technology/knowledge-intensive industries and 
low-technology/less knowledge-intensive industries – Tobit model 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Ind. av. propensity 
to view publications 
as being important 
to innovation GP1    3.43    
       (3.16)    
  GP2    -4.02    
       (4.37)    
F statistic      3.61    
prob>F      0.06    
Ind. av. propensity 
to view formal 
protection as 
important GP1     2.479***   
        (0.47)   
  GP2     2.214***   
        (0.59)   
F statistic       0.79   
prob>F       0.38   
Ind. av. propensity 
to view informal 
protection as 
important GP1      2.761***  
         (0.48)  
  GP2      2.519***  
         (0.59)  
F statistic        0.71  
prob>F        0.40  
Ind. av. propensity 
to adopt new formal 
protection GP1       3.697*** 
          (0.72) 
  GP2       2.510*** 
          (0.82) 
F statistic         2.92 
prob>F         0.09 
Constant   -0.08 0.38 0.737*** 0.789*** 0.16 -0.04 0.437** 
    (0.26) (0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.23) (0.25) (0.20) 
           
N   99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 
Chi-squared  103.75 91.31 83.83 78.24 100.80 105.42 97.98 
p   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 
(pseudo)  0.40 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.39 0.41 0.38 
bic   196.44 208.87 216.36 221.95 199.39 194.77 202.21 
 
 
Notes: See Table 3.2 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent 
level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 
GP1=High-technology/knowledge-intensive firms 
GP2=Low-technology/less knowledge-intensive firms 




Table 3.11: The mean or average number of knowledge-protection mechanisms   
in high-technology/knowledge-intensive industries and low-
technology/less knowledge-intensive industries – OLS model 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Ind. cooperation on 
any innovation 
activity   0.257*** 0.245** 0.364*** 0.24 0.329*** 0.347*** 0.13 
    (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) 
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation   0.154*** 0.283*** 0.332*** 0.354*** 0.137** 0.107* 0.250*** 
    (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Av. firm 
employment within 
industry   -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* 0.00 -0.000** 0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry birth rate   -0.13 -0.30 -0.517* -0.554* -0.444* -0.21 -0.432* 
    (0.25) (0.28) (0.30) (0.31) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) 
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio   0.08 0.10 0.22 0.22 0.04 0.06 0.17 
    (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Industry average 
propensity to be a 
product innovator GP1 1.530***       
    (0.20)       
  GP2 1.314***       
    (0.25)       
F statistic   3.19       
prob>F   0.08       
Industry average 
propensity to be a 
process innovator GP1  1.475***      
     (0.29)      
  GP2  0.814**      
     (0.33)      
F statistic    10.27      
prob>F    0.00      
Industry average 
propensity to view 
standards as being 
important to 
innovation GP1   1.802**     
      (0.70)     
  GP2   0.05     
      (1.12)     
F statistic     5.98     







Table 3.11 (continued): The mean or average number of knowledge-protection 
mechanisms in high-technology/knowledge-intensive industries and 
low-technology/less knowledge-intensive industries – OLS model 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Ind. av. propensity 
to view publications 
as being important 
to innovation GP1    2.869**    
       (1.13)    
  GP2    -0.92    
       (1.56)    
F statistic      7.36    
prob>F      0.01    
Ind. av. propensity 
to view formal 
protection as 
important GP1     1.150***   
        (0.15)   
  GP2     0.995***   
        (0.19)   
F statistic       2.61   
prob>F       0.11   
Ind. av. propensity 
to view informal 
protection as 
important GP1      1.208***  
         (0.16)  
  GP2      1.050***  
         (0.19)  
F statistic        2.88  
prob>F        0.09  
Ind. av. propensity 
to adopt new formal 
protection GP1       1.694*** 
          (0.24) 
  GP2       0.927*** 
          (0.27) 
F statistic         11.08 
prob>F         0.00 
Constant   -0.06 0.14 0.260*** 0.296*** 0.03 -0.04 0.169** 
    (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
           
N   99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 
p   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
bic   -41.64 -15.05 -1.61 3.39 -38.07 -40.95 -30.05 
 
 
Notes: See Table 3.2 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent 
level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 
GP1=High-technology/knowledge-intensive firms 
GP2=Low-technology/less knowledge-intensive firms 




Table 3.12: The variance or variability of knowledge-protection mechanisms in 
high-technology/knowledge-intensive industries and low-
technology/less knowledge-intensive industries – OLS model 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Ind. cooperation on 
any innovation 
activity   0.639** 0.594* 0.869** 0.819* 0.798** 0.827*** 0.40 
    (0.31) (0.34) (0.34) (0.43) (0.31) (0.30) (0.34) 
Ind. extent of 
internationalisation   0.490*** 0.777*** 0.906*** 0.952*** 
0.476**
* 0.375** 0.695*** 
    (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) 
Av. firm 
employment within 
industry   -0.000* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry birth rate   -0.64 -1.02 -1.535* -1.499* -1.354* -0.81 -1.28 
    (0.79) (0.84) (0.86) (0.89) (0.79) (0.78) (0.80) 
Industry five-firm 
concentration ratio   0.17 0.20 0.47 0.53 0.09 0.10 0.38 
    (0.34) (0.37) (0.38) (0.39) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35) 
Industry average 
propensity to be a 
product innovator GP1 3.359***       
    (0.63)       
  GP2 3.038***       
    (0.79)       
F statistic   0.69       
prob>F   0.41       
Industry average 
propensity to be a 
process innovator GP1  3.266***      
     (0.87)      
  GP2  1.921*      
     (0.98)      
F statistic    4.78      
prob>F    0.03      
Industry average 
propensity to view 
standards as being 
important to 
innovation GP1   3.24     
      (2.03)     
  GP2   -1.29     
      (3.22)     
F statistic     4.78     






Table 3.12 (continued): The variance or variability of knowledge-protection 
mechanisms in high-technology/knowledge-intensive industries and 
low-technology/less knowledge-intensive industries – OLS model 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Ind. av. propensity 
to view publications 
as being important 
to innovation GP1    3.41    
       (3.26)    
  GP2    -4.11    
       (4.52)    
F statistic      3.45    
prob>F      0.07    
Ind. av. propensity 
to view formal 
protection as 
important GP1     2.428***   
        (0.49)   
  GP2     2.144***   
        (0.61)   
F statistic       0.85   
prob>F       0.36   
Ind. av. propensity 
to view informal 
protection as 
important GP1      2.700***  
         (0.49)  
  GP2      2.439***  
         (0.61)  
F statistic        0.78  
prob>F        0.38  
Ind. av. propensity 
to adopt new formal 
protection GP1       3.642*** 
          (0.74) 
  GP2       2.444*** 
          (0.85) 
F statistic         2.79 
prob>F         0.10 
Constant   -0.07 0.38 0.734*** 0.784*** 0.17 -0.03 0.436** 
    (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.21) 
N   99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 99.00 
p   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 




Notes: See Table 3.2 
Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent 
level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level. 
GP1=High-technology/knowledge-intensive firms 
GP2=Low-technology/less knowledge-intensive firms 





Formal versus informal knowledge protection: which matters most 
for innovation returns? 
4.1 Introduction 
The success of organisations and businesses, in the form of growth or performance, 
often derives from innovation.  Successful firm innovation, or the completeness of 
the development and exploitation of new knowledge (Roper et al., 2008), yields 
considerable benefits for the innovating firm: higher profits, increased market value, 
improved credit ratings and a higher chance of survival (Geroski et al., 1993; Hall, 
2000; Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2004; Cefis and Marsili, 2005).  Previous empirical work 
finds a positive relationship between innovation and firm performance; some studies 
find a positive relationship between innovation and productivity (for example, Hall 
et al., 2009), while others find a positive relationship between innovation and growth 
(for example, Freel and Robson, 2004). 
In practice, however, not all innovating firms are able to successfully exploit their 
knowledge, increasing profits and improving performance.  Outcomes depend upon 
the extent to which a firm is able to capture profits generated by its innovation 
(Teece, 1986; Levin et al., 1987).  When an innovating firm is unable to limit other 
firms from imitating its innovations, the appropriability problem (Arrow, 1962) 
arises.12 Consequently, a firm may fail to appropriate returns from its own 
innovations (Ceccagnoli and Rothaermel, 2008) and be unable to gain and sustain a 
competitive advantage (Laursen et al., 2013). 
Before a firm invests in innovation, it has an expectation of post-innovation returns 
(Du et al., 2007); the incentive to innovate itself comes from this expectation 
                                                          
12 The innovating firm may earn only a portion of the overall social benefits of the innovation.  The 
social benefits of an innovation include the private benefits received by the firm that developed the 
innovation and the value of all positive externalities resulting from the innovation i.e. beneficial 
spillovers to a third party, or parties of the new idea or product; new innovations often lead to other 
creative endeavours that society also values. 
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(Laursen and Salter, 2005).  To overcome the appropriability problem, firms use 
knowledge-protection mechanisms – both formal and informal – to capture returns to 
innovation (Laursen and Salter, 2005; Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007).  Formal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms are implemented through regulation and are 
effective by legally excluding imitators, examples include patents and trademarks 
(Hall, 1992).  Informal protection mechanisms are not based upon structures and 
statutory enforcement possibilities, examples include secrecy and lead-time 
(Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2014).  The knowledge-protection mechanisms allow 
innovators to appropriate returns by making their innovative knowledge (a non-rival 
good) excludable.  Therefore the knowledge-protection mechanisms that are 
effective and available to the firm provide it with an incentive to invest in innovation 
activities (Granstrand, 1999). 
The present study acknowledges that a firm is able to formulate a knowledge-
protection strategy in order to help capture returns from its innovations and that 
strategies for protecting knowledge have become a central part of the development of 
a firm’s innovative strategy (Rivette and Kline, 2000).  The study examines both 
formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies and seeks to ascertain which 
knowledge-protection strategy – formal or informal – allows firms to most 
successfully derive economic benefit from an innovation; the study is concerned 
with a firm’s returns to innovation rather than its decision to innovate or not.   
By combining features of previous research in this area (Laursen and Salter, 2005; 
Laursen et al., 2013; Hall and Sena, 2017), this firm-level study examines how both 
formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies affect firms’ innovation returns 
and seeks to explore how these effects differ across sectors, firm size and innovator 
type.  This study builds upon the existing knowledge-protection literature by using 
the United Kingdom’s Community Innovation Survey data on the actual use of 
formal and informal knowledge-protection mechanisms to investigate the effects of 
knowledge protection use on a firm’s returns to innovation.  Previous studies 
(Laursen and Salter, 2005; Laursen et al., 2013; Hall and Sena, 2017) use data on 
how firms rate the importance of various knowledge-protection mechanisms – data 
more prone to subjectivity bias (Veulegers and Schneider, 2018).  Laursen et al. 
(2013) focus on manufacturing firms and their orientation towards formal 
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knowledge-protection mechanisms.  Hall and Sena (2017) place emphasis on both 
formal and informal knowledge-protection mechanisms and examine the extent to 
which this emphasis is correlated with the type of innovation being carried out.  
Following this, they investigate the relationship between firm productivity and 
innovation type, conditional on the firm’s chosen knowledge-protection 
mechanisms.  The present study builds upon this literature by examining both formal 
and informal knowledge-protection strategies and their impact upon a firm’s returns 
to innovation in terms of the proportion of firm sales coming from innovation.  The 
analysis is extended by exploring the effects of formal and informal knowledge-
protection strategies on the returns to innovation in firms of different sizes, firms 
with different technologies, firms in different sectors and firms innovating with 
different degrees of novelty.  Following this, those firms undertaking innovation 
which is new to the marketplace are further explored.  The effects of formal and 
informal knowledge-protection strategies on the returns to innovation in firms of 
different sizes, firms with different technologies and firms in different sectors within 
this sub-group of innovators are examined. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows.  Section 4.2 introduces the 
concepts of innovation, appropriability and knowledge protection, Section 4.3 
discusses firms’ knowledge-protection choices and innovation returns, Section 4.4 
profiles the data and empirical methodology used in the study, Section 4.5 contains 
the empirical results and Section 4.6 includes discussion and conclusions. 
4.2 Innovation, appropriability and knowledge protection 
4.2.1 Innovation  
Innovation is essential to the competitive performance of firms and the growth of 
economies (Granstrand, 1999).  It represents the beginning of a process of value 
creation (Roper et al., 2008) from which a competitive advantage emerges (Porter, 
1985).  Implementing a value-creating innovation strategy, not being simultaneously 
implemented by any current or potential competitor (Barney, 1991), helps a firm to 
gain a competitive advantage and achieve a superior performance relative to other 
competitors within the same industry group or relative to the industry average.  
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Those firms more able to mobilise knowledge and technological skills and use their 
experience to create new products, services and processes gain a competitive 
advantage over others. 
Innovation can be radical or incremental; it can be in products, processes, or services 
and it can happen in any organisation and at all organisation levels.  A radical 
innovation has a significant impact upon a market and upon the economic activity of 
firms within that market.  The innovation may lead to a change in the structure of the 
market, create new markets or displace existing products.  Incremental innovation is 
the improvement of an existing product, process or service i.e. it is ‘doing better 
what is already being done’ (Tidd et al., 1997).  Radical innovations create major, 
disruptive changes, whereas incremental innovations continuously advance the 
process of change (Schumpeter, 1942). 
Innovative firms are those that create new or improved products or processes, those 
that develop new methods of commercialisation and those that formulate new 
models of organisation (Diamond, 1997).  An innovating firm’s introduction of a 
new product, process or service represents the end of a process of knowledge 
sourcing (for example, research and development – R&D – activities) and 
transformation (i.e. turning knowledge into an innovation) and the beginning of a 
process of exploitation by the firm in an attempt to improve performance and 
generate value added (Roper et al., 2008).  Combined, this recursive process of 
knowledge sourcing, transformation and exploitation by the innovating firm is what 
has become known as the innovation value chain (Roper et al., 2008). 
4.2.1.1 Innovation value chain 
The first stage of the innovation value chain is a firm’s knowledge-sourcing 
activities.  From previous research, Roper et al. (2008) identify five different types of 
knowledge-sourcing activity that firms engage in: intramural R&D (Shelanski and 
Klein, 1995), customer linkages (Joshi and Sharma, 2004), supplier and external-
consultant linkages (Horn, 2005), competitor and joint-venture linkages (Link et al., 
2005) and university/public-research-centre linkages (Roper et al., 2004).  In 
practice, knowledge-sourcing activities do not occur in isolation – some complement 
each other, others are substitutes for one another.  In accordance with the resource-
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based view, a firm’s choice of knowledge-sourcing activity may depend upon firm-
specific factors, for example, existing knowledge resources and knowledge 
utilisation capabilities.  
The second stage of the innovation value chain – the stage with which the present 
study is concerned – involves the transformation of knowledge sourced during stage 
one into innovation outputs (Roper et al., 2008).  This transformation depends upon 
firm characteristics as well as firm resources and capabilities (Griliches, 1992; Love 
and Roper, 1999).  The type of knowledge sourced during stage one of the 
innovation value chain may have different transformation effects in terms of 
product-innovation and process-innovation outputs.  The transmission process 
through which sourced knowledge impacts a firm’s innovation activity – and in turn 
the returns to innovation – depends upon the type of knowledge sourced, and 
different knowledge types may affect different features of a firm’s innovation 
activity (Roper et al., 2008). 
The third stage of the innovation value chain is knowledge exploitation.  Knowledge 
is exploited when a firm’s innovation output positively influences its performance 
(Geroski et al., 1993).  After a firm sources knowledge and transforms it into 
innovation outputs, the new products and processes are presented to the market with 
the ultimate aim of increasing firm performance (in terms of growth or productivity, 
for example).  However, whether or not a firm is able to successfully exploit its 
knowledge and improve performance depends upon its ability to appropriate 
innovation returns. 
4.2.2 Appropriability 
The third stage of the innovation value chain, knowledge exploitation, is when new 
products and processes in the marketplace lead to an increase in firm growth and 
performance.  Although evidence exists supporting the link between innovation and 
performance (Freel and Robson, 2004; Hall et al., 2009), the successful exploitation 
of knowledge, in terms of higher profits or performance is not guaranteed – it 
depends upon firm attributes and market conditions (Roper et al., 2008) and the 
extent to which a firm can capture profits generated by an innovation (Teece, 1986; 
Levin et al., 1987) i.e. appropriability.  
250 
 
4.2.2.1 The appropriability problem 
The appropriability problem (Arrow, 1962) – the feature of innovative activity which 
distinguishes it from other strategic investments made by firms (Geroski, 1995) – 
arises when firms are unable to limit other firms from imitating their innovations. 
Consequently, firms may fail to appropriate returns from their own innovations 
(Ceccagnoli and Rothaermel, 2008). 
Innovating firms are faced with a risk of imitation by both existing competitors and 
new competitors attracted into the market by the existence of high returns 
(Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009).  It is possible that a fast second entrant into the 
market or even a slow third can outperform the innovator (Teece, 2012).  A firm 
therefore faces a key strategic challenge: it somehow needs to protect returns from 
its innovations.  A firm’s ability to do so determines its performance and continued 
survival (Ceccagnoli and Rothaermel, 2008).   
When an innovating firm is faced with imitation, its competitive advantage may be 
eroded.  Without an expectation of profiting from an innovation and a monopolistic 
power over an innovation, firms will be discouraged from investing in innovative 
activities – there will be no incentive to innovate (Schumpeter, 1942).  It is the 
expectation of success which encourages firms to allocate time and money towards 
innovation.  In the extreme case of perfect competition, the rate of innovation 
amongst firms is low; no firm has market power, there is no product differentiation 
and all firms have immediate and perfect access to the same technologies (Lopez, 
2009). 
The semi-public good characteristics of knowledge (exclusion is rarely perfect) leads 
to the appropriability problem (Arrow, 1962).  The appropriability of the returns 
from new knowledge is always incomplete, and the resulting externalities create a 
difference between the private and the social marginal return from new knowledge.  
Unless innovators are able to address this problem by protecting the knowledge 
which they create, competitors will be able to imitate their innovations at a much 
lower cost than the innovator themselves – imitators will not incur the high fixed 
costs associated with the first stage of the innovation value chain when knowledge is 
sourced (Section 4.2.1.1 above).   
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In order to address the problem of imitation risk, innovators require an understanding 
of appropriability.  Teece (1986) identifies two essential components of 
appropriability – the appropriability regime and specialised complimentary assets.  
The appropriability regime determines the barriers to imitation which exist within an 
industry and the ease with which competitors are able to imitate an innovation 
(Ceccagnoli and Rothaermel, 2008); it encompasses the means of protecting both the 
innovation itself and the increased rents which flow from it (Cohen et al., 2000).  
The most important dimensions of the appropriability regime are the nature of the 
technology involved (whether it is a product or process technology or whether 
technological knowledge is tacit or codified, for example), and the means of 
intellectual property (IP) protection which are effective and available to the firm for 
use (for example, patents and trademarks) (Teece, 1986).  An appropriability regime 
is ‘weak’ when innovations are difficult to protect i.e. when they can be easily 
codified and legal protection of IP is ineffective, or ‘strong’ when innovations are 
easy to protect because knowledge about them is tacit and/or they are well protected 
legally. 
Specialised complementary assets – the second component of appropriability – may 
be acquired by firms in order to strengthen appropriability conditions (Gans and 
Stern, 2003).  When faced with a weak appropriability regime, firms are unable to 
use legal protection mechanisms to protect their innovations and any returns which 
flow from them.  Acquiring complimentary assets (for example, competitive 
manufacturing, distribution channels and complementary technologies), may allow a 
firm to profit from an innovation, whether it be the innovating firm itself capturing 
returns or an imitating firm profiting from an innovation at the expense of the 
innovator. 
In order to appropriate returns, it is important for the innovating firm to understand 
the strength of the industry appropriability regime it faces and the nature of any 
specialised complementary assets that are required to take the innovation to the 
marketplace.  In reality, some innovating firms fail to appropriate returns, for 
example, Electrical Musical Instruments (EMI), innovator of the Computerised Axial 
Tomography (CAT) scanner, lost to the imitator, GE Medical systems (Ceccagnoli 
and Rothaermel, 2008).  Through reverse engineering, the codified nature of the 
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CAT scanner was identified and imitated.  Patents were not enforced and the 
resulting weak appropriability regime, combined with EMI’s lack of specialised 
complementary assets, meant that EMI lost out to GE Medical systems. 
4.2.3 Knowledge protection 
A firm’s decision to invest in innovation depends upon the expected post-innovation 
returns (Du et al., 2007), and without the possibility of capturing the benefits of their 
innovative efforts, there would be little incentive for firms to innovate (Laursen and 
Salter, 2005).  The ability to appropriate or capture the benefits of an innovation is a 
central element in gaining and sustaining competitive advantage (Laursen and Salter, 
2005).  Knowledge-protection mechanisms – one component of the appropriability 
regime – are used by firms as a strategic tool to capture the private benefits or returns 
to innovation (Laursen and Salter, 2005; Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007).  Such 
mechanisms encourage innovation (Guellec, 2007) by providing an incentive for 
firms to invest in innovation activities – they increase appropriability, reduce 
competition and act as an incentive for future innovations (Granstrand, 1999). 
Knowledge-protection mechanisms allow innovators to appropriate returns by 
making their innovative knowledge – a non-rival good – excludable.  Unfortunately, 
introducing an element of excludability also introduces an inefficiency as the 
innovator, now a monopolist as a result of the knowledge protection, drives the price 
of the innovative good above the marginal cost of its production (Greenhalgh and 
Rogers, 2007).  Output becomes restricted in order to increase price, and the 
customer loses.  By encouraging innovation, the knowledge-protection mechanisms 
may benefit society but they also introduce the consequences of a temporary 
monopoly – a trade-off formally analysed by Nordhaus (1969). 
Product and process innovators benefit from knowledge protection in different ways 
(Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007).  After protecting its knowledge, the process 
innovator is able to reduce its costs of production.  If prices are kept constant, the 
firm enjoys higher returns.  If the firm chooses to reduce prices, it displaces 
competitors and increases its market share.  After implementing knowledge 
protection, product innovators are able to earn higher returns due to an increase in 
market share and by charging relatively higher prices.  Both process and product 
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innovators benefit from knowledge protection because they are able to steal returns 
from competitors – something known as ‘a business stealing effect’ (Greenhalgh and 
Rogers, 2007). 
Firms may use a variety of knowledge-protection mechanisms – ranging from 
patents to trade secrets – to protect any returns from innovation from being eroded 
by imitation.  The particular combination of knowledge-protection mechanisms 
chosen by a firm becomes part of its appropriability strategy (Cohen et al., 2000).  
The chosen knowledge-protection mechanisms are therefore also a central 
component of a firm’s innovation strategy (Rivette and Kline, 2000); they represent 
investment into a firm’s innovation. 
Firms choose between formal (statutory) and informal (non-statutory) knowledge-
protection mechanisms to protect their innovations and aid the appropriation of 
returns.  Formal protection mechanisms are legally enforceable protection 
mechanisms and typically include registered rights such as patents, design rights and 
trademarks and unregistered rights such as copyright, whereas informal protection 
mechanisms are not based directly on regulated structures and statutory enforcement 
possibilities (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2014); they include secrecy, complexity of 
design and lead-time on competitors.  Formal protection mechanisms are an official 
means of protection provided by society to innovators (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and 
Puumalainen, 2007a), whereas informal mechanisms, although not based directly 
upon statutory enforcement possibilities, may have associated legal contracts 
alongside them; a firm using secrecy may require employees to sign non-disclosure 
agreements, for example. 
Formal protection mechanisms address the appropriability problem by allowing an 
innovator to legally exclude imitators.  Acquiring such mechanisms is often viewed 
by firms as a costly exercise – some mechanisms being more costly to obtain than 
others.  Obtaining formal protection can be a slow, time-consuming and costly 
process, deterring firms from its use.  In addition, formal protection often requires 
firms to disclose technologies; it forces firms to codify the knowledge they source 
and use in the creation of their innovations.  This codification may itself lead to 
imitation and result in competitors inventing around innovations. 
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The disclosure of knowledge when formally protecting innovations may lead to 
positive as well as negative effects.  Disclosure allows other firms to avoid 
duplicating research (Hall et al., 2014), and any knowledge spillovers among firms 
and sectors – as illustrated by endogenous growth theories – will be important for 
sustained long-run growth (Romer, 1990).  Technology spillovers may generate 
social benefits for the industry as a whole (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007) – over 
time, many firms may contribute, through the disclosure of knowledge in a patent, 
towards a new technology.  In addition, the disclosure of knowledge in the form of 
licensing and ‘patent pools’ – where firms share technologies – may help raise 
revenues and reduce costs.  Such activity helps reduce reverse engineering by 
imitators and rivals’ efforts to ‘invent around’ an existing patent (Baumol, 2002). 
In the same vein, informal knowledge protection is invisible or only partially visible 
to competing firms.  Such protection, in the form of secrecy for example, reduces 
knowledge spillovers and may in turn restrict economic growth (Hall et. al., 2014).   
The use of formal protection mechanisms by firms may also act as a signal of quality 
– it can signal a firm’s expertise.  Firms formally protecting knowledge may appear 
more attractive, thus leading to added benefits, for example, firms may be able to 
more easily raise finance or attract talented employees.  In some cases, the sole aim 
of firms obtaining formal protection is to experience such effects, rather than to aid 
the appropriation of innovation returns (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007).  In their 
study, Cohen et al. (2000) find evidence that United States (US) firms use protection 
mechanisms for such strategic reasons – for example, to block competitors and to 
improve reputation – as well as to appropriate returns.  Blind et al. (2006) also find 
evidence of German firms using patents to block competitors and improve firm 
image. 
4.2.3.1 The choice between informal and formal knowledge protection 
The theoretical literature surrounding a firm’s knowledge-protection strategy 
typically regards the use of formal and informal mechanisms as mutually exclusive 
choices (Friedman et al., 1991).  The effects of two mechanisms – one formal 
(patents) and one informal (secrecy) – are often compared and contrasted.  The trade-
off between using patents as a protection mechanism, in terms of the associated 
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benefits and costs, are compared with those associated with the use of secrecy.  
Patents and secrecy are considered to be substitutes for one another with one 
mechanism ruling out the use of the other – the former requires the disclosure of firm 
knowledge whereas the latter relies upon non-disclosure.  It is for this reason that the 
two mechanisms become the focus of much theoretical literature.  The benefits and 
costs associated with each mechanism are a function of the innovation to be 
protected and the innovating firm’s defensive strategy in relation to competitors’ 
behaviour; the value of the knowledge-protection mechanism lies in its ability to 
affect the behaviour of competitors (Hall et al., 2014). 
In practice, patents are an unsuitable protection mechanism for some innovations (for 
example, computer software is not patentable according to the European Patent 
Office) (Hall et al., 2014).  The strength of protection offered by patents differs 
across industries (Veulegers and Schneider, 2018): patent use is particularly high in 
industries with discrete technologies, for example pharmaceuticals, where 
knowledge is well codified (Hall et al., 2014) – the extent to which a firm codifies its 
knowledge helps determine the effective protection mechanisms available to a firm 
(Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 2007a).  The use of secrecy as a 
protection mechanism is far less restricted.  It can be used to protect knowledge at 
different stages of the innovation value chain rather than at a particular stage of 
development as is the case with patents.  Patents and secrecy also differ with respect 
to the length of time that knowledge is protected for when each mechanism is used; 
secrecy provides (potentially) indefinite protection, whereas the protection provided 
by patents is limited to twenty years (Hall et al., 2014).  
The overall strength of protection implemented by a firm is determined by its 
business strategy and its resources and capabilities.  Firms are able to establish 
relatively strong appropriability conditions by utilising the knowledge-protection 
mechanisms available to them – whether or not their environment supports 
enforceable, formal protection mechanisms (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and 
Puumalainen, 2007a). 
Empirical evidence shows informal mechanisms to be more widely used than formal 
mechanisms (Hall et. al., 2014; Freel and Robson, 2017).  Much of the survey-based 
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evidence suggests that firms rely heavily on informal mechanisms such as lead time 
and secrecy.  Arundel (2001) examines Community Innovation Survey (CIS) data 
from seven different countries.  Results indicate that more than 50 per cent of firms 
view lead time as the most important protection mechanism and 17 per cent regard 
secrecy as the most important.  The proportion of firms regarding patents and 
registered designs as most important is much lower – 10 per cent and 7 per cent 
respectively. 
4.3 Knowledge-protection choices and returns to innovation 
The discussion in Section 4.2 above suggests that firms which implement 
knowledge-protection strategies, i.e. use formal and informal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms, are more likely to capture the returns from their innovations 
(appropriate the returns).  Firms’ knowledge-protection strategies are therefore an 
important source of heterogeneity in firm performance (Teece, 2000b). 
Using survey analysis, Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al. (2000) were amongst the 
first to report that firms generally prefer informal knowledge-protection mechanisms 
to formal mechanisms to aid appropriability of their innovations.  Other studies, for 
example, Arundel (2001) and Laursen and Salter (2005), also find that informal 
mechanisms are preferred to formal mechanisms.  Existing literature on the 
performance effects of a firm’s choice of knowledge-protection mechanisms is 
limited.  Some studies focus on the relationship between firms’ preferences for 
different knowledge-protection mechanisms and financial or innovation 
performance.  Hanel (2008) uses a two-stage model to examine the relationship 
between profits in Canadian manufacturing firms and their knowledge-protection 
choices.  Initially, the propensity to use knowledge-protection mechanisms within 
innovative firms is calculated.  The impact of this propensity on firm profits is then 
determined.  Results indicate that firms that use formal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms experience either unchanged or higher profit levels.  Hussinger (2006) 
finds a strong positive correlation between patents and sales of new products in 
German manufacturing firms, although no such correlation is found for secrecy.  
Hall et al. (2013) find that patent use is positively linked with turnover from 
innovation but unrelated to other performance measures.  The authors suggest that 
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this is because patents are more likely to be used to protect product innovations 
which directly affect sales, whereas informal protection mechanisms, such as secrecy 
for example, are more likely to be used to protect process and early-stage 
innovations. 
Three further studies which examine the performance effects of firms’ knowledge-
protection choices are Hall and Sena (2017), Laursen and Salter (2005) and Laursen 
et al. (2013).  Using data from the Business Structure Database and the United 
Kingdom (UK) CIS, Hall and Sena (2017) examine the relationship between firm 
performance and innovation conditional on the firm’s chosen knowledge-protection 
mechanisms.  They find that formal knowledge protection has a positive effect on 
productivity (10 to 20 per cent higher); informal mechanisms do not have the same 
impact.  It is suggested that the firms that experience increased productivity when 
using formal protection mechanisms are firms that develop high-quality innovations.  
The increase in productivity may therefore be due to the higher quality innovations 
rather than the use of formal mechanisms themselves. 
Laursen and Salter (2005) use UK CIS data to investigate the relationship between 
the strength of formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies and innovative 
performance in manufacturing firms.  They find that formal and informal protection 
mechanisms help innovative performance, but an overemphasis on strength 
eventually becomes detrimental for innovative performance.  In addition, they find 
that strategies which focus on both formal and informal protection mechanisms are 
incompatible; formal mechanisms tend to require firms to disclose knowledge 
whereas informal mechanisms require secrecy.  Their results suggest that firms are 
required to make a choice between different paths of knowledge protection.  In a 
later version of this study (Laursen et al., 2013), the authors define some of their 
independent variables differently and use a different estimation method.  The focus 
is on formal knowledge-protection mechanisms only, although they do include a 
variable reflecting the relative weight a firm attaches to informal protection.  Results 
indicate that a stronger formal knowledge-protection strategy leads to an increase in 
innovative performance up to a maximum point, following which innovative 
performance declines.  However, Laursen et al. (2013) find that this maximum 
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occurs when the strength of formal knowledge protection is outside its range of 
values. 
The discussion in Section 4.2 above suggests that a firm’s use of formal and informal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms is beneficial to innovation returns.  The empirical 
studies discussed here highlight the importance of formal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms to firm performance; informal knowledge-protection mechanisms are 
found to be less important – although many of the studies discussed above examine 
product innovation for which formal protection mechanisms have proved to be more 
effective (Levin et al., 1987; Harabi, 1995).  Taking all of this evidence into account, 
the importance of a firm’s formal and informal knowledge-protection strategy to its 
innovation returns is clear, and this leads to the first hypothesis that: 
Hypothesis 1:  A firm’s formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies are 
positively related to its innovation returns. 
However, questions remain around the factors which govern firms’ choices of 
informal or formal knowledge-protection strategies and around which strategy is 
most effective in boosting innovation returns. 
4.3.1 Factors affecting firms’ knowledge-protection choices 
Previous research suggests that a firm’s use of formal and informal knowledge-
protection mechanisms differs across sectors and industries (due to the presence of 
tacit or codified knowledge, product and process technologies and the industry 
appropriability regime, for example) (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000), firms 
(due to resources and capabilities, for example) (Lopez, 2009; Hall et al., 2014) and 
the novelty of the innovation (Hanel, 2005). 
iv. Industry/technology characteristics 
Industry characteristics play an important part in determining whether firms use 
formal or informal protection methods to protect innovations.  Levin et al. (1987) – 
the Yale I survey – and Cohen et al. (2000) – the Carnegie Mellon survey – examine 
the extent to which firms in different industries choose formal and informal 
knowledge-protection methods to appropriate returns.  Both studies report broadly 
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consistent findings.  For both product and process innovations, secrecy and lead time 
are viewed as important knowledge-protection mechanisms; a high percentage of 
firms are found to rely on informal mechanisms in their knowledge-protection 
strategies.  With the exception of the pharmaceutical and chemical industries, patents 
are found to be much less important.  However, patents are identified as being more 
important for product innovations than for process innovations.  One reason for this 
is that a patented process could easily be invented around once knowledge is 
disclosed.  This is supported by Harabi (1995), who in a study of Swiss firms finds 
the same result.  In this study, firms express concern regarding the disclosure of 
knowledge because it allows competitors an opportunity to invent around their 
innovations.  Again, patents are identified as being most important to firms in the 
pharmaceutical, chemical and machinery industries.  As in Levin et al. (1987), lead 
time is found to be the protection mechanism most important for firms’ 
appropriation.  Results show that secrecy is also important, more so for process 
innovations; processes can be effectively retained within the firm and protected with 
trade secrets.  In a survey of one hundred manufacturing firms, Mansfield (1986) 
finds that in both the pharmaceutical and chemical industries, patent protection is 
necessary for at least 30 per cent of innovations.  Several other industries (petroleum, 
machinery, and fabricated metals) report patents to be necessary for 10 to 20 per cent 
of innovations.  The remaining industries do not rely on patent use. 
Cohen et al. (2000) find that R&D intensive industries, for example pharmaceuticals, 
report a high effectiveness of almost every protection mechanism.  The majority of 
other industries report a high effectiveness for two or more mechanisms and only a 
small number of industries report a high effectiveness of only one.  Cohen et al. 
(2000) find that patents are used more often than secrecy in discrete product 
industries, whereas in complex-product industries it is easier to invent around 
technologies, and therefore firms rely less on patents and more on informal methods 
of protection such as lead-time.  In their study of small Finnish manufacturing and 
service firms, Leiponen and Byma (2009) find that R&D intensive firms and 
science-based firms are more likely to protect knowledge formally.  Other firms use 
speed to market or secrecy as protection methods. 
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Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999) examine Dutch manufacturing firms and find that 
those in high-technology industries are more likely to patent than those in other 
industries.  Their results are consistent with those of Levin et al. (1987) and Harabi 
(1995) who find patents to be most important within the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries.  Across all innovating firms, Levin et al. (1987) and 
Harabi (1995) find around half of firms report patents to be insignificant when 
protecting their knowledge – lead time and secrecy are reported to be more 
important. 
Some technologies are easier to protect formally than others.  For example, in the 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals sector, a patent is able to protect a specific compound 
(or a specific chemical formula); it is clear what the patent protects and few disputes 
arise (Bessen and Meurer, 2008).  In other sectors, for example information 
technology, the range of patents is less precise.  The probability of dispute is higher, 
and patent use is less popular (Hall et al., 2014). 
Despite many of the studies discussed here finding that high-technology firms are 
more inclined to patent, Laursen et al. (2013) find little evidence that formal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms increase the innovative performance of high-
technology industries.  Instead, they find a strong inverted U-shaped relationship 
between formal knowledge-protection mechanisms and the innovative performance 
of low-technology industries.  This suggests that low-technology environments 
provide firms with the scope to strategically use formal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms in order to gain from their innovative efforts. 
Across industries, different knowledge-protection choices may be made due to 
evolving regulatory and legal regimes.  Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Puumalainen 
(2007a) find that some protection methods are difficult to implement in certain 
knowledge-intensive industries due to legal restrictions that are in place.  Regulatory 
and legal distortions may also lead to the use of knowledge-protection mechanisms 
varying across industries.  In their study, Grindley and Teece (1997) examine the use 
of licensing in the semiconductor and electronics industries.  By forcing firms to 
license their technologies below market value, courts discourage firms in these 
industries from using formal knowledge-protection mechanisms.  Once the 
261 
 
distortions in formal protection regimes across industries are removed, firms 
recognise the value of formal knowledge protection and its importance to innovation 
returns.   
The use of formal knowledge protection may be low in rapidly growing industries, 
for example information technology.  Within such environments, formal protection 
mechanisms may inhibit the development of the market for ideas (Andrews and de 
Serres, 2012).  Liebeskind and Oliver (1998) find that the use of formal protection 
mechanisms is low in technology-intensive industries with a high rate of new 
inventions.  Firms in these industries view formal protection as being a slow and 
costly process and are thus deterred from using it to protect their knowledge. 
Many of the studies discussed above identify R&D intensive and high-technology 
firms as being those which use formal methods of knowledge protection to protect 
their knowledge.  Form this it follows that these firms perceive formal knowledge-
protection mechanisms as those which are most effective at helping them to 
appropriate the returns from their innovations.  Studies examining the performance 
effects of formal protection mechanisms in R&D intensive and high-technology 
firms are rather limited, but Laursen et al. (2013) find little evidence that formal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms increase their innovative performance.  Given 
this conflicting evidence, it is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 2a:  Formal/informal knowledge-protection strategies have a stronger 
positive effect upon the innovation returns of high-
technology/knowledge-intensive firms than low-technology/less 
knowledge-intensive firms 
Hypothesis 2b:  Formal/informal knowledge-protection strategies have a weaker 
positive effect upon the innovation returns of high-
technology/knowledge-intensive firms than low-technology/less 
knowledge-intensive firms 
Innovation in services is quite different from innovation in manufacturing, relying 
less on R&D and more on new information technology-based processes (Hall and 
Sena, 2017).  Contrary to the view that service sector firms may gain no benefit from 
using formal knowledge-protection mechanisms, Hall and Sena (2017) find formal 
protection mechanisms to be more important than informal protection mechanisms 
for service sector productivity.  Their results are ambiguous for the manufacturing 
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sector as informal and formal knowledge protection has an equal effect on 
productivity, although the effect is negative.  This negative effect is attributed to 
there being longer lags between innovative activity and productivity within the 
manufacturing sector. 
Other studies which focus on services (Mairesse and Mohnen, 2004; Hipp and 
Herstatt, 2006) suggest that most service firms do not use any type of knowledge 
protection.  Those service firms that do protect their knowledge tend to use formal 
trademarks and copyrights and informal mechanisms such as customer, supplier and 
employee lock-ins.  Mairesse and Mohnen (2004) examine French firms’ use of 
knowledge-protection mechanisms in the manufacturing and service industries.  
Innovative service firms are found to use protection mechanisms less often than 
high-tech manufacturing firms but more often than low-tech manufacturing firms.  
Hipp and Herstatt (2006) find that service-intensive German firms use long-term 
labour contracts to protect their knowledge.  Secrecy, lead time and complexity are 
also identified as being important protection mechanisms, whereas only 6 per cent of 
service firms examined use formal protection mechanisms. 
Blind et al. (2003) find that the propensity to patent and the number of patent 
applications is significantly lower in services compared with manufacturing; 7 per 
cent of service firms applied for patents compared with 25 per cent of firms in the 
manufacturing industry.  Applying formal methods of protection to services is not 
straightforward (Blind et al., 2003; Maskus, 2008), for example, the tacit knowledge 
included in services is not eligible for patenting.  It is the intangible nature of service 
innovations that determines the type of protection mechanisms which can be used 
successfully (Miles and Boden, 2000). 
Baldwin et al. (1998) examine the use of knowledge-protection mechanisms in 
Canadian service industries (for example, communications and financial services) 
using innovation survey data from 1996.  Less than half of innovators report using 
any of the knowledge-protection mechanisms available to them.  Of those used, 
copyright and trademarks are the most popular – particularly in the financial services 
industry.  Patents are used only by the technical business service industry.  Lead time 
is identified as the most effective knowledge-protection mechanism by all service 
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industries.  Of the formal protection mechanisms available, trademarks are identified 
as being most effective. 
Päällysaho and Kuusisto (2006) examine a sample of Finnish and UK firms in three 
knowledge-intensive service industries (advertising, business and management 
consultancy, and software consultancy and supply).  Trademarks and copyright are 
the most popular formal knowledge-protection mechanisms whereas patents are 
rarely used.  The most popular protection mechanism used by firms in these service 
industries is restrictive contracts (for example, non-disclosure agreements).  Secrecy 
is also identified as being important in these industries. 
In terms of the performance effects of formal and informal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms within the service sector, again, the evidence is limited.  One study 
(Morikawa, 2014) examines Japanese service firms and suggests that service sector 
productivity is related to firms’ use of informal knowledge-protection mechanisms.   
Overall, there seems to be no consensus among the empirical studies examining the 
use of formal and informal knowledge-protection mechanisms within the services 
and manufacturing sectors.  In addition to this, studies investigating the performance 
effects of formal and informal mechanisms within the services and manufacturing 
sectors are limited.  The hypotheses here reflect this position: 
Hypothesis 3a:  Formal/informal knowledge-protection strategies have a stronger 
positive effect upon the innovation returns of manufacturing-sector 
firms than service-sector firms 
Hypothesis 3b:  Formal/informal knowledge-protection strategies have a weaker 
positive effect upon the innovation returns of manufacturing-sector 
firms than service-sector firms 
 
v. Firm resources and capabilities 
Although all knowledge protection represents a cost to the firm, formal protection 
mechanisms are often viewed by firms as a more expensive option than informal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms.  Applying for a patent, for example, can be a 
costly process, and a firm will continue to incur costs whilst keeping a patent in force 
(Hall et al., 2014).  Patent enforcement requires firms to actively monitor markets for 
potential infringement.  If an infringement is detected, patent holders require 
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financial resources to enable them to engage in litigation.  Informal protection 
mechanisms, often viewed as the least expensive method of innovation protection, 
are not without their costs.  For example, the use of secrecy by firms is often 
accompanied by confidentiality agreements (Hall et al., 2014). 
As well as incurring costs when protecting innovations, firms face uncertainty when 
using both formal and informal protection mechanisms.  In the case of patents for 
example, this uncertainty relates to whether a patent will be granted, whether it will 
be invalidated at a point thereafter, whether any infringements will occur and if so, 
whether they will be proven.  A firm also faces uncertainty when using informal 
mechanisms, for example when a firm uses secrecy, it is uncertain as to whether the 
secret will be maintained and whether any breach of confidentiality will be proven, 
in court or otherwise. 
The strength of a firm’s formal knowledge protection often depends upon the 
resources it has available to threaten court action, and if necessary to take court 
action.  Small firms are likely to lack the necessary resources and capabilities to do 
this (West, 2006; Olander et al., 2009).  They are therefore more likely to choose 
informal mechanisms to protect their knowledge (Kitching and Blackburn, 1998; 
Leiponen and Byma, 2009). 
The costs and complexity associated with formal methods of protection make it more 
likely that small firms rely upon informal protection methods such as secrecy and 
speed to market (Arundel, 2001; Thomä and Bizer, 2013).  Arundel (2001) examines 
firms from seven European countries and analyses whether firm size influences the 
relative importance of particular knowledge-protection mechanisms.  The study finds 
that for firms of all sizes, secrecy is considered more relevant than patents, although 
in the case of product innovations, the relative importance of secrecy declines with 
firm size.  Regarding R&D intensive firms, all firms believe secrecy to be more 
effective than patents, but R&D intensive small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) attach more importance to patents than other SMEs. 
In their study, Coles et al. (2003) examine small firms in the textile-design sector of 
the UK, Italy and the United States.  Following an increase in computer-aided design 
and communication technologies, an increase in the speed and quality of design 
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copying occurred.  This impacted upon some sectors more than others.  Coles et al. 
(2003) find that small firms are unable to increase their use of formal knowledge 
protection to address the imitation problem because they lack the resources to do so.  
It is suggested that the small firms that lack resources may have to adapt their 
protection strategies in an alternative way, for example by frequently changing 
designs, implementing competitive pricing policies and increasing technical 
complexity so that designs are difficult to copy.   
In a qualitative study, Kitching and Blackburn (2003) examine how 389 small firms 
from four different sectors (computer software, design, electronics and mechanical 
engineering) exploit and protect their innovations.  They find that many small firms 
choose not to protect their innovations in any way and that many are unaware that 
protection mechanisms are available to them.  Small firms that do use formal 
protection methods to protect knowledge are identified as being the more innovative 
firms. 
Larger firms perceive patents to be effective (Combe and Pfister, 2000; Sattler, 
2003) and they attach more importance to them than smaller firms (Blind et al., 
2006).  Leiponen and Byma (2009) conduct an empirical study of small Finnish 
manufacturing and service firms.  They find that patents become more relevant as 
firm size increases. R&D-intensive small firms and science-based small firms are 
identified as those firms more likely to use formal methods of knowledge protection.  
Other small firms use speed to market or secrecy as protection methods.  In a study 
of Canadian firms, Hanel (2005) finds that the use of all formal protection 
mechanisms increases with firm size. 
With regards to performance, Hall and Sena (2017) find both informal and formal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms have a significant positive effect on the 
productivity of SMEs, but informal knowledge protection alone impacts upon larger 
firms’ productivity.  In addition, informal protection is more important for larger 
firms’ productivity than for SMEs.  Despite formal protection being more popular 
among larger firms (Hall et al., 2013), informal protection is more useful for 
increasing productivity in larger firms (Hall and Sena, 2017) – a result which can be 
explained by large firms being inclined to protect very valuable innovations with 
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secrecy rather than patents to avoid disclosing knowledge (Anton and Yao, 2004).  
The finding that formal protection mechanisms have a significant positive effect on 
SME productivity can be explained by SMEs having a greater need to access inputs 
external to the firm – in this case, formal knowledge-protection mechanisms become 
more useful to them than informal ones. 
The empirical evidence here is inconsistent – some studies find that formal 
protection mechanisms become more important as firm size increases whereas others 
find formal mechanisms are more important to SMEs – albeit R&D intensive SMEs 
– than larger firms.  In terms of performance, evidence is yet again limited.  The 
study discussed above finds informal protection mechanisms to be important for 
firms’ productivity – more so for larger firms’.  Taking into account this mixed 
evidence on the importance and use of formal and informal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms across firms of varying size, the following hypotheses are tested: 
Hypothesis 4a:  The positive relationship between a firm’s use of formal knowledge-
protection strategies and its innovation returns becomes stronger as 
firm size increases. 
Hypothesis 4b:  The positive relationship between a firm’s use of formal knowledge-
protection strategies and its innovation returns becomes weaker as 
firm size increases. 
Hypothesis 4c:  The positive relationship between a firm’s use of informal 
knowledge-protection strategies and its innovation returns becomes 
stronger as firm size increases. 
Hypothesis 4d:  The positive relationship between a firm’s use of informal 
knowledge-protection strategies and its innovation returns becomes 
weaker as firm size increases. 
vi. Innovation novelty 
Both the Yale I survey (Levin et al., 1987) and the Carnegie Mellon survey (Cohen 
et al., 2000) asked firms for the reasons why they did not use patents.  One of the 
most common firm responses was the lack of novelty of innovations (Lopez, 2009).  
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The degree of novelty associated with an innovation reflects the degree to which new 
skills, knowledge and capabilities need to be developed in order to capture the 
commercial value of the innovation (Laursen et al., 2013).  An extremely novel 
(radical) innovation is likely to require significant R&D investment (Hewitt-Dundas 
et al., 2017) and has a significant impact upon a market and upon the economic 
activity of firms within that market.  Such a radical or new-to-the-market innovation 
exhibits possible technological spillovers (Veugelers and Schneider, 2018), more so 
than less novel, new-to-the-firm innovation.  It is therefore reasonable to expect 
knowledge-protection mechanisms to be more extensively used in conjunction with 
new-to-the-market innovation than new-to-the-firm innovation.  It is also reasonable 
to expect formal knowledge-protection mechanisms to be used for novel, new-to-the-
market innovation. The lack of novelty associated with new-to-the-firm innovation 
suggests that formal protection mechanisms are less likely. 
Empirical studies tend to support these expectations.  Thomas (2003) interviews 120 
small firms in the biotechnology industry about their knowledge-protection practices.  
Strategies differ according to the firm’s stage of innovation.  Firms that took a 
product or service to the marketplace used patents as a protection method, whereas 
firms that supplied materials or services to other firms typically relied upon trade 
secrets.  Products developed by suppliers are characterised by rapid innovation, and 
the use of secrecy is deemed to be sufficient in such an environment where rapid 
changes in knowledge occur. 
In a study of Canadian manufacturing firms, Hanel (2005) finds that new-to-the-
market innovators rely more on formal protection than informal protection, although 
firms developing new markets are more likely to use trademarks than patents.  The 
stage of development of an innovation may determine which knowledge-protection 
mechanisms a firm uses.  When developing a new technology, firms are likely to use 
secrecy – they tend to apply for patents when taking a product to market (Hussinger, 
2006).  
Regarding performance, Laursen et al. (2013) find that a firm’s use of formal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms impacts upon sales of new-to-the-market 
innovation more strongly than sales of significantly improved products.  
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Significantly improved products represent incremental innovations.  These are 
largely imitative and therefore firms are less able to capture returns using formal 
mechanisms (Laursen et al., 2013).  Given the empirical evidence discussed above, it 
is expected that: 
Hypothesis 5:  Formal knowledge-protection strategies promote new-to-the-market 
innovation returns 
4.4 Data and methods 
4.4.1 Empirical model 
The present study is concerned with the innovation output that results during the 
second stage of the innovation value chain (Section 4.2.1.1 above) and the effect that 
both formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies have upon this innovation 
output.  During the second stage of the innovation value chain, knowledge sourced 
during the first stage, through R&D or external knowledge sourcing for example, is 
combined into a form which can be commercially exploited through innovations 
(Roper et al., 2008; Roper et al., 2017).  This transformation process is modelled 
here using an innovation production function (Geroski, 1990; Roper et al., 2008; 
Roper et al., 2017) where innovation outputs (or innovation returns) measured by 
sales of innovative products and processes is related to the firm’s formal and 
informal knowledge-protection strategies – themselves a reflection of the internally 
and externally generated knowledge that is sourced during the first stage of the 
innovation value chain (firms use formal and informal knowledge-protection 
strategies to aid the appropriation of returns to their innovations).  In accordance 
with the innovation production function literature, there is an underlying assumption 
that firms expect to receive a positive return on any investment they make into 
knowledge sourcing activities, and that the size of this investment is positively 
related to the expected return (Griliches, 1995).  The innovation production function 
is given by equation 1: 
𝐼𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐾𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐾𝑃𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖     (1) 
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where Ii is innovation outputs  (or returns) for firm i, FCi is a set of firm-level control 
variables (firm resources and capabilities, R&D, skills and externally sourced 
knowledge, for example), FKPi is an indicator of formal knowledge-protection 
strategies, IKPi is an indicator of informal knowledge-protection strategies and µi is 
the error term. 
4.4.2 Data 
The empirical analysis in the present study uses the seventh wave of the UK 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) which covers the three-year period 2008 to 
2010.  The UK CIS is based upon a core questionnaire developed by the European 
Commission (Eurostat) and Member States, and it forms part of a wider CIS 
covering European countries – the European Union Community Innovation Survey.   
Background and motivation for the UK’s innovation survey can be found in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Oslo manual 
(OECD, 2005), along with a description of the type of questions and definitions 
used.  In the UK, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) – the UK official 
government statistical office – manages the administration of and data collection for 
the UK CIS. 
The UK CIS is conducted every two years and represents the main source of 
innovation data in the UK providing detailed information on firms’ innovation 
activity.  The survey provides an insight into the objectives of this innovation 
activity and firms’ external innovation connections.  Questions relating to firm size 
and structure, customer base, firm product and process innovation activity, the 
sources of innovation, perceived barriers to innovation, the levels of public support 
and basic economic information about the firm are included. 
The UK CIS sampling frame is taken from the Inter-departmental Business Register 
(IDBR), a UK-Government compiled register of all UK businesses based on tax and 
payroll records. The survey is statistically representative of the 12 regions of the UK, 
most industrial sectors and all sizes of firms with more than 10 employees.   
Although essentially a postal questionnaire sent to 28 thousand UK enterprises with 
10 or more employees across manufacturing and services sectors, an unexpected 
270 
 
poor survey return for the seventh wave of the UK CIS meant that almost half of all 
responses – around seven thousand – were collected by telephone interview.  When 
combined with the postal returns, this resulted in 14,342 valid enterprise responses – 
a 50 per cent response rate.13 
The UK innovation surveys ask firms about their intellectual property and 
knowledge protection, although both the wording and detail level of the question 
varies across the different waves of data.  The seventh wave – covering the three-
year period 2008 to 2010 – asks firms about both formal and informal knowledge 
protection that took place within their business during the three-year period.  Of the 
waves available, this seventh wave of data provides the most detailed insight into 
firms’ new knowledge protection.  For this reason, the seventh wave of UK CIS is 
used here to examine the effect formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies 
have upon a firm’s innovation returns. 
Of the 14,342 responses in the seventh wave of the UK CIS, 3,520 are from firms 
that innovated during the 2008 to 2010 period – these firms introduced new or 
significantly improved products and processes.  The empirical analysis in this study 
uses the survey data obtained from these 3,520 innovating firms. 
4.4.2.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable – innovation returns – uses UK CIS data indicating the 
proportion of firms’ sales – at the time of the survey – coming from products and 
services newly introduced during the previous three-year period.  Firms in the 
seventh wave of the survey are asked to estimate the percentage of their business’s 
total turnover in 2010 from goods and services that were (a) new to the market in 
2008 to 2010 and (b) only new to the business in 2008-2010.  The dependent 
variable is equal to the sum of the firm’s two responses and thus indicates the 
proportion of firm sales coming from new-to-the-market and new-to-the-firm 
innovation.  Previous studies (Laursen and Salter, 2006; Becker et al., 2016; Roper et 
al., 2016b; Roper et al., 2017, for example) use this measure as an indicator of 
innovation output.  It illustrates a firm’s ability to introduce new products and 





services to the market as well as their commercial success (Roper et al., 2017).  The 
proportion of sales turnover coming from new-to-the-market and new-to-the-firm 
innovation is estimated by the firm, and therefore, the dependent variable is not 
measured relative to the sector characteristics – turnover relative to the average 
sector turnover, for example. 
4.4.2.2 Independent variables 
There are two independent variables in the analysis – one variable represents a firm’s 
formal knowledge-protection strategy and the other represents a firm’s informal 
knowledge-protection strategy. 
In the seventh wave of UK CIS, firms are asked if they protected innovation and 
intellectual property during the 2008 to 2010 period.  Firms are asked whether they 
used the following seven knowledge-protection mechanisms: patents, registration of 
design, trademarks, copyright, secrecy (including non-disclosure agreements), 
complexity of design and lead-time on competitors.  Firms’ responses to each 
question are recorded as a 0 or a 1, with a 1 denoting that the method of protection 
took place.     
The seven knowledge-protection mechanisms in the survey data have a high degree 
of internal consistency (Cronbach Alpha Coefficient = 0.75), suggesting a high 
degree of correlation among the individual knowledge-protection survey questions.  
Groups of questions may therefore measure some underlying latent attribute; 
consequently, there may be groups of variables that are closely related.  With a prior 
expectation that formal knowledge-protection mechanisms may be closely related to 
one another and that informal knowledge-protection mechanisms may also be closely 
related to one another, an exploratory factor analysis of the knowledge-protection 
data is performed.  Factor analysis has previously been used to examine firms’ use of 
knowledge protection mechanisms (Miles et al., 2000).  In their study, Miles et al. 
(2000) find that 65 service firms from a variety of sectors rely on four combinations 
of protection mechanisms.  By conducting an exploratory factor analysis of the data 
in the present study, the seven dimensions of knowledge protection are reduced and 
any attributes that exist are condensed into factors. 
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As the response data is binary, the tetrachoric correlation matrix is computed, and a 
factor analysis (with principal component factors14) of the resulting correlation 
matrix is performed.  The two groups of variables – or factors – with an eigenvalue 
greater than 1 are retained (Guttman-Kaiser rule) – together they explain 
approximately 75 per cent of the variation in the knowledge-protection data. 
The original knowledge-protection variables are assigned as efficiently as possible to 
the two extracted factors by undertaking an oblique15, oblimin rotation.  This 
procedure allows the different knowledge-protection mechanisms to group and 
cluster together.   
The correlations (or factor loadings) between the original seven knowledge-
protection mechanisms and the two extracted factors are examined.  The knowledge-
protection mechanisms with factor loadings less than 0.316 (in absolute terms) are 
hidden in order to identify those knowledge-protection mechanisms most correlated 
with the two extracted factors.  The formal knowledge-protection mechanisms 
(patents, registration of design and trademarks) are highly correlated with one  factor 
(factor loading for patents: 0.82; registration of design: 0.86; trademarks:0.95), and 
the informal knowledge-protection mechanisms (secrecy – including  non-disclosure 
agreements, complexity of design and lead-time on competitors) are highly 
correlated with the other factor (factor loading for secrecy – including non-disclosure 
agreements: 0.69; complexity of design: 0.85; lead-time on competitors: 0.90 ).  
Copyright is found to be correlated with both factors, although it loads more strongly 
onto the first factor along with patents, registration of design and trademarks (a 
factor loading of 0.59 compared with 0.36 for the second factor). 
The first factor is loaded most highly with formal protection mechanisms and is 
therefore representative of a formal knowledge-protection strategy.  The second 
                                                          
14 The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.8. As this value is greater than 0.5, the 
use of principal component factor extraction is supported. 
15 Oblique rotation is preferred to orthogonal rotation when the goal is to obtain theoretically 
meaningful factors or constructs rather than to achieve data reduction.  Oblique rotation assumes that 
factors are correlated.  Here, the correlation between factors is 0.48, greater than the suggested 0.32 
threshold. 
16 Knowledge-protection mechanisms with factor loadings less than 0.3 (in absolute terms) are 




factor is loaded most highly with informal knowledge-protection mechanisms and is 
representative of an informal knowledge-protection strategy.  Although copyright is 
a formal knowledge-protection mechanism, it loads onto both factors.  As an easily 
accessible formal protection mechanism, firms are most likely to use copyright 
before any other formal method, thus explaining its correlation with both factors.  
The aim of the present study is to examine how a firm’s formal and informal 
knowledge-protection strategies impact upon its returns to innovation rather than to 
investigate the effect of individual knowledge-protection mechanisms.  The 
exploratory factor analysis conducted here extracts two factors – one factor with  
high factor loadings from formal knowledge-protection mechanisms and the other 
with high factor loadings from informal knowledge-protection mechanisms (with the 
exception of copyright).  The two extracted factors are used in the empirical analysis 
to represent firms’ formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies. 
4.4.2.3 Control variables 
A set of control variables are also included in the model.  These variables represent 
factors, other than a firm’s formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies, 
which previous studies have shown to impact upon a firm’s innovation outputs or 
returns; they are variables – in addition to the independent variables – which 
influence the effectiveness of a firm’s knowledge transformation activities (Roper et 
al., 2008).  The control variables used here reflect a firm’s characteristics, its 
resource base and its capabilities (Griliches, 1992; Love and Roper, 1999).  Many of 
the variables, for example skills, firm size and whether or not a firm exported, are an 
indication of the quality of a firm’s knowledge base.  The control variables include: 
i. Firm size 
Firm size – commonly used in studies of innovative performance (Cohen, 1995) – is 
thought to influence a firm’s propensity to innovate (Laursen et al., 2013).  The 
number of employees (expressed as a logarithm) is included here to reflect the scale 




ii. Skill levels 
 Skill levels – or the strength of firms’ human resources – impact upon innovation 
(Leiponen, 2005; Freel, 2005; Hewitt-Dundas, 2006) and are measured using the 
proportion of a firm’s employees that hold a degree or higher qualification in (a) 
science or engineering subjects and (b) other subjects. 
iii. Firm’s export status 
Exporting and innovative activity has been linked through both competition and 
learning effects (Love and Roper, 2013).  A binary (0/1) variable is included 
indicating whether or not the firm exported during the three-year period. 
iv. R&D 
Innovation outputs are positively related to internally generated knowledge coming 
from in-house R&D (Love and Roper, 2001; Love and Roper, 2005) and knowledge 
sourced from external partners.  Two binary (0/1) variables are included in the model 
to indicate whether or not the firm reported (a) internal R&D expenditure and (b) 
external R&D expenditure during the three-year period.  
v. Other Innovation-related investments 
Following Becker et al. (2016), several variables reflecting firms’ innovation-related 
investments are included in the model.  Binary (0/1) variables indicating whether or 
not acquisition of advanced machinery and equipment took place, whether or not 
acquisition of computer hardware took place, whether or not acquisition of computer 
software took place, whether or not training for innovative activities took place and 
whether or not engagement in design activities took place are all included.  
Investment into design has been shown to impact upon innovation outputs (Love et 
al., 2011), and it is expected that the additional innovation investment variables 
included here will also have a positive impact upon a firm’s innovation outputs or 
returns. 
vi. The acquisition of external knowledge 
The acquisition of knowledge from other businesses or organisations, such as the 
purchase or licensing of patents and non-patented inventions and know-how, 
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strengthens a firm’s knowledge resources and helps promote innovation outputs.  A 
binary (0/1) variable indicating whether or not the firm acquired such external 
knowledge is included in the model.  
vii. Government assistance 
Any government assistance a firm receives enhances its resource base, and the 
additional internal resources are expected to impact positively upon the firm’s 
innovation outputs (Roper and Hewitt-Dundas, 2005; Link et al., 2005).  A binary 
(0/1) variable indicating whether or not the firm received public support for 
innovation is included in the model. 
viii. Breadth of innovation co-operation 
The extent of a firm’s interactive knowledge search has been used extensively in 
studies of the determinants of innovation (for example, Laursen and Salter, 2006; 
Becker et al., 2016) and is measured by a variable indicating the extent or breadth of 
the firm’s innovation co-operation.  The UK CIS asks firms if they co-operated on 
any innovation activity.  Firms are asked specifically about co-operation which may 
have taken place with seven particular co-operation partners ( for example, 
competitors or other businesses within the industry, universities or other higher 
education institutions and government or public research institutes).  Following 
Laursen and Salter (2006) and Becker et al. (2016), firms’ binary (0/1) responses for 
each of the seven co-operation partners are summed to create a count indicator 
having a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 7.  This count indicator is 
included in the model to represent firms’ breadth of innovation co-operation. 
ix. Sectoral dummies 
To allow for sectoral heterogeneity – different levels of innovation intensities across 
industries (Levin et al. 1987; Cohen et al. 2000) – sector dummies at the two-digit 
level are included in the model. 
4.4.3 Estimation method 
The appropriate estimation method for the innovation production function depends 
primarily on the nature of the dependent variable.  The dependent variable here – 
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innovation returns – is the proportion of firm sales coming from innovation: by 
definition, its value is bounded between 0 and 100 (or 0 and 1).  In this case, the 
explanatory variables have non-linear effects on the dependent variable (the variance 
falls as the mean approaches either of the dependent variable boundaries), and 
therefore linear regression methods are inappropriate.17  Previously, some studies 
have used censored normal regression techniques such as Tobit to model proportions 
data (for example, Laursen and Salter, 2005; Roper and Hewitt-Dundas, 2016; Roper 
et al., 2016c).  But, it is important to note that in this case, the Tobit analysis 
truncates values at the boundaries implying that they are not true zeros or ones.  
However, in the case where the dependent variable represents a proportion (bounded 
between 0 and 1), any observed zeros or ones in the dependent variable data here are 
not strictly censored data as values outside the [0, 1] range are not feasible (Baum, 
2008). 
A method for handling proportion or fractional response data of this kind (i.e. 
bounded between 0 and 1) was first proposed by Papke and Wooldridge in their 
1996 seminal paper.  Their fractional response model takes into account both the 
upper and lower bounds of the dependent variable, predicts response values that lie 
within the dependent variable range and captures the nonlinearity of the data (Gallani 
et al., 2015). 
The fractional response model uses a logit link function (i.e. a logit transformation of 
the dependent variable that does not treat the fractional dependent variable as a 
binary response) and the binomial distribution – an appropriate distribution choice 
given that the variance of the binomial distribution tends to 0 as the mean tends to 
either 0 or 1 – the boundary values of the dependent variable.  At each boundary 
value, the variable approaches a constant; the variance is therefore maximised when 
the mean is equal to 0.5.  In addition, the fractional response model does not allow 
for an alternative model of behaviour, or require special data transformations, at 
dependent variable boundary values.  It permits a direct estimation of the conditional 
expectation of the dependent variable given the predictors (Gallani et al., 2015).  
                                                          
17 The drawbacks of using linear models for proportion data are analogous to the drawbacks of using 




This feature of the model is desirable because while it may be the case that zeros in 
the dependent variable are structural, for example process innovators will never 
report product innovation sales, they may also represent product innovators that do 
not make innovation-related sales.   
Following Laursen et al. (2013) who use the Papke and Wooldridge (1996) method 
to estimate a fractional response model of innovative performance, the innovation 
production function here (or the fractional response model) is implemented by 
estimating a generalised linear model (GLM)18 with a binomial distributional family 
and logit link function.19  The estimation of the model’s parameters is based on a 
quasi-maximum likelihood method (QMLE) which generates fully robust and 
relatively efficient estimates under general linear model conditions (Papke and 
Wooldridge, 1996).   
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Descriptive results 
Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients are given in Tables 4.1 to 4.3.  
Table 4.1 shows the use of formal knowledge-protection mechanisms (patents, 
registered industrial designs, registered trademarks and copyright) and informal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms (secrecy – including non-disclosure agreements, 
complexity of design and lead-time advantage) within different groups of innovating 
firms.  Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al. (2000) identify secrecy as being an 
important knowledge-protection mechanism across all innovators, and the data here 
supports this finding as secrecy (including non-disclosure agreements) is the most 
used knowledge-protection mechanism within each innovator group (Table 4.1).  
The highest values are experienced in the new-to-the-market, high-
technology/knowledge-intensive and manufacturing groups with 36.3 per cent, 35.4 
per cent and 34.0 per cent of firms respectively using secrecy (including non-
                                                          
18 Generalised linear models model how the mean of the distribution of the dependent variable 
changes as the explanatory variables change. 
 
19 Note that the fractional response model requires that the dependent variable – the proportion of firm 




disclosure agreements) to protect innovations during the 2008 to 2010 period.  The 
lowest values are in the low-technology/less knowledge-intensive and the new-to-
the-firm group: 20.2 per cent and 22.0 per cent of firms respectively use secrecy to 
protect innovations during the three-year period.  
Registered trademarks are the second most popular knowledge-protection 
mechanism used by all innovators in the UK CIS 2008 to 2010 (14.7 per cent of 
firms).  Trademarks are also the second most popular knowledge-protection 
mechanism for five of the individual innovator groups (new-to-the-firm, medium-
sized, large-sized, low-technology/less knowledge-intensive and service-sector 
innovators).  For three of the remaining four innovator groups (new-to-the-market, 
high-technology/knowledge-intensive and manufacturing-sector innovators), patents 
are the second most popular knowledge-protection mechanism: 22.8 per cent, 15.8 
per cent and 20.2 percent of firms respectively use patents to protect innovations.  
Previous studies (for example, Levin et al., 1987; Harabi, 1995; Cohen et al., 2000) 
find patents to be an important protection mechanism for firms in the pharmaceutical 
and chemical industries.  The data here is consistent with these studies as patents are 
more widely used by R&D-intensive innovators.  In the final innovator group – 
small-sized firms – copyright and lead-advantage time are the second most popular 
knowledge-protection mechanisms.  Around 12 per cent of firms in this small-sized-
firm group use these knowledge-protection mechanisms.  This is supported by 
Leiponen and Byma (2009) who find that small firms use secrecy and speed-to-
market to protect their knowledge.  Informal mechanisms such as secrecy, copyright 
and lead-advantage time are accessed more easily by small firms than the other 
knowledge-protection mechanisms as their use requires fewer firm resources and 
capabilities.  Given that small firms often lack resources and capabilities, the 
popularity of secrecy, copyright and lead-advantage time amongst small firms is 
unsurprising. 
There is a relatively high use of all seven knowledge-protection mechanisms in the 
new-to-the-market and manufacturing sector innovator groups.  In each of these 
groups, the proportion of firms using each protection mechanism is similar. 
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The least popular protection mechanism within all innovator groups is the 
registration of industrial designs.  The proportion of firms using the mechanism is 
highest in the manufacturing sector innovator group (7.9 per cent) and lowest in the 
new-to-the-firm innovator group (2.2 per cent).  The new-to-the-market and large-
sized innovator groups have values towards the top of this range; 6.5 per cent and 7.1 
per cent of firms respectively use the registration of design as a knowledge-
protection mechanism. 
The use of complexity of design as a protection mechanism is the sixth most popular 
knowledge-protection mechanism in all innovator groups.  The largest proportion of 
firms using this mechanism is found in both the new-to-the-market and 
manufacturing-sector innovator groups (13.6 per cent and 13.2 percent respectively), 
although 10.1 per cent of firms in the large-sized innovator group and 11.9 per cent 
of firms in the high-technology/knowledge-intensive innovator group use this 
protection mechanism. 
The proportion of firms using patents, registered industrial designs and registered 
trademarks – all formal knowledge-protection mechanisms – increases with firm size 
as does the proportion of firms using complexity of design – an informal protection 
method. 
Table 4.2 shows the mean and standard deviation value for each of the variables 
described in Section 4.4.2 above and used in the empirical analysis.  Minimum and 
maximum values are not given in compliance with ONS’s rule on disclosure.  Across 
all 3,520 innovating firms, on average, 13.4 per cent of a firm’s sales (at the time of 
the survey) came from products and services newly introduced by the firm during the 
2008 to 2010 period.  On average, 10.6 per cent of an innovating firm’s workforce 
has a science/engineering degree, and 11.7 per cent has a degree from other 
disciplines.  The mean of each binary (0/1) independent variable indicates the 
proportion of innovating firms that gave a positive ‘yes’ response to the particular 
question being asked.  For example, 18 per cent of innovating firms indicated that 
they received public support for innovation during the 2008 to 2010 period; 47 per 
cent of innovating firms indicated that they exported during the 2008 to 2010 period; 
and 33 per cent of innovating firms indicated that they acquired advanced machinery 
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and equipment during the 2008 to 2010 period.  The breadth of innovation co-
operation data indicates that, on average, an innovating firm had 2 innovation 
cooperation partners during the 2008 to 2010 period.    
Table 4.3 shows the correlation coefficients for all variables included in the analysis.  
The reported values do not indicate collinearity problems: The highest value in the 
table is 0.63, and this represents the correlation between the innovating firm’s 
acquisition of computer hardware and its acquisition of computer software.  
Although it is reasonable to expect that these two variables may be correlated, the 
value of the correlation coefficient is not high enough to warrant that further action 
be taken.   
4.5.2 Econometric results 
The estimation results are given in Tables 4.4 to 4.9.  All estimations include two-
digit industry dummy variables, results of which are not shown in the tables. 
4.5.2.1 Baseline model 
A baseline model – including all 3,520 innovating firms – is first estimated.  The 
baseline-model results in Table 4.4 show that a formal knowledge-protection (FKP) 
strategy and an informal knowledge-protection (IKP) strategy have, on average, 
significant, positive effects (at the 1 per cent level) on a firm’s innovation returns.  
The parameter for the FKP strategy variable and the IKP variable is identical (0.441) 
suggesting that formal and informal protection strategies have similar positive effects 
upon a firm’s returns to innovation.  These results indicate that a stronger protection 
strategy – be it a FKP strategy or an IKP strategy – leads to higher innovation 
returns.  These findings are evidence in support of Hypothesis 1 which states that a 
firm’s formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies are positively related to 
its innovation returns. 
The results show that a firm’s knowledge-protection strategy is an important 
determinant of the proportion of its sales coming from innovation (i.e. innovation 
returns), and that, on average, implementing a stronger protection strategy leads to 
an increase in this proportion or an increase in innovation returns.  By strengthening 
its knowledge-protection strategy, a firm can capture the benefits of its innovative 
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efforts – shown here by an increase in the proportion of its sales coming from 
innovation.  If a firm is unable to capture the benefits of its innovative efforts, there 
is little incentive for the firm to innovate (Laursen and Salter, 2005), and these 
results provide evidence in support of the view that knowledge-protection 
mechanisms can be used by firms as a strategic tool to capture the private returns to 
innovation (Laursen and Salter, 2005; Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007).  By allowing 
firms to capture returns to innovation, knowledge-protection mechanisms provide 
firms with an incentive to innovate and, in addition, offer them an incentive for 
future innovation (Granstrand, 1999).    
4.5.2.2 Sub-sample models 
Section 4.3.1 above identifies reasons – suggested by previous studies – why the use 
of formal and informal knowledge-protection mechanisms may differ across firms.  
In accordance with this thinking, sub-sample estimates for specific groups of firms 
are also obtained.  The model is estimated for firms within different industry groups, 
firms with different resources and capabilities and firms carrying out innovations 
with different degrees of novelty. 
i. Different industries/different technologies 
To examine whether the effects of the two different types of knowledge-protection 
strategy vary across industries/technologies, the 3,520 innovating firms are classified 
into two separate groups using two different methods of separation.  Firstly, all 
innovating firms are separated into high-technology/knowledge-intensive firms and 
low-technology/less knowledge-intensive firms, and secondly, all innovating firms 
are separated into service-sector firms and manufacturing-sector firms. 
a. High-technology/knowledge-intensive firms and low-technology/less 
knowledge-intensive firms 
Following the OECD (2011), manufacturing firms are sorted into four groups based 
upon their level of technology – a firm is identified as belonging to one of four 
categories: high-technology industries, medium-high-technology industries, 
medium-low-technology industries or low-technology industries.  In its 
classification, the OECD uses expenditure on R&D to determine the technological 
input of each manufacturing industry.  Both direct and indirect expenditure on R&D 
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are considered, including the purchase of machinery, equipment and intermediary 
inputs (Hatzichronoglou, 1997).  For the purpose of this study, each firm’s economic 
activity is classified according to the level of technology and knowledge given by its 
three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code.   
Firms in the service sectors are sorted into six categories based upon the OECD’s 
proposal for knowledge-intensive services (Eurostat, 2007) – they are identified as 
belonging to one of six groups: knowledge-intensive high-technology services, 
knowledge-intensive market services, knowledge-intensive financial services, other 
knowledge-intensive services, less knowledge-intensive market services or other less 
knowledge-intensive services.  The most knowledge-intensive services generally 
show higher investment in R&D, a greater use of information technology and a 
tendency to hire highly qualified personnel.  As for the manufacturing sector, each 
service-sector firm’s economic activity is classified according to the level of 
technology and knowledge given by its three-digit SIC code. 
In order to obtain two groups of firms with contrasting technology/knowledge levels, 
firms belonging to the high-technology and medium high-technology manufacturing 
groups are merged with those belonging to the four knowledge-intensive service-
sector groups – forming a group of high-technology/knowledge-intensive firms 
(1,758 firms), and firms belonging to the medium low-technology and low-
technology manufacturing groups are merged with those belonging to the two less 
knowledge-intensive service groups – forming a group of low-technology/less 
knowledge-intensive firms (1,762 firms). 
The estimation results for the high-technology/knowledge-intensive firms and the 
low-technology/less knowledge-intensive firms are shown in Table 4.5.  The results 
show that a FKP strategy and an IKP strategy have a significant, positive effect (at 
the 1 per cent level) on the returns to innovation of high-technology/knowledge-
intensive firms: a stronger FKP strategy leads to higher returns to innovation as does 
a stronger IKP strategy.  The parameter for the IKP strategy variable (0.555) is larger 
than that for the FKP strategy variable (0.461) suggesting that an informal strategy 
has a larger, positive effect upon a firm’s returns to innovation. 
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Both a FKP strategy and an IKP strategy have a significant, positive effect upon the 
returns to innovation of low-technology/less knowledge-intensive firms, although the 
degree of significance for each strategy variable is less than in the 
high-technology/knowledge-intensive firm case (the protection variables are 
significant at the 5 per cent and 10 per cent level respectively).  As with high-
technology/knowledge-intensive firms, a stronger FKP strategy leads to higher 
returns to innovation as does a stronger IKP strategy.  In contrast to the 
high-technology/knowledge-intensive firms, the parameter for the FKP strategy is 
larger than that for the IKP strategy (0.415 compared with 0.276) suggesting that a 
formal strategy has a larger, positive effect upon a firm’s returns to innovation than 
an informal strategy.  These findings provide evidence which suggests that 
Hypothesis 2b should be rejected in favour of Hypothesis 2a which states that 
formal/informal knowledge-protection strategies have a stronger positive effect upon 
the innovation returns of high-technology/knowledge-intensive firms than low-
technology/less knowledge-intensive firms. 
Although the analysis shows FKP strategies and IKP strategies to have a significant, 
positive impact upon the innovation returns of high-technology/knowledge-intensive 
and low-technology/less knowledge-intensive firms, the two different protection 
strategies illustrate a greater level of statistical significance for 
high-technology/knowledge-intensive firms’ innovation returns.  This is consistent 
with Cohen et al. (2000) who find that R&D intensive industries report a high 
effectiveness of almost every knowledge-protection mechanism – the results here 
show that a predominantly formal protection strategy and a predominantly informal 
protection strategy have a highly significant, positive effect upon a firm’s innovation 
returns.  Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al. (2000) find that a high percentage of all 
firms rely on informal protection mechanisms, and it is the R&D intensive firms, 
such as those in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, that also use formal 
protection methods.  Other studies (for example, Mansfield, 1986; Harabi, 1995; 
Leiponen and Byma, 2009) find similar results.  The results here support previous 
studies that highlight the importance of informal knowledge-protection mechanisms 
for the innovation returns of all firms, regardless of their industry.  They also 
illustrate the importance of formal protection mechanisms for the innovation returns 
of low-technology/less knowledge-intensive firms.  Results here show that informal 
284 
 
protection strategies have a less significant effect upon the innovation returns of 
firms in low-technology/less knowledge-intensive firms than those in high-
technology/knowledge-intensive firms. 
b. Service-sector firms and manufacturing-sector firms 
The 3,520 innovating firms are separated into service sector firms (2,310 firms) and 
manufacturing sector firms (1,210 firms) according to their three-digit SIC codes.  
The estimation results for each group are shown in Table 4.6.  The results show that 
a FKP strategy and an IKP strategy have a significant, positive effect (at the 10 per 
cent level) on a firm’s innovation returns in manufacturing-sector firms, indicating 
that a stronger FKP strategy leads to higher returns to innovation as does a stronger 
IKP strategy.  The parameter for the FKP strategy variable (0.295) is slightly larger 
than that for the IKP strategy variable (0.272) suggesting that a formal protection 
strategy has a slightly larger, positive effect on manufacturing firms’ innovation 
returns than an informal protection strategy. 
As for service-sector firms, the results in Table 4.6 show that a FKP strategy and an 
IKP strategy have a significant, positive effect (at the 1 per cent level) on firms’ 
innovation returns, so that a stronger FKP strategy leads to higher innovation returns 
as does a stronger IKP strategy.  The parameter for the IKP strategy variable is 
slightly larger than that for the FKP strategy variable (0.559 compared with 0.504) 
suggesting that an informal protection strategy has a slightly larger positive effect on 
service firms’ innovation returns than a formal protection strategy.  These findings 
provide evidence which suggests that Hypothesis 3a should be rejected in favour of 
Hypothesis 3b which states that formal/informal knowledge-protection strategies 
have a weaker positive effect upon the innovation returns of manufacturing-sector 
firms than service-sector firms. 
Although FKP strategies and IKP strategies are found to be statistically significant 
for manufacturing and service firms’ innovation returns, both knowledge-protection 
strategies illustrate a greater level of statistical importance for service-sector firms’ 
innovation returns.  These results are evidence against the view that service-sector 
firms gain no benefit from using formal knowledge-protection mechanisms.  Indeed, 
some studies (for example, Mairesse and Mohnen, 2004) suggest that most service-
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sector firms do not use any protection mechanisms.  In accordance with Hall and 
Sena (2017) who find that formal protection mechanisms are important for service-
sector productivity, the results here show that formal protection mechanisms have a 
significant, positive effect on service-sector firms’ innovation returns.  In contrast to 
Hall and Sena (2017), results here show that an informal protection strategy has a 
slightly larger effect upon service-sector firms’ innovation returns than a formal 
protection strategy; Hall and Sena (2017) find that formal protection mechanisms are 
more important for service-sector productivity.  In this study, both protection 
strategies have a significant, positive effect on the returns to innovation of firms in 
the manufacturing sector although the effects are not as strong as in the service 
sector.  In contrast, Hall and Sena (2017) find that formal and informal protection 
has a negative effect on the productivity of manufacturing firms. 
Previous studies highlight the limited use of formal and informal protection methods 
in service-sector firms: Hipp and Herstatt (2006) find that those that use protection 
tend to use informal methods with only 6 per cent of service-sector firms using 
formal protection methods, Blind et al. (2003) find that applications made for formal 
protection mechanisms in the service sector are far fewer than those in the 
manufacturing sector and Baldwin et al. (1998) find that less than half of all 
innovating service-sector firms report using any knowledge protection.  The analysis 
here shows the importance of formal and informal protection mechanisms for returns 
to innovation in service-sector firms and highlights the need to promote the use of 
protection mechanisms in these firms. 
ii. Different resources and capabilities 
Section 4.3.1 above discusses previous studies that find small firms lack the 
necessary resources and capabilities needed to use formal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms to protect their knowledge (for example, Olander et al., 2009; West, 
2006).  In line with this viewpoint, firm size is used here to indicate the level of firm 
resources and capabilities that are available in order to protect knowledge. 
To examine whether the effects of the two knowledge-protection strategies vary 
across firms with different resources and capabilities, the 3,520 innovating firms are 
classified into three separate groups according to firm size.  The first group includes 
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firms with 10 to 49 employees (1,491 firms), the second group includes medium 
firms with 50 to 249 employees (1,143 firms) and the third group includes large 
firms with 250 or more employees (789 firms).20 
Table 4.7 shows the model estimation results for all three sizebands.  In small firms, 
both the FKP strategy and the IKP strategy have significant, positive effects (at the 1 
per cent and 5 per cent levels respectively) on a firm’s innovation returns.  This 
indicates that a stronger protection strategy leads to higher innovation returns.  
However, a FKP strategy has a higher level of statistical significance than an IKP 
strategy.   
In medium-sized firms, a FKP strategy and an IKP strategy have significant, positive 
effects (at the 10 per cent level) on a firm’s innovation returns.  As with small firms, 
the results imply that a stronger protection strategy leads to higher innovation 
returns.  The parameter for the FKP strategy variable (0.375) is slightly larger than 
that for the IKP strategy variable (0.359) suggesting that a FKP strategy has a 
slightly larger, positive effect on the innovation returns of medium-sized firms than 
an IKP strategy. 
The results for large firms show that an IKP strategy has a significant, positive effect 
(at the 1per cent level) on a firm’s innovation returns, and therefore a stronger IKP 
strategy leads to higher innovation returns.  In contrast, a FKP strategy has an 
insignificant effect on the innovation returns of large firms. 
Previous studies find that patents – a formal protection mechanism – become more 
relevant to firms as firm size increases (for example, Leiponen and Byma, 2009) and 
that the use of all formal protection mechanisms increases with firm size (for 
example, Hanel, 2005).  Larger firms also perceive patents to be effective (Combe 
and Pfister, 2000), but results here show that large-firm innovation returns are 
positively related to informal protection strategies – formal protection strategies have 
an insignificant effect upon innovation returns in large firms.  This introduces an 
                                                          
20 There are 97 firms with fewer than 10 employees. 
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inconsistency between the mechanisms large firms believe to be important for 
innovation returns and those which have a significant impact upon them. 
Many studies identify that formal knowledge-protection mechanisms may be too 
costly and complex for small firms to use (for example, Olander et al., 2009) and that 
because of this, they are more likely to use informal protection methods (for 
example, Kitching and Blackburn, 1998).  The results here show that the benefits to 
small firms from using formal protection mechanisms – in terms of returns to 
innovation – are greater than those from using informal knowledge protection.   
Although the significance of formal knowledge-protection strategies for firm 
innovation returns falls here as firm size increases and formal knowledge-protection 
strategies are insignificant in the large-firm model results, it is important to note that 
the results for each sizeband relate to all sectors – formal protection mechanisms are 
more relevant in some sectors than others.  In contrast, informal knowledge-
protection strategies have a significant, positive effect on a firm’s innovation returns 
in all sizebands emphasising the importance of informal protection strategies more 
generally.  In terms of performance effects, the results here are consistent with those 
of Hall and Sena (2017) who find that both formal and informal knowledge-
protection mechanisms have a significant positive effect on SME productivity but 
only informal knowledge-protection mechanisms impact upon large-firm 
productivity.    
Overall, the estimation results in Table 4.7 lead to the rejection of Hypothesis 4a in 
favour of Hypothesis 4b which states that the positive relationship between a firm’s 
use of formal knowledge-protection strategies and its innovation returns becomes 
weaker as firm size increases and the rejection of Hypothesis 4d in favour of 
Hypothesis 4c which states that the positive relationship between a firm’s use of 
informal knowledge-protection strategies and its innovation returns becomes 





iii. Different levels of innovation novelty 
To examine whether the effects of the two protection strategies vary with the novelty 
of the firm’s innovation, three different groups of innovators are identified.  Firstly, 
firms that introduce a new good or service to the market before competitors represent 
a new-to-the-market group, secondly, firms that introduce a new good or service that 
was essentially the same as a good or service already available from competitors 
represent a new-to-the-firm group and thirdly, firms that introduce both a good or 
service before competitors and a good or service essentially the same as competitors 
represent form a new-to-the-market-and-firm group. 
The estimation results for the three different innovator types – new-to-the-market, 
new-to-the-firm and new-to-the-market-and-firm – are shown in Table 4.8.  The 
results for the new-to-the-market group of firms show that a FKP strategy has a 
significant, positive effect (at the 5 per cent level) on a firm’s innovation returns – a 
stronger FKP strategy will lead to higher returns to innovation.  An IKP strategy has 
an insignificant effect on the innovation returns of new-to-the-market innovators. 
The two protection strategy variables have an insignificant effect on the innovation 
returns of new-to-the-firm innovators, whereas both protection-strategy variables 
have a significant, positive effect on the innovation returns of firms carrying out both 
new-to-the-market and new-to-the-firm innovations.  Results for firms carrying out 
both types of innovation show the FKP strategy variable to be significant at the 10 
per cent level – less significant than in the new-to-the-market case, and the IKP 
strategy variable to be significant at the 1 per cent level – the IKP strategy is 
insignificant in the new-to-the-market case. 
Results here are consistent with Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al. (2000) who find 
that firms do not use patents when an innovation lacks novelty and Thomas (2003) 
and Hanel (2005) who find firms that take a product or service to the marketplace are 
those that use formal knowledge-protection mechanisms.  The estimation results in 
Table 4.8 show that formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies have no 
significant impact upon the innovation returns of a new-to-the-firm innovator.  A 
new-to-the-firm innovation lacks novelty, and because of this, the use of formal 
knowledge-protection mechanisms is less likely.  In contrast, new-to-the-market 
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innovation is novel, and the results here are consistent with those of Laursen et al. 
(2013) who find firms that carry out new-to-the-market innovation are able to use 
formal protection mechanisms to increase their innovative sales. 
In summary, the estimation results support Hypothesis 5 which states that formal 
knowledge-protection strategies promote new-to-the-market innovation returns. 
4.5.2.3 New-to-the-market innovators: an extended analysis 
Those firms introducing a new good or service to the marketplace are described here 
as new-to-the-market innovators.  Section 4.5.2.2 above examines the effects a 
formal knowledge-protection strategy and an informal knowledge-protection strategy 
have upon the innovation returns of new-to-the-market innovators.  This section 
explores whether the effects of the two different knowledge-protection strategies 
vary across different firms within this new-to-the-market group.  In line with the sub-
sample estimations discussed above, the new-to-the-market innovators are separated 
into different groups for comparative purposes: small firms, medium firms and large 
firms; high-technology/knowledge-intensive firms and low-technology/less 
knowledge-intensive firms; and manufacturing-sector firms and service-sector firms.   
Table 4.9 shows the estimation results for small, medium and large new-to-the-
market innovators.  In small, new-to-the-market innovating firms, a FKP strategy has 
a significant, positive effect (at the 5 per cent level) on firms’ innovation returns, 
while an IKP strategy has an insignificant effect.  Both protection strategies have an 
insignificant effect on the innovation returns of medium-sized, new-to-the-market 
innovators, and an IKP strategy alone has a significant, positive effect on the 
innovation returns of large, new-to-the-market innovators.  While IKP strategies 
have a significant, positive effect on the innovation returns of firms across sizebands 
when all innovators are aggregated, it is only in large firms that they have a 
significant, positive effect on innovation returns when the new-to-the-market 
innovators are examined as a separate group. 
Table 4.10 shows the estimation results for high-technology/knowledge-intensive 
and low-technology/less knowledge-intensive new-to-the-market innovators.  In the 
high-technology/knowledge-intensive, new-to-the-market innovator group, a FKP 
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strategy has a significant, positive effect (at the 1 per cent level) on a firm’s 
innovation returns, whereas an IKP strategy has an insignificant effect.  In contrast, 
when all innovators are aggregated (Table 4.5), both protection strategies are highly 
significant.  In low-technology/less knowledge-intensive, new-to-the-market firms, 
both protection strategies have an insignificant effect on firms’ innovation returns.  
This contrasts with the results for the aggregated group of innovators (Table 4.5) 
which show that both a FKP strategy and an IKP strategy have significant, positive 
effects on firms’ innovation returns (at the 5 per cent level and 10 per cent level 
respectively). 
Table 4.11 shows the estimation results for manufacturing and service-sector new-to-
the-market innovators.  Both a FKP strategy and an IKP strategy have a significant, 
positive effect (at the 5 per cent level) on innovation returns in new-to-the-market 
manufacturing-sector firms.  When all innovators are aggregated (Table 4.6), the two 
protection-strategy variables are less significant for the innovation returns of 
manufacturing-sector firms than when new-to-the-market innovators are considered 
in isolation (Table 4.11).  The two protection strategies have an insignificant effect 
on the innovation returns of new-to-the-market service-sector firms, but when all 
innovators are aggregated (Table 4.6), both protection strategies have a highly 
significant effect on the innovation returns of service-sector firms. 
4.6 Discussion and conclusions 
A firm’s incentive to innovate comes from the expectation of post-innovation returns 
(Laursen and Salter, 2005).  But unless a firm is able to limit others from imitating 
its innovations, it may fail to appropriate returns from its own innovations 
(Cecccagnoli and Rothaermel, 2008).  Firms overcome this appropriability problem 
(Arrow, 1962) by using knowledge-protection mechanisms as a strategic tool to 
capture the returns to innovation (Laursen and Salter, 2005; Greenhalgh and Rogers, 
2007).  A firm’s strategy for protecting its knowledge is an integral part of its 
innovation strategy, and the firm is faced with a choice about how best to protect this 
knowledge: it can choose to rely upon formal, legally-enforceable protection 
mechanisms or it can choose to protect knowledge using more informal protection 
mechanisms that are based upon secrecy and non-disclosure. 
291 
 
This firm-level study examines formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies 
and asks how a firm’s choice of protection strategy – be it formal or informal – 
affects returns to innovation.  Using UK CIS data for the 2008 to 2010 period, an 
innovation production function is estimated to investigate the relationship between 
the proportion of firm sales coming from innovation and the firm’s orientation 
towards formal and informal knowledge-protection mechanisms.  Initially, the 
analysis examines all innovating firms and then moves on to examine and compare 
firms within different industries, firms in different sizebands and firms innovating 
with different degrees of novelty.  Firms that carry out novel, new-to-the-market 
innovations are analysed further: different sub-groups – industries and sizebands – 
are compared both with each other and with the sub-group estimates obtained using 
the wider sample of innovating firms. 
This study adds to the existing knowledge-protection literature by asking if a firm’s 
knowledge-protection strategy – formal or informal – matters for innovation returns.  
It adds to the existing body of knowledge by combining features of previous research 
in this area (Laursen and Salter, 2005; Laursen et al., 2013; Hall and Sena, 2017) and 
using data on firms’ use of knowledge-protection mechanisms rather than data on the 
importance of knowledge-protection mechanisms to firms – data prone to 
subjectivity bias (Veulegers and Schneider, 2018).  Unlike previous studies, the 
present study examines both formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies in 
innovating firms, analyses how each strategy-type affects innovation returns and 
asks how the effects on innovation returns are influenced by the sector/technology of 
the firm, the size of the firm and the novelty of the innovation being carried out. 
This study deepens our understanding of how firms are able to use formal and 
informal knowledge-protection strategies to capture the returns to innovation.  The 
empirical analysis leads to a number of key findings. 
i. First, the results suggest that a stronger knowledge-protection strategy – 
either formal or informal – increases a firm’s returns to innovation.  A firm is 
able to capture the benefits of its innovative efforts by strengthening its 
knowledge-protection strategy.  Interestingly, the results here suggest that an 
informal knowledge-protection strategy has a similar impact upon a firm’s 
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innovation returns to a formal knowledge-protection strategy.  This finding 
illustrates the benefits to the innovating firm of allocating resources to 
knowledge protection – formal or informal – when formulating an innovation 
strategy. 
ii. Second, the analysis suggests that the industrial context plays a part in 
determining the effect formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies 
have on a firm’s innovation returns.  Both a stronger formal and informal 
knowledge-protection strategy increases innovation returns across high-
technology/knowledge-intensive and low-technology/less knowledge-
intensive innovating firms, although both protection strategies are more 
significant for the former.  This finding is supported by those firms in 
industries with more technological opportunities placing a greater emphasis 
on knowledge-protection mechanisms (Laursen and Salter, 2005).  With 
regards to the manufacturing and service sectors, both a stronger formal and 
informal knowledge-protection strategy increases a firm’s innovation returns, 
although both strategies are more significant in service-sector innovating 
firms.   
iii. Third, a stronger formal and informal knowledge-protection strategy 
increases the innovation returns of small firms, but formal strategies are more 
significant.  Hall and Sena (2017) suggest that smaller firms have a greater 
need than larger firms to access inputs external to the firm and therefore 
derive a greater benefit from formal protection mechanisms.  In large firms, 
only a stronger informal knowledge-protection strategy increases innovation 
returns.  Hall and Sena (2017) find informal protection to be more important 
for large-firm productivity than for smaller-firm productivity.  They suggest 
that large firms protect valuable innovations with informal mechanisms 
rather than formal mechanisms to avoid the disclosure of their knowledge. 
iv. Fourth, a stronger formal knowledge-protection strategy increases the 
innovation returns of a radical, new-to-the-market innovator, whereas an 
informal protection strategy has an insignificant effect.  As expected, new-to-
the-market innovators are able to successfully appropriate the returns to 
innovation by protecting their knowledge with formal, legally enforceable, 
mechanisms.  Formal knowledge-protection mechanisms are insignificant for 
new-to-the-firm innovation returns, as are informal mechanisms.  As new-to-
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the-firm innovations are largely imitative, it is not surprising that firms are 
unlikely to increase their returns to innovation by using formal protection 
mechanisms (Laursen et al., 2013), whereas it is surprising that informal 
protection strategies have no significant impact on a new-to-the-firm 
innovator’s returns.  For example, a new-to-the-firm innovator taking a 
product to market behind a new-to-the-market innovator would be expected 
to benefit from using speed-to-market and secrecy, for example. 
v. Fifth, a stronger formal knowledge-protection strategy increases the 
innovation returns of small new-to-the-market innovators, whereas a stronger 
informal knowledge-protection strategy increases the innovation returns of 
large new-to-the-market innovators.  The extended analysis on radical, new-
to-the-market innovators confirms the findings that were found in the wider-
innovator data; formal knowledge-protection mechanisms are important for 
small-firm innovation returns and informal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms are important for large-firm innovation returns.  In the high-
technology/knowledge-intensive, new-to-the-market innovator group, a 
stronger formal knowledge-protection strategy increases innovation returns – 
an informal knowledge-protection strategy is insignificant.  This supports the 
viewpoint that formal knowledge protection is more likely to be used by 
new-to-the-market innovators.  A stronger formal and informal knowledge-
protection strategy in manufacturing firms carrying out new-to-the-market 
innovations leads to increased innovation returns, although both protection 
strategies are insignificant for the innovation returns of radical, new-to-the-
market innovators in the services sector. 
Much of the policy debate surrounding the use of knowledge protection in the UK 
focuses on formal knowledge-protection mechanisms.  In 2011, for example, an 
independent review of the UK’s IP system was carried out to assess how the existing 
IP framework supported economic growth and innovation (Hargreaves, 2011). A 
series of recommendations were made in order to "ensure that the UK has an IP 
framework best suited to supporting innovation and promoting economic growth in 
the digital age".21 Interestingly, the analysis undertaken in the present study not only 
                                                          




highlights the importance of formal knowledge-protection mechanisms for 
innovation returns but also highlights the importance of informal knowledge-
protection mechanisms.  Informal protection mechanisms have a significant, positive 
effect upon the innovation returns of all sub-sample groups of innovators, suggesting 
that government policy should also be directed towards the promotion of informal 
protection mechanisms.  
The significance of informal mechanisms for large-firm innovation returns – both in 
the wider-innovator group and in the new-to-the-market innovator group is 
particularly interesting given that a higher proportion of large firms relative to most 
other innovator groups use formal protection mechanisms (Table 4.1).  Given the 
widespread use of formal protection mechanisms across large firms, this study shows 
that large firms that position themselves differently by using informal protection 
mechanisms achieve higher innovation returns. 
The Intellectual Property Office (IPO) – the official UK government body 
responsible for intellectual property rights – organises events, provides guidance and 
internet tool-kits which are designed to help firms identify and protect their 
intellectual property. The focus is on formal protection mechanisms (patents, 
designs, trademarks and copyright). This service should be expanded to help firms 
develop strategies to protect their knowledge in an informal way. Some of the 
strategies firms should be encouraged to use include: 
i. Designating an individual within the firm to identify intellectual property 
and implement and enforce secrecy compliance, for example. The individual 
should keep records, distribute and collect operations manuals, conduct exit 
interviews and respond to questions relating to the protection of the firm’s 
IP. 
ii. Making IP protection part of the employees’ orientation and training 
program, and informing those employees who have access to firm-specific 
knowledge and confidential information of their continuing duty to prevent 
disclosure. 
iii. Prohibiting individuals from making copies of confidential information 
unless it is necessary for them to perform their duties. 
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iv. Establishing physical safeguards to prevent third parties from gaining access 
to confidential information. For example, restricting access to proprietary 
documents and information and implementing log-in procedures prior to 
gaining access to locked desks and files. 
v. Restricting access to software or records to those who have a need to use 
them in their job function. For example, only those involved in performing 
accounting services should be permitted to access the proprietary accounting 
software. 
vi. Prohibiting employees from downloading proprietary software onto portable 
computers without prior authorisation and maintain detailed records of 
employees permitted to download proprietary software. 
The government should direct the IPO to provide events and guidance to help firms 
use these and other informal strategies as a way of protecting their knowledge in an 
informal way.  
The significance of formal knowledge-protection mechanisms for the innovation 
returns of small firms, both in the wider-innovator group and in the new-to-the-
market innovator group, is evidence in support of policies aimed at improving the 
accessibility of IP for small firms.  The Hargreaves Review in 2011 (Hargreaves, 
2011) recommended that the accessibility of the IP system to small firms should be 
improved, and that small firms should have access to lower-cost providers of 
integrated IP legal and commercial advice.  But in 2015, a study by the Federation of 
Small Businesses (FSB) found that small firms were still struggling to protect their 
innovations (FSB, 2015).  The FSB surveyed more than 1,000 of its members and 
found that 25 per cent of these firms experienced a violation of their IP within the 
previous five years.  Half of these firms reported that a product had been imitated by 
a competitor; a third reported a copyright infringement; a third said that they had 
experienced trademark infringements; and 44 per cent of firms that spent money on 
IP did not think that it was a worthwhile investment.  The study concluded that there 
is a need for small firms to be better supported in utilising IP in the UK and 
overseas.  The analysis conducted in the present study highlights that small, 
innovating firms may benefit – in terms of returns to innovation – by implementing a 
formal knowledge-protection strategy.  It provides further evidence in support of IP-
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policy initiatives directed towards small firms.  Given the significance of smaller 
firms in the UK economy – over 99 per cent of UK businesses were SMEs at the 
beginning of 2016 (NESTA, 2017) – policy designed to help small firms gain access 
to formal protection mechanisms, as well as policy aimed at promoting the use of 
formal knowledge-protection mechanisms in small firms, would support small-firm 
innovation and promote both firm and national-economy growth. 
Expensive enforcement action presents major difficulties for SMEs.  The UK 
government should look to other countries for examples of best practice. Start-ups 
and SMEs in the UK would benefit from an IP-voucher scheme similar to that which 
operates in Austria.  The Austrian Ministry for Transport, Innovation and 
Technology absorbs 80 per cent of firms’ patent-application costs, encouraging start-
ups and SMEs to protect their IP using patents. In addition to receiving financial 
help, a team of experts advises firms throughout the process and provides the 
answers to any questions that they may have. 
In addition, the IP problems of SMEs are often overlooked or underestimated by the 
police and customs authorities and by the courts and legal profession. SMEs should 
be helped to work more effectively with these agencies. Accordingly, staff at these 
agencies should be trained to take SMEs’ IP problems more seriously. 
Globally, the IP system is fragmented and would benefit from IP co-ordination 
offices at national levels. These offices should promote, co-ordinate and monitor the 
enforcement of formal IP rights. They should work with the courts and customs 
authorities to exchange information and experiences between countries. The 
promotion of an effective, co-ordinated enforcement system will encourage SMEs – 
and indeed firms of all sizes – to use formal IP protection; they will view it as a 
worthwhile investment. 
4.6.1 Limitations and future work 
There are several limitations to this study.  First, this is a cross-sectional study, and 
due to the associated reverse-causality limitations, causal statements cannot be made.  
Pooling UK CIS data and creating a balanced-panel dataset would allow a causal 
analysis to be undertaken. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the UK CIS survey 
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questions on knowledge protection varying across the different waves of data, a 
pooled UK CIS panel could not be used in the analysis. Second, it is expected that 
firms’ knowledge-protection strategies have a delayed impact upon innovation 
returns. Given the cross-sectional nature of this study, it is not possible to allow for 
this delay in the estimations. In an attempt to overcome this problem, the proportion 
of firm sales coming from innovation at the end of the 2008 to 2010 period is related 
to formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies which take place during the 
three-year period.  Future research will attempt to link firms’ IP application and 
acquisition data with a pooled UK CIS panel dataset in order to address this 
limitation and enable a more in-depth analysis to be carried out.  Third, the analysis 
here is limited to the UK.  IP systems vary from country to country, and the 
effectiveness of formal knowledge-protection mechanisms may differ in different 
countries: the findings from the analysis carried out here may be specific to the UK.  
Fourth, there is no guarantee that the firm sales coming from innovation at the end of 
the survey period represent sales of innovations that were protected by formal and 
informal protection strategies during the previous three-year period – there is no link 
between the firm’s innovative sales at the end of the period and the knowledge-
protection mechanisms used during the period. 
Using a pooled UK CIS panel dataset and matched IP data, future research will 
conduct a more detailed exploration of the performance effects of individual formal 
IP mechanisms within different industries – exploring sectoral contexts in more 
detail – and different sizebands.  Analysis within specific industries and different 
sizebands within those industries is not undertaken in this study due to small sample 
sizes.  The availability of a pooled UK CIS panel dataset with matched IP data will 





































































Patent 12.8 22.8 7.2 9.6 14.7 17.0 15.8 9.8 8.9 20.2 
Registered industrial design 4.5 6.5 2.2 3.0 5.0 7.1 4.5 4.5 2.7 7.9 
Registered trademark 14.7 18.9 10.8 10.9 15.3 21.5 15.0 14.4 13.0 17.9 
Copyright 12.6 16.7 8.6 12.2 11.2 15.7 15.4 9.7 11.5 14.6 
Secrecy (including non-
disclosure agreements) 
27.8 36.3 22.0 26.9 29.0 28.8 35.4 20.2 24.5 34.0 
Complexity of design 9.0 13.6 6.7 8.3 9.5 10.1 11.9 6.0 6.8 13.2 
Lead-advantage time 11.8 16.5 8.3 12.3 11.1 12.0 13.1 10.5 9.1 16.9 















Proportion of sales coming from products 
and services newly introduced (%) 
3,520 13.38 21.16 
Log of employment 
 
3,369 4.05 1.74 
Proportion of workforce that has a 
science/engineering degree (%) 
 
3,249 10.64 19.93 
Proportion of workforce that has a degree 
from other disciplines (%) 
 
3,284 11.71 19.01 
Export indicator (0/1) 
 
3,520 0.47 0.50 
Public support for innovation indicator (0/1) 
 
3,520 0.18 0.38 
Internal R&D indicator (0/1) 
 
3,520 0.56 0.50 
External R&D indicator (0/1) 
 
3,520 0.24 0.43 
Acquisition of advanced machinery and 
equipment indicator (0/1) 
 
3,520 0.33 0.47 
Acquisition of computer hardware indicator 
(0/1) 
 
3,520 0.47 0.50 
Acquisition of computer software indicator 
(0/1) 
 
3,520 0.58 0.49 
Acquisition of external knowledge indicator 
(0/1) 
 
3,520 0.19 0.39 
Training for innovative activities indicator 
(0/1) 
3,520 0.43 0.50 
Engagement in design activities indicator 
(0/1) 
 
3,520 0.40 0.49 
Extent or breadth of innovation 
co-operation (0 to 7) 
 
3,520 2.03 2.00 
Factor 1 – Formal knowledge-protection 
strategy 
 
3,520 0.13 0.26 
Factor 2 – Informal knowledge-protection 
strategy 
 
3,520 0.17 0.30 
 
 




Table 4.3: Correlation matrix (N=3,520) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
                                    
(1) Proportion of sales coming from products 
and services newly introduced (%)  1.00                                 
(2) Log of employment -0.19 1.00                               
(3) Proportion of workforce that has a 
science/engineering degree (%) 0.20 -0.02 1.00                             
(4) Proportion of workforce that has a degree 
from other disciplines (%) 0.03 -0.03 0.09 1.00                           
(5) Export indicator (0/1) 0.06 0.15 0.24 0.04 1.00                         
(6) Public support for innovation indicator 
(0/1) 0.11 0.04 0.23 -0.02 0.16 1.00                       
(7) Internal R&D indicator (0/1) 0.15 0.11 0.21 0.04 0.25 0.21 1.00                     
(8) External R&D indicator (0/1) 0.10 0.09 0.15 0.03 0.14 0.19 0.37 1.00                   
(9) Acquisition of advanced machinery and 
equipment indicator (0/1) 0.04 0.11 0.04 -0.11 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.15 1.00                 
(10) Acquisition of computer hardware 
indicator (0/1) 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.13 0.14 0.25 1.00               
(11) Acquisition of computer software 
indicator (0/1) 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.63 1.00             
(12) Acquisition of external knowledge 
indicator (0/1) 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.22 0.38 0.17 0.17 0.18 1.00           
(13) Training for innovative activities 
indicator (0/1) 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.26 0.23 0.17 0.24 0.25 0.28 1.00         
(14) Engagement in design activities indicator 
(0/1) 0.14 0.06 0.16 0.01 0.24 0.14 0.40 0.27 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.25 0.21 1.00       
(15) Extent or breadth of innovation 
co-operation (0 to 7) 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.05 0.16 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.23 0.25 0.23 1.00     
(16) Factor 1 – Formal knowledge protection 
strategy 0.15 0.14 0.21 0.07 0.30 0.20 0.29 0.26 0.15 0.06 0.08 0.22 0.14 0.28 0.27 1.00   
(17) Factor 2 – Informal knowledge 
protection strategy 0.19 0.04 0.27 0.05 0.27 0.25 0.31 0.25 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.20 0.17 0.32 0.34 0.32 1.00 
 
 








Table 4.4: The effect of formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies on 




Log of employment -0.228*** 
 (0.02) 
Proportion of workforce that has a science/engineering degree (%) 0.006*** 
 (0.00) 
Proportion of workforce that has a degree from other disciplines (%) 0.001 
  (0.00) 
Export indicator (0/1) -0.048 
  (0.08) 
Public support for innovation indicator (0/1) 0.01 
  (0.08) 
Internal R&D indicator (0/1) 0.266*** 
  (0.08) 
External R&D indicator (0/1) -0.009 
  (0.08) 
Acquisition of advanced machinery and equipment indicator (0/1) -0.061 
  (0.07) 
Acquisition of computer hardware indicator (0/1) 0.224*** 
  (0.09) 
Acquisition of computer software indicator (0/1) -0.092 
  (0.09) 
Acquisition of external knowledge indicator (0/1) 0.014 
  (0.08) 
Training for innovative activities indicator (0/1) 0.087 
  (0.07) 
Engagement in design activities indicator (0/1) 0.153** 
  (0.07) 
Extent or breadth of innovation co-operation (0 to 7) 0.051*** 
  (0.02) 
Factor 1 – Formal knowledge-protection strategy 0.441*** 
  (0.12) 
Factor 2 – Informal knowledge-protection strategy 0.441*** 
  (0.11) 
Constant -0.865 
  (0.56) 
   
N 3178 
Log pseudo-likelihood -960.97 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. Models contain sectoral 
dummies, * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 
per cent level. 




Table 4.5: The effect of formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies on 
the innovation returns of high-tech/knowledge intensive and low-











Log of employment -0.277*** -0.175*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Proportion of workforce that has a science/engineering 
degree (%) 0.006*** 0.005 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Proportion of workforce that has a degree from other 
disciplines (%) -0.002 0.009*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Export indicator (0/1) -0.159 0.064 
  (0.12) (0.10) 
Public support for innovation indicator (0/1) -0.026 0.051 
  (0.11) (0.12) 
Internal R&D indicator (0/1) 0.280** 0.274*** 
  (0.12) (0.10) 
External R&D indicator (0/1) 0.125 -0.214* 
  (0.11) (0.12) 
Acquisition of advanced machinery and equipment 
indicator (0/1) -0.078 -0.049 
  (0.11) (0.09) 
Acquisition of computer hardware indicator (0/1) 0.192 0.270** 
  (0.12) (0.12) 
Acquisition of computer software indicator (0/1) -0.081 -0.116 
  (0.13) (0.12) 
Acquisition of external knowledge indicator (0/1) -0.066 0.122 
  (0.12) (0.12) 
Training for innovative activities indicator (0/1) 0.053 0.135 
  (0.10) (0.10) 
Engagement in design activities indicator (0/1) 0.066 0.220** 
  (0.11) (0.10) 
Extent or breadth of innovation co-operation (0 to 7) 0.075*** 0.028 
  (0.03) (0.02) 
Factor 1 – Formal knowledge-protection strategy 0.461*** 0.415** 
  (0.16) (0.16) 
Factor 2 – Informal knowledge-protection strategy 0.555*** 0.276* 
  (0.14) (0.15) 
Constant -1.295** -1.016* 
  (0.53) (0.55) 
N 1567 1611 
Log pseudo-likelihood -496.02 -459.86 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. Models contain sectoral 
dummies, * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 
1 per cent level. 




Table 4.6: The effect of formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies on 
the innovation returns of manufacturing sector and service sector 








Log of employment -0.164*** -0.251*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Proportion of workforce that has a science/engineering 
degree (%) 0.011*** 0.004** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Proportion of workforce that has a degree from other 
disciplines (%) 0.005 0 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Export indicator (0/1) -0.026 -0.052 
  (0.12) (0.10) 
Public support for innovation indicator (0/1) 0.051 -0.015 
  (0.11) (0.11) 
Internal R&D indicator (0/1) 0.201 0.287*** 
  (0.13) (0.10) 
External R&D indicator (0/1) -0.202* 0.111 
  (0.12) (0.11) 
Acquisition of advanced machinery and equipment 
indicator (0/1) -0.052 -0.093 
  (0.10) (0.10) 
Acquisition of computer hardware indicator (0/1) 0.117 0.282*** 
  (0.13) (0.11) 
Acquisition of computer software indicator (0/1) 0.028 -0.169 
  (0.13) (0.12) 
Acquisition of external knowledge indicator (0/1) 0.034 -0.018 
  (0.14) (0.10) 
Training for innovative activities indicator (0/1) 0.245** 0.003 
  (0.11) (0.09) 
Engagement in design activities indicator (0/1) 0.167 0.15 
  (0.11) (0.09) 
Extent or breadth of innovation co-operation (0 to 7) 0.049* 0.052** 
  (0.03) (0.02) 
Factor 1 – Formal knowledge-protection strategy 0.295* 0.504*** 
  (0.15) (0.17) 
Factor 2 – Informal knowledge-protection strategy 0.272* 0.559*** 
  (0.14) (0.15) 
Constant -1.115** -4.692*** 
  (0.55) (0.53) 
N 1106 2072 
Log pseudo-likelihood -327.97 -629.77 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. Models contain sectoral 
dummies, * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 
1 per cent level. 




Table 4.7: The effect of formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies on 


















Log of employment -0.322*** -0.164*** -0.144*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Proportion of workforce that has a 
science/engineering degree (%) 0.005** 0.005 0.009** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Proportion of workforce that has a degree from 
other disciplines (%) -0.001 0.001 -0.003 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Export indicator (0/1) -0.129 0.099 -0.109 
  (0.11) (0.15) (0.19) 
Public support for innovation indicator (0/1) -0.002 0.18 -0.167 
  (0.12) (0.14) (0.16) 
Internal R&D indicator (0/1) 0.380*** 0.037 0.276 
  (0.12) (0.14) (0.19) 
External R&D indicator (0/1) -0.04 0.161 -0.098 
  (0.13) (0.14) (0.16) 
Acquisition of advanced machinery and equipment 
indicator (0/1) -0.084 -0.038 0.037 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) 
Acquisition of computer hardware indicator (0/1) 0.213* 0.299* 0.316* 
  (0.13) (0.15) (0.18) 
Acquisition of computer software indicator (0/1) -0.054 -0.196 -0.23 
  (0.13) (0.16) (0.17) 
Acquisition of external knowledge indicator (0/1) 0.033 -0.102 -0.068 
  (0.12) (0.18) (0.18) 
Training for innovative activities indicator (0/1) 0.189* -0.251** 0.162 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) 
Engagement in design activities indicator (0/1) 0.128 0.199 0.201 
  (0.11) (0.13) (0.16) 
Extent or breadth of innovation co-operation (0 to 7) 0.044 0.107*** 0.055 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Factor 1 – Formal knowledge-protection strategy 0.556*** 0.375* 0.142 
  (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) 
Factor 2 – Informal knowledge-protection strategy 0.396** 0.359* 0.784*** 
  (0.17) (0.19) (0.21) 
Constant -0.674 -2.644*** -2.490** 
  (0.71) (0.52) (1.04) 
N 1344 1056 697 
Log pseudo-likelihood -454.88 -280.74 -168.71 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. Models contain sectoral 
dummies, * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 
per cent level. 




Table 4.8: The effect of formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies on 
the innovation returns of new-to-the-market, new-to-the-firm and 














Log of employment -0.262*** -0.257*** -0.158*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 
Proportion of workforce that has a 
science/engineering degree (%) 0.002 0.006* 0.005* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Proportion of workforce that has a degree from other 
disciplines (%) 0.001 0.004 -0.004 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Export indicator (0/1) 0.194 -0.031 -0.238** 
  (0.20) (0.12) (0.10) 
Public support for innovation indicator (0/1) 0.099 0.104 -0.062 
  (0.22) (0.16) (0.10) 
Internal R&D indicator (0/1) 0.112 -0.014 0.036 
  (0.23) (0.13) (0.12) 
External R&D indicator (0/1) 0.089 -0.083 -0.111 
  (0.21) (0.15) (0.11) 
Acquisition of advanced machinery and equipment 
indicator (0/1) -0.114 0.022 -0.111 
  (0.20) (0.11) (0.09) 
Acquisition of computer hardware indicator (0/1) 0.563*** 0.227 0.131 
  (0.19) (0.15) (0.11) 
Acquisition of computer software indicator (0/1) -0.088 -0.156 -0.045 
  (0.20) (0.16) (0.12) 
Acquisition of external knowledge indicator (0/1) -0.393* 0.029 0.069 
  (0.22) (0.15) (0.10) 
Training for innovative activities indicator (0/1) -0.069 0.021 0.056 
  (0.19) (0.12) (0.10) 
Engagement in design activities indicator (0/1) -0.038 0.069 0.122 
  (0.20) (0.12) (0.10) 
Extent or breadth of innovation co-operation (0 to 7) -0.015 0.057 0.025 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
Factor 1 – Formal knowledge-protection strategy 0.745** -0.02 0.238* 
  (0.31) (0.24) (0.13) 
Factor 2 – Informal knowledge-protection strategy 0.292 0.151 0.352*** 
  (0.26) (0.21) (0.13) 
Constant -2.249*** -0.267 -0.179 
  (0.40) (0.71) (0.91) 
N 502 1225 802 
Log pseudo-likelihood -162.27 -356.72 -320.76 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. Models contain sectoral 
dummies, * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 
per cent level. 




Table 4.9: The effect of formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies on 
the innovation returns of small, medium and large new-to-the-














Log of employment -0.508*** -0.002 -0.403*** 
 (0.17) (0.12) (0.12) 
Proportion of workforce that has a 
science/engineering degree (%) -0.002 0.006 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Proportion of workforce that has a degree from other 
disciplines (%) -0.004 0.002 -0.001 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Export indicator (0/1) 0.017 0.659** 0.519 
  (0.30) (0.33) (0.46) 
Public support for innovation indicator (0/1) 0.007 0.256 0.216 
  (0.34) (0.38) (0.44) 
Internal R&D indicator (0/1) -0.067 0.039 0.655 
  (0.36) (0.31) (0.51) 
External R&D indicator (0/1) 0.333 0.204 -0.236 
  (0.34) (0.27) (0.43) 
Acquisition of advanced machinery and equipment 
indicator (0/1) 0.171 -0.276 0.874* 
  (0.33) (0.27) (0.51) 
Acquisition of computer hardware indicator (0/1) 0.800** 0.591** 0.838** 
  (0.32) (0.30) (0.41) 
Acquisition of computer software indicator (0/1) 0.357 -0.424 0.207 
  (0.33) (0.29) (0.38) 
Acquisition of external knowledge indicator (0/1) -0.624* -0.209 -1.403*** 
  (0.36) (0.39) (0.43) 
Training for innovative activities indicator (0/1) 0.084 -0.487* -0.564 
  (0.28) (0.29) (0.43) 
Engagement in design activities indicator (0/1) -0.27 0.181 -0.104 
  (0.30) (0.34) (0.45) 
Extent or breadth of innovation co-operation (0 to 7) 0.009 -0.044 -0.072 
  (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) 
Factor 1 – Formal knowledge-protection strategy 1.109** 0.513 0.296 
  (0.47) (0.52) (0.62) 
Factor 2 – Informal knowledge-protection strategy 0.398 0.077 1.188** 
  (0.49) (0.33) (0.51) 
Constant -1.664** -2.192*** -1.726 
  (0.78) (0.58) (1.08) 
N 215.00 162.00 113.00 
Log pseudo-likelihood -74.94 -45.02 -24.38 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. Models contain sectoral 
dummies, * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 
per cent level. 




Table 4.10: The effect of formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies 
on the innovation returns of high-tech/knowledge-intensive and 













Log of employment -0.300*** -0.228*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) 
Proportion of workforce that has a science/engineering 
degree (%) 0.003 0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Proportion of workforce that has a degree from other 
disciplines (%) 0.001 -0.006 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Export indicator (0/1) -0.184 0.805*** 
  (0.26) (0.30) 
Public support for innovation indicator (0/1) -0.334 0.749** 
  (0.28) (0.31) 
Internal R&D indicator (0/1) 0.022 0.287 
  (0.38) (0.29) 
External R&D indicator (0/1) 0.313 -0.188 
  (0.26) (0.31) 
Acquisition of advanced machinery and equipment 
indicator (0/1) 0.192 -0.472* 
  (0.26) (0.26) 
Acquisition of computer hardware indicator (0/1) 0.678** 0.01 
  (0.30) (0.25) 
Acquisition of computer software indicator (0/1) -0.363 0.482** 
  (0.29) (0.24) 
Acquisition of external knowledge indicator (0/1) -0.667** 0.019 
  (0.29) (0.40) 
Training for innovative activities indicator (0/1) -0.078 -0.103 
  (0.24) (0.29) 
Engagement in design activities indicator (0/1) 0.007 -0.087 
  (0.30) (0.24) 
Extent or breadth of innovation co-operation (0 to 7) 0.048 -0.077 
  (0.07) (0.06) 
Factor 1 – Formal knowledge-protection strategy 1.104*** 0.135 
  (0.43) (0.56) 
Factor 2 – Informal knowledge-protection strategy 0.343 0.325 
  (0.32) (0.42) 
Constant 0.353 -2.433*** 
  (0.65) (0.59) 
N 273.00 229.00 
Log pseudo-likelihood -91.97 -65.77 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. Models contain sectoral 
dummies, * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 
per cent level. 




Table 4.11: The effect of formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies 
on the innovation returns of manufacturing sector and service 










Log of employment -0.116 -0.338*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Proportion of workforce that has a science/engineering 
degree (%) 0.017** -0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Proportion of workforce that has a degree from other 
disciplines (%) -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Export indicator (0/1) 0.404 0.219 
  (0.30) (0.25) 
Public support for innovation indicator (0/1) 0.131 0.123 
  (0.32) (0.28) 
Internal R&D indicator (0/1) -0.382 0.214 
  (0.34) (0.29) 
External R&D indicator (0/1) -0.267 0.282 
  (0.33) (0.26) 
Acquisition of advanced machinery and equipment 
indicator (0/1) -0.612** 0.205 
  (0.27) (0.27) 
Acquisition of computer hardware indicator (0/1) 0.654** 0.596** 
  (0.28) (0.24) 
Acquisition of computer software indicator (0/1) -0.159 -0.071 
  (0.30) (0.25) 
Acquisition of external knowledge indicator (0/1) -0.36 -0.48 
  (0.31) (0.30) 
Training for innovative activities indicator (0/1) 0.048 -0.128 
  (0.25) (0.25) 
Engagement in design activities indicator (0/1) -0.113 0.001 
  (0.31) (0.24) 
Extent or breadth of innovation co-operation (0 to 7) 0.011 -0.013 
  (0.07) (0.05) 
Factor 1 – Formal knowledge-protection strategy 0.919** 0.673 
  (0.38) (0.42) 
Factor 2 – Informal knowledge-protection strategy 0.638** -0.022 
  (0.28) (0.39) 
Constant -1.221* -4.252*** 
  (0.65) (0.89) 
N 186.00 316.00 
Log pseudo-likelihood -51.89 -107.29 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. Models contain sectoral 
dummies, * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and *** at the 1 
per cent level. 






5.1 Summary of findings and policy implications 
Since the recent emergence of the knowledge-based economy, intangible assets have 
overtaken tangible assets as the dominant driver of value creation.  The recognition 
that growth and innovation stem from intangible assets (Montresor et al., 2014; 
Roper et al., 2016a) has led firms to become increasingly concerned with strategies 
relating to such assets, focusing particularly on the creation of intangible assets 
through investment and their management thereafter. 
This thesis contributes towards the understanding of firms’ intangibles strategies and 
the link between firms’ intangibles strategies and innovation returns.  More 
specifically, it explores how the investment and protection components of firms’ 
intangibles strategies are influenced by the industry environment (in particular the 
industry appropriability regime and elements of industry structure), how the industry 
appropriability regime influences the complexity and variability of firms’ 
knowledge-protection strategies within an industry and how firms’ intangibles 
protection strategies influence innovation returns. 
As an important part of overall industrial policy, knowledge protection mechanisms 
support firms’ investment into knowledge.   Knowledge protection mechanisms 
boost innovation and productivity and allow for faster growing, more resilient 
businesses.  This thesis supports policy teams by providing economic analysis on 
key issues.  The development of well-informed policy relies upon robust data and 
evidence, and this thesis can inform knowledge-protection policy by providing an 
economic, evidence-based approach to research into intangibles strategy. 
The research findings in this thesis are of interest to both the academic and policy 
audience.  The policy audience – including the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) and 
Innovate UK – can use the results from the three empirical studies in this thesis to 
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inform and justify focused policy initiatives.  The IPO – the official United Kingdom 
(UK) government body responsible for intellectual property (IP) rights – supports 
firms in obtaining the correct protection for creations or inventions and helps firms 
to better understand how to manage and exploit IP.  The IPO encourages and 
supports innovation, helping the economy and society to benefit from knowledge 
and ideas.  Innovate UK – the UK's innovation agency – supports business-led 
innovation and helps to drive growth by working with firms to enable and support 
innovation.  This thesis provides both the IPO and Innovate UK (amongst other 
policy bodies) with information on the determinants of firms’ intangibles strategies 
(including IP).  In addition, it provides information on how these strategies impact 
upon firm innovation performance.  The research helps inform policymakers on how 
best to direct firm strategy, through policy interventions, in order to promote firm 
innovation and growth. 
5.1.1 Chapter 2: Conclusions and policy implications 
Chapter 2 investigates the proposition that firms’ strategy decisions depend strongly 
on the market environment in which they operate (Scott, 1982).  The empirical 
analysis examines how the industry appropriability regime and industry structure – 
both part of the industry environment – affect firms’ intangibles investment and 
protection strategies.  The empirical results suggest that both an industry’s structure 
and the industry appropriability regime help drive firms’ intangibles strategies.  Both 
elements of the industry environment are found to affect the individual components 
of a firm’s intangibles strategy in different ways.  Consequently, it is not possible to 
single out one part of the industry environment as having the greatest impact upon a 
firm’s intangibles strategy. 
Theory suggests that a change in industry structure – given by a change in the 
competitive forces within the industry (Porter, 1980) – may affect firm strategy.  In 
this firm-level study, an increase in competition within an industry reduces the 
probability that a firm will invest in research and development (R&D) and Training 
– two forms of intangible investment.  In addition, the analysis suggests that the 
source of any new competition within an industry – be it from new entrants or 
existing firms – may be important; as well as reducing the probability that a firm will 
invest in R&D and Training, an increase in competition from new entrants also 
311 
 
reduces the probability that a firm will invest in Design, whereas an increase in 
competition from incumbent firms also reduces the probability that a firm will invest 
in Computer Software. 
In summary, the analysis presented in Chapter 2 suggests that an increase in 
competition within an industry reduces the probability that a firm will invest in 
intangible assets.  Firms are discouraged from investing in innovative activities 
because the expected return to investment falls.  As there is little incentive to 
innovate (Schumpeter, 1942), the probability that a firm will invest in intangible 
assets falls. 
In addition to industry structure, the industry appropriability regime – also part of the 
industry environment – has implications for a firm’s intangibles strategy; it governs 
a firm’s ability to capture profits from an innovation (Teece, 1986).  In Chapter 2, 
several variables are included to represent the industry appropriability regime.  The 
empirical analysis suggests that there is a consistent, positive effect on the 
investment component of a firm’s intangibles strategy when the ‘nature of 
technology’ dimension of the industry appropriability regime weakens.  As part of 
this study, it is hypothesised that those variables which reflect the importance of 
standards and publications to firms’ innovation activities will be negatively related to 
firms’ intangibles investment; it is assumed that they reflect the extent to which 
knowledge is codified.  In contrast to the expected findings, the results show that an 
increase in the importance of standards and publications to firms’ innovation 
activities represents a source of benefit for a firm.  Indeed, Spencer (2003) suggests 
that firms that share technological knowledge may achieve higher innovative 
performance than firms that do not share knowledge because they are able to shape 
the institutional environment in favour of their own technological design. 
In addition, the analysis in Chapter 2 finds that there is a clear, consistent, positive 
effect on the investment component of a firm’s intangibles strategy when the 
‘knowledge-protection dimension’ of the industry appropriability regime 
strengthens.  An increase in the effective knowledge protection within an industry 
provides firms with the tools necessary to appropriate the returns to investment.  It is 
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these stronger appropriability conditions which provide firms with an incentive to 
invest in innovative activities (Levin et al., 1987). 
In Chapter 2, the protection component of a firm’s intangibles strategy is analysed by 
examining how the industry appropriability regime and elements of industry 
structure affect the importance firms attach to different knowledge-protection 
mechanisms as well as examining how the industry appropriability regime and 
elements of industry structure affect firms’ actual protection decisions.  The 
empirical results suggest that when industry competition increases, the importance 
firms attach to various knowledge-protection mechanisms depends upon the source 
of the competition.  It seems that firms attach more importance to formal protection 
when the increase in competition comes from existing firms, whereas when the 
increase in competition is from new, young firms, less emphasis is placed upon the 
importance of all knowledge-protection mechanisms.  This may be explained by 
new, young firms posing less of a threat than existing firms due to their limited 
resources and capabilities, for example. 
When the ‘nature of technology’ dimension of the industry appropriability regime 
weakens (knowledge becomes more codified), the empirical analysis finds that firms 
are more likely to view informal and formal knowledge-protection mechanisms as 
being important.  Firms realise that knowledge-protection mechanisms allow them to 
appropriate the returns from their investments by helping guard against the increased 
risk of imitation (as knowledge is more codified).  Firms are also more likely to view 
informal and formal knowledge-protection mechanisms as being important when the 
‘knowledge-protection dimension’ of the industry appropriability regime 
strengthens.  As the effective protection mechanisms within an industry increases, 
firms have available tools to protect their knowledge and help appropriate the returns 
from their investment; they are therefore more likely to view protection mechanisms 
as being important. 
Upon examination of firms’ actual protection decisions, the analysis suggests that 
new competition from new entrants increases the probability that firms will use some 
forms of informal knowledge protection (Secrecy and Complexity of Design).  The 
probability that firms will use formal knowledge protection is reduced.  When 
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knowledge within an industry becomes more codified, and when effective 
knowledge protection within an industry increases, there is also an increase in the 
probability that a firm will use informal knowledge-protection mechanisms (Secrecy, 
Lead-time Advantage and Copyright). 
The results in Chapter 2 suggest that firms’ actual knowledge-protection decisions 
differ from what they say is important.  As the industry environment changes, firms 
indicate that the importance of both informal and formal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms changes.  In reality, the results suggest that firms are more likely to use 
protection mechanisms which are easy to implement, rather than opt for more 
formal, costly options. 
The analysis in Chapter 2 suggests that both industry structure and the industry 
appropriability regime have a role in driving a firm’s intangibles strategy.  The 
results indicate that the industry appropriability regime has a consistent effect – in 
terms of direction – on all of the intangible investments examined.  The effects of a 
change in industry structure or competition vary across the intangible investments 
being examined and also depend upon the source of the change in competition. 
Firms attach more importance to both informal and formal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms when the industry appropriability regime increases in strength.  When 
there are changes in industry structure, firms attach more importance to formal 
mechanisms.  Regarding firms’ actual protection decisions, the results suggest that 
industry structure is less important than the industry appropriability regime in 
determining firms’ knowledge-protection strategies – increased competition from 
incumbents has an insignificant effect on the probability that a firm will use most 
knowledge-protection mechanisms, whereas there is a significant, positive effect on 
a firm’s use of the easier-to-implement protection mechanisms when the industry 
appropriability regime strengthens. 
5.1.1.1 Policy implications 
The analysis in Chapter 2 provides policymakers with an understanding of how 
different elements of the industry environment – industry structure and the industry 
appropriability regime – impact upon firms’ innovation strategies.  By ensuring that 
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the correct policy levers are in place, the government can help firms foster the 
accumulation of intangibles and, in turn, unleash potential growth. 
Policy designed to strengthen industry appropriability regimes (for example, policy 
designed to increase the available, effective protection mechanisms or policy 
designed to help firms strengthen their natural protection) will encourage firms to 
invest in innovative activities.  Particular industries have strong appropriability 
regimes – the pharmaceuticals industry, for example. Some firms in these industries 
may face barriers to formal protection (for example, smaller firms), and government 
policy should target these firms; innovation vouchers could be issued to help those 
firms facing financial constraints; firms could be helped identify IP that they own; 
firms could be guided through the formal-IP application process; and firms could be 
given specialist advice if an IP-infringement occurs.  Other industries, for example 
the soft-drinks industry, have weak appropriability regimes. Typically, formal 
protection such as patents is ineffective in these industries, and firms rely on 
trademarks, copyright and easier-to-implement protection such as secrecy.  In the 
case of the soft-drinks industry, secret recipes help deter imitation, for example. 
Government policy should help firms in these industries develop a protection 
strategy using formal protection mechanisms such as trademarks and copyright and 
informal protection mechanisms such as secrecy.  Government policy initiatives can 
support firms to increase their informal protection by helping them: designate an 
individual within the firm to identify intellectual property and implement and 
enforce secrecy compliance; make IP protection part of their employees’ orientation 
and training program; inform those employees who have access to firm-specific 
knowledge and confidential information of their continuing duty to prevent 
disclosure; prohibit individuals from making copies of confidential information 
unless it is necessary for them to perform their duties; and prohibit employees from 
downloading proprietary software onto portable computers without prior 
authorisation and maintain detailed records of employees permitted to download 
proprietary software.  The Intellectual Property Office (IPO) (the official UK 
government body responsible for intellectual property rights) should, in the same 
way as they do for formal protection, provide events, tool-kits, case studies and 
guidance to help firms use these and other informal strategies as a way of protecting 
their knowledge in an informal way.  In summary, government policy aimed at 
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increasing appropriability strength across all industries – by promoting both informal 
and formal knowledge protection – will encourage innovative investment in all 
firms. 
An increase in industry competition sees firms increase their use of informal 
protection mechanisms and identify formal mechanisms as having an increased level 
of importance in the innovation process.  Firms should be encouraged to know their 
market – they should actively monitor the market in which they are engaged as firms 
can only react to changes in their competitive environment if they know that they 
have happened.  Monitoring competitors’ behaviour can be costly – both financially 
and in terms of time.  Large firms may employ market analysts to keep abreast of the 
industry climate, whereas small firms may be resource constrained.  Policy 
initiatives should be put in place to help firms monitor their market and set up 
appropriate strategies in order to protect themselves. 
5.1.2 Chapter 3: Conclusions and policy implications 
In Chapter 3, the heterogeneous nature of firm-specific resources and capabilities 
gives rise to a variation in firms’ knowledge-protection strategies within an industry, 
despite all firms within an industry being faced with identical knowledge-protection 
opportunities as defined by the industry appropriability regime.  Firms choose 
protection mechanisms in line with their own resources and capabilities and the 
appropriability regime of the industry to which they belong.  They assess the 
potential of and the restrictions related to the use of each available protection 
mechanism – in terms of its availability, efficacy and efficiency (Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 2007b) – before deciding which protection 
mechanisms to implement.  Firms reach optimising decisions by considering the 
constraint which they face i.e. the appropriability regime, and this results in a range 
of knowledge-protection choices – or profiles (Hurmelinna- Laukkanen et al., 2017). 
In this industry-level study, the empirical analysis examines how an increase in the 
strength of the industry appropriability regime – given by an increase in the 
availability of effective knowledge-protection mechanisms within the industry – 
affects the average complexity and variability of firms’ knowledge-protection 
strategies within an industry. 
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The industry appropriability regime – part of the industry environment – governs a 
firm’s ability to capture profits from an innovation (Teece, 1986).  As a 
consequence, the two dimensions of the industry appropriability regime – the nature 
of the industry technology and the methods of knowledge protection available to 
protect both innovations themselves and any increased rents which flow from them 
(Teece, 1986, 1998, 2000a; Levin et al., 1987; Teece and Pisano, 1998), have 
implications for a firm’s knowledge-protection strategy.  The empirical results in 
Chapter 3 suggest that the average complexity of firms’ knowledge-protection 
strategies within an industry increases when the knowledge-protection dimension of 
the industry appropriability regime strengthens.  The stronger appropriability regime 
allows those firms equipped with the required resources and capabilities to 
strengthen their own knowledge-protection strategy by increasing the number of 
knowledge-protection mechanisms they use to help appropriate returns to their 
innovations.  The stronger protection regime increases firms’ strategy space and 
allows more firms within the industry to optimise their knowledge-protection 
decisions.  More firms capture the benefits from innovation and are incentivised to 
make further innovative investments (Granstrand, 1999). 
The empirical analysis further suggests that the diversity or variability of firms’ 
knowledge-protection strategies within an industry increases when the knowledge-
protection dimension of the industry appropriability regime strengthens.  Within an 
industry, a firm that conforms to the strategies of others has many similar 
competitors; this limits performance and increases failure rates (Henderson, 1981; 
Hannan et al., 1990; Baum and Singh, 1994).  As the industry protection regime 
strengthens, the knowledge-protection strategy space increases.  Firms with the 
necessary resources and capabilities to do so are able to position themselves 
differently to other firms within the industry because they are no longer forced to 
conform to the knowledge-protection strategies of others.  Consequently, within an 
industry, the variability of firms’ knowledge-protection strategies increases.  By 
positioning themselves differently, firms face less competition and improve their 
chances of success.  Subsequently, successful firms will be incentivised to make 
further innovative investments. 
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These empirical results i.e. that, within an industry, the average complexity and 
variability of firms’ knowledge-protection strategies increases when the knowledge-
protection dimension of the industry appropriability regime strengthens, emerge 
from UK Community Innovation Survey (CIS) data which covers all industries.  
Following this initial analysis, the empirical analysis is further extended to include a 
comparison of different industries – high-technology/knowledge-intensive industries 
and low-technology/less knowledge-intensive industries.  The results from this 
comparison suggest that there is a stronger relationship between strategic complexity 
and the strength of the industry appropriability regime in knowledge-intensive 
industries.  High-technology/knowledge intensive firms undertake knowledge-
intensive innovations, and are therefore more likely to use any additional protection 
options available to them. 
The increase in the diversity or variability of firms’ knowledge-protection strategies 
within an industry following an increase in the strength of the industry formal-
protection regime is also greater for high-technology/knowledge-intensive industries 
than for low-technology/less knowledge-intensive industries, although the difference 
between the two industry groups is less significant than in the complexity-of-strategy 
case.  Given that firms in high-technology/knowledge-intensive industries have more 
complex strategies when the knowledge-protection dimension of the industry 
appropriability regime strengthens, their ‘strategy sets’ will be larger than those of 
firms in low-technology/less knowledge-intensive industries, and therefore they have 
more opportunities to act differently to other firms within the industry. By 
positioning themselves differently, firms face less competition and improve their 
chances of success. 
5.1.2.1 Policy implications 
Government policy relating to firms’ use of knowledge-protection mechanisms 
focuses on formal protection methods.  The empirical results in Chapter 3 suggests 
that the availability and effectiveness of both informal and formal protection 
mechanisms have implications for the average complexity and variability of firms’ 
knowledge-protection strategies within an industry.  
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It is important, therefore, that in addition to the current policy which surrounds 
formal knowledge protection, new policy initiatives are directed towards the 
promotion and use of informal protection mechanisms across all firms. This will 
enable firms to seize valuable, strategic opportunities by engaging in informal 
protection practices.  The likelihood of a firm finding a strategic opportunity is 
increased if it is able to use its resources and capabilities in a unique way – 
differentiating itself from other firms.  Therefore, government policy aimed at 
promoting the use of informal protection will enable those firms that face barriers to 
the use of formal mechanisms to position themselves differently to other firms when 
new opportunities arise.  In doing so, a firm is more likely to receive the benefits 
from its positioning (Denrell et al., 2003).  Government policy supporting informal 
protection will increase firms’ chances of receiving the returns to its innovation, 
increase the probability of further innovative investment and, in turn, promote long-
run growth.  Government policies supporting informal knowledge protection will 
encourage firms that do have the resources and capabilities to use formal knowledge 
protection to also invest in informal protection.  This may allow both the innovations 
and the knowledge-protection to be used more widely (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 
2014).  A wide set of knowledge-protection mechanisms will give firms the 
readiness to change direction and, at the same time, it will increase their chances of 
performance success in new ventures – given that performance outcomes depend 
upon a firm’s ability to protect assets. 
Examples of ways in which government policy initiatives can support firms to 
increase their informal protection include: designating an individual within the firm 
to identify intellectual property and implement and enforce secrecy compliance.  The 
individual should keep records, distribute and collect operations manuals, conduct 
exit interviews and respond to questions relating to the protection of the firm’s IP; 
making IP protection part of the employees’ orientation and training program, and 
informing those employees who have access to firm-specific knowledge and 
confidential information of their continuing duty to prevent disclosure; prohibiting 
individuals from making copies of confidential information unless it is necessary for 
them to perform their duties; and prohibiting employees from downloading 
proprietary software onto portable computers without prior authorisation and 
maintain detailed records of employees permitted to download proprietary software.  
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The Intellectual Property Office (IPO) (the official UK government body responsible 
for intellectual property rights) should, in the same way as they do for formal 
protection, provide events, tool-kits, case studies and guidance to help firms use 
these and other informal strategies as a way of protecting their knowledge in an 
informal way. 
The empirical results also indicate that there is a need for policymakers to be aware 
of the differences which exist in relation to the individual industry responses to a 
change in the strength of the industry appropriability regime.  The results in Chapter 
3 help inform policymakers about the sensitivity of different industries to 
knowledge-protection policies.  Results suggest that government policies supporting 
formal knowledge-protection will have stronger positive effects upon the average 
knowledge-protection strategy and the diversity of knowledge-protection strategies 
in high-technology/knowledge intensive industries than in low-technology/less 
knowledge-intensive industries.  Government policy should provide extra formal-
protection support for firms in high-technology/knowledge-intensive industries. The 
IPO should target high-technology/knowledge-intensive firms – particularly those 
that may find it difficult to engage in formal knowledge protection (small firms, for 
example) and help them to identify their intellectual property (through tool-kits, for 
example) and suggest appropriate formal protection mechanisms.  Resource-
constrained high-technology/knowledge-intensive firms should also be directed 
towards any financial help that is available to them (innovation vouchers, for 
example). 
5.1.3 Chapter 4: Conclusions and policy implications 
The empirical analysis in Chapter 4 tests the contention that knowledge-protection 
strategies help firms capture returns from their innovations.  The empirical analysis 
examines both formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies and seeks to 
ascertain which knowledge-protection strategy – formal or informal – allows firms to 
most successfully derive economic benefit from an innovation. 
The empirical results in Chapter 4 suggest that a stronger formal or informal 
knowledge-protection strategy increases a firm’s returns to innovation, and the 
effects are similar in magnitude for both strategy types.  In addition, the analysis 
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highlights industrial context as being an important determining factor; both formal 
and informal knowledge-protection strategies are more significant for firms’ 
innovation returns in high-technology/knowledge-intensive industries than in low-
technology/less knowledge-intensive industries, and both formal and informal 
knowledge-protection strategies are more significant for firms’ innovation returns in 
service-sector firms compared with manufacturing-sector firms. 
In addition, Chapter 4 considers whether formal and informal knowledge-protection 
strategies impact upon firms’ innovation returns differently across firms of different 
sizes.  Although empirical results suggest that both formal and informal protection 
strategies are significant for small-firm innovation returns, the results indicate that 
formal knowledge-protection strategies are more significant.  This result supports 
that of Hall and Sena (2017) who suggest that smaller firms derive a greater benefit 
than larger firms from formal mechanisms because small firms have a greater need 
to access inputs external to the firm.  Indeed, the results in Chapter 4 suggest that a 
stronger informal protection strategy increases large-firm innovation returns, but a 
stronger formal protection strategy does not.  Hall and Sena (2017) suggest that large 
firms derive more benefit from informal mechanisms because formal mechanisms 
require the disclosure of knowledge. 
In addition to comparing results across different industries and firm sizes, Chapter 4 
considers how informal and formal knowledge-protection strategies affect the 
innovation returns of different innovator types.  The empirical results suggest that a 
stronger formal knowledge-protection strategy increases the innovation returns of a 
radical, new-to-the-market innovator, whereas an informal protection strategy has an 
insignificant effect.  The innovation returns of new-to-the-firm innovators are not 
significantly affected by either formal or informal knowledge-protection strategies.  
The imitative nature of new-to-the-firm innovators makes it unsurprising that such 
firms are unlikely to benefit from using formal knowledge-protection mechanisms.  
Informal knowledge-protection mechanisms, on the other hand, may benefit a new-
to-the-firm innovator by shielding knowledge from other competitors in the 
marketplace (for example secrecy, and speed-to-market).  The insignificant effect of 




An extended analysis further examines the new-to-the-market innovator group.  The 
findings confirm that a more formal knowledge-protection strategy is important for 
small-firm innovation returns and a more informal knowledge-protection strategy is 
important for large-firm innovation returns.  Upon examination of different 
industries within the new-to-the-market innovator group, high-
technology/knowledge-intensive firms only benefit from stronger formal knowledge-
protection strategies; informal knowledge-protection strategies are insignificant.  In 
manufacturing new-to-the-market innovating firms, both a stronger formal and 
informal knowledge-protection strategy leads to increased innovation returns.  In 
contrast, both formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies are insignificant 
for the innovation returns of new-to-the-market innovators in the services sector. 
5.1.3.1 Policy implications 
Formal knowledge-protection mechanisms lie at the centre of much of the policy 
debate surrounding the use of knowledge protection in the UK.  The empirical 
analysis in Chapter 4 confirms the importance of formal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms for innovation returns (in some firms), and in addition, highlights the 
important performance effects associated with the use of informal knowledge-
protection mechanisms (in some firms).  Consequently, tailored policy directed 
towards particular innovators and aimed at promoting the use of formal and/or 
informal knowledge protection may lead to wider economic benefits.  It is 
particularly interesting that informal knowledge-protection strategies appear to be a 
source of benefit to large firms, given that a higher proportion of large firms, than 
any other sizeband, use formal knowledge protection.  In light of this result, the 
promotion of informal protection in large firms would free-up resources being used 
to obtain formal protection and allow for them to be directed elsewhere. 
The results in Chapter 4 provide evidence of the importance of formal knowledge 
protection mechanisms for small firms.  In 2011, the Hargreaves Review 
(Hargreaves, 2011) recommended that the accessibility of IP for small firms needed 
to be improved, and following this, a study by the Federation of Small Businesses 
(FSB) in 2015 (FSB, 2015) found that small firms struggle to protect their 
innovations.  The analysis in Chapter 4 provides further evidence in support of IP-
policy initiatives directed towards small firms.  At the beginning of 2016, over 99 
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per cent of UK businesses were small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
(NESTA, 2017).  Given the significance of small firms in the UK economy, it is in 
the national economy’s interest to target IP policy towards small firms.  By helping 
small firms overcome any barriers to formal knowledge protection that they face, 
and by promoting the use of formal protection mechanisms within small firms, 
policymakers will play a part in promoting both firm-level and national-economy 
growth. 
5.2 Contributions 
5.2.1 Chapter 2: Contributions 
This study adds to existing literature by providing a holistic view of a firm’s 
intangibles strategy; it examines factors which influence a firm’s investment into 
intangibles, a firm’s attitudes towards knowledge protection mechanisms and a 
firm’s actual knowledge-protection decisions.  Previous studies have examined the 
performance effects of firms’ intangibles strategies i.e. how intangibles investment 
affects performance (for example, Nesta, 2008) and how intangibles protection 
influences performance (for example, Hu, 2013).  In contrast to these studies, the 
empirical analysis in Chapter 2 is concerned with the determinants of a firm’s 
intangibles strategy rather than the performance effects.   
Previously, many studies have examined the determinants of a firm’s innovative 
investment – one dimension of a firm’s intangibles strategy.  The majority of this 
literature focuses upon two factors: the effects of firm size and market power 
(Schumpeter, 1942) and industry-specific determinants such as appropriability 
(Teece, 1986).  Empirical studies investigating the effects of market concentration or 
industry structure upon innovative behaviour (for example, Acs and Audretsch, 
1987; Kraft, 1989; Aghion et al., 2005) do not reach a consensus.  Empirically, 
evidence on the relationship between appropriability and innovative investment is 
inconclusive.  Some studies find no statistically-significant effect of appropriability 
upon R&D intensity (for example, Levin et al., 1985), while others find a positive 
effect for some industries (for example, Mansfield, 1986).  Market concentration 
plays a part in determining a firm’s knowledge-protection decisions – another 
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dimension of a firm’s intangibles strategy.  For example, it would be inefficient for 
firms to use costly protection methods within an industry controlled by a monopolist 
(Granstrand, 1999).  In addition, studies have found that appropriability conditions 
within an industry’s environment help determine a firm’s knowledge-protection 
strategy (for example, Harabi, 1995; Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Leiponen and Byma, 
2009).  Chapter 2 adds to this existing body of knowledge by considering how two 
elements of the industry environment – the industry appropriability regime and 
industry structure – affects firms’ intangibles strategies.  Unlike previous studies, 
Chapter 2 focuses on both factors which have previously been identified as helping 
to determine a firm’s intangibles investment and protection strategy.  The study 
contributes to existing knowledge by asking if one particular element of the industry 
environment matters more than the other in determining a firm’s intangibles 
investment and protection strategies.  In addition, the study examines whether the 
effects of the different elements of the industry environment are consistent across the 
individual components of a firm’s intangibles strategy.      
5.2.2 Chapter 3: Contributions 
This study adds to the existing literature on knowledge protection by providing a 
holistic view of firms’ knowledge-protection strategies within an industry setting.  
The empirical analysis examines how the industry appropriability regime affects the 
average complexity and variability of firms’ protection strategies within an industry.  
Previous studies identify industry characteristics such as the level of technology and 
R&D intensity as being an important determinant of a firm’s protection strategy 
(Mansfield, 1986; Levin et al., 1987; Harabi, 1995; Cohen et al., 2000), and factors 
such as the availability of firm resources (Kitching and Blackburn, 1998; Leiponen 
and Byma, 2009) and the novelty of an innovation (Thomas, 2003; Hanel, 2005; 
Hussinger, 2006) have been found to be important.  Hurmelinna-Laukkanen et al. 
(2017) identify three different appropriability profiles among firms (patterns of 
knowledge-protection choice) with industry factors and firm-resource factors jointly 
determining the profile group to which a firm belongs.  Their findings suggest that 
firms are better to approach the appropriability problem by considering protection 
mechanisms as a whole rather than by comparing one protection mechanism with 
another, and they suggest that firms are likely to benefit from having a wide range of 
protection mechanisms available to them.  Chapter 3 adds to this body of knowledge 
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and builds upon the study by Hurmelinna-Laukkanen et al. (2017) by examining how 
strengthening the protection dimension of the industry appropriability regime 
impacts upon firms’ protection choices within an industry.  Rather than examining 
the nature of firms’ knowledge-protection profiles across different industries, this 
study is concerned with firms’ knowledge-protection profiles within an industry.  
Previous studies acknowledge that industry characteristics have implications for 
firms’ knowledge-protection choices, and the analysis here examines, quantitatively, 
the relationship between the strength of the protection dimension of the industry 
appropriability regime and the complexity and variability of knowledge-protection 
choices (or strategies) made by firms within the industry.  In addition, the analysis 
considers whether the effects on firms’ knowledge-protection choices differ across 
industries by undertaking a comparison of high-technology/knowledge-intensive 
industries and low-technology/less knowledge-intensive industries. 
5.2.3 Chapter 4: Contributions 
A firm’s ability to formulate a knowledge-protection strategy in order to help capture 
the returns from its innovations lies at the heart of Chapter 4.  Strategies for 
protecting knowledge have become a central part of the development of a firm’s 
innovative strategy (Rivette and Kline, 2000), and the empirical analysis in Chapter 
4 examines both formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies, seeking to 
discover which knowledge-protection strategy – formal or informal – most 
successfully drives firms’ innovation returns. 
Chapter 4 contributes to existing knowledge by deepening our understanding of how 
firms use formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies to capture the returns 
to innovation.  This firm-level study combines the features of previous research in 
this area (Laursen and Salter, 2005; Laursen et al., 2013; Hall and Sena, 2017), and 
seeks to explore how the effects of different knowledge-protection strategies differ 
across industrial sectors, firm size and innovator type.  Previously, studies have 
identified sectors and industries (for example, Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000), 
firm characteristics (for example, Kitching and Blackburn, 1998; Hall et al., 2014) 
and the novelty of an innovation (for example, Hanel, 2005) as being important 
determinants of a firm’s knowledge-protection strategy, and the empirical analysis in 
Chapter 4 adds to this existing knowledge. 
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In addition, the analysis in Chapter 4 builds upon existing knowledge-protection 
literature by using data on the actual use of firms’ formal and informal knowledge-
protection mechanisms to investigate the effects of knowledge protection use on a 
firm’s returns to innovation.   Previous studies (Laursen and Salter, 2005; Laursen et 
al., 2013; Hall and Sena, 2017) use data on how firms rate the importance of various 
knowledge-protection mechanisms – data more prone to subjectivity bias (Veulegers 
and Schneider, 2018). 
The empirical analysis in Chapter 4 is further extended to explore the effects of 
formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies on the returns to innovation in 
firms of different sizes, firms with different technologies, firms in different sectors 
and firms innovating with different degrees of novelty.  Previous literature focuses 
on manufacturing firms and their orientation towards formal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms (Laursen and Salter, 2013) as well as the extent to which formal and 
informal knowledge-protection mechanism are correlated with the innovation type 
being carried out and the relationship between firm productivity and innovation type, 
conditional on the firm’s chosen knowledge-protection mechanisms (Hall and Sena, 
2017).  The analysis in Chapter 4 adds to this literature by considering both 
manufacturing and service firms, formal and informal knowledge-protection 
mechanisms and their effect upon the innovation returns of different innovator sub-
groups.  In addition to this, Chapter 4 further explores those firms undertaking new-
to-the-market innovation.  The effects of both formal and informal knowledge-
protection strategies on the innovation returns in firms of different sizes, firms with 
different technologies and firms in different sectors within this new-to-the-market 
innovator group are examined. 
5.3 Limitations and future work 
5.3.1 Chapter 2 
There are several limitations to Chapter 2.  First, the variables which are designed to 
represent the industry appropriability regime in the empirical analysis are highly 
correlated with one another.  For this reason, each variable is included in a separate 
regression model.  Future work will aim to address this issue and seek ways to 
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develop an appropriability-regime measure that can be used in a single model.  
Second, the empirical analysis in Chapter 2 only considers UK data.  Innovation data 
for a single country may not be sufficient to support an innovation policy.  As some 
countries are more intangible-intensive than others and IP systems vary across 
countries, further research using other countries’ data may be necessary to verify 
results.  Third, the knowledge-protection data obtained from the UK CIS is binary 
data, indicating whether or not the firm used the particular protection method, and 
ordered categorical data, indicating the importance of a particular protection method 
to a firm’s innovation.  This data does not indicate the extent of a firm’s use of 
particular mechanisms.  Future research will make use of firms’ IP application and 
acquisition data (patents, registered designs and trademarks) obtained from the UK 
IPO.  Once linked with innovation survey data, the resulting dataset will allow for a 
more in-depth analysis of firms’ knowledge-protection strategies and how a 
changing industry environment affects the extent to which firms protect knowledge.  
Fourth, the analysis is carried out across all industries and all sizes of firm.  Future 
research aims to conduct a more detailed exploration of firms’ intangibles strategies 
across different sizebands and different sectors, for example.  Fifth, the study 
assumes that industry appropriability regime is exogenous, and firms are required to 
consider the protection mechanisms that are available to them.  The assumption that 
firms only adjust their knowledge-protection strategies in this way may be too 
narrow.  Firms use other endogenous features of the appropriability regime – 
contracts and labour legislation, and human resource management, for example – to 
appropriate the returns to innovation.  Sixth, the empirical analysis adopts a 
reductionist perspective (Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990).  This approach enables 
specific theoretical links to be separated out, but the ceteris paribus conditions come 
with the disadvantage of specification errors. 
5.3.2 Chapter 3 
There are several limitations to Chapter 3.  First, as in Chapter 2, the variables 
designed to represent the industry appropriability regime exhibit a high degree of 
correlation between one another.  This led to each element of the appropriability 
regime being examined in a separate regression model.  Future work will aim to 
address this issue by exploring ways of representing the industry appropriability 
regime as a single measure.  Second, the empirical analysis examines firms’ 
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cumulative knowledge-protection strategies and provides no indication as to which 
mechanisms formulate these strategies when the appropriability regime changes in 
strength.  Future work will aim to examine the responses of particular mechanisms to 
a change in strength of the industry appropriability regime so that complementarities 
and connections between particular protection mechanisms can be identified.  Third, 
the study examines how the results differ across high-technology/knowledge-
intensive industries and low-technology/less knowledge-intensive industries.  
Providing that data is available, future work will aim to carry out a more in-depth 
industry analysis so that individual industries can be compared with one another.  
Fourth, the analysis in Chapter 3 assumes that industry appropriability regime is 
exogenous, and firms are required to consider the protection mechanisms that are 
available to them.  The assumption that firms only adjust their knowledge-protection 
strategies in this way may be too narrow.  Firms use other endogenous features of the 
appropriability regime – contracts and labour legislation, and human resource 
management, for example – to appropriate the returns to innovation.  Fifth, the 
analysis considers UK data only.  As knowledge-protection availability and 
effectiveness varies across countries, future work will aim to undertake a multi-
country comparative analysis, providing the data is available. 
5.3.3 Chapter 4 
There are several limitations to Chapter 4.  First, the study is essentially cross-
sectional as it uses one wave of UK CIS data.  Associated reverse-causality issues 
limit the ability to make causal statements.  Due to the changing nature of CIS 
questions relating to firms’ knowledge protection across the different waves of CIS 
data, a pooled dataset could not be used in the analysis.  Second, it is expected that 
firms’ knowledge-protection strategies have a delayed impact upon innovation 
returns. Given the cross-sectional nature of this study, it is not possible to allow for 
this delay in the estimations. To overcome this limitation, the proportion of firm 
sales coming from innovation at the end of the 2008 to 2010 period is related to 
formal and informal knowledge-protection strategies which take place during the 
three-year period.  Future work will aim to link firms’ formal protection – patent, 
trademark and registered design – application and acquisition data with a pooled UK 
CIS panel dataset in order to partially address this limitation.  It will enable a more 
in-depth analysis of how firms’ formal knowledge-protection strategies affect firms’ 
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innovation returns to be carried out.  Third, as with Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the 
analysis is confined to UK data.  The effectiveness of different knowledge-protection 
strategies may vary across countries, given that IP systems and the availability of 
knowledge protection methods varies across different countries.  Fourth, the 
innovations from which firm sales come may not be those innovations being 
protected by the formal and informal mechanisms.  The UK CIS survey provides no 
link between the firm’s innovative sales at the end of the period and the knowledge-
protection mechanisms used during the period. 
The availability of a pooled UK CIS dataset covering the 2002 to 2016 period 
matched with formal knowledge protection application and acquisition data will 
allow for a more detailed exploration of the performance effects of individual formal 
IP mechanisms.  This richer, more detailed data will allow sectoral contexts and 
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